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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 20 1971
E. ROBERT SEAVER, CLERK

APPENDIX

Supreme Court of the United States

TERM, 1971

No. 69-5003

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN,

Petitioner,

—v.—

STATE OF GEORGIA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JULY 23, 1969
CERTIORARI GRANTED JUNE 28, 1971

Supreme Court of the United States

TERM, 1971

No. 69-5003

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN,

Petitioner,

—v.—

STATE OF GEORGIA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CHATHAM COUNTY, GEORGIA

STATE OF GEORGIA

v.

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN

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GEORGIA, CHATHAM COUNTY

THE GRAND JURORS SELECTED, CHOSEN, AND SWORN FOR THE COUNTY OF CHATHAM, TO-WIT:

1 Walter A. Fulmer Foreman
2 Armand D. Wells
3 W. Claggett Gilbert, Jr.
4 Eugene G. Hardy
5 Ralph E. Kennickell
6 Richard Singleton
7 Charles L. Stewart
8 William L. Hopkins, Jr.
9 William D. Mathews
10 Glenn C. Kimble
11 James R. Fisher
12 J. Fleming Bel
13 Mary E. Heidt
14 Thomas C. Bordeaux
15 James A. Eason
16 Frank J. Finocchiaro
17 Eros K. Bell
18 Dwight L. Bliss, Sr.
19 Jake Fine, Jr.
20 Fred H. Quante
21 Hugh H. Jackson, Jr.
22 David A. Byck, III
23 Frederick J. Hart, Jr.

in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge and accuse WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN of the county and State aforesaid, with the offense of MURDER for that the said Defendant in the County of Chatham and State of Georgia aforesaid, on the 11th day of August in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven, with force and arms, Did unlawfully and with malice aforethought kill and murder William J. Micke, by shooting the said William J. Micke with a pistol, contrary to the laws of the State of Georgia, the good order, peace and dignity thereof.

/s/ Andrew J. Ryan
Solicitor General
Eastern Judicial Circuit of
Georgia

No. 17216

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF CHATHAM COUNTY
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1967

STATE

vs.

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN

MURDER

B. W. SMITH
Prosecutor

TRUE BILL

9/12 1967

/s/ W. W. Fulmer
Foreman

Minute Book 41 Folio 264
42 353

ANDREW J. RYAN, JR.
Solicitor General E. J. C.
of Georgia.

Witnesses for the State:

B. W. Smith, J. M. Tanquay, Lt. Kendricks, L. Lower, Johnny Dozier, C. Walker, J. D. Wood, A. Hall, G. W. Spivey, J. R. Goode, H. F. Prouse, J. E. Mincey, C. W. Waters, Mrs. William J. Micke, Dr. H. M. Smith, James Furman.

The Defendant William Henry Furman being in open Court, waives arraignment, pleads Not Guilty, and puts self upon the country.

/s/ B. C. Mayfield
Atty. for Deft.

The State says that he is Guilty, and will so prove this 20 day of Sept. 1968.

/s/ Andrew J. Ryan, Jr.
Solicitor General E. J. C.
of Georgia
September 20, 1968

We the jury find the defendant guilty.

/s/ Thomas V. Dye
Foreman

This indictment was returned into Open Court, on the 12 day of Sept., 1967

/s/ Ben P. Axson
Clerk
Superior Court of Chatham
County, Georgia

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF CHATHAM COUNTY, GEORGIA
EASTERN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

SEPTEMBER 1968 TERM

Indictment No. 17216

STATE OF GEORGIA

vs

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN

Charge: Murder

Plea: Of Not Guilty

Verdict: Guilty

SENTENCE OF THE COURT

The above defendant, William Henry Furman having on September 20, 1968 at the present Term of Court, been convicted in the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia, of the offense of murder, a capital crime, without recommendation,

IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the said William Henry Furman be delivered to the Director of Corrections for electrocution at such penal institution as may be designated by said Director, and the said defendant shall, on November 8, 1968, be put to death by electrocution in the manner provided by law.

IN OPEN COURT, this September 20, 1968.

/s/ Dunbar Harrison
Judge Superior Court
Eastern Judicial Circuit of
Georgia

ANDREW J. RYAN, JR.
Solicitor General

B. CLARENCE MAYFIELD
Attorney for Defendant

TO THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF CHATHAM COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF CHATHAM

INDICTMENT FOR MURDER

No. ———

STATE

vs.

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN

The petition of WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN, respectfully shows:

1. This application is being made by his counsel on his behalf, which counsel deems necessary for the adequate defense of said Defendant.

2. That following an interview with said Defendant, Counsel being very much concerned as to the extent of Defendant's mentality and ability to realize the gravity of his actions, Counsel feels that in the interest of justice that Defendant should be given an extensive, thorough and comprehensive psychiatric examination and evaluation in accordance with mordern accepted methods of psychiatry at an appropriate institution to be designated by this Court at the expense of the State in order for the Court and Jury to have this information in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused and should Defendant be found guilty as charged, in assessing the proper punishment.

WHEREFORE, Movant prays that this Honorable Court issue a Rule Nisi to the Solicitor General of Chatham County, Georgia, to show cause, if any he can, why this petition should not be granted.

/s/ B. Clarence Mayfield
Attorney for Defendant

RULE—NISI

The foregoing petition having been presented and upon consideration, it is Ordered that a Rule Nisi issue and that the Honorable Andrew J. Ryan, Jr., Solicitor General, Chatham County, Georgia, show cause before me on the 24 day of Oct., 1967, why this petition should not be granted.

In Open Court, this 24 day of October, 1967.

/s/ Dunbar Harrison
Judge
Superior Court, E. J. C. of
Georgia

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF CHATHAM COUNTY

GEORGIA
CHATHAM COUNTY

INDICTMENT FOR MURDER

No. ———

THE STATE

vs.

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN

ORDER

The defendant herein through his attorney having filed a special plea of insanity,

Upon consideration of the matter, it is ordered that the said WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN, be transported by the Sheriff of this County to the Milledgeville State Hospital for psychiatric examination and be kept there until said examination has been completed. Upon the completion of such examination, the defendant is to be returned to this County to stand trial for the offense with which he is charged.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the findings of said Hospital be transmitted to this Court with a copy thereof to the Solicitor General of this Circuit and to Counsel for the defendant

This 24 day of October, 1967.

/s/ Dunbar Harrison
Judge
Superior Court E. J. C. of
Georgia

CLERK'S OFFICE, SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF GEORGIA
CHATHAM COUNTY

I, BEN AXSON, Clerk of the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia do hereby certify: That the foregoing pages, hereto attached, contain the original Notice of Appeal together with a true and complete copy of those portions of the record required by the Notice of Appeal, to be transmitted to the Supreme Court of Georgia, in the case of STATE OF GEORGIA, Appellee versus WILLIAM JENRY FURMAN, Appellant.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my official signature and affixed the Seal of the Superior Court, at the City of Savannah, County and State aforesaid upon the 17 day of March in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hunderd and 69.

/s/ Ben P. Axson
Clerk
Superior Court, Chatham
County, Georgia

[fol. 1]

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF CHATHAM COUNTY, GEORGIA

Indictment 17,216—Murder

THE STATE

versus

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN

Transcript of trial proceedings in the above styled case heard before the HONORABLE DUNBAR HARRISON, Judge, Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia and a JURY, on the 20th day of September, 1968.—

APPEARANCES:

For the State:

ANDREW J. RYAN, JR., ESQ., *Solicitor General, Chatham County,* ROBERT BARKER, ESQ., *Assistant Solicitor General,* Chatham County Courthouse, Savannah, Georgia.

For the Defendant:

B. C. MAYFIELD, ESQ., 910 West Broad Street, Savannah, Georgia.

Reporter:

Dorothy R. Brown, Court Commsisioner, EJC of Ga., 207 Courthouse Building, Savannah, Georgia.

Filed in Office March 14, 1969

/s/ Ben P. Axson
Clerk S.C.C.C. Ga.

[fol. 2]

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* * * * *

[fol. 2-a] NOTE: (Hearing on Defense Motion to Suppress Evidence follow immediately hereafter, numbered pages 11-A through 11-EE)

[fol. 3] NOTE: (Selection of jury commenced)

THE COURT: Wait just a moment. Do you want a panel of forty-eight qualified jurors before you—

MR. MAYFIELD: I would respectfully request it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Call the next twelve and—

MR. MAYFIELD: Your Honor, inasmuch as we have a space problem here, I would simply wish to have advantage of the forty-eight but, of course, have them available—not to have them all—

THE COURT: Well, we have sixty here today—

MR. MAYFIELD: Is this the only case to be tried before a jury, sir?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MAYFIELD: Then I am sure we will have the requisite number.

THE COURT: Then are you willing to go ahead and strike this twelve?

MR. MAYFIELD: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

NOTE: (Selection of jury resumed.)

[fol. 4] NOTE: (During examination of prospective jurors the interrogation proceeded as follows.)

MR. BARKER: Mrs. Weiner, you state that you are opposed, or conscientiously opposed to capital punishment. Does your answer of 'yes' mean that you would refuse to impose capital punishment in a case regardless of the evidence?

MR. WEINER: No.

MR. BARKER: In other words, you might impose capital punishment if the evidence so—

MRS. WEINER: And I may not.

MR. BARKER: And you may not. Do you think that your attitude toward the death penalty would prevent you from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt?

MRS. WEINER: No.
THE COURT: She is qualified.
MR. BARKER: Juror upon the prisoner.
MR. MAYFIELD: Swear the juror.

* * * *

MR. BARKER: Mr. Anchors, I would ask you the same questions, sir. You've stated that you were against —opposed to capital punishment. Does your answer of [fol. 5] 'yes' mean that you would refuse to impose capital punishment in a case regardless of the evidence?
MR. ANCHORS: I believe I would.
MR. BARKER: Do you think that your attitude toward the death penalty would prevent you from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt?
MR. ANCHORS: (Inaudible)
MR. BARKER: Pardon me, sir?
MR. ANCHORS: I said I am opposed—
MR. BARKER: Would this opposition to the death penalty affect your decision as to a defendant's guilt?
MR. ANCHORS: I think it would.
MR. BARKER: I would ask that he be stricken for cause, sir.
THE COURT: All right; have a seat, Mr. Anchors.

* * * * *

NOTE: (Jury selection completed)
THE COURT: Are you all ready to proceed on or do you want a recess?
MR. BARKER: No, sir, we are ready to proceed. However, we do want something to appear on the record.
THE COURT: Take the Jury out.

NOTE: (The jury withdrew from the courtroom.)

[fol. 6] THE COURT: This is the only jury case—
MR. RYAN: Yes, sir. It's the only case . . .

NOTE: (Announcement to other jurors by the Court regarding further service.)

* * * *

MR. RYAN: If Your Honor please, I would like to read into the record the—what took place when juror

number 40, Mr. Alvin W. Anchors, Senior was being asked the voir dire questions by the Clerk. It appears in answer to question number four, "Are your conscientiously opposed to capital punishment?", the juror answered "Yes". Thereafter, when he was put upon the State the State propounded first, question number one, "Mr. Anchors, does your answer of 'yes' to the capital punishment question mean that you would refuse to impose capital punishment in a case regardless of the evidence?" The juror answered "Yes". Question number two by the State, "Do you think that your attitude toward the death penalty would prevent you from making an impartial decision as to a defendant's guilt?" To this question the juror answered "Yes." The State then requested the Court to excuse the juror for cause. The [fol. 7] juror—juror was excused by the Court for cause.

MR. MAYFIELD: If Your Honor please, may the record further reflect that defense counsel objects to the exclusion of any witnesses conscientiously—

UNIDENTIFIED: Any 'juror'—

MR. MAYFIELD: I'm sorry, sir,—any jurors who are conscientiously opposed to capital punishment—and further qualify that statement, Your Honor . . . . the questions that were propounded to the juror by the State, we object to the witness (sic) being excused on those grounds.

THE COURT: Let's see now. There were two or three jurors who stated that they were conscientiously opposed to capital punishment which the Court did not disqualify.

MR. MAYFIELD: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No questions were asked them by anyone, so are you taking that as to those—they were not disqualified. There was only one juror—

[fol. 8] MR. MAYFIELD: My objection, Your Honor, is strictly to Mr. Anchors—I believe his name was—Mr. Anchors—

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MAYFIELD: Yes, sir. That's why I—I interpose my exception to his disqualification only.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. RYAN: I would like it also to appear that juror number 39, Mrs. Hilda P. Weiner—when she was asked question number four by the Clerk of the voir dire questions, "Are you conscientiously opposed to capital punishment?" Mrs. Weiner answered "Yes", she was; however, upon response to the question asked by the State whether or not this attitude of her's would prevent her from making an impartial decision she said it would not and she was accepted by the State, sir.

THE COURT: As I recall, her answer to the question was whether or not her feelings toward capital punishment were such that she would just automatically—

MR. RYAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: —refuse to impose the death penalty [fol. 9] regardless of the evidence, and her answer to that was that it would not.

MR. RYAN: Yes, sir, so we—so the State accepted her as a juror, sir.

THE COURT: . . . the defendant would have no objections to Mrs. Weiner being on the jury—

MR. MAYFIELD: We would take our chances with Mrs. Weiner, sir.

THE COURT: I thought so.

MR. RYAN: But what I wanted to appear was that Mr. Anchors was not excused for being opposed to capital punishment, in principle, but he was excused by the Court for the reason that he said that would affect his decision as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner.

THE COURT: The Court took the position that he would not have been an impartial juror.

• • • • •

[fol. 11] NOTE: (The Jury returned to the jury box)

NOTE: (Witnesses sworn and sequestered. Opening statement presented by the State and waived by the defense.)

• • • •

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Clerk's Office, Atlanta

May 29, 1969

I hereby certify that a true and complete copy of the entire record in Georgia Supreme Court Case No. 25163, William Henry Furman v. The State, consists of consecutively numbered pages 1 through 425, and that the first 213 consecutively numbered pages hereto attached constitute Part One of two parts of the said copy of the said record—as appears from the records and files of this office.

Witness my signature and the seal of the said Court hereto affixed the day and year above written.

/s/ Henry H. Cobb
Clerk

[SEAL]

[fol. 12] MR. BARKER: Mrs. Micke, please.

MRS. LANELL MICKE, having been first duly sworn, took the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q Would you state your name for the record, please?
A Mrs. Lanell Micke.
Q Mrs. Micke, were you the wife of Mr. William Micke?
A Yes.
Q When did Mr. William die?
A August the 11th, 1967.
Q Now, Mrs. Micke, I know it's difficult, but I'll ask you to keep your voice up so this last gentleman in the jury box can hear and understand. Back on the 11th of August, 1967 where were you living?
A 508 West 63rd.
Q Is that area—or is that home located here in Savannah, Chatham County, Georgia?
A Yes, it is.
Q Who was living in the house with you?
A My husband, myself, and five children.
Q And what are the ages of the children?
A Thirteen, twelve, five—and I had one, she was fiifteen at the time—she is not there now—let me start again; fifteen, thirteen, twelve, five, and a year old.
Q Do you have one son named Jimmie?
A Yes.
[fol. 13] Q Is Jimmie a chronic sleep-walker?
A Well, he used to be; yes.
Q And how old was Jimmie on August the 11th, 1967?
A He was eleven.
Q He was eleven. In the early morning hours of August the 11th, 1967 between 2:00 and 2:30 where were the children?
A Jimmie was sleeping in the back bedroom across from the kitchen and the other two girls were in the middle bedroom and I had the baby in the room with me.

Q At that time how old was Mr. Micke?
A He was twenty-nine.
Q And where was Mr. Micke employed?
A He was with the Coastguard.
Q United States Coastguard?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he have another job to supplement his income?
A Yes, he had just started to work at the Tiffany Lounge that night.
Q ~~What~~ time did he arrive home that night?
A Around 12:00 o'clock.
Q Had you and Mr. Micke retired for the night?
A Yes we had.
Q Had you gone to sleep yet?
A No.
[fol. 14] Q Between 2:00 and 2:30 was there a disturbance in the house?
A Yes, there was.
Q Did Mr. Micke express any idea of what caused the disturbance?
A Well, we both said that it was probably Jimmie—
Q Sleep-walking again?
A Yes.
Q As a result of this what did Mr. Micke do?
A Well, at the first sound we didn't do anything. We just, you know, lay in the bed, and I guess maybe five minutes passed and we heard another sound, sounded like the same identical sound.
Q Where—from what area of your house was the sound coming?
A From toward the dining room and kitchen.
Q From the dining room and kitchen area?
A Yes.
Q Did Mr. Micke get up to investigate?
A After the second noise, yes.
Q And what route would he take from your bedroom to the kitchen area?
A Well, he went out our bedroom door into the living room and from the living room into the dining room and from the dining room into the kitchen.

[fol. 15] Q Did you hear Mr. Micke make any statement as he approached the kitchen area?

A Well, as he went into the dining room I heard him say, "All right, Jimmie, let's go back to bed."

Q 'All right, Jimmie, let's go back to bed.'?

A Yes.

Q What did you hear from then on, Mrs. Micke?

A Oh, seems like a couple of seconds passed and I heard —seems like his footsteps quickened.

Q Mr. Micke's footsteps quickened?

A Yes.

Q All right.

A And then all of a sudden I just heard a real loud sound and he screamed.

Q Did you then go into the kitchen?

A No, I did not. I ran into the bedroom, my daughters' bedroom. I could run through the bathroom into my daughters' bedroom and I got my children and I got them all into my bedroom and we started screaming for Mr. Dozier and Johnny.

Q Now, Mr. Dozier and Johnny lived next door. Is that correct?

A Right.

Q Did they come over?

A They came over shortly after that. I guess we had [fol. 16] to wake them all up and, you know, took them a few minutes to—

Q Were the police called?

A Yes. I called the police.

Q Were they called immediately?

A Just as soon as I got Mr. Dozier up and he came out of his house I got on the phone and called the police.

Q And how long would you say it took the police officers to arrive?

A I'm not sure; just a very few minutes.

Q Did Mr. Micke die as a result of this—

A Yes, he did.

Q —gun shot? Now,—describe to the jury, Mrs. Micke, how the back of the house was set up. If I were to go into the back of the house what would I first enter when I walked up on the steps?

A Small screened in porch.

Q Does the screened in porch enclose the porch entirely?

A Yes, it does.

Q Is there a screen door on the porch?

A Yes.

Q Is there a latch on the screen door?

A Yes.

Q Was there a tear prior to this on the screen door on [fol. 17] the back porch?

A Yes, there was.

Q Do you know whether or not the screen door was locked that night when you went to bed?

A I am not sure that the door was locked, the screen door.

Q To gain entry to the back porch would it be necessary to open the screen door?

A Yes, it would.

Q Was the back door to the kitchen locked?

A Yes, it was.

Q What kind of door was this, Mrs. Micke?

A It was a wooden door, just a normal wooden door is all I can tell you.

Q Normal wooden door—no glass in the—in the door?

A No.

Q Is there a window that goes out onto the porch?

A Yes.

Q Is there anything—

MR. MAYFIELD: Your Honor, I'm going to have to object to Mr. Barker leading this witness.

MR. BARKER: May it please the Court, to ask if there's a window on the porch I don't see—

THE COURT: I don't think that's a leading question. Go ahead.

[fol. 18] Q Was there anything in this window at that time?

A Yes, I had a piece of—fan sitting in the window that we had been using. It wasn't a window fan. It was just a fan that's been setting on a stand and it wasn't on the stand any more and I just had it braced . . . .

Q Did you have any other articles on the back porch?

A I had a washing machine right behind the window.

Q Where was the washing machine sitting—or setting in relation to the window?

A It was setting right behind the window, just to the left of the door that goes out onto the porch.

Q Did you ever have an opportunity after this to look at that window and the fan to see if anything had been disturbed?

A Yes.

Q Was—had anything been disturbed?

A Yes.

Q Would you describe what the condition was when you saw it?

A Yes. My washing machine had been pulled out from the wall where someone could get behind it, looked like, and the fan had been slipped over to the left of the window.

Q How far—you say the fan had been slipped over to [fol. 19] the left in the window?

A Well, from the inside it would have been to the left; from the outside to the right.

Q How far from the window is the kitchen door?

A It's not very—I can just measure . . . just shortly—I don't know just exactly.

Q Could a normal size person reach in through the window and unlock the door?

A Yes.

Q What kind of lock was that on the back door?

A Just a lock on the door—knob and—I think, I'm not sure.

NOTE: (A juror signified that she wished to speak.)

MR. BARKER: Mrs. Weiner—you would have to address the Court; the Judge—Mrs. Weiner would like to know if she could ask a question.

THE COURT: What is the question?

JUROR MRS. WEINER: I'm just curious to know why Mrs. Micke didn't go see what the disturbance was in the kitchen. I mean she said she took her children back into the bedroom and—did you remain there?

THE WITNESS: Well, when I got my children and all, the first thought—I knew somebody was in the house at that time because I heard my husband scream and I

[fol. 20] got my children in there where—I was afraid there was someone else in the house and I got them up there where they wouldn't be harmed, and then we started screaming for Mr. Dozier to get over there because I knew we couldn't take care of anyone that was in the house. We didn't have a gun or anything.

MR. BARKER: Witness with you.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAYFIELD:

Q Mrs. Micke, you do not know who the individual may have made entry into your house, do you?

A No, I don't.

Q And you are not in position to testify that William Henry Furman, defendant on trial today, was the individual who entered your house, can you?

A I cannot.

Q Did you, Mrs. Micke, hear a door slam prior to the sound, the loud sound you heard you testified to on direct examination?

A No, I did not.

Q You did not hear a door slam?

A No, I didn't.

Q But I believe you testified on direct examination that your door is a solid door. Is this correct?

A That's right.

[fol. 21] Q It has no mirror in the center—or near the top?—

A No.

Q It's a solid plywood door?

A Right.

MR. MAYFIELD: Thank you.

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q Mrs. Furman—I mean, Mrs. Micke, I'm sorry—had you ever seen the defendant, William Henry Furman, prior to this date?

A Not that I know of.

Q Whose responsibility would it be to have work done on the washing machine?

A Pardon me—I'm—

Q Whose responsibility would it be if the washing machine were to break down to call somebody to have them fix it?

A I would.

Q Would—had you had any work done on the washing machine prior to this night?

A No.

Q Would the defendant Furman have had any reason at any time to be in or about your back porch or house?

A No.

MR. BARKER: You can come down, ma'am.

THE COURT: Let me ask you one question: this loud noise that you heard, what did it sound like?

[fol. 22] THE WITNESS: Well, I thought somebody had hit him with something. I didn't know what it was. It was just a real loud sound.

THE COURT: Have you ever heard a gun shot—?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: Did this resemble a shot—?

THE WITNESS: No, it did not. I didn't even think it was a gun shot.

THE COURT: All right.

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAYFIELD:

Q . . . Your Honor—just one other question: you said the sound that you heard, Mrs. Micke, did not resemble the sound of a gun shot?

A I didn't think it was a gun shot. It was just a real loud sound like somebody had hit him with something. I was just a real loud cracking sound.

Q Could it have been the sound of a door closing?

A No.

Q It did not?

A That was no door closing that I heard; no.
Q But you definitely do not think it was a gun shot?
A Well, I wasn't sure. It just—to me right at the time it didn't sound like a gun shot.
Q Yes. Thank you, ma'am.
MR. BARKER: You may step down.

NOTE: (The witness withdrew)

[fol. 23] MR. BARKER: Sergeant Spivey, please.

* * * *

SERGEANT G. W. SPIVEY, Having been first duly sworn, took the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q You are Sergeant G. W. Spivey, Savannah Police Department?
A Yes, I am.
Q Sergeant Spivey, were you so employed on the 11th day of August, 1967?
A Yes, sir, I was.
Q On about the 11th day of August, 1967 at approximately 2:23 A.M. did you get a call to 508 West 63rd?
A Yes, I did.
Q When you arrived at the scene describe to the Court and to the jury what you did.
A I pulled up in front of the house and I was met by Mr. Dozier, who lives next door, and tried to find out from him what the complaint was. I had not learned from my radio—we didn't know. We just knew there was a disturbance there of some type. The lady on the phone was rather hysterical. We couldn't get the straight of it. I pulled up in front of the house and Mr. Dozier told me that there was someone in the house that had broken into [fol. 24] the house—that's what he was able to learn—or . . . was told to me. I tried the front door and it was locked and I couldn't get in through the front door. I

ran around to the back and went in through a screened porch—the screen door was open and the kitchen door was closed, but unlocked. I thurned the door knob and, of course, the door came open. And I was told by Mr. Dozier and his own son that someone was still in the house, or whoever was in there was in the house at that time, and the lights were off in the back of the house. I shined a flashlight into the kitchen and I saw the—I saw a body laying in the floor.

Q Now how did you get your beam of the flashlight into the kitchen?

A I opened the door.

Q Was the door locked or unlocked?

A The door was unlocked, but closed.

Q But closed. All right. Continue.

A Thinking that somebody was in the house I crouched just for a moment outside the door with my flashlight off trying to see—I couldn't see into the house or what was, too much,—the dights were off in the back. After I shined the light in there I saw a man lying on the floor with a lage puddle of blood around his head, around the shoulder and his head area. I continued on into the house then, on [fol. 25] the floor, checked the man's pulse, breathing, what-have-you. Still believing it was someone else in the house other than him, or other than his wife in the front room, I crawled on the floor through the rooms to check and I found nobody in the house other than his wife and children. They were locked up in a front room, front bedroom.

Q At this time did you return to the kitchen?

A I did.

Q Did you check Mr. Micke's vital signs?

A I did again, the second time, after I found the house was clear.

Q At this time what was his condition?

A I could detect no pulse whatsoever and no breath—breathing or nothing. From all appearances to me the man was dead at that time.

Q Did other officers arrive on the scene about that time?

A Yes, sir. After I had checked the man the second time officers came to the front of the house. I walked

through the house to open the door in the front, to let them in the front. I was only about a block, or two blocks, when the call came in, so I—I wasn't dispatched on the [fol. 26] call but I went there, and this is the reason the officers were a little delayed in getting there that were sent on the call. I was there, oh, a good two or three minutes, or four minutes, before they arrived.

Q Did you then request that photographs be made and the area around the back porch and kitchen area of the house be dusted for fingerprints?

A Yes. The first thing I told the Officer who arrived at the front was to call an ambulance, which they did right away. After the ambulance arrived, the ambulance attendants and myself again checked the man on the floor—no disturbance other than check the vital signs—the body was not moved or anything else. At this point, through our closer examination of the man, it was determined by us, the best we could, that he was dead at that time so the fingerprint identification people were called out there for pictures, prints and the kitchen area was sealed off and officers posted there to keep everyone out.

Q All right, sir. Did you examine more thoroughly then the back porch area of the house?

A Yes, sir, I did.

Q How do you make entry onto the back porch?

A There are two or three little steps as you go up to the screened door. The screened door opens onto a small [fol. 27] back porch area and then the kitchen door itself is there, a wooden door.

Q All right. I show you a picture marked State's Exhibit 1 and ask can you identify that picture?

A Yes, sir, this is front—excuse me—this is the front of the house where this man lived.

Q And is this a true representation of the appearance of that house at the time you arrived there?

A Yes, sir, it is. His wife was in this room right—front bedroom right there, by that window.

Q All right. I show you a picture marked State's Exhibit 2 and ask you what does that represent?

A This is the back of the house.

Q Are these the steps that lead into the back porch?

A Yes, sir, it is.

Q What is this door?

A This is a screened door leading onto the small screened porch on the back.

Q All right, sir. I show you a picture marked State's Exhibit 3 and ask what does that represent?

A This is the same picture a little closer up of the same screened porch and the back door, screened door leading into the back porch.

Q All right, sir. I show you a picture marked State's Exhibit 4 and ask you what does that represent?

[fol. 28] A This picture is looking, as you're standing on the screened porch, looking back outside of the same screened door on that small porch.

Q And what is this up in here in the top of the door, or middle part of the door?

A The screen latch, of course unlatched with a hole punched in the screen by the latch.

Q Now, right next to the latch, did you look at that area closely, that hole, to determine whether it was a fresh hole or an old rusted hole?

A I didn't examine it closely, the hole, to tell one way or another.

Q All right, sir. I show you a picture marked State's Exhibit 5 and ask you what that represents?

A This is the kitchen door leading into the kitchen from the screened porch area.

Q All right, sir. I show you a picture marked State's Exhibit 6 and ask you what that represents?

A This is a hole that we found in the door, in the kitchen door, apparently made by a bullet fired through the door from the outside, as the powder burns were on the outside of the door and the splintered wood as a bullet would make, was on the inside of the door.

Q I show you a picture marked State's Exhibit 7 and [fol. 29] ask you what that represents?

A Yes, sir, this is a picture of the splintered wood on the inside of the door; would be the exit of a bullet from this side, meaning the inside of the house, coming into the house.

Q All right, sir. To go back just a moment, State's Exhibit 5, what is this just to the right of the back door, that you have described as the back door?

A The washing machine was setting by the door leading into the kitchen—

Q Was this washing machine dusted for fingerprints?

A Yes, sir, it was.

Q By whom?

A By Officer Mincey.

Q Were you present?

A Yes, sir, I was.

Q Ishow you a picture marked State's Exhibit 8 and ask you what that represents?

A This is the body of the man lying on the floor that I saw as I saw it when I come in the back door.

Q Is this the body of Mr. William Micke?

A Yes, it is.

Q Do all of these—are all of these pictures true representations of the scene as it appeared when you arrived on your investigation, August the 11th, 1967?

[fol. 30] A Exactly.

MR. BARKER: Like to introduce State's Exhibits 1 through 8 into evidence.

MR. MAYFIELD: If Your Honor please, I would like to . . . Mr. Spivey questions, before I would agree to admission of these.

THE COURT: All right.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAYFIELD:

Q Were you present, Mr.—Sergeant Spivey, when these photos were made?

A Yes, sir, I was.

Q And you saw the photographer make these—

A Yes, sir, I did.

Q —photos?

MR. BARKER: At this time, sir—

THE COURT: Any objections?

MR. MAYFIELD: No objections, Your Honor.

NOTE: (States' Exhibits 1 through 8, pictures, admitted in evidence.)

MR. BARKER: —so we would have a little continuity I'd like to pass—just take a couple of minutes to pass the pictures through to the jury.

NOTE: (Jurors examined pictures.)

MR. BARKER: Witness with you.

[fol. 31] FURTHER CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAYFIELD:

Q Mr. Spivey, were you with the group of officers who apprehended the defendant here?

A No, sir, I was not.

Q Now, you have no knowledge as to how the entry was made in this place, do you?

A No, sir, I—

Q —or if entry was made, do you?

A No, sir, I don't.

Q You have no knowledge, personal knowledge, as to who actually shot Mr. Micke, do you?

A As to seeing it; no, sir.

Q Now, let us direct our attention to this door, Mr. Spivey, the back door to Mr. Micke's house. This is a solid plywood door. Is this correct?

A Yes, sir, it is.

Q About a couple of—about an inch thick. Is this right?

A No, sir, it would not be an inch thick; it's about a quarter of an inch thick.

Q About a quarter of an inch thick?

A Uh-huh.

Q Now, from your investigation could you determine whether or not this door was closed before the bullet made entry penetrating this door?

[fol. 32] A I don't quite follow you.

Q I am saying, sir, could you determine from your investigation whether or not this door was closed—was a straight shot through a door—that is, the bullet hole

through the door or was it a slant—could you determine whether the door was open or closed when the entry was made, the bullet entry was made?

A From appearances to me the door was closed.

Q Closed?

A Right.

Q Now did you at any time have occasion—occasion to interrogate the defendant, William Henry Furman?

A I did not.

Q Was there anyone on the premises at the time you arrived to conduct your investigation?

A At the house?

Q That's right, sir.

A Mr. Dozier, next door, and his son was in the front yard when I arrived.

Q I believe you stated that it was your information that the assailant or the person who had perpetrated this offense was inside the house. Is this correct?

A This is what I was told by the Doziers.

[fol. 33] Q Now, with reference to this back porch, Mr. Spivey, was it a very short back porch—that is, only a few feet from the steps into the back door?

A Yes, I would say seven or eight feet, about like that.

Q It was a considerable sized back porch?

A No, it was—it was small. To me, a small back porch.

Q Seven or eight feet in length or in width?

A In length.

Q In length?

A Uh-huh.

Q Now in width, sir, how many feet would you say? Two feet?

A No, it was larger than that.

Q Little larger than that?

A Probably six, six feet in width.

Q And you have no knowledge of anything that William Henry Furman may have done toward this—at least entering the house, do you?

A No.

MR. MAYFIELD: Thank you.

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q Just one other question: looking at picture marked State's Exhibit 7, is that the inside of the door—the inside of the door where the bullet was fired?

[fol. 34] A Yes, this is the inside.

Q What type of lock does that have on it?

A A snap lock.

Q Is that one of those kind where you just have a regular door knob with a little twist on it?

A Yes, sir, it is. You turn it and you can shut the door and it will lock with this—if you lock it before you close the door and as you lock the door it will stay locked.

Q All right. Right over here (indicating), what is this?

A This is a fan placed in a window right by the back door, a few inches.

Q If you were to go directly out that window, what would you touch or see directly outside the window?

A The washing machine shown in one of the other photographs.

Q State's Exhibit 3—

A Yes, sir.

Q I meant 5, rather.

A Five.

MR. RYAN: Five.

MR. BARKER: All right. You can come down.

NOTE: (The witness withdrew)

MR. BARKER: We'd like to call one witness out [fol. 35] of line. Doctor Smith is here, sir.

Doctor Smith, please.

• • • •

DOCTOR HAROLD SMITH, having been first duly sworn, took the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q You are Doctor Harold M. Smith?
A Yes, sir.
Q Doctor Smith, you are a medical doctor?
A Yes.
MR. BARKER: The defense stipulates that the doctor is qualified as an expert in his field.
Q Doctor, what is your official capacity with Chatham County?
A Coroner.
Q Doctor, back on the 11th day of August, 1967, did you examine the body of William Joseph Micke, Junior?
A Yes, sir.
Q At the time you examined him what—was he alive or deceased?
A He was deceased.
Q Were you able to determine the cause of death, Doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you tell the Court and the jury what caused the death of William Joseph Micke, Junior?
[fol. 36] A There was a pistol wound which entered the upper chest right near the midline on the right hand side. The bullet went through the lung producing severe hemorrhage, was found under the skin in the back.
Q Who removed this bullet from the body of William Micke, Junior, sir?
A I did, sir.
Q And what did you do with that bullet?
A The bullet was turned over to Detective B. W. Smith, whose signature is on this card.
Q Was the bullet and the wound produced thereby the cause of the death of William Joseph Micke, Junior?
A Yes, sir. There were no powder burns noted.

* * * *

[fol. 39] THE COURT: The bullet you turned over to Mr. Smith—was that the same bullet that you had taken from the body of Mr. Micke?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. MAYFIELD: Thank you, sir.

* * * *

[fol. 40] OFFICER J. E. MINCEY, having been first duly sworn, took the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q You are Officer J. E. Mincey?

A Yes, sir.

Q Officer Mincey, you are with the Savannah Police Department?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were you so employed on the 11th day of August, 1967?

A Yes, sir.

NOTE: (The qualifications of the witness as a fingerprint expert were stipulated by the defense.)

Q Officer Mincey, back on the 11th day of August, 1967 were you called to a residence of 508 West 63rd Street?

A Yes, sir.

Q Approximately what time did you arrive?

A I arrived approximately 3:00 A. M.

Q What was your purpose in being there, sir?

A I was called and advised that there had been a burglary and a man had been shot.

Q All right, sir. Did you take pictures at the scene?

A A Yes, sir, I did.

Q Did you also dust the scene for fingerprints?

A Yes, sir, I did.

Q Were you able to find any latent fingerprints on [fol. 41] the back porch of 508 West 63rd Street?

A Yes, sir.

Q In what portion of the back porch did you find the fingerprints?

A There was a washing machine setting on the back porch under a window.

* * * *

[fol. 43] Q And what did your comparison of the known prints of the defendant, James (sic) Henry Furman—William Henry Furman and the latent prints on card marked State's Exhibit 10 and 11 show?

A That the right thumb of the known print and a part of the latent print that came off the top of the washing machine were one and the same.

Q So the print, the known prints of the defendant matched up with the prints removed from the washing machine. Is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q All right, sir. What did you then do with cards marked State's Exhibits 10, 11 and 12?

A I put these in an envelope and sent them to the F. B. I.

* * * *

[fol. 46] JOHN F. WALTERS, having been first duly sworn, took the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q Please state your name and address.

A My name is John F. Walters, that's W-a-l-t-e-r-s. I live in Oxenhill, Maryland.

Q By whom are you employed?

A By the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Q Where are your official headquarters?

A In the Identification Building in Washington, D. C.

Q And what is your official title, sir?

A Fingerprint Examiner.

Q And what are your official duties?

A Well, official duties consist mainly of examining lifts, photographs and negatives for latent prints, proc-

essing various articles for latent prints, comparing latent prints with the inked prints of known individuals—the findings are then reported and, if requested, I will testify as to the results of my examination. Also, I process [fol. 47] friction ridge skin tissue of un-known deceased persons in an attempt to obtain either inked prints or photograph of the fingerprints. I then compare these prints with the known prints of known individuals in an attempt to aid in the identification. I also aid in the training of special agents of the F. B. I., as well as other law enforcement agencies and I, occasionally, will fingerprint people who, because of deformities or infirmities, cannot be fingerprinted in the normal manner. I also train other individuals how to do the same.

Q How much experience have you had in fingerprint work?

A Twenty and a half years.

* * * * *

[fol. 50] Q Did you examine or process the Exhibits?

A I did examine them, yes, sir.

Q And what was the result?

A That upon examining Exhibit 10 and 11 that I determined that they were latent prints, upon the visible and the lifts present thereon and that there were four latent prints. These latent prints I compared with the inked prints appearing on Exhibit 12 and I determined that the latent prints were made by fingers that made the inked prints that—latent prints appearing on Exhibits 10 and 11 were made by fingers that were made —the inked prints appearing on Exhibit 12.

Q Were the latent prints photographed?

A Yes, they were.

Q Do you have the photographs and the negatives with you?

A Yes, I do.

Q Have you seen these inked fingerprints? State's Exhibit 12?

A Yes. I had these in my possession at one time. That's when I had the photographs and negatives.

Q And this was in your headquarters in Washington.

[fol. 51] Is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Did you compare the latent prints with the fingerprints appearing on State's Exhibit 12?

A I did.

Q What was the result of your comparison?

A That the latent prints on Exhibit 11—there are two lifts, and on each lift there is a latent print and that one of these latent prints on Exhibit No. 11 was made by the left thumb appearing on Exhibit No. 12 which is a card bearing, or a piece of paper bearing the name of William Henry Furman, and the other latent print appearing on the second lift from Exhibit No. 11 was made by the finger that made the right thumb print appearing on Exhibit No. 12, and referring to Exhibit No. 12 on one of the lifts, there are three lifts present on Exhibit No. 10, two latent fingerprints appear on one of these lifts and those two fingerprints were made by the same fingers that made the right middle finger and the right ring finger appearing on Exhibit No. 12.

* * * * *

[fol. 56] CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAYFIELD:

Q I certainly want to ask you just a few questions for my own . . .

A Yes, sir.

Q I believe you stated that there was a—ridge arrangement that travels . . . that's formed in the—before the child is born and follows throughout, the person throughout life?

A That is correct.

Q Now—

A This is persistence—

Q Beg pardon, sir?

A This is persistent, yes.

Q Yes. Now, I want to find—that if there are any possible instances wherein you have a partial print—not a whole entire print, but a partial print, that ever compared with some other known prints?

A Not in my experience I have never seen it and, of course, in various books and such in my studies that I have never heard of it, either. This is based upon a number of ridge characteristics that the identifications are affected. It is not a simple—one characteristic, but a number of characteristics that the identification is affected on so far as fingerprints are concerned. And so far as the area that is concerned it makes no difference. [fol. 57] You can compare a fingerprint with a footprint and still the ridge arrangement would not be the same.

Q In truth and fact, are you saying—now, I want to get it straight in my own mind—a partial print would be just as conclusive as far as identification purposes as a whole print?

A That is correct.

MR. MAYFIELD: Thank you. No further questions at this time.

* * * *

[fol. 58] OFFICER A. HALL, having been first duly sworn, took the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q You are Officer A. Hall, Savannah Police Department?

A Yes, sir, I am.

Q Officer Hall, were you so employed on or about the 11th day of August, 1967?

A Yes, sir, I was.

Q On or about the 11th day of August, 1967 after the hour of 2:30 A. M. did you also answer a call to 508 West 63rd Street?

A Yes, sir, I did.

Q When you arrived on the scene did you see the dead body of Mr. William Micke?

A I did.

Q As a result of this did you and other officers scan out in the area to search?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where did you go? Where did you station yourself?

A Southwest of the house that the murder happened in.

Q All right, sir. Now describe the house at 508 West 63rd, between there and Temple Street is there anything [fol. 59] between?

A A wooded area.

Q A wooded area?

A Yes, sir.

Q And where did you park your automobile?

A I was on Belk Street at the very west end of it at a dead end of the wooded area.

Q And how close is that to Temple Street?

A Half a block.

Q After you stationed yourself at this point did you leave your engine running?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you turn your lights off?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you see anyone emerge from the woods?

A Yes, sir. I saw a silhouette of a subject come out of the woods. He was wearing a dirty white shirt with the shirt out of his pants. It was a light shirt.

Q Approximately what size was this person?

A Approximately six feet all. He was thin—built on the—on my order.

Q Was he colored or white?

A Colored subject.

Q Was he male—or female?

A Male.

[fol. 60] Q What happened when the subject came out of the wooded area?—Or first of all, was this from the direction of 508 West 63rd Street?

A I didn't understand you. Would you repeat—

Q Did he come from the direction of 508 West 63rd Street?

A Yes, sir, the house was north of where I was at and he came from a northerly direction out of the woods going south.

Q All right. What happened when he came out of the woods?

A When he came out of the woods he was walking nonchalantly and as—he heard the engine of my automobile—he saw me—we saw each other at just about the same time—he started walking faster and then he broke into a run. It was raining, however.

Q As a result of this what did you do?

A I pursued him and I called for other units to come into the area and Officer Waters was the first one to come to me, and Officer Prouse, he came south of where I was at and I lost the subject and I told Officer Prouse over the radio that the guy had to be between he and myself, you understand, and then Officer Waters and I got out of the automobiles and we started walking, following his foot tracks that the subject had left and they [fol. 61] led us to a house at 5020 Temple Street.

Q Did you go up to the house at 5020 Temple Street?

A Yes, sir, we did.

Q Who was the owner of this home, or who—

A Mr. James Furman.

Q Was he the uncle of the defendant?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you talk to James Furman at that time?

A I did. We told him that we were in pursuit of a fellow and foot tracks led us into his yard. I asked him did anybody come into his house. He said 'no', but he said, "I did hear a noise in my back yard as if something had turned over or something fell over in the back yard.'

Q Did you get permission from him at that time to search the area?

A Yes, sir, we did.

Q Did you search into the back and side of the house?

A Yes, sir. We followed the foot tracks. They went around on the south side of the house—they went around in the rear and half-way of the house on the north side and then they—there was a can or someting on a little shelf he had in the back yard that had been turned over, you understand. This was the noise that the uncle heard,

[fol. 62] and the foot tracks led under the house halfway on the north side.

Q Did you shine your flashlights under the house?

A Yes, sir, we did.

Q Did you see anyone under the house?

A Yes, sir, we saw a subject under the house.

Q Who was under the house?

A The defendant there.

Q What did the defendant do, if anything, when you shined your flashlights on him?

A Well, he was back under the house facing us, you understand, so we told him to come out. And just as we said 'come out from under the house' he reached as if he was reaching for his back pocket and I pulled my pistol and I pointed it at him and I told him to come out and don't make any move and I reached my hand to him —asked him to take my hand and he reached for my hand—I just pulled him out from under the house.

Q The person that you pulled out from under the house, is that the same person that you saw emerge from the woods?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you pulled him out from under the house, was he advised that he was under arrest?

[fol. 63] A Yes, sir.

Q Was a search made of the individual at that time?

A Yes, sir, it was.

Q By whom was the search made?

A John Goode.

Q That's Officer J. R. Goode?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what, if anything, did Officer Goode get off of the defendant?

A He took a .22 caliber pistol off of him.

Q Did you see anyone else out in the area—any civilians out in the area while you were making your search?

A No, sir. No one.

MR. BARKER: Witness with you.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAYFIELD:

Q Now, Mr. Hall, this defendant whom you pulled from under the house did not make any statement to you, did he?

A No, sir. He did not.

Q And he was not—only thing . . . pursued him because he came out of the woods—?

A Yes, sir.

Q And at no time did he make any admission to you that he had been engaged in a burglary or murder or any other statement?

[fol. 64] A No.

MR. MAYFIELD: No further questions.

MR. BARKER: You can come down. Officer J. R. Goode.

NOTE: (The witness withdrew.)

OFFICER J. R. GOODE, having been first duly sworn, took the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q You are Officer J. R. Goode, Savannah Police Department?

A Yes, sir.

Q Officer Goode, back on the 11th day of August, 1967, did you in the company of Officer Hall, Officer Waters and Officer Prouse converge on the scene of 5020 Temple Street?

A Yes, sir.

Q As a result of going to that area did you find a person under the house?

A We did.

Q After he was brought out from under the house and advised that he was under arrest did you search the individual?

A I did.

Q What, if anything, did you find on him?
A In his right front pocket I found a .22 caliber pistol.
[fol. 65] Q All right, sir. I show you a pistol marked State's Exhibit 9 and ask you if you can identify this gun?
A Yes, sir, I can.
Q And how do you identify it, sir?
A Right here I have my initials scratched into the weapon and it's dated—also by the serial number.
Q Was the gun—were there any unspent bullets in the gun?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many?
A There was three live rounds and three that had been fired.
Q Had three that had been fired?
A Yes, sir.
MR. BARKER: At this time I would like to introduce the pistol into evidence.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. MAYFIELD: No objection, Your Honor.

NOTE: (State's Exhibit No. 9, pistol, admitted in evidence.)

Q Officer Goode, at this time you advised him of his constitutional rights?
A I did. I read him his constitutional rights.
Q He didn't make any statement to you at that time?
A Not at this time, no, sir.
[fol. 66] Q Did you ask him for his address?
A I did.
Q What was his address?
A 708 Sherman Street.
Q Was this at 708 Sherman Street where you found him under the house?
A No, sir; it was 5020 Temple Street he was under the house.
MR. BARKER: Witness with you.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAYFIELD:

Q Mr. Goode, did you have occasion to examine the premises at 508 West 63rd Street?
A No, sir.
Q You did not?
A No, sir.
Q I believe your testimony is that there were three live rounds of ammunition in the pistol. Is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And three spent?—
A Yes, sir.
Q —rounds? Which means—indicating that there were three shots fired. Is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q You didn't at any time examine the premises at 508 East (sic) 63rd?
[fol. 67] A I didn't examine it. I went by there later.
Q Now, let me ask you: this man at no time made no admission or statement to you that he had been engaged, or at least had . . . burglarized anyone's house, or anything, did he?
A You mean at this—this night?
Q Yes.
A Not that particular night, no, sir.
MR. MAYFIELD: No further questions.
Q You don't know—Nothing; no further questions.

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q What did you do with the gun, Officer Goode?
A After I labeled the gun I placed it in a property room bag. I sealed it. I put it in a property room drawer at Police Headquarters.
MR. BARKER: All right. You can come down, sir.

NOTE: (The witness withdrew.)

* * * *

[fol. 71] NOTE: (Jury withdrew from the courtroom.)

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q Detective Smith, on or about the 11th day of August, 1967, did you interview the defendant, William Henry Furman?

A Temporarily—just for a moment or two.

Q Prior to that interview did you advise him of his constitutional rights?

A I did.

Q What did you advise him, sir?

[fol. 72] A I advised him 'before we ask you any questions you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent and to refuse to answer any questions. Anything you do say can and will be used against you in a Court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advise before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed for you before any questions if you wish. If you desire to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time you wish until you talk to an attorney.'

Q What did the defendant state in regards to having an attorney or wanting an attorney?

A I advised him after I advised him of his rights that I had one question I wanted to ask him, and adadvised him 'you do not have to answer if you don't wish' —after I advised him of his rights.

Q And what did he say in regards to wanting an attorney present?

A He did not want an attorney at that time.

Q Did the defendant make a statement?

A He asked me—

Q No—did he make a statement?

[fol. 73] A Yes.

Q Was that statement made freely and voluntarily without hope of reward or fear of punishment held out by you or anyone in your presence?

A That's correct.

Q Did you then propound your question?
A I asked him—
Q Go ahead.
A I asked him one question.
Q And what was that question?
A I asked him 'Did you get in the house?'
Q What was his answer?
A He stated 'yes', that he got in the kitchen; that the man came in the kitchen, saw him in the kitchen, tried to grab him and when he went out the door the man hit the door, slammed the door between them, he turned around and fired one shot and run.

MR. BARKER: We submit that the statement was made freely and voluntarily.

MR. MAYFIELD: Yes, Your Honor—I'd like to ask Mr. Smith a question.

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAYFIELD:

Q Did you further advise this defendant, Mr. Smith, that any statement he made could be used against him in a Court of law?
A I did.
[fol. 74] MR. RYAN: He said he did.
Q You did not read that a few minutes ago—?
A Yes, sir. I did.
MR. RYAN: Yes, he did.
Q You did?
A I did.
Q Now, let me ask you: with regard to—do you feel that this man, in talking to him, he understood what you were saying when you advised him of his constitutional rights?
A I asked him did he thoroughly understand it.
Q And what, if anything, did he say at that time, Mr. Smith?
A Pardon?
Q What, if anything, did he say, sir, at that time?
A He said he understood it.
Q Now, did you determine his grade level he had attained in school—

A No, I—

Q —prior to your asking him whether he understood his constitutional rights?

A I asked him when I read him this—this pamphlet here, did he understand what I had asked him. He said he did.

Q So you did not determine from him his degree of [fol. 75] intelligence, did you?

A No, I didn't find out how high he went in school or anything.

Q Yes, sir. You cannot positively testify here today that this man thoroughly, unequivocably understood what you were saying, can you?

A No more than what he answered.

MR. MAYFIELD: Thank you.

MR. BARKER: We submit, sir—

THE COURT: After hearing evidence, I find that there has been no technical, legal objection sufficient to render inadmissible the alleged incriminatory statement of the defendant, and I hold as a matter of fact after a full and definitive determination from a consideration of all the facts that the statements are, and were, voluntarily made and, therefore, are admissible both legally and factually.

MR. BARKER: Bring in the jury, please.

MR. MAYFIELD: Your Honor, just for the record I would like to interpose an exception at this point.

THE COURT: Oh, yes.

NOTE: (The jury returned to the jury box.)

[fol. 76] RE RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q Detective Smith, on about the 11th day of August, 1967 at the Savannah Police barracks did you interview the defendant?

A I did.

Q Prior to the interview did you advise the defendant of his constitutional rights?

A Yes, sir, I did.

Q What did you advise him, sir?

A I advised him 'Before we ask you any questions you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent and to refuse to answer any questions. Anything you do say can and will be used against you in a Court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed for you before any questions if you wish. If you decide to answer any questions now without a lawyer present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time you wish until you talk to a lawyer.'

Q What did he say in respect to wanting a lawyer present?

A He did not want a lawyer at that time.

Q Did you ask him if he understood what you had just advised him?

[fol. 77] A I asked him 'Do you thoroughly understand what I have read to you?' and he stated that he did.

Q Did the defendant then make a statement?

A I advised him I had one question I would like to ask him.

Q Did he then—

A I asked him one question.

Q Did he make a statement?

A He made a statement.

Q Was that statement made freely and voluntarily without hope of reward or fear of punishment held out by you or anyone in your presence?

A Yes, sir.

Q What question did you propound to the defendant?

A I asked him did he get inside of the house.

Q And what was his answer?

A He stated yes, that he was in the kitchen; the man come in the kitchen, saw him in there and attempted to grab him as he went out the door; said the man hit the door—instead of catching him, he hit the door, the door slammed between them, he turned around and fired one shot and ran.

MR. BARKER: Witness with you.

[fol. 78] RE RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. MAYFIELD:

Q Mr. Smith, did you reduce this statement, this alleged statement to writing?

A No, sir, he would not sign any statement in writing.

Q Now, where was this alleged statement made, sir?

A Right inside the station house.

Q At the station house?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, is it not customary that statements that are made that may be admissions against the interest of the individual usually are reduced to writing?

A I didn't understand the question.

Q Is it not a common police practice that statements or admissions made by individuals accused of crime are reduced to writing?

A Well, quite frequently they refuse to give a statement in writing but they will give you a statement orally.

Q Did you make any overture or any attempt to have him reduce this to writing or you reduce it to writing and have him to acknowledge it?

A I asked him about giving me a written statement and he wouldn't agree to give no written statement at that time.

Q Now, during the time this alleged statement was made were there any other officers present during this [fol. 79] interrogation period?

A Yes, there was.

Q Who were they?

A Officer Goode was one of them.

Q Officer Goode. And who else, sir?

A That's the only one that I remember as being present at the time.

Q But it was not reduced to writing?

A No, sir.

Q Now, he stated he shot backward—is that correct? Or shot behind him? I did not quite get the continuity of it.

A Stated—he stated that the man come in the kitchen, made a grab for him and missed him as he was going out the door and struck the door and the door slammed between them; he turned around and fired one time and ran.

MR. BARKER: You can come down, sir.

NOTE: (The witness withdrew from the courtroom.)

MR. BARKER: Doctor Sullenger.

DOCTOR CHARLES SULLENGER, having been first duly sworn, took the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARKER:

Q You are Doctor Charles Sullenger of the State Crime Lab?

A I am.

[fol. 80] Q What are your duties—your official duties at the State Crime Lab—?

A I am Senior Toxicologist in charge of the State Crime Laboratory.

MR. BARKER: Let the record show that the defense stipulates the Doctor's qualifications as an expert.

Q Doctor, subsequent to the 11th day of August, 1967 or on the 11th day of August, 1967, was—or were several items delivered to you by Detective B. W. Smith of the Savannah Police Department?

A They were.

Q I show you a pistol marked State's Exhibit 9 and ask you if you can identify this pistol?

A Yes, sir, I can.

Q I show you an envelope containing a bullet marked State's Exhibit 13 and ask if you can identify that?

A Yes, I can.

Q I show you an envelope marked State's Exhibit 14 containing—open it—containing a shell casing and the bullet part of a shell.

A Yes, sir, I can identify that.

Q All right, sir. Now, what does this represent? State's Exhibit 14?

A This is a test bullet and a test shell that I fired [fol. 81] from this revolver.

Q And what did State's Exhibit 13 represent?

A It is a .22 caliber lead bullet that had been removed from the body of Mr. Micke.

Q What request for comparison was made of you, Doctor Sullenger?

A I was asked to determine, if possible, whether this bullet that was removed from the body of Mr. Micke had been fired from this particular firearm.

Q Did you run a ballistics comparison?

A I did.

Q What is your expert opinion of the comparison that you ran?

A In my opinion this gun did fire the bullet that was removed from Mr. Micke's body.

* * * *

[fol. 84] MR. MAYFIELD: Your Honor please, may I respectfully request the Court to excuse the jury for a—

THE COURT: Take the jury out.

NOTE: (The jury withdrew from the courtroom.)

MR. BARKER: To be sure that the record is clear, sir, we have submitted Exhibits 1 through 14 for evidence and they have been admitted. Is that correct?

MR. MAYFIELD: They have been admitted, whatever—

MR. BARKER: Yes.

MR. MAYFIELD: If Youh Honor please, I would respectfully ask and wo ld like for the record, to call the defendant to the stand to ascertain from him whether or not, for the record, he wishes to make a sworn or unsworn statement or no statement at all.

THE COURT: All right.

* * * *

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN, Defendant, took the stand and made the following statement:

MR. MAYFIELD: Now, will you state your name, please?

THE DEFENDANT: William Henry Furman.

MR. MAYFIELD: And you are the defendant in this case, are you not?

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

[fol. 85] MR. MAYFIELD: You are charged with the murder of Mr. William Micke?

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

MR. MAYFIELD: Now, I have conferred with you, have I not, with regards to whether or not you want to make a statement?

THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible)

MR. MAYFIELD: Please speak for the record, 'yes' or 'no'.

THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't.

MR. MAYFIELD: No—I said I have conferred with you, have I not?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

MR. MAYFIELD: I have talked with you, have I not?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

MR. MAYFIELD: I have asked you whether or not you wanted to make a statement and I have given you my advice? . . . Is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

MR. MAYFIELD: Now, would you tell the Court what you advised me—whether or not you wanted to make a statement or not?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't.

[fol. 86] MR. MAYFIELD: And you are telling me now that you do not wish to make a statement. Is that correct?

THE REFENDANT: Right.

MR. MAYFIELD: I have conferred with you and given you my advice as to whether or not you should or should not. Is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's right.

MR. MAYFIELD: And it's your considered opinion that you do not want to make a statement?

THE DEFENDANT: That's right.

MR. MAYFIELD: You may come down.

THE COURT: Furman, let me—before you go down, —under the law, under the law you have a right to make an unsworn statement, that is, to tell the jury anything you want to tell them with reference to the case.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: It won't be under oath and nobody can ask you any questions—

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You can also—you also have the right if you care to do so, to be sworn just like any other witness and can testify in your own behalf. If you are [fol. 87] sworn then, of course, you can be asked questions by your lawyer and the State's lawyer will have a right to cross examine you. Those are two, two rights that the defendant has; a right to give an unsworn statement, which nobody can ask you any questions; you have a right to be sworn just like any other witness. The law gives you those two rights, but as I understand from you, you don't want to make any kind of a statement. Is that right? You don't want to say anything in your behalf?

THE DEFENDANT: (No response)

THE COURT: (To Mr. Mayfield) What do you want to do? You want to talk with him a little bit about the thing, some more? I—

MR. MAYFIELD: Yes, Your Honor—

THE COURT: . . . I've tried to explain thoroughly his choice in—I want him to—

MR. MAYFIELD: Now, let me ask—

THE COURT: —thoroughly understand—he can . . . tell that jury anything he wants to tell them and—

MR. MAYFIELD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: —and no one can question him about it.

[ofl. 88] MR. MAYFIELD: What we want you to understand now is, do you thoroughly understand what I've tried to tell you and what the Court is telling you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

MR. MAYFIELD: You understand that? You understand you have a right under the law to make an un-

sworn statement to the Court and to the jury and they will give you—give that statement any type of weight that they choose to give it. They can believe it in preference to all the sworn testimony that has been given here today. They can also disregard it in its entirety. Now, under that statement, if you make an unsworn statement, I have no right to ask you any questions—neither does Mr. Barker who represents the State, any right to ask you any questions. No one can ask you any questions. You can go and tell the Court and the jury anything that you want to with reference to this case and anything else that may bear on this case. But, by the same token, you also have the right to make a sworn statement. Under that sworn statement I have a right [fol. 89] to examine you; Mr. Barker has a right to cross examine you. Now, do you thoroughly understand this?

THE DEFENDANT: (Nodded affirmatively)

MR. MAYFIELD: Now, let me ask you also: how far did you go in school?

THE DEFENDANT: Sixth grade.

MR. MAYFIELD: Went to the sixth grade. Now, do you thoroughly understand—I want you to be thoroughly mindful of this now. Do you understand what we are trying to ask you?

THE DEFENDANT: Some of it I don't.

MR. MAYFIELD: Some of it you do?

THE DEFENDANT: 'I don't.'

MR. MAYFIELD: Some of it you don't.

THE COURT: Do you want to tell this jury anything?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: You do?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

NOTE: (The jury returned to the jury box)

MR. MAYFIELD: If Your Honor please, I would like to have the defendant take the stand . . . he has requested—

* * * *

[fol. 90] WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN, Defendant, took the stand and made the following statement:

MR. MAYFIELD: Now, Mr. Furman, I would like for you to speak loud enough for the last gentleman here to hear you. Now, I believe you stated you wanted to make an unsworn statement to the jury?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

MR. MAYFIELD: You understand what I am saying by the unsworn statement, that I will have no right to ask you any questions and neither will the Solicitor's office have any right to ask you any questions? You understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

MR. MAYFIELD: But you want to tell the jury about this case. Is this correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's right.

MR. MAYFIELD: Now, if this is your choice I want you to tell the jury in your own words—speak loud enough so the last gentleman here can hear you and tell them anything that you want them to know about this case. I cannot ask you any questions and neither can the State ask you any questions. Give your name, your age and everything else about you.

[fol. 91] THE DEFENDANT: William Henry Furman.

MR. MAYFIELD: Speak a little louder, please.

THE DEFENDANT: William Henry Furman. I am twenty-six. I work at Superior Upholstery.

UNIDENTIFIED: Where?

THE DEFENDANT: Superior Upholstery.

MR. MAYFIELD: Speak loud enough now for everyone to hear you and hear you clearly.

THE DEFENDANT: They got me charged with murder and I admit, I admit going to these folks' home and they did caught me in there and I was coming back out, backing up and there was a wire down there on the floor. I was coming out backwards and fell back and I didn't intend to kill nobody. I didn't know they was behind the door. The gun went off and I didn't know nothing about no murder until they arrested me, and when

the gun went off I was down on the floor and I got up and ran. That's all to it.

MR. MAYFIELD: Now, do you have anything else you want to tell this jury about this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, one other thing: they didn't—questioned me down there, down there at the police station, they didn't told me nothing about a law-[fol. 92] yer and I told them who I wanted as an attorney and they still asked me questions and I wouldn't answer none. That's—that's all I've got to say.

MR. MAYFIELD: Anything else you want to say now?

THE DEFENDANT: That's all.

MR. MAYFIELD: You may come down.

NOTE: (The defendant withdrew from the witness stand.)

* * * *

SERGEANT G. W. SPIVEY, recalled, under oath, took the stand and testified as follows:

MR. RYAN: He is calling Mr. Spivey for the purpose of cross examination. He's not his witness.

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

Q Mr. Spivey, I have only one question I would like to ask you, sir. You examined the premises of Mr. Micke's home, did you not, sir? The door that—

A Yes, I did.

Q And how many bullet holes did you find in the door?

A One bullet hole.

Q And did you further examine the premises for possible penetration of other bullets, or holes, or markings where bullets may have struck?

A No, I did not.

Q There was only one bullet hole in the door. Is that [fol. 93] correct?

A That's right.

MR. MAYFIELD: That's all. Thank you.

NOTE: (The witness withdrew from the witness stand.)

MR. BARKER: You rest?
MR. MAYFIELD: Yes.

NOTE: (Both sides closed.)

END IF EVIDENCE:

* * * * * *

State Exhibit No. 8

[fol. 109] THE STATE

versus

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN

* * * *

[fol. 110] CHARGE OF THE COURT:

JUDGE HARRISON: You members of the jury, the defendant, William Henry Furman, is on trial for the offense of murder.

The indictment charges the defendant with having on August 11, 1967, with force and arms, did unlawfully and with malice aforethought kill and murder William J. Micke by shooting the said William J. Micke with a pistol contrary to the laws of the State of Georgia, the good order, peace and dignity thereof. To this charge the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty and that forms the issue that you are to try.

I charge you that the defendant entered upon the trial of this case with the presumption of innocence in his favor, and that presumption remains with him throughout the trial of the case until it is shown by competent evidence that he is guilty to a moral and reasonable certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, a reasonable doubt is a doubt for which you can give a reason. It means just what it says. It is the doubt of a fair-minded, impartial juror honestly seeking the truth; not an arbitrary or a capricious doubt, but a doubt arising from the consideration of the evidence, or from the lack of evidence, or from a conflict in the evidence or from [fol. 111] the statement of the defendant himself. Now if, after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case giving to the defendant's statement just such weight and credit as you think it is entitled to receive, your minds are wavering, unsettled and unsatisfied, then that is the doubt of the law and you should acquit the defendant, but if that doubt does not exist in your minds as to the guilt of the defendant then it would be your duty to convict him.

Now, the defendant has made a statement in this case, as the law gave him the right to do. The law provides

that in every criminal case the defendant may make to the Court and jury just such statement as he sees proper in his own defense. It is not under oath and shall have such force only as the jury think right to give it. You may believe it, if you see proper to do so in preference to the sworn testimony in the case. You may believe it all if you see proper to do so. You may disbelieve it all. You may believe a part and disbelieve a part. The force, effect and credit to be given to the defendant's statement is a matter entirely for the consideration of the jury.

I charge you further that where in any given case the substantial part of the case is dependent on circumstan- [fol. 112] tial evidence, that is, where there are no actual eye witnesses to the homicide and that proof of the possible guilt of the defendant is dependent on facts and circumstances which the State contends establishes his guilt, in such a case the burden is upon the State, not only to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but to prove his guilt to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.

The object of all legal investigations is the discovery of the truth. Direct evidence is that which points immediately to the question at issue. Indirect or circumstantial evidence is that which only tends to establish the issue by proof of various facts sustaining by their consistency the hypothesis claimed. To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.

In the investigation of all matters, civil as well as criminal, the true function of the Court and jury is in the ascertainment of the truth. This defendant is presumed to be innocent and that presumption continues [fol. 113] with him throughout the trial of the entire case and until his guilt has been made to appear to you by evidence which you can believe to a reasonable and moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt.

I charge you further that where there are two theories or conclusions, that the evidence might point to, one of the theories being consistent with the guilt of the de-

fendant and the other being consistent with his innocence, and if you find this to be a fact, and that reasonable deductions lead to his guilt on one hand and that reasonable deductions lead to his innocence on the other, the justice and humanity of the law compel you to accept the theory which is consistent with his innocence and give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and accept the theory that would indicate the innocence of the defendant.

I charge you that an admission, as applied to a criminal case is the avowal of a fact or circumstance by the defendant, not amounting to a confession of guilt but, tending to prove the offense and from which guilt may be inferred. An incriminating statement is one made by the defendant which tends to establish the guilt of the accused or one from which, together with other proven facts, if any, guilt may be inferred, or one which tends to disprove some defense set up by the accused. [fol. 114] Admissions and incriminating statements are not direct, but circumstantial, evidence and should be scanned with care and received with great caution. The jury may believe admissions or incriminatory statements in whole or in part, believing that which they find to be true and rejecting that which they find to be untrue, unless the State relies solely upon such admissions or statements. Admissions must be freely and voluntarily made and made without the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury. Unless thus made they must not be considered.

The charge against the defendant is that of murder. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being in the peace of the State, by a person of sound memory and discretion, with malice aforethought, either express or implied. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Implied malice may exist and there may be no evidence of express malice, but it may be implied. Implied malice, says the law, is where no considerable provocation appears and where all of the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. Now an abandoned and malignant heart, in the sense of the law, is

[fol. 115] commonly held to be evinced by a weapon likely to produce death and by a brutal and bloodthirsty use of the same. Whether or not a given instrument is a weapon likely to produce death, when used in the manner in which it was used, is in every instance a question for the jury. In other words, murder is the intentional killing of a human being, or the killing of a human being by the intentional use of a weapon that as used is likely to kill and a killing without justification, mitigation or excuse. The punishment for persons convicted of murder shall be death, but may be confinement in the penitentiary for life if the jury trying the case shall so recommend.

I charge you that involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of a human being without intention to do so, but in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act, which probably might produce such consequence in an unlawful manner provided, that where such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an unlawful act which in its consequences naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being or is committed in the prosecution of a crime punishable by death or confinement in the penitentiary, the offense shall be deemed [fol. 116] and adjudged to be that of murder.

I charge you that burglary is the breaking and entering into the dwelling, mansion or storehouse or other place of business of another where valuable goods, wares, produce or any other article of value are contained or stored, with intent to commit a felony or a larceny. There are several ingredients in the offense of burglary. It must be a dwelling or place of business of another. There must be both a breaking and entering into the dwelling or place of business, and such breaking and entering must be with intent to commit a felony or a larceny. Any removal of those things which are usually found in buildings to protect them from intruders on the outside would be a breaking within the law. It is a breaking within the law of burglary to raise a window that is found down. It is a breaking to break a glass of a window and raise the latch and raise the window afterwards. It is a breaking to turn the knob of a door and

enter by that means. It must be such force as used as would be necessary to break into a house and which destroys or puts out of the way those safeguards about a house that are intended to protect the house from intruders from without and there must be an entering [fol. 117] after the breaking. There must be an entering into the house. This breaking and entering must be done with intent to commit either a felony or a larceny. Burglary is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than twenty years. If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant broke and entered the dwelling of the deceased with intent to commit a felony or a larceny and that after so breaking and entering with such intent, the defendant killed the deceased in the manner set forth in the indictment, and if you find that such killing was the natural, reasonable and probable consequence of such breaking and entering then, I instruct you that under such circumstances, you would be authorized to convict the defendant of murder and this you would be authorized to do whether the defendant intended to kill the deceased or not.

Take this case, take the rules of law I have given you and apply them to the evidence in the case. If you find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of murder, you should so find, and the form of your verdict would be, "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty." Now that, without more, would mean that the [fol. 118] Court would, of necessity, sentence the defendant to the extreme penalty of the law which would be death by electrocution. If you find the defendant guilty of murder and in the exercise of the discretion which is left you by the law you should recommend mercy, then the form of your verdict would be, "We, the jury find the defendant guilty and recommend mercy." That form of verdict would carry as the punishment imprisonment in the penitentiary for life.

I charge you that the punishment for murder is death by electrocution, but you, the jury, have the right in your discretion to recommend him to the mercy of the

Court and fix the punishment for life, either of which actions by you would be binding upon the Court. The jury does not have to give any reason for its action in fixing the punishment at life or death. It does not even have to find that there were extenuating circumstances. The punishment is an alternative punishment and may be one or the other as the jury sees fit.

Now, if you do not believe the defendant guilty, or if you have a reasonable doubt in your minds as to his guilt, it would be the duty of the jury to give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and to find him not guilty, in which event the form of your verdict would [fol. 119] be, "We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty."

Now, whatever your verdict might be it must be unanimous, in writing, dated, signed by one of you as foreman and returned into Court. You will write out your verdict on the back of the indictment and return it into Court.

You may now retire and consider your verdict.

NOTE: (The jury withdrew to the jury room at 3:35 o'clock P.M.)

NOTE: (The jury returned to the jury box at 4:10 o'clock P.M.)

THE COURT: Some question you want to ask me?

JUROR: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it a question of law or a question of fact?

JUROR: It's a question of law.

THE COURT: All right.

JUROR: It's—among the jurors . . . a difference of opinion on the verdict that we can render. Can we render a verdict, leaving it to the discretion of the Court—

THE COURT: No, sir. I have given you the forms of the verdicts. It's up to the jury to determine.

JUROR: That's all we need.

END OF CHARGE:

NOTE: (The jury retired to the jury room and returned to the jury box at 5:10 o'clock P. M.)

* * * *

[fol. 120] NOTE: (At the request of defense counsel the jury was polled and all answered in the affirmative as to the correctness of their verdict.)

NOTE: (The defendant sentenced by the Court.)

MR. MAYFIELD: Your Honor, note for the record that an appeal will be filed immediately.

THE COURT: All right.

END OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS:

* * * *

[fol. 121] CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above and foregoing one hundred and twenty-one pages of typewritten material, plus pages of motions contained herein as part of the record, were taken down and then transcribed by me, and I certify that the same contain a true and correct transcript of said trial proceedings.

I further certify that I am a disinterested party to this action and that I am not of kin nor counsel to any of the parties hereto.

This 29th day of October, 1968.

/s/ Dorothy R. Brown
DOROTHY BROWN
Court Commissioner, EJC
of Ga.

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

Decided: Apr. 24, 1969 April Term, 1969 #105

25163

FURMAN

v.

THE STATE

DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice. This case involves the crime of murder by shooting, occurring during a burglary after the intruder had been discovered by the deceased who was then shot through a closed door. The accused was indicted, tried and convicted without a recommendation for mercy. A motion for new trial, as amended, was filed, heard and overruled, and the appeal is from the judgment, after conviction, and sentence with error enumerated on the denial of the motion for new trial, as amended. *Held:*

1. A juror having been excluded for cause because he stated that his opposition to the death penalty would affect his decision as to a defendant's guilt, his exclusion did not fall within the rule as laid down in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (88 SC 1770, 20 LE2d 776), and the court did not err in excluding him for cause. There is no merit in the amended motion complaining that the exclusion violated the rule in the Witherspoon case, supra.

2. The record showing a definitive determination from a consideration of the evidence by the trial judge, out of the jury's presence, that upon his arrest the accused had his constitutional rights explained to him; including the right to remain silent, the right of counsel, and that anything he said might be used against him in court, and that he thereafter freely and voluntarily and knowingly made certain statements in regard to the crime, the same was admissible both legally and factually, and all the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.

436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U. S. 335 (83 SC 792, 9 LE2d 799, 93 ALR2d 933); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (84 SC 1758, 12 LE2d 977); and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908, 1 ALR3d 1205), have been complied with fully and completely. We find no merit in the contention of counsel that his constitutional rights had been violated.

3. We find no violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, supra, as contended by counsel, hence the extrinsic evidence of fingerprints, admissions, and pistol were properly allowed in evidence against him and should not have been suppressed. Manor v. State, 223 Ga. 594 (3) (157 SE2d 431); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (86 SC 1826, 16 LE2d 908); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889).

4. The statutes of this State authorizing capital punishment have repeatedly been held not to be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution. See Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7 (2) (136 SE2d 766); Manor v. State, 223 Ga. 594 (18), supra. Hence, there is no merit in this complaint.

5. The record discloses that the accused was arrested on August 11, 1967, and a commitment hearing held on August 15, 1967. While Code Ann. § 27-212 (Ga. L. 1956, pp. 796, 797) requires a hearing within 48 hours, nevertheless, a detention or imprisonment beyond a reasonable time does not render the verdict of a jury after indictment illegal or void. It has already been held above that the evidence of fingerprints, pistol and admissions which were obtained after his arrest could be used against him, and no secret inquisition or interrogation is claimed in this case. See Dukes v. State, 109 Ga. App. 825 (1) (137 SE2d 532); Pistor v. State, 219 Ga. 161 (132 SE2d 183).

6. The admission in open court by the accused in his unsworn statement that during the period in which he was involved in the commission of a criminal act at the home of the deceased, he accidentally tripped over a wire in leaving the premises causing the gun to go off, together with other facts and circumstances surrounding

the death of the deceased by violent means, was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of murder, and the general grounds of the motion for new trial are not meritorious. See Code § 26-1004; Williams v. State, 222 Ga. 208 (149 SE2d 449); Manor v. State, 223 Ga. 594, supra.

7. Having considered every enumeration of error argued by counsel in his brief and finding no reversible error, the judgment is

Affirmed. All the Justices concur.

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

Atlanta, April 24, 1969

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment. The following judgment was rendered:

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN

v.

THE STATE

This case came before this court upon an appeal from the Superior Court of Chatham County; and, after argument had, it is considered and adjudged that the judgment of the court below be affirmed. All the Justices concur.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 5059, October Term, 1970

JOHN HENRY FURMAN, PETITIONER

v.

GEORGIA

On petition for writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia.

On consideration of the motion for leave to proceed herein *in forma pauperis* and of the petition for writ of certiorari, it is ordered by this Court that the motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* be, and the same is hereby, granted; and that the petition for writ of certiorari be, and the same is hereby, granted limited to the following question:

"Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in this case constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?"

June 28, 1971

No. 69-5003

Supplemental brief in support of petition filed May 11, 1971. See No. 68-5007.

For the following briefs, see No. 68-5027:

Motion of Jas. V. Bennett et al. for leave to file amici curiae brief.

Motion of the NAACP et al. for leave to file amici curiae brief.

Motion of Amer. Civil Liberties Union for leave to file amicus curiae brief.

Motion of The Synagogue Council of America and Its Constituent et al. for leave to file brief amici curiae brief.

Motion of Hon. Edmund E. Brown, former Gov. of Calif., et al., for leave to file brief amici curiae.

Motion of State of Alaska for leave to file brief amicus curiae.

Motion of Dist. Atty. for the Eastern Circuit of Ga. for leave to file brief amicus curiae.

Petition for rehearing filed July 24, 1972. See No. 69-3.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 69-5003

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN, *Petitioner,*

v.

GEORGIA, *Respondent.*

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 69-5003

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN, *Petitioner,*

v.

GEORGIA; *Respondent.*

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

OPINION BELOW

The syllabus opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia affirming petitioner's conviction of murder and sentence of death by electrocution is reported at 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E. 2d 628, and appears in the Appendix [hereafter cited as A.____] at A. 66-68.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), the petitioner having asserted below and asserting here a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia was entered on April 24, 1969. (A. 68.) A petition for *certiorari* was filed on July 23, 1969, and was granted (limited to one question) on June 28, 1971 (A. 69).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides:

> "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

It involves the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It further involves Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-1001, 26-1002, 26-1005, 26-1009, 27-2512, 27-2602, 27-2604 which are set forth in Appendix A to this brief [hereafter cited as App. A, pp._____], at App A, pp. 1a - 4a, *infra*.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in this case constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner William Henry Furman was convicted of murder and sentenced to die following a one-day jury trial in the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia, on September 20, 1968. (A. 10-65.) The trial was very brief. Jury selection began at about 10:00 a.m.;[1] the taking of

[1] One venireman was excused for cause over petitioner's objection (A. 13-14 [Tr. 6-9]) because of his opposition to the death penalty. He was asked if he would refuse to impose capital punishment

evidence and the court's charge to the jury were concluded by approximately 3:30 p.m. (A. 64 [Tr. 119]); the jury retired at 3:35 p.m. *(ibid.)* and returned its death verdict at 5:10 p.m. *(ibid.)*.

The murdered man was William Joseph Micke, Jr. His widow testified at the trial that Mr. Micke was twenty-nine years old, and lived with her and five children—ranging in age from one to fifteen—in a house in the City of Savannah. (A. 17-18 [Tr. 12-13.]) Mr. Micke was employed by the Coast Guard; and on August 11, 1967, he began work at a second job, at the Tiffany Lounge, to supplement his income. (A. 18 [Tr. 13].) He returned home from that job at about midnight; then he and his wife retired for the night. *(Ibid.)*

Between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m., Mr. and Mrs. Micke heard noise coming from the dining room or kitchen area of the house. They thought that it was their eleven year-old son sleepwalking, and Mr. Micke went to investigate. Mrs. Micke heard him call the boy, heard his footsteps quicken, then heard "a real loud sound and he screamed." (A. 19 [Tr. 15]; see A. 17-19 [Tr. 13-15].) She ran and locked herself with her children in her daughters' bedroom, where they all began to shout for the neighbors. The neighbors came in a few minutes, and Mrs. Micke immediately phoned the police who arrived shortly thereafter. (A. 19-20, 21-22 [Tr. 15-16, 19-20].) From her testimony and that of an investigating officer, the jury could find that Mr. Micke's assailant had entered the rear porch of the house through

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in a case regardless of the evidence, and said, "I believe I would" (A. 13 [Tr. 5]); when asked whether his opposition to the death penalty would affect his decision as to a defendant's guilt, he said "I think it would" *(Ibid.)*. Veniremen were not excused for cause who, although opposed to capital punishment, said that they could impose it in some circumstances, and that their attitudes toward capital punishment would not prevent them from making an impartial determination of the defendant's guilt. (A. 12, 14-15 [Tr. 4, 7-9].) The Georgia Supreme Court held that this form of death qualification was proper under *Witherspoon v. Illinois*, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). (A. 66.)

a screen door (which might or might not have been locked), had moved a washing machine away from the porch wall outside the kitchen window, and had reached through the kitchen window to unlatch the kitchen door from the inside. (A. 19-21, 25 [Tr. 16-19, 24].)

The investigating officer, responding to a call at the Micke house at about 2:30 a.m., found Mr. Micke lying dead on the kitchen floor. (A. 24-26 [Tr. 23-26].) The cause of death was later determined to be a single pistol wound which entered Mr. Micke's upper chest near the midline and passed through the lung causing severe hemorrhaging. (A. 32 [Tr. 35-36].) The bullet which produced this wound had been fired through the kitchen door from the outside while the door was closed. (A. 27, 29-30 [Tr. 28, 31-32].) Only one bullet hole was found in the door (A. 55 [Tr. 92-93]), which was constructed of solid plywood with no window (A. 20, 22, 29 [Tr. 17, 20-21, 31]). The prosecution adduced no evidence that more than this one shot was fired at the Micke house that night.[2]

Petitioner Furman was identified as Mr. Micke's killer because his fingerprints, taken following his arrest, matched several latent prints that were lifted from the surface of the washing machine on the Mickes' rear porch. (A. 33-34, 35-36 [Tr. 40-43, 50-55].) Petitioner was also seen and apprehended leaving the area with the murder weapon shortly after the killing, under the following circumstances.

One of the officers who had been called to the Micke house went thence to a street bordering a wooded area south of the house. He saw a man emerge from the woods, walking from the north. The man saw the officer and began to run. The officer called several other officers who

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[2]When petitioner was arrested in possession of the murder gun shortly thereafter (see text, *infra*), the gun contained three live bullets and three expended shells. (A. 42 [Tr. 65].) However, there is no evidence that more than one of these shells was fired at the Micke house. (A. 55 [Tr. 92].)

took up pursuit. Two followed foot-tracks left by the fleeing man in the rain. These led to the nearby house of Mr. James Furman, petitioner's uncle. (A. 38-39 [Tr. 59-61].) The officers followed the tracks around the house to an area which gave entrance to the space under the house. They shined their flashlights in, saw petitioner under the house, and called him out. (A. 39-40 [Tr. 61-62].) Petitioner "reached as if he was reaching for his back pocket and [one officer] . . . pulled [his] . . . pistol and . . . pointed it at him and . . . told him to come out and don't make any move." [A. 40 [Tr. 62].) The officers then pulled petitioner out from under the house, searched him, and found a .22 caliber pistol in "his right front pocket." (A. 42 [Tr. 64]; see also A. 40 [Tr. 63].) This pistol was later identified ballistically as the one which fired the bullet that killed Mr. Micke. (A. 42, 43, 49-50 [Tr. 65, 67-68, 80-81].)

Petitioner was the only eyewitness to the circumstances of Mr. Micke's killing. Two versions of those circumstances were put before the jury at the trial. A detective who questioned petitioner after his arrest testified that petitioner said:

> "that he was in the kitchen; the man came in the kitchen, saw him in there and attempted to grab him as he went out the door; said the man hit the door—instead of catching him, he hit the door, the door slammed between them, he turned around and fired one shot and ran." (A. 47 [Tr. 77]; see also A. 44-45; 49 [Tr. 71-73, 79].)

In his unsworn statement at trial,[3] petitioner denied making this declaration (A. 54-55 [Tr. 91-92]); he said:

> "I admit going to these folks' home and they did caught me in there and I was coming back out,

[3]Under Georgia practice following *Ferguson v. Georgia*, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), a criminal defendant may elect to testify under oath, questioned by his attorney and cross examined by the prosecutor, or to make an unsworn statement without questioning or cross examination. Petitioner "elected" the latter course. See note 8 *infra*.

> backing up and there was a wire down there on the floor. I was coming out backwards and fell back and I didn't intend to kill nobody. I didn't know they was behind the door. The gun went off and I didn't know nothing about no murder until they arrested me, and when the gun went off I was down on the floor and I got up and ran. That's all to it." (A. 54-55 [Tr. 91].)

It is impossible to know, of course, which of those versions of the facts—if either—the trial jury believed. But, as the case comes to this Court, it must be taken to be one in which the Georgia courts have permitted the imposition of a death sentence for an unintended killing, committed by the accidental discharge of a pistol during petitioner's flight from an abortive burglary attempt. This is so for several reasons.

First, Georgia law allows the imposition of the death sentence upon such a basis. Like the common law, but unlike the statutory law of most American jurisdictions today, Georgia does not divide murder into degrees. It maintains two crimes of homicide: murder and manslaughter. Ga. Code Ann., § 26-1001, App. A, p. 1a *infra*. The hallmark of murder is, as at common law, "malice aforethought," see Ga. Code Ann., § 26-1002, App. A, p. 1a *infra;* but a proviso to Ga. Code Ann., § 26-1009 creates a form of constructive malice, or of "felony-murder," by providing that even unintended killings are murder if they "happen in the commission of an unlawful act which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of . . . a crime punishable by death or confinement in the penitentiary." App. A, p. 2a *infra*. The punishment for murder by any person seventeen years of age or older is death by electrocution, except that (1) the jury may make a binding recommendation, in its sole discretion, that the punishment shall instead be life imprisonment; and (2) if the conviction is based solely on circumstantial testimony, the presiding judge is also given discretion to impose a sentence of life imprisonment not-

withstanding the jury's death verdict. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-1005, 27-2512, App. A, pp. 1a-3a *infra*.

Second, the jury charge in this case permitted a murder conviction, and thereby a death sentence, if petitioner's killing of Mr. Micke was found to be either (a) actuated by "express malice" (i.e., an intentional killing) (A. 61-62 [Tr. 114-115]), or (b) the product of "implied malice," defined to include "the killing of a human being by the intentional use of a weapon that as used is likely to kill and a killing without justification, mitigation or excuse" (A. 62 [Tr. 115]), or (c) "an involuntary killing . . . in the commission of an unlawful act which in its consequences naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being or . . . in the prosecution of a crime punishable by . . . confinement in the penitentiary" (A. 62-63 [Tr. 115-116])—here, the crime of burglary (A. 62-63 [Tr. 116-117)]. The jury was specifically instructed:

> "If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant broke and entered the dwelling of the deceased with intent to commit a felony or a larceny and that after so breaking and entering with such intent, the defendant killed the deceased in the manner set forth in the indictment, and if you find that such killing was the natural, reasonable and probable consequence of such breaking and entering then, I instruct you that under such circumstances, you would be authorized to convict the defendant of murder and this you would be authorized to do whether the defendant intended to kill the deceased or not." (A. 63 [Tr. 117],)[4] [5]

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[4]Petitioner challenged this instruction as erroneous in paragraph 7 of his Amended Motion for New Trial (R. 34, 42-43), which was overruled (R. 46). [Here and hereafter, references in the form R.___ designate pages of the Clerk's Record in the Superior Court of Chatham County, which is contained in the original record filed in this Court.] The same claim was incorporated by reference in paragraph 7, p. 2, of his Enumeration of Errors filed March 28, 1969, in the

Third, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim of insufficiency of the evidence upon the express ground that even an involuntary killing in the course of a burglary was murder, and in express reliance upon petitioner's trial statement:

> "The admission in open court by the accused in his unsworn statement that during the period in which he was involved in the commission of a criminal act at the home of the deceased, he accidentally tripped over a wire in leaving the premises causing the gun to go off, together with other facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased by violent means, was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of murder. . . ." (A. 67-68.)

The jury which sentenced petitioner to die knew nothing about him other than the events of one half-hour of his life on the morning of August 12, 1967—as just recited—and the fact that he was black.[6] However, additional facts ap-

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Georgia Supreme Court. [This document is contained in, but is not paginated as a part of, the original record in this Court.]

[5]The court further charged the jury that, if it convicted the petitioner of murder, it might sentence him to death by electrocution or to life imprisonment without giving "any reason for its action in fixing the punishment at life or death." "The punishment is an alternative punishment and may be one or the other as the jury sees fit." (A. 64 [Tr. 118].)

[6]The cursory nature of the trial which determined that petitioner would die resulted from his indigency. Because petitioner was a pauper, the court appointed counsel to represent him. Under Georgia practice, appointed counsel was compensated $150 for defending a capital murder case. See the affidavit of B. Clarence Mayfield, Esq., dated May 5, 1969, filed in the Georgia Supreme Court and included in the original record in this Court. Counsel sought by written pretrial motions: (1) funds for a defense investigator, (2) "reasonable compensation [for counsel] to enable them [sic: him] to devote the necessary time to prepare a case of this kind," and (3) relief from the requirement that counsel "advance the expenses in the preparation of a trial in the lower court without knowing whether or not such expenses will be reimbursed to him." (Motions, paragraphs 2, 3, 4, R. 12-13.) Each of these requests was denied. (Order, R. 15.)

pear in the record which this Court may properly consider as bearing on the question whether the State of Georgia will be carrying out a cruel and unusual punishment if it electrocutes William Henry Furman. Those facts indicate, in summary, that Petitioner Furman is both mentally deficient and mentally ill.

On October 24, 1967—ten weeks after Mr. Micke's killing and almost a year prior to petitioner's trial—the trial court ordered petitioner committed to the Georgia Central State Hospital at Milledgeville for a psychiatric examination upon his special plea of insanity. (A. 8.) On February 28, 1968, the Superintendent of the Hospital reported by letter to the court that a unanimous staff diagnostic conference on the same date had concluded "that this patient should retain his present diagnosis of Mental Deficiency, Mild to Moderate, with Psychotic Episodes associated with Convulsive Disorder." The physicians agreed that "at present the patient is not psychotic, but he is not capable of cooperating with his counsel in the preparation of his defense;" and the staff believed "that he is in need of further psychiatric hospitalization and treatment." (App. B, p. 2b *infra.*)[7] By a subsequent letter of April 15, 1968, the Superintendent reported the same staff diagnosis of "Mental Deficiency, Mild to Moderate, with Psychotic Episodes associated with Convulsive Disorder," but concluded that petitioner should now be returned to court for trial because "he is not psychotic at present, knows right from wrong and is able to cooperate with his counsel in preparing his defense." (Id., at 3b-4b.) At the time of trial, petitioner was twenty-six

[7]The reference is to Appendix B to this brief. That Appendix sets forth the texts of the two letters described in this paragraph, and explains why they may properly be considered by this Court although they were not before the Georgia Supreme Court.

years old,[8] had gotten to the sixth grade in school,[9] and was visibly confused by aspects of the proceedings against him.[10]

HOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION WAS PRESENTED AND DECIDED BELOW

Paragraph 3 of petitioner's Amended Motion for New Trial, filed by leave of court, contended that the death sentence which had been imposed upon him was a cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. (R. 34, 38-39.) The motion was overruled. (R. 46 Paragraph 4 of petitioner's Enumeration of Errors in the

[8]Petitioner recited his age in his unsworn statement to the jury. (A. 54 [Tr. 91].)

[9]Petitioner's level of schooling was elicited from him, out of the presence of the jury, while he was being questioned by his counsel and the court in order to determine whether he wished to take the stand. (A. 53 [Tr. 89].)

[10]At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the jury was excused, and petitioner's court-appointed counsel asked leave of the court to put the defendant on the stand "to ascertain from him whether or not, for the record, he wishes to make a sworn or unsworn statement or no statement at all." (A. 50 [Tr. 84]). See note 3 *supra*. In yes-and-no responses to counsel's questioning, petitioner stated that counsel had previously talked with him and advised him concerning his making a statement to the jury; and petitioner said and repeated that he did not want to make such a statement. (A. 51-52 [Tr. 85-86.]) The court and counsel then advised petitioner again concerning his rights to make a sworn or unsworn statement or no statement; petitioner was asked if he understood "what we are trying to ask you"; and he replied: "Some of it I don't." (A. 52-53 [Tr. 86-89].) He then answered "yes" to the court's question whether he wanted to tell the jury anything, and repeated this "yes." (A. 53 [Tr. 89].) Without further inquiry regarding the reasons for, or advisedness of, petitioner's unexplained change of mind, counsel and the court treated this response as an election to make an unsworn statement; the jury was recalled; and petitioner took the stand. (A. 54 [Tr. 90].)

Georgia Supreme Court made the same contention.[11] The Georgia Supreme Court rejected it upon the merits. (A. 67.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Petitioner's sentence of death is a rare, random and arbitrary infliction, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment principles briefed in *Aikens v. California.*

II. The Eighth Amendment forbids affirmance of a death sentence upon this record, which casts doubt upon petitioner's mental soundness. To relegate petitioner to the torments and vicissitudes of a death sentence without appropriate inquiry into his mental condition is to subject him to cruel and unusual punishment.

I.

THE DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDER VIOLATES CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS OF DECENCY IN PUNISHMENT

The Brief for Petitioner in *Aikens v. California* [12] fully develops the reasons why we believe that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of murder, as that penalty is administered in the United States today. At the heart of the argument is the principle that the Eighth Amendment condemns a penalty which is so oppressive that it can command public acceptance only by sporadic, exceedingly rare and arbitrary imposition.

Petitioner's case epitomizes that characteristic of the penalty of death for murder. His was a grave offense, but one noways distinguishable from thousands of others for

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[11] P. 1 of the Enumeration of Errors, filed March 28, 1969. [This document is contained in, but is not paginated as a part of, the original record filed in this Court.]

[12] O.T. 1971, No. 68-5027.

which the death penalty is not inflicted. Following a brief trial which told the jury nothing more than that petitioner had killed Mr. Micke by a single handgun shot through a closed door during an armed burglary attempt upon a dwelling—and which permitted his conviction whether or not the fatal shot was intentionally fired—he was condemned to die. The jury knew nothing else about the man they sentenced, except his age and race.

It is inconceivable to imagine contemporary acceptance of the general application of the death penalty upon such a basis. Only wholly random and arbitrary selection of a few, rare murder convicts makes capital punishment for murder tolerable to our society. For the reasons stated in the *Aikens* brief, it is not tolerable to the Eighth Amendment.

II.

PETITIONER'S SENTENCE OF DEATH IMPOSED WITHOUT ADEQUATE INQUIRY CONCERNING HIS MANIFESTLY IMPAIRED MENTAL CONDITION VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

But there is an additional reason why the sentence of death imposed on this petitioner cannot constitutionally stand. The record in this case bears plain indications that petitioner is mentally ill. The imposition of a death sentence upon him without adequate inquiry concerning either his competency to be executed or his capability to withstand the stress of such a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.

(1) This Court need not look to evolving standards of decency for evidence that the execution of a mentally disordered person offends the most basic human precepts embodied in our legal history. Coke in 1644 wrote that in earlier years it had been provided that:

> ". . . if a man attainted of treason become mad, that notwithstanding he should be executed which

> cruell and inhuman law lived not long, but was repealed, for in that point also it was against the common law, because by intendment of law the execution of the offender is for example, *ut poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat,* as before is said: but so it is not when a mad man is executed, but should be a miserable spectacle, both against law and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others." (COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE (1644), 6.)[13]

The British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment concluded that:

> "It has for centuries been a principle of the common law that no person who is insane should be executed . . . ." (ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953, REPORT (H.M.S.O. 1953) [Cmd. 8932] [hereafter cited as ROYAL COMMISSION], 13.[14]

The Commission found that "the Home Secretary is under a statutory obligation to order a special medical inquiry if there is reason to believe that a prisoner under sentence of death is insane, and similar inquiries are often held where a lesser degree of abnormality is suspected." ROYAL COM-

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[13]See also, 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716), 2; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1803), 24; Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 Howell State Trials 474, 476 (1816); CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW (Earle Ed. 1819), 525; 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1678), 35, 370; and the authorities cited in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in *Solesbee v. Balkcom,* 339 U.S. 9, 16-20, (1950).

[14]See also ROYAL COMMISSION 123; Testimony of Sir John Anderson, ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE (1949) [hereafter cited as ROYAL COMMISSION MINUTES], 363:

> "As was stated in the House of Commons in the case of Ronald True, 'the principle that an insane man should not go to execution has been enshrined in the Common Law since the days of Coke and Hale.'"

See also, *e.g., id.* at 3, 40, 128.

MISSION 13. In the event the doctors who examined the condemned man found him insane, the Home Secretary was required to respite the sentence.

> "[I]t is not only right and proper that the Home Secretary should respite the sentence of death and direct the prisoner's removal to Broadmoor or to a mental hospital, but it is his imperative duty to do so, both under the statute and because it is contrary to the common law to execute an insane criminal." (ROYAL COMMISSION 127.)[15].

The reasons advanced for this traditional prohibition have been varied. They include the notions that an insane person can not bring evidence on his own behalf to defeat the sentence,[16] that the execution of an insane person cannot reasonably be thought to deter others,[17] that an insane person is not mentally fit to make peace with his maker,[18] that he has already been punished sufficiently by God or by the devil,[19] and that the execution of an insane person would

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[15]See also ROYAL COMMISSION MINUTES 3, 47, 372, 380 For general discussion of the British procedure, see ROYAL COMMISSION 2, 124-130; ROYAL COMMISSION MINUTES 2, 40, 246, 256, 352, 522; WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956), 52-53. See also WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956), 52-53. See also WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954), 463-470; *Solesbee v. Balkcom*, 339 U.S. 9, 26-32 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter).

[16]See, *e.g.* 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1803), 24-25; Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 Howell State Trials 474, 476-477 (1868).

[17]See, *e.g.*, COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE (1644), 6, p. 13 *supra*.

[18]See *e.g.*, Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 Howell State Trials 474, 477 (1868): "[It] is inconsistent with religion, as being against Charistian charity to send a great offender quick, as it is stiled, into another world, when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it."

[19]Ehrenzweig, *A Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea–Clues to the Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell*, 1 CRIM. L. BULL. (No. 9) 3, 21 (1965) [hereafter cited as Ehrenzweig].

not satisfy the extreme judgment inflicted on him.[20] However, "[w]hatever the reason of the law is, it is plain the law is so." Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 Howell State Trials 474, 477 (1816).

> "When we seek the purpose of the rule we are met with diverse explanations of varying persuasiveness. The very multiplicity of explanations suggest that the rule may have been devised to meet an earlier theoretical or practical need or special consensus and has survived the obsolescence of the original cause." Hazard & Louisell, *Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution*, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381, 383 (1962) [hereafter cited as *Death, the State, and the Insane*].

Its survival, we suggest, manifests a common and unwavering recognition—albeit expressed through quite wavering and often unsatisfactory rationalizations—of Coke's basic observation that the execution of the mentally ill constitutes "a miserable spectacle," smacking of "extreme inhumanity and cruelty," *supra*.[21]

(2) The record in this proceeding concerning petitioner's mental condition is scant, due in part to the negligible resources allowed his appointed trial counsel,[22] and in part to Georgia practice which forbids a capital defendant to put in evidence of mental impairment relevant to the question of sentencing.[23] However, enough appears, we think to

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[20] *Musselwhite v. State*, 215 Miss. 363, 367, 60 So. 2d 807, 809 (1952): "it is revealed that if he were taken to the electric chair he would not quail or take account of its significance." See also Ehrenzweig, at 14-15.

[21] See also, *e.g.*, Hawles, Remarks from the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 Howell State Trials 474, 477 (1816): "[T]hose on whom the misfortune of madness fall, it is inconsistent with humanity to make examples of them. . . ."

[22] See note 6, *supra*.

[23] A defendant may assert incompetency to be tried, and may present evidence on that question; or he may contest guilt on the grounds of criminal irresponsibility at the time of the offence. *E.g.*,

establish significant mental abnormality. Petitioner was diagnosed on February 28, 1968, to be afflicted with "Mental Deficiency, Mild to Moderate, with Psychotic Episodes associated with Convulsive Disorder," and was found incapable of cooperating with counsel in his defense. (App. B, p. 2b *infra*.) Although this latter incapacity was found no longer to exist on April 15, 1968, the same diagnosis was reported. (App. B, p. 3b *infra*.) Petitioner was not found to be psychotic; and the character and extent of his condition are not otherwise disclosed; but the record at the least reveals grounds for the gravest doubt of his mental stability.

(3) For any man, be he mentally firm or infirm, condemnation under a sentence of death and the "thousand days" on death row create conditions of mind-twisting stress.[24]

> "He hopes by day and despairs of it by night. As the weeks pass, hope and despair increase and become equally unbearable. . . . He is no longer a man but a thing waiting to be handled by the executioners." (Camus, *Reflections on the Guillotine*, in CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH (1961), 200-201.)[25]

Dr. Louis J. West has described death row as a "grisly laboratory [which] . . . must constitute the ultimate experimental stress in which he [sic: the] condemned prisoner's personality is incredibly brutalized."[26] Dr. Isidore Zifferstein writes that:

Rogers v. State, 128 Ga. 67, 57 S.E. 227 (1907); *Summerour v. Fortson*, 174 Ga. 862, 164 S.E. 809 (1932).

[24] LAWES, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING (1928), 161-162; West, *Medicine and Capital Punishment*, in *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary*, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 1760, To Abolish the Death Penalty (March 20-21 and July 2, 1968) (G.P.O. 1970) [hereafter cited as *Hearings*], 124, 127.

[25] See also *Ex parte Medley*, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890).

[26] West, *Medicine and Capital Punishment* in *Hearings*, at 127.

"Modern techniques of execution have aimed at minimizing the physical pain of dying (although we do not really know how much pain is experienced in electrocution or execution by gas). But these modern techniques have retained to the fullest the exquisite psychological suffering of the condemned man."[27]

[27] Zifferstein, *Crime and Punishment*, 1 THE CENTER MAGAZINE (No. 2) 84 (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 1968). We must admit that the published literature concerning the psychological impact of the "thousand days" upon condemned men is limited and unsystematic. This is one of the subjects concerning which counsel for petitioner have, in other litigations, unsuccessfully sought to present evidence. See Brief for Petitioner, in *Aikens v. California, supra*, n. 120. The literature contains enough, however, to glimpse the extent of the pressures upon the condemned. As execution approaches, some prisoners exhibit grossly psychotic reactions, see, *e.g.*, ESHELMAN, DEATH ROW CHAPLAIN (1962), 159-161; DUFFY & HIRSHBERG, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN (1962), 221-223, 229-230; Ehrenzweig 11, while other prisoners respond to the stress with psychological mechanisms involving major personality distortion. See Bluestone & McGahee, *Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution*, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393 (1962).

Institutional practices on death row recognize the likelihood of extreme reactions from the condemned, particularly suicide attempts. "The 'cheating of the chair' by escape or suicide is rendered practically impossible by . . . extraordinary precautions against these contingencies." LAWES, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING (1928), 161. In Warden Lawes' experience, these precautions cover the minutest detail, including paring the fingernails of the condemned once or twice a week "as long nails could be used to cut the arteries of the wrist." *Id.* at 163-164. In spite of these precautions, attempts at suicide are not rare phenomena, *id.* at 163, 177, and occasionally succeed, *id.*, 165, 180; LAWES, TWENTY THOUSAND YEARS IN SING SING (1932), 334; DUFFY & JENNINGS, THE SAN QUENTIN STORY, (1950) 108-109; ESHELMAN, DEATH ROW CHAPLAIN (1962), 161-164. Such attempts have sometimes required surgical intervention to save the life of the condemned man in order that he could be properly executed. LAWES, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING (1928), 165, 177; DUFFY & HIRSHBERG, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN (1962), 51-52; ESHELMAN, DEATH ROW CHAPLAIN (1962), 164-165. See generally Gottlieb, *Capital Punishment*, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 8-10 (1969).

(4) Under these circumstances, we believe that a judgment inflicting a sentence of death upon petitioner, in the absence of further inquiries into his mental state, subjects him to a cruel and unusual punishment. We recognize that in the *Crampton* case[28] this Court declined to hold that the Due Process Clause required any particular form of procedure by which facts relevant to the sentencing decision in a capital case could be put into the record. But the question here is not one concerning forms of procedure: it is whether, once facts are called to the trial court's attention which convey notice that its process may be unconstitutional, it is required by the Constitution to conduct an adequate inquiry into those facts. Cf. *Pate v. Robinson*, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). We think that it is, where the effect of its process subjects a man who may be mentally ill not only to the jeopardy of electrocution, but to the devastating stresses of death row.

(5) We must also recognize, of course, that the traditional Anglo-American inhibition upon the execution of the insane has been enforced by post-conviction, non-judicial process; and that Georgia provides a form of such process for an inquiry into the insanity of the condemned. See Ga. Code Ann., § 27-2602 (1970 Cum. pocket part), App. A, p. 3a *infra*; *Solesbee v. Balkcom*, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). Pursuant to that statute, the Governor may, in his discretion, cause a condemned man to be mentally examined; and if the Governor finds that he has become insane subsequent to his conviction, the Governor may commit him to a state hospital until his sanity is restored. When his sanity is restored he is returned to Court, a new death warrant for his execution is signed, and he is executed. Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2604 (1953), App. A, p. 3a *infra*.

Solesbee sustained the constitutionality of this procedure as a corrective against insanity supervening trial and sen-

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[28] *Crampton v. Ohio*, reported *sub nom. McGautha v. California*, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).

tence. But we do not think that its existence, or even its constitutionality in that context, warrants a court imposing a sentence of death upon a man of manifestly questionable mentality without first making its own thorough inquiry and determination whether he is competent to be put to death and capable of receiving a death sentence.[29] This is so for two basic reasons.

First, the Georgia Governor's process can reprieve a condemned man from death, but not from the torments of a death sentence. Those torments are agonizing even for a mind of normal stability, but may be unbearable for an unstable one. Without adequate judicial inquiry into the mental state of the defendant, a death sentence may be tantamount to a sentence of insanity.

Second, the gubernatorial reprieve merely sets in motion a procedure by which the condemned man is hospitalized and healed enough to kill. Georgia's insistence upon executing a condemned man following his restoration to sanity is consistent with prevailing American practice.[30] It is, however, a plain barbarity which the Eighth Amendment should condemn. In England, at least since 1840, "there has been no case where a prisoner has been executed after being certified insane under the statute in force at the time."[31] In principle as well as in fact, the Royal Commission found:

> ". . . If a prisoner under sentence of death is certified insane and removed to Broadmoor, it is unthinkable that the sentence should ever be carried out in the event of his recovery. . . ."[32]

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[29] See also *Nobles v. Georgia*, 168 U.S. 398 (1897); *Phyle v. Duffy*, 334 U.S. 431 (1948); *Caritativo v. California*, 357 U.S. 549 (1958).

[30] WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954) 468-470; *Death, the State, and the Insane* 382-383; Ehrenzweig 11.

[31] ROYAL COMMISSION 128.

[32] ROYAL COMMISSION 157-158. See also Feltham, *The Common Law and the Execution of Insane Criminals*, 4 MELBOURNE U.L. REV. 434, 475 (1964): "if such a medical inquiry finds a priso-

A judicial sentence of death imposed upon a man in the same condition—or for want of inquiry upon notice that he may be in the same condition—seems to us equally unthinkable. It is no less so because thereafter, by executive grace, he may be permitted to vacillate between insanity and death.

CONCLUSION

The death sentence imposed upon petitioner William Henry Furman should be set aside as a cruel and unusual punishment.

Respectfully submitted,

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ner insane; there should be a mandatory duty upon the executive to reprieve. This, although not required by law, has been the invariable practice in England since 1840 and is no more than common decency and humanity requires."

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APPENDIX A

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Ga. Code Ann., § 26-1001
(1953 Rev. vol.)
effective prior to July 1, 1969

26-1001. (59 P.C.) **Definition; kinds.**—Homicide is the killing of a human being, and is of three kinds—murder, manslaughter, and justifiable homicide. (Cobb, 783.)

Ga. Code Ann., § 26-1002
(1953 Rev. vol.)
effective prior to July 1, 1969

26-1002. (60 P.C.) **Murder defined.**—Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, in the peace of the State, by a person of sound memory and discretion, with malice aforethought, either express or implied. (Cobb, 783.)

Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005
(1970 Cum. pocket part)
effective prior to July 1, 1969

26-1005. (63 P.C.) Punishment for murder; recommendation by jury.—The punishment for persons convicted of murder shall be death, but may be confinement in the penitentiary for life in the following cases: If the jury trying the case shall so recommend, or the the conviction is founded solely on circumstantial testimony, the presiding judge may sentence to confinement in the penitentiary for life. In the former case it is not discretionary with the judge; in the latter it is. When it is shown that a person convicted of murder had not reached his 17th birthday at the time of the commission of the offense, the punishment of such person shall not be death but shall be imprisonment for life.

Whenever a jury, in a capital case of homicide, shall find a verdict of guilty, with a recommendation of mercy, instead of a recommendation of imprisonment for life, in cases

where by law the jury may make such recommendation, such verdict shall be held to mean imprisonment for life. If, in any capital case of homicide, the jury shall make any recommendation, where not authorized by law to make a recommendation of imprisonment for life, the verdict shall be construed as if made without any recommendation. (Cobb, 783. Acts 1875, p. 106; 1878-9, p. 60; 1963, p. 122.

Ga. Code Ann., § 26-1009
(1953 Rev. vol.)
effective prior to July 1, 1969

26-1009. (67 P.C.) **Involuntary manslaughter defined.**—Involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of a human being without any intention to do so; but in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act, which probably might produce such a consequence, in an unlawful manner: Provided, that where such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an unlawful act which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a riotous intent, or of a crime punishable by death or confinement in the penitentiary, the offense shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder. (Cobb, 784.)

Ga. Code Ann., § 27-2512
(1953 Rev. vol.)

27-2512. Electrocution substituted for hanging; place of execution.—All persons who shall be convicted of a capital crime and who shall have imposed upon them the sentence of death, shall suffer such punishment by electrocution instead of by hanging.

In all cases in which the defendant is sentenced to be electrocuted it shall be the duty of the trial judge, in passing sentence, to direct that the defendant be delivered to the Director of Corrections for electrocution at such penal institution as may be designated by said Director. However no executions shall be held at the old prison farm in Bald-

win county. (Acts 1924, pp. 195, 197; Acts 1937-38, Extra Sess., p. 330.)

Ga. Code Ann., § 27-2602
(1970 Cum. Pocket part)

27-2602. (1074 P.C.) **Disposition of insane convicts. Cost of investigations.**—Upon satisfactory evidence being offered to the Governor, showing reasonable grounds to believe that a person convicted of a capital offense has become insane subsequent to his conviction, the Governor may, in his discretion, have said person examined by such expert physicians as the Governor may choose, the cost of said examination to be paid by the Governor out of the contingent fund. It shall be the responsibility of the Governor to cause said physicians to receive written instructions which plainly set forth the legal definitions of insanity as recognized by the laws of this State, and said physician shall, after making the necessary examination of the prisoner, report in writing to the Governor whether or not reasonable grounds exist to raise an issue that the prisoner is insane by the standards previously specified to them by the Governor. The Governor may, if he shall determine that the person convicted has become insane, have the power of committing him to the Milledgeville State Hospital until his sanity shall have been restored or determined by laws now in force. (Acts 1903, p. 77; 1960, pp. 988, 989.)

Ga. Code Ann., § 27-2604
(1953 Rev. vol.)

27-2604. (1076 P.C.) **Resentence and warrant on recovery of convict.**—If the convict mentioned in the preceding section should recover, the fact shall be at once certified by the superintendent of the Milledgeville State Hospital to the judge of the court in which the conviction occurred. Whenever it shall appear to the judge by said certificate, or by inquisition or otherwise, that the convict has recovered and is of sound mind, he shall have the convict removed to the

jail of the county in which the conviction occurred, or to some other safe jail, and shall pass sentence, either in term time or vacation, upon the convict, and he shall issue a new warrant, directing the sheriff to do execution of the sentence at such time and place as may be named in the warrant, which the sheriff shall be bound to do accordingly. The judge shall cause the new warrant, and other proceedings in the case, to be entered on the minutes of said superior court. (Acts 1874, p. 30.)

Ga. Crim. Code, § 26-1101
(1970 Rev. vol.)
(effective July 1, 1969)

26-1101. Murder.—(a) A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears, and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

(b) A person also commits the crime of murder when in the commission of a felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of malice.

(c) A person convicted of murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life.

(Acts 1968, pp. 1249, 1276.)

Ga. Crim. Code § 26-3102
(1970 Rev. vol.)
effective July 1, 1969

26-3102. Capital offenses—jury verdict and sentence.—Where, upon a trial by jury, a person is convicted of an offense which may be punishable by death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury verdict includes a recommendation that such sentence be imposed. Where

a recommendation of death is made, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. Where a sentence of death is not recommended by the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment as provided by law Unless the jury trying the case recommends the death sentence in its verdict, the court shall not sentence the defendant to death. The provisions of this section shall not affect a sentence when the case is tried without a jury or when the judge accepts a plea of guilty.

(Acts 1968, pp. 1249, 1335; 1969, p. 809.)

APPENDIX B
PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS

Pursuant to petitioner's commitment for a pretrial mental examination in this case (A. 8), the following two letters were written by the Superintendent of the Georgia Central State Hospital to the trial court below. They were subsequently made a part of the record of the trial court by express written order;[1b] and petitioner's notice of appeal requested the clerk to transmit the entire record to the Georgia Supreme Court.[2b] However, for reasons unknown to us, the clerk of the trial court neglected to transmit the letters as a part of the appellate record; and they were not before the Georgia Supreme Court. Subsequent to this Court's order granting certiorari, petitioner's counsel noticed their absence and asked the clerk of the Chatham County Supreme Court to certify the records of the Georgia Supreme Court. The clerk did so; whereupon the clerk of the Georgia Supreme Court transmitted them to this Court under certification reciting that they were not a part of the record in the Georgia Supreme Court.

Under these circumstances, we think that the letters are properly a part of the record upon which this Court may consider the case. Petitioner did all that he was required to do in order to include them in the appellate record, and is not responsible for the clerk's neglect. The authenticity of the letters cannot be questioned; they are a part of the trial court record; and their absence from the record before the Georgia Supreme Court did not affect the course of the litigation in any way. That court's decision of the Eighth Amendment question was perfunctory in any event, since

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[1b]Order, dated February 20, 1969 (R. 44): "FURTHER ORDERED that the Psychiatric Report of the Movant WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN be and is made a part of this record."

[2b]Notice of Appeal, dated March 3, 1969 (R.1): "The clerk will please include the entire record on appeal."

the question was foreclosed by and decided summarily on authority of several prior Georgia decisions.

* * *

STATE OF GEORGIA
CENTRAL STATE HOSPITAL
MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA 31062

February 28, 1968

Honorable Dunbar Harrison
Judge, Superior Court
Eastern Judicial Circuit
c/o Courthouse
Savannah, Georgia

Re: William Henry Furman
Case No: 157 086
Binion 4

Dear Judge Harrison:

The above named patient was admitted to this hospital on October 26, 1967, by Order of your Court.

The patient was presented to a staff meeting today, February 28, 1968. It was the unanimous opinion of the members of the staff, Dr. Elpidio Stincer, Dr. Jose Mendoza, and Dr. Armando Gutierrez, that this patient should retain his present diagnosis of Mental Deficiency, Mild to Moderate, with Psychotic Episodes associated with Convulsive Disorder.

It was also agreed that at present the patient is not psychotic, but he is not capable of cooperating with his counsel in the preparation of his defense.

We feel at this time that he is in need of further psychiatric hospitalization and treatment. He will be reevaluated at a later date and presented to the staff again for a deci-

sion as to his final disposition. We will notify you of the results of that meeting.

Yours very truly,

/s/
James B. Craig, M.D.
Superintendent

By: E. Stincer, M.D.
Senior Staff Physician

ES:jfh

STATE OF GEORGIA
CENTRAL STATE HOSPITAL
MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA 31062

April 15, 1968

Honorable Dunbar Harrison
Judge, Superior Courts [sic]
Eastern Judicial Circuit
c/o Courthouse
Savannah, Georgia

Re: William Henry Furman
Case No. 157 086
Binion 4

Dear Judge Harrison:

The above named patient was admitted to this hospital on October 26, 1967 by Order of your Court.

An evaluation has been made by our staff and a diagnosis of Mental Deficiency, Mild to Moderate, with Psychotic Episodes associated with Convulsive Disorder, was made. It is felt that he is not psychotic at present, knows right from wrong and is able to cooperate with his counsel in preparing his defense.

It is recommended that he be returned to the court for disposition of the charges pending against him. Please have a duly authorized person to call for him at your earliest convenience.

Yours very truly,

/s/
James B. Craig, M.D.
Superintendent

By: E. Stincer, M.D.
Senior Staff Physician

ES:jfh

CC: Hon. Andrew Joe Ryan, Jr.
Solicitor General

Hon. Carl A. Griffin
Sheriff, Chatham County

FILE COPY

SEPT
AUG 23 1971

E. ROBERT SEAVER

IN THE

Supreme Court of The United States

No. 69-5003

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN,
Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF GEORGIA,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

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

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IN THE

Supreme Court of The United States

No. 69-5003

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN,
Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF GEORGIA,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

The interest of the State of Indiana is in the preservation of the Indiana Constitution and statutes that are directly analogous to those in question. In the Bill of Rights of the Indiana Constitution, at Section 16, it is provided that:

> "Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. *Cruel and unusual punishments*

shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense." (My emphasis.)

Indiana statutes, IC 1971, 35-1-46-9, as found in Burns' (1956 Repl.) Section 9-2236 et. seq. provide for the death penalty by electrocution.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether Georgia's statute allowing the death penalty for a conviction of first degree murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Statement of the Case contained in the Brief of Respondent is accurate and concise and is referred to here.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Capital punishment is not "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The framers of the Bill of Rights had in mind the abolishment of other penalties such as those attributed to the infamous English Court of Star Chamber.

The Fifth Amendment, which was ratified at the same time as the Eighth Amendment, only requires that due process be observed in assessing the ultimate penalty. The intent of the framers is to be found in the explicit language of the Fifth Amendment and not in the nebulous "cruel and unusual punishment" phrase contained in the Eighth Amendment, which has until this day defied precise definition.

Petitioners argue that the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause should be viewed from the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."[1] In their view, a majority of the population is opposed to capital punishment and, because of this, the penalty is no longer acceptable. Yet at the same time, they argue that neither legislation nor constitutional amendment is an effective means for changing the law because public feeling is not strong enough to compel change, either in Congress or the state legislatures. By this reasoning, they attempt to justify change in the law through judicial action rather than by proper legislation or constitutional amendment.

Capital punishment *is* a deterrent to future crime. It is argued by opponents that statistical evidence refutes this reasonable conclusion. However, the statistics which form the basis of the petitioner's argument omit all the essential subjective variables and are therefore of limited value. This issue is far too important to be decided exclusively by bare statistics.

Capital punishment was contemplated by the framers of the Bill of Rights and the concept was re-affirmed in 1869 when the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment borrowed the explicit language of the Fifth Amendment which allows the death penalty provided due process has been observed.

---

1 Trop v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86, 101

ARGUMENT

The issue involves a question of whether capital punishment is in violation of the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the U. S. Constitution, Eighth Amendment. This amendment provides that:

> "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States included capital punishment in its scope. Historically the Fifth and Eighth Amendments were ratified together as part of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment states in part, that:

> "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . ."

This same language appears again in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states, in part, that:

> ". . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . ."[2]

The Eighth Amendment was adopted as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791. This wording initially appeared in the Act of Parliament of 1688,[3] to abolish the atrocities of the English Court of the Star Chamber. In that "judicial" body, confessions were extracted in open court

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2 Robinson v. California (1962), 370 US 660

3 William and Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2 at 192 (1869)

through various diabolical means, and the punishments that were meted out included the loss of ears for perjurers, face branding and nose splitting for forgers and conspirators, and whipping for those guilty of "unnatural" offenses.[4] The adoption of the Eighth Amendment verbatim from the 1688 Act of Parliament, with no reported controversy, would suggest that it was intended to apply to the kinds of medieval torture described above.[5]

Courts which have heard questions of "cruel and unusual punishment" have refused to follow the inflexible theory that cruel and unusual punishment must be determined by the same standards that were in effect at the time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights. They have continually applied a less rigid standard of "a developing and maturing society." Opponents of capital punishment have ignored this judicial test and have erroneously stated that our society has progressed to the point that capital punishment is no longer acceptable. Chief Justice Warren, in the majority opinion in *Trop v. Dulles* (1958), 356 U.S. 86, 100, explained that:

> "The exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this court. But the basic policy reflected in these words is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice. The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the state has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards."

---

4 Parry, "The History of Torture in England," 9 (1934)

5 Sherman, ".... Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted," 14 Crime and Delinquency 73, (1968)

Indeed, in the same decision, *Trop v. Dulles, supra,* Chief Justice Warren expressly recognized the necessity of the retention of capital punishment where the offense requires its imposition. He stated that:

> "*Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime,* but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." (My emphasis.)

It must be emphasized that although Chief Justice Warren recognized the flexible standard of contemporary society, he did not find that capital punishment was unconstitutional when the facts of the case showed that the death penalty was proportionate to the severity of the crime. In the case presently being considered, the death penalty was imposed as a just and proportionate punishment for a cold-blooded and wanton murder.

Opponents have never presented sufficient evidence to show that opposition to the death penalty is, indeed, as widespread as they would have us believe. Chief Justice Warren, in *Trop v. Dulles, supra,* at 99, further stated that:

> "Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, *it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty.*" (My emphasis.)

At this point, opponents introduce numerous polls to show that a certain percent of the population is opposed

to capital punishment. Without going into the myriad of problems inherent in these polls and the accuracy of their findings, one point remains a mystery. If the anticapital punishment advocates are so sure of public opinion, why are they not willing to submit this question to the voters in a referendum; or why do they feel that state and federal legislators are not sufficiently in tune to realize the alleged feeling against this punishment? The fallacy in the reasoning of the opponents is quite obvious. They continually talk of the 'great movement' to abolish the death penalty. They say that since the citizens of the United States are against this punishment, it no longer meets the "standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." At the same time, they state that this change must be initiated through the courts as public opinion is not sufficiently strong to influence this change through legislation. Obviously, one of their conclusions is erroneous, and they are asking the Court to usurp this legislative function. The fixing of penalties for crimes has always been a legislative function, and courts should intervene only when the legislative discretion is violated.

In *Bailey v. U.S.* (1934), 74 F. 2d 451, the opinion of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals stated that:

> "The fixing of penalties for crimes is a legislative function. What constitutes an adequate penalty is a matter of legislative judgment and discretion, and the courts will not intervene therewith unless the penalty prescribed is clearly and manifestly cruel and unusual."

(A reading of cases in this area fails to develop an adequate definition of "cruel and unusual." Also, the courts which have considered whether there is a difference be-

tween "cruel" and "unusual" have not arrived at a precise distinction between the two terms.)

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in *Weems v. U.S.* (1910), 217 U.S. 349, stated that:

> "This interpretation curtails the legislative power of Congress to define and punish crime by asserting a right of judicial supervision over the exertion of that power, in disregard of the distinction between the legislative and judicial departments of Government."

In *Adams v. State* (1971), 271 NE 2d 425, the Indiana Supreme Court viewed its function as follows:

> "We feel the question in our jurisdiction hardly needs to be discussed, since precedent and authority have determined the question against the position taken by the appellant; and although a judge may personally not approve the punishment fixed by the legislature for some crimes, it is not the judge's privilege, because he does not agree with the legislative policy, to attempt to nullify legislative enactment. We would be violating our oaths and stepping outside our jurisdictional function to do so."

The entire argument of the desirability of legislative change or judicial decision was summarized in 79 Harvard Law Review 635, 639 (1966):

> "In light of these difficulties and the uniform authority sustaining capital punishment, to hold that it is a method of punishment wholly prohibited by the eighth amendment would be to confuse possible legislative desirability with constitutional requirements."

The desire of some advocates for social change should not be confused with the desire of the entire nation for a constitutional amendment. How can capital punishment

be abolished by a judicial tribunal, albeit the United States Supreme Court, without, in effect, amending the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? Since the death penalty is not cruel and unusual, any change ought to be sought through legislation or by a constitutional amendment.

There are several reasons for the *privacy*, not secrecy, of legal executions in the United States. An execution has a deterrent effect only to the degree that a person contemplating the crime has knowledge of the penalty attached to the crime committed. In this day and age, this knowledge is not acquired by means of public executions. Are the opponents so naive as to think the potential criminal is unaware of the death penalty unless he is reminded by a public execution?

The privacy of executions is evidence that as a developing and maturing society, we are simply insuring the dignity of man. There is no reason to put the families of those sentenced to execution through the traumatic experience of a public display since the deterrent effect is the knowledge that the death penalty is imposed. Any reasonable person dislikes confinement but this attitude does not buttress the conclusion that he is against imprisonment for crime or that he wishes to abolish sentences of incarceration.

It is well to remind ourselves of the purpose of legal punishment itself: "Punishment is ordinarily justified under a utilitarian theory as being necessary for the achievement of a long-range benefit."[6] The long range benefit discussed in relation to punishment is its deterrent effect, which is often defined as the preventive effect

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6 Harvard Law Review, 79:635 (1965-66)

which actual or threatened punishment of offenders has upon potential offenders. This principle has always influenced our penal codes and is largely responsible for the lawful and justified use of capital punishment. Richard M. Gerstein, State Attorney for Dade County, Miami, Florida, stated that:

> "As do many members of our profession, I take the position that deterrence is necessary for the maintenance of the legal system and the preservation of society, as clearly stated by Sir John Salmond:
>
> > 'Punishment is before all things deterrent, and the chief end of the law of crime is to make the evil doer an example and a warning to all who are likeminded with him.' "[7]

The deterrent effect of the death penalty is a vital consideration in discussing the necessity of its retention. The basic question to be considered here is the deterrent effect on potential offenders. In other words, does the knowledge that he may be executed have a discernible influence on the potential murderer's decision to commit the murder or the felony that leads to the murder. It is the contention of a vast majority of prosecutors that the deterrent effect of capital punishment *is* significant. Forgetting for the moment the wealth of evidence available to substantiate its deterrent effect, we should rely more on the practitioner instead of the academic reformer. We should believe the person who deals with the accused murderer in the real-life situation, rather than the person who has analyzed what he would or should have done in a clinical psychological vacuum.

---

7 Gerstein, J. Crim. L. 51:252 (1961)

Vital Speeches of the Day recently carried the following pertinent observations from a presentation on law enforcement:

"The propaganda drive to abolish capital punishment appears to be a geared part of a general drive toward leniency in the treatment of criminals in our society. Such leniency has, in my opinion, had undeniable psychological impact on potential murderers, and has contributed to the upward spiral of the crime rate. There is a striking over-all correlation between the recent decline in the use of the death penalty and the rise in violent crime. Such crime has increased by geometric proportions.

In the first three years of the last decade, the number of executions in the United States was by present standards relatively high. Fifty-six persons were executed in 1960; 42 in 1961; and 47 in 1962. During these same three years the number of people who died violently at the hands of criminals actually declined and the murder rate per 100,000 of population also declined.

Beginning in 1963, however, there was a drop in the number of legal executions, and the graph line of violent crime simultaneously began moving up instead of down. In the following years the number of legal executions has decreased dramatically from one year to the next, until in 1968 there was none at all. But each of those years has seen murders increase sharply both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of population.

In 1964, for example, the number of legal executions dropped to 15. Yet the number of violent deaths moved up from 8,500 to 9,250, and the murder rate per 100,000 went up from 4.5 to 4.8. In 1965, the number of legal executions dropped to seven, while the number of violent deaths increased to 9,850, and the murder rate went to 5.1. Similar decreases in legal

executions have occurred in the following years accompanied by similar increases in the murder rate.

In 1968, with no legal executions at all, the total number who died through criminal violence reached 13,650, while the murder rate climbed to 6.8 per 100,000.

The movement in these figures, with murders increasing as the deterrence of the death penalty diminished, confirms the verdict of ordinary logic: That a relaxation in the severity and certainty of punishment leads only to an increase in crime.

These remarks concern the deterrent effect of the death penalty on those who might commit murder but do not. That is a negative phenomenon which can be inferred both from the record and the assessment of common sense. The repeal of the death penalty would not repeal human nature. To these truisms we may add the fact that there are numerous cases on record in which criminals have escaped the capital penalty for previous murders and gone on to commit others . . .

Is a course of action humanitarian which actually encourages a vast and continuing increase in the number of people killed and maimed and otherwise brutalized? There have been many sentimental journeys into the psychological realm of the criminals who are to be executed; I think there should be more sympathetic concern expressed for the thousands of innocent victims of those criminals.

Opponents of the death penalty may rejoice that in 1968 there were 47 fewer murderers executed in this country than was the case in 1962; but, do they say anything of the fact that some 5,150 more innocent persons died by criminal violence in 1968 than was the case in 1962?

In the question of human suffering, this is a staggering loss of more than 5,000 individual innocent lives.

What about the human rights and civil rights of the individual victim? Are not those 5,000 persons entitled to the dignity and sacredness of life? Is that a result of which humanitarians can be proud? I think not.

Only misguided emotionalism, and not facts, dispute the truth that the death penalty is a deterrent to capital crime.

Individuals must be held responsible for their individual actions if a free society is to endure.'"[8]

Additionally, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment made the following finding in relation to deterrence and the abolition of capital punishment:

"The general conclusion which we reach, after careful review of all the evidence we have been able to obtain as to the deterrent effect of capital punishment, may be stated as follows. *Prima facie the penalty of death is likely to have stronger effect as a deterrent to normal beings than any other form of punishment and there is some evidence (though no convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so.*" (My emphasis.)[9]

The statistics used to minimize the deterrent effect of capital punishment categorically omit the essential variables that would have, otherwise, given these statistics some meaning. One of the most glaring omissions from the statistical standpoint is the input of common sense. If the death penalty is no more of a deterrent than life imprisonment, as the opponents would have us believe,

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8 Sendak, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 38, No. 18, page 574, (July 1, 1971)

9 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report 18, note 15 at page 24.

why do convicted murderers exhaust all legal barriers in attempting to get a death sentence commuted to life imprisonment? They want us to believe that at the time just prior to and during the act, the criminal sees no discernible difference between life and death, but upon apprehension, he suddenly feels the importance of life imprisonment. It is the contention of this Amicus Curiae that deductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that in view of the importance of life imprisonment over the death penalty to those who are awaiting execution, this same importance must, either consciously or subconsciously, be in the mind of the potential slayer as he is preparing to perpetrate his crime. It is, therefore, a deterrent.

Further evidence of the unreliable nature of the opponents' statistics on the deterrent effect of the death penalty is that none of their statistics shows the number of persons who were aware that they could be put to death for their act, and for that reason decided not to perpetrate the crime. Their statistics only show the failure, i.e. the persons who were not deterred and actually committed the crime. No one can reduce to cold, impersonal, statistical columns the number of persons who have refrained from murder because of fear of the death penalty. There is no way to gauge this most essential variable. Judge Hyman Barshay had this fact in mind when he made the following observation:

> "The death penalty is a warning, just like a lighthouse throwing its beam out to sea. We hear about the shipwrecks, but we do not hear about the ships

that the lighthouse guides safely on their way. We do not have proof of the number of ships it saves, but we do not tear the lighthouse down."[10]

CONCLUSION

Capital punishment is not in violation of the United States Constitution. Attackers of the death penalty rely on the ambiguous and elusive "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment in the attempt to have it declared unconstitutional. These attackers ignore the explicit language of the contemporaneous Fifth, and Fourteenth, Amendments that recognize capital punishment provided due process is observed.

Those who wish to abolish capital punishment say, without proof, that it is now offensive to the general population. If and when the voice of the people is strongly against capital punishment, their representatives in Congress and the legislature will change the laws and amend the Constitution to abolish it. There have been, to date, twenty-six amendments to the United States Constitution which clearly shows that there is no necessity for the Judiciary to take over that procedure instead of utilizing the prescribed procedures for constitutional amendment.

Opponents of capital punishment document their case with statistics which are intended to show that there is no deterrent effect in the death penalty. But strong statistics also buttress support of capital punishment. Capital punishment is, in fact a deterrent and is not in violation of the United States Constitution.

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10 Sr. Schol., Capital Punishment: Pro and Con. 71:6.

Therefore, the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of capital punishment for conviction of first degree murder should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

1971 TERM

NO. 69-5003

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN,
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v

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Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

In addition to the provisions recited by Petitioner, this case involves also certain Georgia statutes and published Rules of the State of Georgia Board of Corrections, each of which is set forth

as Appendix A to this Brief [hereinafter cited as "App. A, pp. ____] at App. A, pp. 1a - 16a *infra*.

QUESTION PRESENTED

> "Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in this case constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?"

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

William Joseph Micke, Jr., age 29, died on August 11, 1967, at his home in Savannah, Georgia, as the result of a bullet being shot through his lung and producing severe hemorrhaging (A. 17, 18, 32). The unprovoked shooting occurred as follows: Micke and his wife retired to bed sometime after midnight, when he returned from his initial night of work at a second job taken to supplement the family income. Mr. Micke's primary employment was with the United States Coast Guard (A. 18). The young family included five children, ranging in age from one year to fifteen years (A. 17). Between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m., before falling asleep, the Mickes heard noises and, thinking it was 11-year-old Jimmie sleepwalking, Mr. Micke went to get Jimmie back to bed (A. 18, 19).

Mrs. Micke, listening, heard her husband's footsteps quicken. Then she heard a loud sound and her husband's scream (A. 19). Believing then that someone was in the house because of Mr. Micke's cry, and fearful that someone else was also in the house, and afraid that her children might be harmed, Mrs. Micke ran to the bedrooms for the children and gathered them into her bedroom in an effort to protect them (A. 19, 21, 22). She and the children then screamed for their neighbor, she realizing that she had no gun or other means to defend against an intruder (A. 19, 22). She called the police as soon as she saw Mr. Dozier, the neighbor, come out of his house (A. 19), but her hysteria prevented the police from learning what the disturbance was (A. 24). Sergeant Spivey, who was just one or two blocks away from the Micke home when the call came at about 2:23 a.m., went immediately there and was met by Mr. Dozier out front (A. 24, 26). They thought an intruder was still in the house, so Sergeant Spivey checked the front door and, finding it locked, went around to the back door.

The back of the house was dark, and when the officer tried the back door, it opened (A. 24-25). Shining his flashlight into the house, he saw Mr. Micke's body lying on the floor with a large puddle of blood around the head and shoulder (A. 25). Still thinking there

was an intruder in the house, the officer crawled through the rooms and found no one other than Mrs. Micke and the children locked in a front bedroom (A. 25). Upon doubly checking Mr. Micke's vital signs, Sergeant Spivey concluded that he was dead. Other policemen arrived, an ambulance was called, and an investigation begun (A. 26).

Officers Hall and Goode and others immediately scanned the area in a search for the assailant (A. 37, 41). Hall stationed himself at the far end of a wooded area next to the Micke house, in his patrol car with the lights off and motor running (A. 38). Petitioner came out of the woods and when he saw the patrol car, he walked faster and then started to run (A. 38-39). Hall and other officers pursued, finally on foot, and traced Petitioner's tracks to the nearby home of his uncle (A. 39). After obtaining the uncle's permission to search the area, the officers located Petitioner hiding under the house and pulled him out by the hand (A. 39, 40, 41). A search was made of Petitioner and a .22 caliber pistol, which was later identified as having discharged the bullet which killed Mr. Micke, was taken from his right front pocket (A. 40-43, 49, 50; R. Transcript 67-71). No other civilian was seen out in the area during the course of the search (A. 40).

Detective Smith testified (after a voluntariness hearing before the court in the absence of the jury and after the court concluded that the statements were not inadmissible on that account [A. 44, 46]), that on the same day and following an explanation of Petitioner's rights to him [1] and his indication that he did not then want a lawyer, the detective said he had one question, which was: ". . . did he get inside of the house" (A. 47). Petitioner's reply, he said, was:

> "A. He state yes, that he was in the kitchen; the man come in the kitchen, saw him in there and attempted to grab him as he went out the door; said the man hit the door, instead of catching him, he hit the door, the door slammed between them, he turned around and fired one shot and ran." (A. 47).

The investigation at the Micke home, commenced while Officers Hall and Goode and others were searching for the assailant (A. 26, 29, 33, 37, 41) yielded latent fingerprints on a washing machine on the back porch which were later deter-

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[1] Officer Goode testified that his constitutional rights were also read to him upon arrest (A. 42).

mined to have been made by Petitioner (A. 28, 33, 37). The inch-thick plywood door which lead from the small porch to the kitchen where Mr. Micke's body was found, contained a bullet hole (A. 27, 29), the appearance of which indicated that the bullet came into the house (A. 27, 30). Mrs. Micke testified that the door had been locked (A. 20). It appeared that the washing machine had been pulled away from a window, a fan moved, and the door unlocked on the inside by slipping a hand through the window (A. 20, 21, 27, 28, 31).

After the State presented its case, Petitioner's counsel (who has been counsel throughout the proceedings and up to the present time) asked that the jury be excused and that the defendant be called to determine, on the record, whether he then wished "to make a sworn or unsworn statement or no statement at all." (A. 50). This was done (A. 50).2/

2/ Georgia law gives a criminal defendant these three options. Ga. Laws 1962, p. 45; Ga. Code Ann. § 27-405, App. A, p. 6a. See also Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 133-135, Ga. Code Ann. § 38-415 and -416.

Petitioner verified that his attorney had discussed these three alternatives with him and advised him in this regard, and that it was his decision not to make a statement (A. 51). After further explanation by the court and his attorney, in which it was emphasized that he could make either a sworn or an unsworn statement, the court asked: "Do you want to tell this jury anything?" The defendant then said, "Yes". (A. 52, 53). He reiterated this desire before the jury, and after his attorney instructed him to "Give your name, your age and everything else about you," the following transpired:

"The Defendant: William Henry Furman.

"Mr. Mayfield: Speak a little louder, please.

"The Defendant: William Henry Furman. I am twenty-six. I work at Superior Upholstery.

"Unidentified: Where?

"The Defendant: Superior Upholstery.

"Mr. Mayfield: Speak loud enough now for everyone to hear you and hear you clearly.

"The Defendant: They got me charged with murder and I admit, I admit

going to these folks' home and they did caught me in there and I was coming back out, backing up and there was a wire down there on the floor. I was coming out backwards and fell back and I didn't intend to kill nobody. I didn't know they was behind the door. The gun went off and I didn't know nothing about no murder until they arrested me, and when the gun went off I was down on the floor and I got up and ran. That's all to it.

"Mr. Mayfield: Now, do you have anything else you want to tell this jury about this case?

"The Defendant: Yes, sir, one other thing; they didn't -- questioned me down there, down there at the police station, they didn't told me nothing about a lawyer and I told them who I wanted as an attorney and they still asked me questions and I wouldn't answer none. That's -- that's all I've got to say.

"Mr. Mayfield: Anything else you want to say now?

"The Defendant" That's all.

"Mr. Mayfield: You may come down.

Note: (The defendant withdrew from the witness stand.)" (A. 54-55).

Before the trial commenced, a motion o suppress evidence was heard and denied, motion challenging the array of the jury enire was submitted upon stipulation of ranscript from another case, and other efense motions were made and denied (R. -15, R. Transcript 2, 2-a, 11A through 1 BE; A. 11, 12).

In obtaining a panel of forty-eight ualified jurors, only one person was dis-ualified, and thus required replacement, or answering that he would refuse to im-ose capital punishment in a case regard-ess of the evidence (A. 12-15).

The trial was held on September 20, 968 (A. 10), the homicide having occur-ed on August 11, 1967 (A. 17). The apse of time was occasioned by defen-ant's attorney having moved for psychi-:ric examination and evaluation at an stitution designated by the court and State expense so that the jury could ve the information in determining guilt innocence and proper punishment (A. 6). October 24, 1967, the court granted the tion inadvertently referring to it as a ecial plea of insanity, and ordered fendant sent to Milledgeville (Central) ate Hospital for examination (A. 8).

By the terms of the order, the findings were to be sent to the court, the solicitor general, and defendant's counsel. Defendant was returned to the court in April, 1968, as being competent to stand trial, it having been determined that he was not psychotic, knew right from wrong, and was able to cooperate with his counsel in preparing his defense (Petitioner's Brief, Appendix B, p. 3b).

No further reference was made to any insanity, either in terms of a defense or in terms of being competent to stand trial. Despite all of the pre-trial and post-trial activity which marks the course of this case, the subject did not arise until after this Court granted certiorari and preparations for the appendix began (Petitioner's Brief, App. B, p. 1b). Contrary to the assertion putting the blame for omission of the "reports" on the trial court clerk, the law clearly imposes this duty of perfecting the record on the party contending the record is incomplete, in this case, the Petitioner. Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 18,24; Ga. Code Ann. § 6-805(f), App. A. p. 1a. Respondent knows of no requirement that the clerk include in the record more than is recorded in his office.

The merits of the new assertions regarding Petitioner's mental condition are palpably suspect since, although

trial counsel pressed an appeal before the Georgia Supreme Court and was thus responsible for drawing up the enumeration of errors and supporting brief based on the record, the absence of the letters was not even noticed or thought important enough to be made a part of the record at that stage, as may be done in accordance with appellate practice. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 18, 24, supra.

Petitioner, in his Statement of the Case, refers to the characterization of the crime given in the opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court (Petitioner's Brief, p. 6). That Court, in section 6 of its opinion (A. 67, 68), ruled that the general grounds of the motion for new trial 3/ were not meritorious.

3/ That is, contentions that the verdict was contrary to evidence and without evidence to support it; that the verdict was decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence; and that the verdict was contrary to law and the principles of justice and equity. See R. 20.

The reason was that the evidence was sufficient to show either implied malice [4] or at least the death occurring in the commission of a felony. [5]

Contrary to Petitioner's comment, Georgia law at the time of his conviction, and still now, divides crimes of homicide into three categories: murder [6],

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[4] Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1004: "Implied Malice. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. Cobb, 783." This now comprises § 26-1101(a) of the Code of Georgia, effective July 1, 1969. (Petitioner's Brief, App. A, p. 4a)

[5] Illustrated, as the Court notes, by Williams v. State, 222 Ga. 208 (1966) and Manor v. State, 223 Ga. 594(1967) This type of murder is now defined in the Criminal Code of Georgia, § 26-1101(b). (Petitioner's Brief, App. A, p. 4a).

[6] Formerly Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1002, now Criminal Code of Georgia § 26-1101. (Petitioner's Brief, App. A, p. 1a, 4a).

voluntary manslaughter [7], and involuntary manslaughter [8]. The Committee Notes which accompany the new Criminal Code of Georgia effective July 1, 1969, discusses the decision not to divide the offense of murder into degrees:

> "An examination of murder legislation in operation in 30 States discloses that six jurisdictions (Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas) follow the Georgia pattern of dividing homicide into murder, voluntary, and involuntary manslaughter, with separate definitions of these offenses. The remaining 24 States, approximately 80 % of the jurisdictions studied, in addition to having statutes dealing manslaughter, divide murder into degrees for purposes of prosecution and punishment. . . .
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> * * *

7/ Formerly Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1002, now in Criminal Code of Georgia, § 26-1101. (Petitioner's Brief, App. A, pp. 1a, 4a).

8/ Formerly Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1009, now in Criminal Code of Georgia, § 26-1103. (Petitioner's Brief, App. A, pp. 2a, 4a).

> "While more than three-fourths of the States divide the offense of murder into degrees, primarily to facilitate punishment, Georgia has always followed the common-law view of a single definition. Illinois and Louisiana, which have recently enacted criminal Code legislation, have adopted the definitional classification of homicide similar to the method presently employed in Georgia. The Model Penal Code Proposed Official Draft approves and utilizes the single definition (Section 201.2)." Committee Notes, Criminal Code of Georgia, 1970 Revision, p. 84.

Thus, Georgia submits to the jury trying the case the discretion to fix the punishment at death in a murder case, and does not limit its consideration by classifications of degree. The value of any life ended by murder is thus given the same weight insofar as the maximum penalty imposeable is concerned. The myriad of variables attendant to each case is left to consideration of the jury, representing the community, as to which murder cases appropriately call for the death penalty.

Petitioner states, as a footnote, his Amended Motion for New Trial challenged a certain jury instruction re-

garding felony murder (Petitioner's Brief p. 7, fn. 4). He did not object to the instruction when given (A. 64).

He states that he incorporated the challenge by reference into the Enumeration of Errors which formed the basis of appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, but it appears there only thusly:

> "7. That the Court erred in one and all of the respects set out in the amended Motion for New Trial and for the reasons set forth thereon." Enumeration of Errors dated March 27, 1969, p. 2 (Not paginated in original record in this Court and not included in printed Appendix.).

The Supreme Court of Georgia does not consider enumerations not briefed or argued. Schmid v.State, 226 Ga. 70 (1970). And it is abundantly evident that Petitioner did not assert the matter below at all, as at the conclusion of the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion, it is stated:

> "7. Having considered every enumeration of error argued by counsel in his brief and finding no reversible error, the judgment is Affirmed." (A. 68).

Consequently, Petitioner can raise no inference or implication that any issue in this regard was properly raised.

Petitioner refers to "additional facts" concerning him which the jury did not know but which "appear in the record" (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 8-9). That these "facts" are not a part of the record and were not a part of the record before the court below has already been pointed out. It is further noted that the "facts" alluded to, i.e., results of psychiatric examination, were readily available for disclosure to the jury, had Petitioner's counsel deemed it favorable to the defendant to make such a revelation. The letters are dated February 28, 1968, and April 15, 1968 (Petitioner's Brief, App. B, pp. 2b and 3b), long before the trial on September 20, 1968, and it is obvious from their content that defense counsel would not have chosen to make the jury aware of their substance. There is no basis whatsoever for Petitioner's bald statement that the two letters "indicate that Petitioner Furman is both mentally deficient and mentally ill." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 9). The lately contrived "issue" of insanity is further dealt with in this Argument, infra, p. 88 et seq. The facts concerning the same are simply recited here, in refutation of Petitioner's erroneous Statement of the Case in this regard.

Contrary to Petitioner's statement, he was not "committed" to Central State Hospital upon a special plea of insanity.

There was no such special plea of insanity, which would have ultimately required a jury determination of competency to stand trial, such as occurred in Jackson's case. See Jackson v. Georgia, No. 69-5030, A. 12, 13, 17, 18, 21; 33. Instead, counsel simply moved for psychiatric examination, at State expense, to be used for purposes of defense and possibly for sentencing (A. 6). As indicated heretofore, the court in granting the motion inadvertently referred to it as a plea of insanity, but none was ever filed nor did counsel ever make any issue of competency to stand trial.

Petitioner also asserts an erroneous conclusion regarding the meaning of the second letter: the Hospital did not report on April 15, 1968, that he was THEN diagnosed identically as he had been diagnosed on February 28. Instead, the letter merely repeated the earlier diagnosis as having at one time been made, and it then goes on to say that the present condition is different. There is no basis for concluding, as Petitioner inferredly attempts to, that the Hospital deliberately sent back for trial a man who had some mental condition which should have legally avoided trial and sentencing.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

THE IMPOSITION AND CARRYING OUT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THIS CASE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.

The Fourteenth Amendment, by virtue of which cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment is a prohibition against the states, provides that the states may not deprive any person of life without due process of law. Conversely, the states may deprive a person of life so long as the mandates of due process of law are observed. The Eighth Amendment, adopted as part of a declaration of rights to confine the federal government, may not effect a curtailment of a right of the states recognized by the states-restricting Fourteenth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the penalty of death for crime, in that such a penalty was historically acceptable in the context of the period in which the Amendment was adopted, has thereafter traditionally been a part of the penal system in this country, and is widely accepted today as a reasonable, rational, and appropriate

instrument in the control of crime. It is not a punishment that is prohibited as constitutionally "cruel and unusual." The function of State legislatures to define crimes and fix punishments is therefore not restricted against providing such a punishment.

This case is devoid of any issue concerning the sanity of Petitioner.

There is no constitutional barrier to the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in the case at bar.

ARGUMENT

I

THE DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDER IS NOT PER SE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE, AND IS THEREFORE NOT A DEPRIVATION BY THE STATE OF PETITIONER FURMAN'S LIFE WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

The Court has framed the question for examination to be, whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in Furman's case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner contends that his sentence is a rare, random, and arbitrary infliction and for that reason is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment principles briefed in Aikens v. California, No. 68-5027. He states therein that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "involved" 9/, but he makes little or no reference to it thereafter, traveling instead on the assumption that the Eighth Amendment is incorporated into the Due Process Clause and so it need

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9/ Aikens Brief, p. 2.

only be examined in terms of the former. However, since the Eighth Amendment is not, alone, applicable to the States and was not applicable to them in any sense before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the question at issue must be reviewed in the context of the latter's requirements. The Eighth Amendment imposes no restrictions on the States, but the Fourteenth Amendment does. The Due Process requirements will therefore be developed as the appropriate arena in which to focus on the cruel and unusual punishment question.

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees:

> "(N)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; . . ." (Emphasis added).

It does not prohibit a State from depriving a person of life, but rather the prohibition is that it shall not be done without due process of law. Thus, the Nation saw fit, one hundred years ago, to give constitutional permanence to the right of every person to demand due process before his life could be forfeited by the State. The mandates of this clause, in terms of cruel and unusual punishment, has been stated variously:

In Ex parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) the Court explained:

> "[I]n the Fourteenth Amendment, the same words [due process of law] refer to that law of the land in each State, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. Undoubtedly the Amendment forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property, and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights; and in the administration of criminal justice requires that no different or higher punishment shall be imposed upon one than is imposed upon all for like offenses. But it [the Fourteenth Amendment] was not designed to interfere with the power of the State to protect the lives, liberties and property of its citizens, and to promote their health, peace, morals, education and good order." Id. at 448.

Kemmler complained that the form of the death penalty, electrocution, was

cruel and unusual and therefore a deprivation of life without due process of law. The Court concluded that in order to reverse the New York highest court, it would ". . . be compelled to hold that it had committed an error so gross as to amount in law to a denial by the State of due process of law to one accused of crime." Id. at 448. Petitioner's complaint faces the same test because in order to prevail, it, too, must evidence a denial of substantive due process: whereas Kemmler challenged the form of infliction, i.e., electrocution itself, rather than the procedure for inflicting it, Petitioner challenges the punishment, i.e., the death penalty, itself, rather than the procedure by which it was imposed on him.

In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the circumstances of execution were complained of as cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, procedural due process was the frame. Mr. Justice Frankfurter developed the concept of the due process safeguard in a concurring opinion and said it is part of "the conceptions of justice and freedom by a progressive society." Id. at 467.

> "The Fourteenth Amendment," he wrote, "did mean to withdraw from the States the right to

> act in ways that are offensive to a decent respect for the dignity of man, and heedless of his freedom." Id. at 468.
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> "In short," he continued, "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not withdraw the freedom of a State to enforce its own notions of fairness in the administration of criminal justice unless, as it was put for the Court by Mr. Justice Cardozo, 'in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Id. at 469.

This context, then, is the proper one in which the Court is to review State penal laws, with respect to whether they are cruel and unusual. The question of the moment is whether the death penalty offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. This test looks to the solid past, as well a constitutional inquiry should, rather than simply to the shifting present, which Petitioner presses with his emphasis on a test of "evolving standards."

Measured by this due process test, it is indisputable that the death penalty for crimes which immediately endanger or

take life does not offend a rooted principle of justice. The existence and application of the death penalty itself has been an integral part of our penal systems since at least Colonial days, although, as Justice Burton pointed out in dissent in the Louisiana case, torturous means and forms of inflicting death is prohibited as shocking fundamental instincts of civilized man. Id. at 473.

Since due process standards are very broadly conceived, Mr. Justice Frankfurter cautioned, "great tolerance toward a State's conduct is demanded of this Court." Id. at 470. The State does not assert that its position in this case cannot be maintained without a great tolerance being shown by the Court, but rather points up this concept to illustrate the foreshortened framework of Petitioner's premise.

Although Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950) is not a punishment case, it involves an application of the Due Process Clause. The question was whether the method applied by Georgia to determine the sanity of a convicted defendant offended due process. The Court held that the statute as applied did not do so. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who dissented, again exhaustively reviewed the meaning of the Due Process Clause. The rule against

executing an insane person is "protected by substantive aspects of due process," he noted. (Id. at 24). This conclusion followed from an application of the substantive aspect of due process, which was phrased thusly:

> "It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history." Id. at 16.
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> * * *
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> "In applying such a large, untechnical concept as 'due process,' the Court enforces those permanent and pervasive feelings of our society as to which there is compelling evidence of the kind relevant to judgments on social institutions." Id. at 16.

The distinction between substantive and procedural due process which was there made was that substantive due process prohibited killing an insane man, whereas procedural due process required that where a question of

sanity arises, the prisoner must be given the opportunity to show that he is otherwise. This distinction illustrates that Petitioner's argument, as embodied in the Aikens Brief, must be construed to be that the death penalty violates substantive due process, because the theory is that any execution actually inflicted in our contemporary society would be unconstitutional.

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) is strictly an Eighth Amendment case because of its federal character. Due process considerations did not enter in. Therefore, Petitioner's lifting of the test suggested in that case and his primary reliance thereon distorts the question in this case. Its adaptability to the present situation must be circumscribed by the superimposition of the broad limits in which due process allows the States to operate.

Petitioner, moreover, makes the Trop test unworkable in a judicial setting by construing it narrowly. The evolving standards of decency, he says, are ones which are current and can be measured by contemporary statistics and public opinion indicators and world-wide "trends". Such a close-to-pocket construction of the Trop language not only fails to take into account the changes of tomorrow but refuses to acknowledge

the judicial setting in which it must be applied. Petitioner's brief is replete with partial statistics, assertions of unconfrontable "experts", and all types of "objective indicators" which allow not of cross-examination and which are not subject to the rules of evidence. It is submitted that the standards intended by the statement that "the [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" 10/ are standards of fundamental significance and capable of demonstration to a judicial body that is confined to the evidence in the record of a case and is not equipped with the facilities for factual investigation and the gathering of conflicting evidence which a legislative body would have. The scope and magnitude of the "evidence" proffered by Petitioner itself bespeaks an attempt that would more fittingly be directed to a legislature. The Court, as a matter of fact, has on more than one occasion with respect to penalties, pointed this out: see dissent of Mr. Justice White, concurred in by Mr. Justice Holmes, in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 384 (1910); dis-

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10/ 356 U.S. at 101.

sent of Mr. Justice Clark in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 682, 683 (1962); dissent of Mr. Justice White in Robinson v. California, supra, 370 U.S. at 689. At the least, the Court has taken cognizance of the comprehensive task involved in reaching the conclusion that a legislatively defined crime or legislatively fixed punishment is unconstitutional:

> "And for the proper exercise of such power [judicial power to judge the exercise of legislative power] there must be a comprehension of all that the legislature did or could take into account, -- that is, a consideration of the mischief and the remedy." Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 379.

The standard, then, is the much broader one implicit in "the dignity of man"; it requires only that the power to punish "be exercised within the limits of civilized standards". Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 100. The overriding applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment due process concept, which was absent in the Trop and Weems tests, is present in Robinson v. California, supra, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). There the Court concluded that it was "doubtless" that a law which made a criminal offense of a disease would universally be thought to be cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 11/ The fundamental character of the condemnation is therefore the gauge.

The narrow construction which Petitioner puts on "contemporary human knowledge", "public opinion enlightened by humane justice", and "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society", also fails prey to one of his own arguments. The United States Constitution is, to be sure, a vital organ which must be interpreted with deference to its elastic nature. This does not mean, however, that it may be construed solely to fit today's needs, desires and best judgment. That is employment more appropriate to laws, which can be made today and changed, modified, altered, amended, or repealed tomorrow. Laws can be experimented with. But the Constitution remains as it stands, subject only to infrequent and difficult-to-achieve amendment. If the Court were to construe the foundation document in terms of current world or national opinion, and assuming for the sake of argument that Petitioner has demonstrated total contemporary rejection

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11/ 370 U.S. at 666.

of the death penalty, the constitutional invalidation of capital punishment would remove it foreover as a penal sanction in this country, absent constitutional amendment.

Such finality should not be imposed when it has not been shown that the death penalty serves no legitimate purpose and, even more importantly, when no one can yet imagine the types or magnitudes of crimes that will surely evolve in future generations. Who, for example, envisioned twenty years ago that our society plagued with gun-point airplane highjacking, would find it necessary to define a new crime, commonly referred to as "skyjacking", and provide as a maximum the death penalty? 12/ Who today can imagine the new and more broadly sweeping crimes that can evolve in the increasingly complex, mobile, speeding, technological, interdependent society in which we live? It is all too well known that the flip of a switch can destroy millions. As the Court succinctly stated in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910):

12/ See Ga. Laws 1969, p. 741; Criminal Code of Georgia § 26-3301. (App. A, p. 5).

> "The future is their (constitution's) care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be." Id. at 373.

Note also that this statement immediately succeeds the Court's observation that the death penalty was not meant to be excluded by the Eighth Amendment prohibition.

The penalty here sought to be outlawed should be abolished by the law makers, if such a penalty is currently unacceptable as Petitioner says. Then, if ever again thought useful or necessary, it could likewise be reinstated. Experience would then provide a knowledgeable guideline by a number of states which at one time elected to abolish the penalty. 13/ But to ban it as a matter of constitutional imperative is not only unjustified in terms of its present posture but is also dangerous in terms of its future use. As it was pointed out on pre-

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13/ United States Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin, Number 45, August, 1969, Table 15, p. 30 [hereinafter cited as NPS].

vious occasions, the power of the legislature to define crimes and their punishment must yield only to a constitutional prohibition:

> "The function of the legislature is primary, its exercise fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be interferred with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of its wisdom or propriety. They have no limitation, we repeat, but constitutional ones, and what those are the judiciary must judge. We have expressed these elementary truths to avoid the misapprehension that we do not recognize to the fullest the wide range of power that the legislature possesses to adapt its penal laws to conditions as they may exist, and punish the crimes of men according to their forms and frequency." Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 379.

The same principle is reiterated in Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 103:

> "Courts must not consider the wisdom of statutes but neither can they sanction as being merely unwise that which the Constitution forbids."

And more recently in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971):

> "Our function is not to impose on the States, ex cathedra, what might seem to us a better system for dealing with capital cases. Rather it is to decide whether the Federal Constitution proscribes the present procedures of these two States in such cases." Id. at 195.

In the instant case, the antagonist to the traditional penalty has not only failed to show that it is constitutionally forbidden but even that it is unwise. Fundamental requirements of fairness and decency are what the Due Process Clause embodies, [14] and it is that bedrock standard which Petitioner must show capital punishment contravenes. It is abundantly evident that he has not proved his case.

Emphasis has been given to the due process setting in which the claim of cruel and unusual punishment must be viewed. This is not to deny that judicial measurements of Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment are not to be applied. Indeed they are, as is illus-

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14/ McGautha v. California, supra, 402 U.S. at 215.

trated by at least as early a case as Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra, 329 U.S. at 463 (1947).

The test of whether punishment is cruel and unusual in the constitutional sense has been variously stated in differing circumstances. In attempting to ascertain the meaning of the Eighth Amendment clause in the federal case of Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), the Court in part measured the mode of execution by the proposition that the Constitution forbids punishments of torture and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty. In that regard, death by electrocution does not fail the test. Ex Parte Kemmler, supra. Even Petitioner concedes as much. 15/

"Punishments are cruel", the Court said in Kemmler, "when they involve torture or a lingering death; . . . something inhuman and barbarous . . ." Ex parte Kemmler, supra, 136 U.S. at 447.

15/ Aikens Brief, App. I, p. 9i: "Under correct application," electrocution "insures a death that is both instantaneous and painless."

The meaning of cruel and unusual punishment was subsequently expanded and liberalized to cover a broader spectrum. Mr. Justice Field, in dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), precursed the concept that the inhibition is directed not only against punishments of a torturous character, "but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." Id. at 340. The punishment imposed in that case was, in Field's opinion, "a punishment at the severity of which, considering the offenses, it is hard to believe that any man of right feeling and heart can refrain from shuddering." Id. at 340. So measured, the punishment which has over the past several years been imposed by juries to at least most, if not all, of the approximately 660 persons now under death penalty in this country, cannot be said to be excessive in terms of the right feeling and heart of any man.

The Court in Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903) declined to set out a rule for determining what punishment is cruel and unusual or under what circumstances the Court would interfere with the decision of a state court in respect thereto. Reference was made instead to Ex parte Kemmler, supra.

The Court did say, however, that "Undue leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable punishment in another case to a cruel one." Howard v. Fleming, supra, 191 U.S. at 136. By that measurement, the penalty in the cases sub judice will stand.

The excessiveness concept outlined by Mr. Justice Field in O'Neil, supra, was applied in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). After reviewing the history of the cruel and unusual punishment clause and the judicial pronouncements concerning it, the Court concluded that the punishment provided by statute in Weems was cruel in its excess and unusual in its character. Thus, because of its degree and because of its kind, it was deemed invalid. Petitioner here, too, challenges the statutory punishment itself, rather than merely its application in his case. He says in effect that it is per se cruel and unusual. He assumes that it is "cruel" and directs his attention to an attempt at showing that it is also "unusual."

But is the death penalty excessive, that is, cruel, per se for murder and other crimes that take, or clearly and presently endanger, innocent life? It is inconceivable that in our system of justice the victim should be compelled

to suffer more than the attacker. The death penalty has always been regarded by this Court as constitutionally allowable as a punishment:

> "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, and something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Ex parte Kemmler, supra, 136 U.S. at 447.

Lest there be any doubt as to the meaning of that statement, the Court in Weems, supra, 217 U.S. at 370-371, explained:

> "It was not meant in the language we have quoted to give a comprehensive definition of cruel and unusual punishment, but only to explain the application of the provision to the punishment of death. In other words, to describe what might make the punishment of death cruel and unusual, though of itself it is not so."

Mr. Justice Burton repeated this precept with approval in his dissent in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,

supra, 329 U.S. at 463, footnote 4. More recently it was said:

> "At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment--and they are forceful--the death penalty has been employed throughout history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty." Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 99.

Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in McGautha v. California, supra, makes it plain:

> "The Eighth Amendment forbids 'cruel and unusual punishments.' In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the Framers intended to end capital punishment by the Amendment. Although some people have urged that

> this Court should amend the Constitution by interpretation to keep it abreast of modern ideas, I have never believed that lifetime judges in our system have any such legislative power. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)." Id. at 226.

It is not pretended that previous pronouncements foreclose the question. However, the consistent views expressed over the years by this Court on this subject illustrate that the death penalty is not an unacceptable punishment. It cannot be said that these views do not give expression to that common standard of decency required of punishment in our society by humane justice, or that they must be abandoned because contemporary human knowledge has rendered the death penalty constitutionally "unusual".

Returning to the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment clause and its previous construction by this Court, which serves to instruct as to its appropriate application in this case, the Weems definition was reiterated in the later federal case of Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 100. The Eighth Amendment merely circumscribes the power to punish so that it does not exceed "the limits of civilized standards."

Id. at 100. The punishment of denationalization for even a minor desertion in wartime was found to exceed these limits because it destroyed the political existence of the individual and his right to have rights. It was found to be excessive, contrary to "the dignity of man." The death penalty, when so measured, withstands the test. Execution is a traditional penalty which may be imposed depending on the enormity of the crime, the Court in Trop noted. Id. at 100. It is submitted that the Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that the death penalty is no longer clothed with validity. His primary assertion is that capital punishment has now become unusual in a constitutional sense because of the rarity of actual execution, and that that rarity proves its unacceptability in terms of "evolving standards of decency." The failure of his proofs to substantiate his claim is demonstrated subsequently.

"Unusual", that aspect of the clause to which Petitioner directs the weight of his argument, was given particular attention in footnote 32 of the Trop decision. Without concluding whether the word "unusual" should be given an independent meaning, it was observed that the Court:

> ". . . simply examines the particular punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual.'"

Going on, the Court suggested that:

> "If the word 'unusual' is to have any meaning apart from the word 'cruel', however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different from that which is generally done."

And why did the Court regard denationalization as "unusual" in this sense? Because:

> "[i]t was never explicity sanctioned by this Government until 1940 and never tested against the Constitution until this day." Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 100, fn. 32.

The death penalty on the other hand, has always been sanctioned in this country and is still sanctioned by the vast majority of jurisdictions here. It was such an integral part of the penal system when the Amendment was adopted that there

was not even a question so far as Respondent can find, in Congress or in any of the State legislatures to which it was sent for ratification, as to whether that Amendment conceivably excluded the death penalty. And as to its testing against the Constitution, it would appear that the question would have come up prior to this almost 200th year of our national history, if it had been regarded as debatable.

The "contemporary human knowledge" test which Petitioner extracts from Robinson v. California, supra, must be examined in its context in order to be a reliable guide in the present action. The Court said:

> "It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might determine that the general health and welfare require that the victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. But, in the

> light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, . . ." Id. at 666.

Thus, the Court considered the penalty to be so grossly antagonistic to contemporary human knowledge that universal thought would "doubtless" regard it as violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The same degree of attitude or opinion is not present in terms of capital punishment. Even Petitioner's statistics show that there is no "universal thought" in this country on its validity in the constitutional sense, or that such thought is "doubtless" a condemnatory one.

II

THE "INDICATORS" OF UNACCEPTABILITY OF DEATH AS A PENALTY ARE NOT RELIABLE YARDSTICKS, ARE NOT RELEVANT OR APPROPRIATE YARDSTICKS, AND DO NOT PROVIDE ACCURATE MEASURES FOR DETERMINING THAT STANDARD OF DECENCY BEYOND WHICH STATES MAY NOT GO IN FIXING PUNISHMENT.

It has been demonstrated that the antagonist has failed to take into account the due process aspect of the question before the Court, and the perimeters of that aspect have been explained. It has also been pointed out that the interpretation by the antagonist, of the tests heretofore enunciated and applied by this Court in construing the "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition, has been too narrow and has sought to restrict the Court to a simple present pulse-taking. A proper perspective of the question would sustain the punishment imposed, when history, experience, and purpose are scrutinized within the light of present knowledge. Leave that for the moment, however, and turn to the "proof" which Petitioner offers. It fails even the tests which he has proposed; that is, it fails to show that the standard which he has outlined is not being met by the State.

The premise which Petitioner attempts to prove, and which he says spells the doom of capital punishment, is that the death penalty has a fatal characteristic, i.e., "extreme contemporary rarity resulting from a demonstrable historical movement which can only be interpreted fairly as a mounting and today virtually universal repudiation." 16/ The following objective indicia, he asserts, all point to unacceptability by contemporary standards:

(1) The suggestion is made that there is a world-wide trend towards disuse for civilian crime, a de facto abolition.

Firstly, by excluding military crimes from discussion, Petitioner attempts to artificially limit the scope of the Eighth Amendment which, as exemplified by its application to wartime desertion in the case of Trop v. Dulles, supra, admits of no such restriction. What this distortion does is allow the argument to be made that the death penalty has been "abolished" in many countries. Petitioner has failed to point out that

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16/ Aikens Brief, p. 12.

it has been almost universally retained for war-time crimes or treason. 17/ The legislative restrictions on the use of the death penalty in this and other countries certainly do not constitute "abolition". It presents rather a matter of degree. Thus the moral and legal absolutes presented in Petitioner's Brief are hedged, he having excluded at the outset an entire class of crimes the inclusion of which would weaken his argument. Petitioner has tacitly admitted by this exclusion that the death penalty has not been outlawed but has at the most been restricted.

It is highly questionable, secondly, whether the international picture is an appropriate measure of whether a State has contravened our Federal Constitution. Although the Court in Trop took cognizance of the non-acceptability by civilized

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17/ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Capital Punishment (ST/SOA/SD/9-10) (1968).

nations of the world of statelessness as a punishment for crime, the penalty of denationalization in that case was of a peculiarly international character and involved the international political status of the person. Thus, the law of other nations was uniquely pertinent. It is not so with the penalty of death, which does not involve an individual's citizenship relationship with his country or others. The same Trop opinion, moreover, comments on the death penalty in terms of "our", meaning our Nation's, history.

It was to the States that Mr. Justice Frankfurter looked in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). In the dissent he tested the due process problem:

> "The manner in which the States have dealt with this problem furnishes a fair reflex, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, of the underlying feelings of our society about the treatment of persons who become insane while under sentence of death." Id. at 21.

In Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 380-381, the Court compared the Philippine punishment, for Eighth Amendment purposes, only with the law of

the United States and with other punishments in the Philippines.

Further, Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition that the Framers intended the test of "cruel and unusual punishment" to be a poll-taking of other countries' use of a particular punishment. It is unlikely that such a concept was envisioned.

And it cannot be said that the reports cited by Petitioner 18/ indicate a world-wide repudiation of such certainty that the death penalty contravenes the very dignity of man. Great Britain only abolished it after a trial period which indicates its own hesitancy, and Canada is still undergoing a five-year experiment that will expire unless affirmatively acted on by its Parliament. 19/ Such built-in vacillation

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18/ Aikens Brief, p. 27, fn. 46.

19/ See report of the "Limitation of Death Penalty in Canada" by J. R. Mutchmor, Christian Century, January 24, 1968, Vol. 85, page 120. Just prior to the enactment of the experimental abolition in Canada, the death penalty was retained by

(continued on next page)

by the two countries whose underlying philosophies are most closely allied with our own refutes the implication that our country alone remains barbaric.

In addition, the circumstances of other countries may indeed permit them to abolish the death penalty; their crime rates and penal facilities, their systems of criminal law and their underlying concepts of crime, themselves undoubtedly each affected the decision to abolish. Thus, the mere number of such foreign countries have no effect on the constitutionality of what, in most of these United States, is regarded as a legitimate and needed penalty for crime.

(2) The Petitioner alleges that the countries have abandoned capital punishment because of their concern with fundamental human decency, which he says is illustrated by an intense concern of religious groups, a crusade fervor with which the forces against the death penalty have moved, and anti

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a vote of 143 to 112 despite the fact that Prime Minister Lester Pearson and the leaders of all other major parties favored abolishing it. "Time", April 15, 1966, Volume 87, page 40.

capital punishment opinions of highly respected persons. Bedau lists examples of literature stating the case for capital punishment. 20/

The "objective indicator" which is thus put forth is merely contrived as a bald conclusion. Without a careful study of the circumstances under which a foreign country designed to discontinue use of the death penalty, it cannot be surmised that its reason was that which Petitioner wishes it to be. A conclusion, especially of the magnitude made by Petitioner in this regard, cannot reliably be drawn from a small and carefully selected set of illustrations, especially ones that do not even accurately portray what they portend to. For example, the fervor of crusade alluded to is indicative of most, if not all, attempts to reverse time-honored and traditional concepts and practices. It does not "show" that the reason for abolition is basically a concern with fundamental human decency. It goes without saying that forces

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20/ Bedau, The Death Penalty in America (Rev. ed 1967), p. 120. See also, Bernard Lande Cohen, Law Without Order (1970).

destructive of society are also often imbued with the fervor of a crusade.

(3) Petitioner condemns what he regards as the mainstay of support for the death penalty. This "indicator of unacceptability" is the belief in retribution, atonement, or vengeance. The implication is that such is not a legitimate purpose.

In the first place, punishment for its own sake is not regarded in law as unconstitutional. The Court in Trop referred to this in finding that the purpose of denationalization was simply to punish the deserter: "There is no other legitimate purpose that the statute could serve," the Court concluded. "Here the purpose [of the law] is punishment, and therefore the statute is a penal law." Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 97. Mr. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Trop, indicated that if the sole purpose of punishment was retribution, the punishment was not a valid one. Not incidentally, in discussing the purposes of the penal law, he noted that the thought of death as a penalty would serve the legitimate purpose of deterrence. Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 112.

It is patent that the death penalty serves a number of legitimate ends of punishment, contrary to Petitioner's contention. Such recognized purposes are deterrence of the wrongful act by threat of punishment (Trop, supra, concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, 256 U.S. at 111-112; Robinson, supra, dissent of Mr. Justice Clark, 370 U.S. at 68; Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 530 [1968]); the protection of society itself and of its members (Solesbee v. Balkcom, supra, 339 U.S. at 13; Robinson, supra, concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, 370 U.S. at 677; Trop, supra, Mr. Justice Brennan concurring opinion, 256 U.S. at 111-112: included as a purpose of the penal law is the insulation of society from a dangerous individual by imprisonment "or execution"); the repression of crime and prevention of repetition (Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 381).

How can it possibly be said that the death penalty does not act to deter would-be crime perpetrators from carrying out their schemes? In Powell, supra, 392 U.S. at 531, the Court presumed that the very existence of criminal sanctions serves to reinforce condemnation of murder, rape and other anti-social conduct. It cannot, on

the other hand, be presumed that the threat of death has not stayed the hand and saved the life, simply because the penalty has failed to deter those who commit capital felonies. Statistics could never be gathered to prove how many capital crimes were averted by the existence of the death penalty, for no census gatherer or poll-taker could persuade even one person to admit that he would have committed a murder, or rape, or an armed robbery, or a kidnapping, but for the knowledge that he could have received the death penalty! It is in the very nature of man to recoil the most strenuously from forfeiture of his life. Although this deterrent effect cannot for lack of knowledge be measured in terms of the numbers of capital crimes NOT committed, other indications of the prevailing belief in the superior deterrent effect of the death penalty are recitable:

a) Six of the states which have partially abolished the death penalty have retained it for certain crimes. New York, Vermont, North Dakota, and Rhode Island are particularly notable for retaining it for murders committed by certain prisoners, and New York and Vermont retain it also for murder of a police officer or certain persons in[21]

21/ NPS, p. 30.

the prisons. What primary purpose could these carefully selected exceptions have other than deterrence? Certainly the exceptions do not bear witness to a greater value being placed on some victims' lives than on others. The resultant disservice of such circumscription as New York placed is tragically illustrated by the recent prison uprising in which a woefully large number of persons, some civilian, were killed; it is doubtful that all of the prisoners responsible were "lifers". New York's law, however, arbitrarily limits the death penalty "for persons found guilty of killing a peace officer who is acting in the line of duty, and for prisoners under a life sentence who murder a guard or inmate while in confinement or while escaping from confinement."22/

b) The threat of the death penalty for armed robbery palpably serves as a deterrent; it is common knowledge that robbers frequently accomplish their evil ends with unloaded weapons. Can it be said that this is not because they are aware that an armed robbery can draw the death penalty but an unarmed robbery cannot? 23/

22/ NPS, p. 30.

23/ Criminal Code of Georgia, §§ 26-1901 and -1902.

A burglar, too, realizing that he risks the death penalty if in the course of his venture, his gun goes off and someone is killed, may well be persuaded to guarantee against that possibility.

c) The deterrent value of the death penalty vis-a-vis other penalties was documented at some length in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on S. 1760, March 20, 21, and July 2, 1968, pages 187-192 of the Report. The deterrent effect was shown by evidence of experience, by the psychology of deterrence, and by statistics.

(4) The next insupportable "indicator" is Petitioner's statement that the United States has overwhelmingly rejected the death penalty as shown by the decreasing trend of executions since 1930 even though many jurisdictions retain the death penalty on the books.

This is grossly misleading. In the first place, the fact that only fourteen states of fifty [25] have

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25/ This and the other statistics mentioned in this section are drawn from NPS, Table 15, p. 30. (continued on next page)

abolished the death penalty either partially or completely cannot be explained away by saying that the majority have it only on their books but do not actually use it. The fact cannot be escaped that America is not yet ready, if ever it will be, to abandon capital punishment altogether. It is not prepared to do that even by legislative action, much less by constitutional fiat declaring it contrary to the fundamental concepts of ordered liberty.

The retention states have not ignored the law that is on their books nor the question now being posed. Eleven states have experimented with abolition and have subsequently restored the penalty, and of those eleven, only three reabolished it and one of those reabolitions occurred in the Nineteenth Century. In the forty years from 1917 to 1957, only the state of Missouri abolished the death penalty, and it was restored in that state in 1919 and

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Also, N. M. Stat. Ann. (1969 Cum. pocket part) § 40A-29-2.1. (Aikens Brief, App. G. p. 9 g.).

remains in force. Since 1947, when Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra, was decided, only seven states have abolished the death penalty while two enacted partial abolitions. One of the seven, Delaware, restored the penalty after three years' experience. Viewed in another perspective, in the thirteen years since Trop v. Dulles, supra, only four states abolished the death penalty, plus the two which adopted partial abolition. It is therefore stretching the point to incredulity to say that the penalty has been overwhelmingly rejected in this country, or that there is any "trend" in this regard.

Affirmative displays of desired retention have recently been demonstrated by the Illinois referendum in December, 1970 26/ and by the results of an extensive study undertaken in Georgia by Study Committees of the

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26/ Reported in "Newsweek," January 11, 1971, pp. 23, 24, 27.

Senate and of the House in 1966 and 1967.27/ Public hearings were held in a number of locations throughout Georgia, written material on the subject was examined, persons responsible for administration of the penal laws were queried, and inquiries were made of the states classified as having abolished capital punishment, with respect to their crime rates before and after abolition and with respect to life imprisonment as the maximum penalty. Based on these studies, the majority reports of each of the Committees recommended retention of the death penalty.

Other clear indications of the Nation's attitude and opinion, which must have at least some bearing on the "standards of decency" which the

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27/ 1966 House Journal, p. 2669, contains the Senate Report; 1968 House Journal, p. 3451, contains the House Report. The Senate Committee was created pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 107. Senate Journal 1965, p. 1226. The House Committee was created pursuant to House Resolution No. 3, House Journal 1967, p. 15.

community embraces, are the results of numerous polls. The polls collected by Erskine in 34 Public Opinion Quarterly (1970-71) bear witness to the high percentages of persons in this country who favor capital punishment. The Gallup polls indicate a rise from 45% to 51% "For Capital Punishment" between the years 1965 and 1969. "Time" magazine on June 6, 1969, pp. 26, 27, reported the results of a Louis Harris poll which indicated that 48% of the Americans questioned favored capital punishment while 38% did not. Among men, 58% favored it and among women, 40%. "Nation's Business" reported in its November, 1970, issue, vol. 58 p. 28, that the results of its October invitation to "Sound Off to the Editor" on "Should the death penalty be abolished?," were that four out of five replies were "no". The readers in this case were of course primarily businessmen. Taking into account that most states and the federal government retain the death penalty, it is significant that the much touted opposition did not take advantage of the opportunity to show their numbers in this poll. The vote was notably nearly two to one in favor of the death penalty in a poll undertaken by a national women's magazine, "Good Housekeeping", and reported in the November

1969 issue, vol. 169 p. 24. 62.1% favored it and 35.8% were against it; only 2.1% reported "no opinion".

The Court in Trop, supra, was therefore demonstrably correct when it stated that the death penalty is still widely accepted in this country, and Petitioner's attempt to discredit that statement or prove that it is no longer valid falls short of its goal. Although polls are not solid proof, they are an acceptable barometer when an "indication" will suffice for the purposes of the question in inquiry. The Court allowed as much in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520, fn. 16 (1968).

Petitioner overlooks the most significant and reliable measuring device, and the one that is more pertinent to this inquiry than any other. That is the contemporary American jury. The Court itself pointed to this keystone in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at 519-520:

> "Guided by neither rule nor standard, 'free to select or reject as it [sees] fit,' a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do

> little more--and must do nothing less--than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death...."28/

Let us look at what the juries are doing in this country. In 1968, 102 persons received the death sentence; in 1967, 85 persons were so sentenced; in 1966, 118 death sentences were imposed; in 1965, 86; in 1964, 106; in 1963, 93; in 1962, 103; in 1961, 140. 29/ Thus, in only eight years of the last decade,

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28/ "And one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system, a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'"

29/ NPS, Table 4, p. 12.

833 persons received the death sentence in the United States. Assuming that in all cases it was a jury which made the determination of this penalty, the total number of persons thus selected by the random methods employed to obtain jurors representing a fair cross-section of the community amounted to 9,996 or almost ten thousand persons! Keeping in mind that these conscientious people, sworn to dispatch the solemn duties of meting out justice, were faced with actual cases and real defendants, and that they deemed the death penalty appropriate in a very real sense and through a very personal involvement in the debate, the significance of these figures is indisputable. It is abundantly evident, therefore, that the people do not believe that we can afford to dispense with the death penalty as an effective weapon against crime in our society.

The juries in the two Georgia cases at bar were selected in accordance with the requirements of Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, (A. 12-15). Insofar as the penalty was concerned, only those prospective jurors who stated in voir dire that they would not even consider returning a verdict in accordance with the maximum provided by law, were excluded for cause.

In Furman's case, only one member of the panel of 48 was disqualified for this reason. So out of 49 persons randomly selected to represent the community by jury duty, only 2%, when faced with a specific case in which the decision as to punishment would be his, affirmatively indicated that he would refuse to impose capital punishment regardless of the evidence (A. 13). Even the juror who indicated a general opposition to capital punishment saw fit to impose the penalty in this case (A. 12, 21). In Jackson's case (No. 69-5030), of a total of 60 prospective jurors submitted to the voir dire, 12, or only 1 out of 5, similarly were disqualified (A. 33-37).

In Georgia, 33 persons are currently under death penalty (App. C, pp.1-6). All were sentenced by juries. Eight were sentenced within the last two years.

The attitudes of the community thus reflected show conclusively that the death penalty is far from being rejected, much less "overwhelmingly rejected", and is certainly not universally thought of in this country as being contrary to standards of decency.

(5) Petitioner misconceives the conclusion he draws from the data concerning the number of executions in the United States in recent years. The penalty, he says, is no longer in actual use because the incidence of executions is "freakishly rare". The conclusion that this is the result of "prevailing" abolitionist sentiment is undocumented and insupportable. Contrarily, it is demonstrable that there have been fewer executions recently because the condemned criminals have averted the carrying out of the penalty by pursuing a variety of appeals and other post-conviction proceedings. The proper conclusion to be drawn is that our system of law is increasingly providing greater and wider opportunity for the convicted defendant to challenge the proceedings which ultimately resulted in his sentence. The perfection of our system of criminal justice is the apex sought as we constantly strive for the greatest degree of fairness. The advancement well known to this Court need hardly be given illustration. It is marked by requirements tending towards greater impartiality of juries and their freedom from prejudice or discrimination, by safeguards against involuntary confessions and erroneous lineup identification, by provision for effective assistance of counsel for all who are charged with crime. This advancement, which assures

more than ever before that a man will be afforded due process by a full panoply of protections, also allows review of his trial to a greater degree, by more tribunals, and subject to a finer scrutiny through the use of verbatim transcripts and post-conviction evidentiary hearings. And that development, taken advantage of by prisoners whether under prison terms or under death penalty, bears most heavily on the carrying out of executions in recent years.

The status of persons subject to capital punishment in Georgia provides a concrete and irrefutable picture which is likely repeated in state after state. Limitations of time and information prevent a revelation of such scope here. In Georgia, however, there are actually 33 persons now under death penalty. This number is not reflected in the published statistics because many of the prisoners are in county jails rather than in the State penitentiary, since it is the policy of Georgia to retain a man locally while he has legal proceedings pending. Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 171, as amended; Ga. Code Ann. § 77-309(c) and (d) (App. A, p. 13a).

By the same token, condemned prisoners are generally to be sent to the State penitentiary not more than twenty days nor less than two days prior to the date set for execution. Ga. Laws 1924, p. 195; Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2514 (App. A, pp. 8a-9a). During periods of stays of execution, prisoners are to be incarcerated in the jail of the sentencing county. 30/ As described in detail in the chart submitted at Appendix C, of the 33 present cases, 13 persons currently have petitions for certiorari pending before this Court, 7 have motions for new trial pending before the trial courts, 5 have habeas corpus proceedings in motion or on appeal, and 2 have executions stayed. One person is in prison out-of-state and 3 are awaiting the setting of new execution dates. 31/ The court proceedings in progress involve numerous

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30/ Opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, 1959, pp. 245-246.

31/ App. C, p. 10c.

alleged grounds, the variety of which demonstrates that the decisions in the cases now before the Court may very well not affect any of them. (App. C, pp. 1-6).

It is plain, at any rate, that it is not public opinion that has caused a cessation in executions but rather an expansion of post-conviction remedies which are being invoked to a greater degree. The fallacy of Petitioner's conclusion concerning public opinion is also pointed out by the numbers of persons sentenced to death in the last few years. 32/ It is contrary to common sense to conclude that the juries which imposed capital punishment on 102 felons in 1968 did so in the belief or hope that the penalty would not be carried out. 33/

As to Petitioner's assertion that the death penalty is a southern phenomenon, it is noted that although the "South" is classified as one of five geographi al groups, it comprises one-third of the fifty-two jurisdictions

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32/ Supra, pp. 62-63.

33/ NPS, p. 12.

counted. 34/ It is more to the point of this case, however, that mere geographical predominence does not render a penalty constitutionally prohibited. The fact that the northern state of New York retains the death penalty only for persons found guilty of killing a peace officer who is acting in line of duty and for prisoners under life sentence who murder a guard or inmate while in confinement or while escaping from confinement 35/ does not render Georgia's retention of the death penalty for the murder of anyone unconstitutional. A harsher sentence in one state does not make it cruel and unusual for that reason. As the Court observed in Howard v. Fleming, supra, 191 U.S. at 136, in sustaining a state sentence against an attack that it was cruel and unusual:

> "If the effect of this sentence is to induce like criminals to avoid its territory, North Carolina is to

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34/ Aikens Brief, p. 38.

35/ NPS, Table 15, p. 30, note (a).

be congratulated, not condemned."

(6) The "rarity" which is alluded to in the abortive attempt to disprove the generally wide acceptance of the death penalty as a viable tool of crime prevention and criminal justice in this country, has previously been put in its more accurate perspective. The faulty conclusions relied on in this regard therefore miss wide the mark. As reemphasized lately by the Court in McGautha v. California, supra, 402 U.S. at 213 : ". . . it requires a strong showing to upset [a] settled practice of the Nation on constitutional grounds." Even Petitioner admits that the "rarities" he proffers only "imply" American unacceptance of the death penalty for consideration by the Court of the constitutional issue at hand.36/

36/ Aikens Brief, p. 39.

And the implications from the public opinion polls might, more logically than Petitioner concludes, be that Americans are alarmed by the growth of crime in their country and by the evidences of disrespect for the law which they see around them.

We say "more logically" because it does not stand to reason, as Petitioner contends, that a polled person will indicate an opinion contrary to what Petitioner purports is a universal attitude, meanwhile harboring a belief against capital punishment. What could possibly induce the polled public to speak for capital punishment and deliberately take what Petitioner regards as an unpopular and "condemned" stand? It stands to reason, instead, that the polled public means what it says and that the "overwhelming rejection" is a fiction. Thus, the "swings in public opinion" referred to by Petitioner 37/ may instead reflect a belief that the lack of actual carrying out of death sentences

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37/ Aikens Brief, p. 39.

imposed in the last several years is directly related to the rise in the rate of serious crimes.

(7) Petitioner suggests that the number of death penalties meted out and the number of actual executions now taking place is an objective indicator that the American conscience has repudiated the penalty. Much has already been discussed in refutation, but an additional point needs to be made with regard to the number of death sentences imposed by today's juries. The proportionately fewer instances in which juries find the death penalty mandated may well indicate not their revulsion to it (or they would not impose it at all) but rather a more stringent demand for a showing of aggravated circumstances than previously. Thus, BECAUSE it is evident that juries are giving greater caution before selecting the death penalty, and BECAUSE it occurs almost exclusively in instances of heinous crime, 38/ juries are shown to reserve the death penalty for unusual cases. There is all the more reason to retain

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38/ See App. C, pp. 1c - 6c.

it as a constitutional penalty. Both the imposition and the carrying out of a death penalty in this country today are surrounded with greater safeguards and humanitarian considerations than have existed in the past. The expanded guarantees of due process, as well as the increasingly more conscientious, knowledgeable, and more cautious jury, give added reason for retaining rather than abolishing it. Our system of criminal justice assures more than ever before that those who are ultimately required to pay the maximum penalty will have had a full measure of due process protection and the responsible consideration of his peers. Such a framework must be regarded as adding to the constitutionality of the death penalty. That it may result in fewer actual impositions and executions should not, because of that additional due process, result in unconstitutionality of the penalty. The "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition surely does not compel depriving the states which are concerned with ordered liberty, and the jurors who act directly on behalf of the citizens of the States, of the freedom to impose and carry out the traditionally maintained penalty of death where justified.

(8) Petitioner refers next to what he describes as a "secrecy" which envelopes executions and suppresses the truth about them from subjection to public opinion. The fact that they are not carried out in the open public objectively indicates, he intimates, that society must therefore regard this punishment as repellent.

No distinction is made between the society which Petitioner alleges is the suppressor and the society which is "unenlightened" and the society which allegedly is thus shown to consider it repugnant. It strains logic to believe that society is so chameleon, or that one hand does not know what the other hand is doing.

Moreover, it is provincial to suggest that the public does not realize the import of an execution. The numerous articles that Petitioner himself cites bear witness to the fact that a great deal of literature is put before the public to inform it of the subject. The anatomy of an execution has been repeatedly described and discussed and testified to at various public hearings, as Petitioner himself acknowledges, e.g., at footnote 89, page 45 of the Aikens Brief and Appendix I therein. Illustrative also is the type of article that appeared in "The Atlanta Journal and Constitution Magazine" last

year. 39/ The article graphically pictured and described the electric chair and procedure used in Georgia. It is notable that the reams written on the subject and directed to the public has not led to abolition of capital punishment in these United States.

As to information concerning executions, the news media policy of the State Board of Corrections is an open one. 40/ A recent pertinent example of the application of this policy was

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39/ "The Death Penalty: Have We Walked The Last Mile?", the first of a two-article series by John Pennington appearing in the issues of August 30 and September 6, 1970.

40/ Secretary of State, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, "Rules of the State Board of Corrections," Sec. 125-1-2-.05; App. A., p. 16a.

the televised interview of Petitioner Lucious Jackson, Jr. (Case No. 69-5030) by NBC on the "Xerox Quarterly Report", September 8, 1971. Thus it cannot be said that knowledge of executions is suppressed.

As to the assertion that executions are carried out "clandestinely", the date of execution is made a part of the sentence itself, which is a public record. 41/ Also, the condemned person may have present, if he desires, his counsel, relatives, and such clergyman and friends as he wishes. 42/

This introduces the pivotal point regarding the fact that executions are carried out privately.

41/ A. 5, Ga. Laws 1924, p. 195; Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2514, App. A. pp. 8a - 9a.

42/ Ga. Laws 1924, p. 196; 1956, pp. 161, 182; Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2515, App. A. p. 10a.

(9) Petitioner suggests that such privacy indicates society's revulsion to public execution. That is indeed true. Such a mode of carrying out the penalty imposed is now generally considered barbaric because it unnecessarily robs the condemned man of the last vestiges of dignity. Decency calls for an abandonment of the public circus atmosphere of execution, not for the abandonment of execution itself.

The humane method predominantly invoked is regarded as sufficient to serve the purposes of the punishment. It is the obvious consensus that requiring a condemned man to make a spectacle of himself in his last hour is too great a price to extract for the additional deterrent value such a procedure might have.

No authority is advanced, nor is any known to Respondent, for the proposition that the deterrent effect of the death penalty is erased by imposing it privately. That the would-be capital felon would be deterred only by the sight of another's forfeiture of life and would not be deterred at all by the thought of the forfeiture of his own, is simply not supportable.

(10) The discretionary aspect which the death penalty now has, Petitioner contends, provides its only basis of acceptability to the public.

While it may be true that a rigid, mandatory use of the death penalty, to cover all manner of acts forbidden within the definition of a capital crime, might impose cruel and unusual punishment on a particular offender, it does not follow that individualization of penalty by the device of minimum - maximum penal laws reaches the same result. It goes without saying that the discretionary aspect of the death penalty, as well as other penalties, removes the very arbitrariness of which Petitioner complains. The feature of discretion allows the jury to take a less wooden approach to penalty. Most importantly in the context of the present inquiry, it allows the community standard to be more immediately felt and applied and is more direct than any change in statute. That juries do impose the death penalty under this procedure makes it abundantly evident that such is as close a reflection of community standards as is presently possible and that it is not, moreover, a result of insensitive or slow-moving legislative directive. The function of the jury as maintaining a link between community values and the penal system is noted in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at 519.

(11) Another indefensible "indicium of unacceptability" is Petitioner's reference to the identity of death penalty prisoners.

Petitioner admits that evidence supporting his theory cannot be brought forth. This omission in itself is fatal to the premise because the burden is his to establish the unconstitutionality claimed. 43/ Certainly he cannot do so by mere innuendo.

Moreover, it can hardly be presumed that the juries in this country have conspired to sentence only certain classes of persons within our society, or that the juries responsible for the death penalties now outstanding were infected with an impermissible discrimination. If the Petitioner in any case now before the Court believes he was unconstitutionally discriminated against because of his status in society, he has not shown so. And the tools for doing so have been made clear and available. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra.

43/ McGautha v. California, supra, 402 U.S. at 203.

In addition, safeguards against arbitrariness or other lack of due process for disadvantaged persons have increased substantially in the last several decades. Added to those previously mentioned is the right to effective assistance of counsel for the indigent, to cite just one.

It is submitted that if it appears that those receiving the death penalty fall primarily into one particular class or another, it is not because of some rampant discrimination but rather because the rate of capital felonies is proportionately higher by far among such groups. The 1970 Annual Report of the Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department 44/ shows in that year a total of 55 murders committed by white persons and 187 murders committed by Negro persons. 45/ Thirty-one persons were killed by white assailants, and one-hundred eighty-seven persons were killed by Negro assailants.46/

44/ City of Atlanta Department of Police, 91st Annual Report, December 31, 1970.

45/ Supra, p. 15.

46/ Supra, p. 15.

Eighty-eight cases of rape by a Negro male were booked, while the total for white males was 18. 47/ The facts are thus destructive of the presumption.

(12) Petitioner asserts that since the legislatures have failed for various reasons to give expression to the public conscience in this area, the Court must do so.

As has been demonstrated, however, the public conscience has not condemned the death penalty per se. Nor have the courts. The decisions of the state high courts have consistently upheld the death penalty against claims that it is contrary to the cruel and unusual punish-

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47/ Supra, p. 41.

ment provision of the Constitution. 48/

48/ Recent cases holding that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment are: Butler v. State, 285 Ala. 387, 232 S.2d 631 (1970); State v. Davis, 158 Ct. 341, 260 A.2d 587 (1969); Rivers v. State, 226 S.2d 337 (Fla. 1969); Wilson v. State, 225 S.2d 321 (Fla. 1969); Massey v. State, 222 Ga. 143 (1966); Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7 (1964); People v. Walcher, 42 Ill.2d 159, 246 N.E.2d 256 (1969); State v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 221 S.2d 473 (1969); Bartholomey v. State, 260 Md. 504, 273 A.2d 164 (1971); Duiser v. State, 441 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1969); State v. Calhoun, 460 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1970); State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E.2d 345 (1969); State v. Kelback, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297 (1969); State v. Cerny, 480 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1971).

Such an objective indicator as a survey of state judicial consideration and pronouncement provides a most relevant and appropriate yardstick.

It is thus abundantly clear that Petitioner has failed to make that strong showing required to upset the settled practice of the Nation on constitutional grounds. McGautha v. California, supra, 402 at 203, and the cases cited therein.

III

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS AN APPROPRIATE MAXIMUM PENALTY FOR MURDER IN OUR SOCIETY TODAY AND ITS USE IS NOT FORBIDDEN TO THE STATES AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.

It was submitted at the outset of this discussion on "indicators" 49/ that, in addition to the fact that Petitioner has not made his case, a proper perspective of the question would of itself sustain the death penalty as a punishment, when history, experience, and the light of present knowledge are scrutinized. These criteria, posed in McGautha v. California, supra, 402 U.S. at 207-208, as the relevant factors to be considered, soundly indicate that the death penalty should not be declared offensive to the Constitution. The purposes of the death penalty as a means of controlling crime and protecting society have already been discussed, and the country's long experience with it does not teach that it has no relevancy to these goals. The experience of those states which have deleted it from their laws has provided a track record of over

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49/ See p. 45.

fifty years in some instances, and yet that experience has not persuaded the great majority of states to join them.

As to history, this Court has on a number of occasions examined the historical context in which the Eighth Amendment was adopted. 50/ It is clear that at the time the amendments known as the Bill of Rights were considered by Congress and subsequently by the state legislatures to which they were sent for ratification in 1789, there was no question that the death penalty was

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50/ Ex parte Kemmler, supra, 136 U.S. at 446, et seq.; O'Neil v. Vermont, supra, 144 U.S. at 339 et seq.; Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. 368, et seq.; 389, et seq.; Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 100. See also Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Vol. I, Yale University Press, 4th Printing 1934; Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791, University of North Carolina Press, 1955, Perry and Cooper, Sources of Our Liberties, American Bar Foundation, 1959.

not regarded as cruel and unusual punishment. The same First Congress which adopted the Bill of Rights approved an act setting the punishment for certain crimes against the United States, on April 30, 1790. It provided the penalty of death for a number of crimes, including treason (Section 2), murder (section 3), a number of high seas crimes (sections 5 and 9), rescue of a capital felon (section 23), forgery of, and other crimes related to, public securities (section 14), and others. 51/

From that early time until this, the death penalty has been an integral part of our penal system, and has been accepted as a legitimate and necessary instrument in the exercise of the right of the sovereign to protect itself and its constituents. This Court has itself given what appears to be tacit approval of the penalty as a means, both in some of the cases hereinbefore discussed in such later cases as Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).

51/ Annals of Congress, Vol. II, Appendix pp. 2274, 2281.

The crux of the matter is that nothing appears in the instant cases to compel, or even to warrant, a reversal of this development.

IV

THERE IS NO ISSUE IN THIS CASE CONCERNING PETITIONER'S MENTAL CONDITION AT THE TIME THE SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED BECAUSE (1) NO QUESTION WAS RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW, EITHER AT TRIAL OR SUBSEQUENTLY, AND (2) THERE ARE NO FACTS WHICH CAST ANY REAL DOUBT ON PETITIONER'S MENTAL COMPETENCY AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING; RATHER THE RECORD PLAINLY SHOWS OTHERWISE.

Petitioner attempts to raise at this juncture a challenge to his mental "soundness" in September, 1968, when he was tried and sentenced. In terms capable of application in a legal sense and relevant to a judicial inquiry, he apparently refers to mental competency.

It has been pointed out in Respondent's Statement of the Case [52] that the question is a new one in the long history of this case. No mention at all was made of it at trial. The record is vacant of any comment whatsoever in this regard. Had counsel thought him incompetent, he surely would have made some mention of it before or during the

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52/ Supra, pp. 10-11.

course of the trial. He had instigated psychiatric examination of Petitioner in October, 1967, shortly after the crime was committed (A. 6, 8), but following Petitioner's return to the court in April, no assertion appears during the months of preparation which culminated in the September trial. No plea of insanity was made [53], nor was any defense of insanity offered. Not the slightest bit of evidence appears. Nor was any complaint made in this regard in the motion for new trial or in the amended motion for new trial. [54] The enumeration of errors submitted to the court below is also devoid of any suggestion along such line (R., unnumbered pages). Moving along, the Petition for Certiorari filed in this Court also contains no such assertion, and even the Reply Brief bears no reference. Since no complaint was made in all of the time and throughout all of the proceedings beginning with Petitioner's return for trial up until the present Brief on the Merits, no question exists which addresses itself to the consideration of this Court. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1957);

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[53] As provided by Ga. Code (1933) § 27-1502; App. A., p. 7a.

[54] R. 20, 34-43.

Barbour v. Georgia, 249 U.S. 454 (1919); Rules, Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 23(1)(f). Not only is there no substantial federal question, there is no question at all.

Moreover, a careful scrutiny of the record unearths no facts which cast any real doubt on Petitioner's mental competency at the time of trial and sentencing. He now alludes to two letters purportedly made a part of the record, which letters were not in the record before the court below, and he claims that they raise substantial doubts concerning his competency. Presumably he means at the time of trial and/or sentencing, although this is not made clear. The letters, even if they had been made available to the Supreme Court of Georgia, could have made no difference whatsoever in connection with its decision. The reason, as noted above, is that no point was made to which they would be relevant. Nor are the letters probative at all in terms of Petitioner's assertion here. The one dated closest to the time of trial plainly states that Petitioner was not psychotic, knew right from wrong and was "able to cooperate with his counsel in preparing his defense" (Petitioner's Brief, App. A, p. 3b).

The record, on the other hand, demonstrates Petitioner's competency. Although he may not have understood the legal terminology or concepts when first questioned by his counsel and the court, he obviously understood plain English and made the determination to tell the jury his side of the story (A. 50-55). To say that he did not comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him, or that he was unable to assist counsel in the preparation of his defense, is thus baseless.

V.

GEORGIA LAW SAFEGUARDS AN INSANE MAN FROM EXECUTION

Petitioner moves from his contention regarding competency at time of sentencing to insanity at the time of execution. If that be his concern, again there is no cause for the Court's consideration of the matter. The State wholeheartedly agrees with the assertion that the execution of an insane person would offend basic precepts of humanitarianism. It has provided statutory avenues designed to prevent such a miscarriage. The record indicates that none have been pursued on Petitioner's behalf, and therefore he cannot assert before this Court that the State has deprived him of due process or thereby inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment on him. He has not, to put it succinctly, exhausted his remedies, and therefore, any question in this regard that might arise is not only not ripe for review, it has not yet been born.

The safeguards referred to provide for an investigation into the sanity of the person under death penalty. Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 988, 989; Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2602. Ga. Laws 1874, p. 30; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 27-2603 and 27-2604.

This procedure is mentioned by Petitioner at page 18 of his brief and is recited in Appendix A thereto, page 3a. However, he omits recital of section 27-2603, which may be found herein in Appendix A, p. 10a. It is a special procedure provided for capitally sentenced felons and its substance has been reviewed and approved by this Court. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1949). In all other cases, the authority to transfer mentally ill inmates is vested in the State Board of Corrections, the procedure to be set out by the Director. Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 173, as amended; Ga. Code Ann. § 77-310(d); App. A., pp. 14a-15a. Opinions of the Attorney General, 1968, No. 68-136, p. 162.

The legal test of insanity, for purposes of determining whether an allegedly insane convict should be executed, as applied in a Governor's investigation, is as follows:

> "Whether the prisoner after conviction has the mental ability to comprehend: (1) the offenses for which he was tried; (2) the nature of and the reason for the punishment to be imposed upon him; and (3) any facts or circumstances whch might make his punishment unlawful,

> and whether he has the ability to make these facts or circumstances known either to his counsel or to the court." Opinions of the Attorney General, 1968, No. 68-310, p. 443. See also Brown v.State, 215 Ga. 784 (1960); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 204 Ga. 122 (1949), affirmed 339 U.S. 9 (1949).

There is thus no cause for complaint in this regard.

Even if there had been raised any question concerning Petitioner's mental condition at the time of imposition of sentence, Georgia law provides for judicial inquiry in such a case. 55/ The trial judge may, in its discretion, order a mental or psychiatric examination.

Due process does not require, as a matter of constitutional law, the type of inquiry suggested by Petitioner, nor should it. Petitioner demands judicial examination into, and determination of, whether he is competent to be executed and whether he is mentally capable

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55/ Ga. Laws 1889, p. 156; 1950, p. 427, 428; Ga. Code Ann. § 24-3005; App. A., p.2a.

of receiving a death sentence. Such considerations, even with the assistance of medical experts, would be impossible of calculation. Who could possibly foretell what effect the imposition of a particular sentence will have on a man's sanity? By what gauge could it be ascertained what his mental condition will be in the future at time of execution? There is, moreover, nothing in this case which would indicate on hindsight that the sentence should not have been imposed due to its effect on Petitioner's mental condition.

Finally, there is no valid connection between (a) the lack of a sua sponte judicial inquiry into Petitioner's mental capacity to receive sentence and (b) the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The question, if there had been one in this case, would direct itself to the requirements of due process, as in Solesbee v. Balkcom, supra, and not to the Eighth Amendment.

CONCLUSION

It is unavoidably clear that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in this case does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

mendments, and that the judgment of the upreme Court of Georgia should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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I, Dorothy T. Beasley, Attorney of Record for the Respondent herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, I served the foregoing Brief for Respondent on the Petitioner by depositing copies of the same in a United States mailbox, with first class postage prepaid, addressed to counsel of record at their post office addresses:

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This _____ day of September, 1971.

_____
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES INVOLVED

Ga. Code Ann. (1970 Cumulative Pocket Part) § 6-805. Preparation of record for appeal; reporting of evidence and other matter when narrative form used. - (f) Where any party contends that the transcript or record does not truly or fully disclose what transpired in the trial court and the parties are unable to agree thereon, the trial court shall set the matter down for a hearing with notice to both parties, and resolve the difference so as to make the record conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record on appeal or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or the trial court, either before or after the record is transmitted to the appellate court, on a proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the omission of misstatement shall be corrected, and, if necessary, that a supplemental record shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk of the trial court. The trial court or the appellate court may at any time order the clerk of the trial court to send up any original papers or exhibits in the case, to be returned after final disposition of the appeal. (Acts 1965, pp. 18, 24).

Ga. Code Ann. (1971 Revision) § 24-3005. (4872) Contingent expenses of superior court; payment.--Any contingent expenses incurred in holding any session of the superior court, including lights, fuel, stationery, rent, publication of grand jury presentments when ordered published, and similar items, such as taking down testimony in cases of felony, etc., shall be paid out of the county treasury of such county, upon the certificate of the judge of the superior court, and without further order, provided however that the judges of the superior courts in counties having a population of 70,000 or more according to the United States census of 1940 or any future census may within their discretion order a mental or psychiatric examination made by a properly qualified psychiatrist after a person has been convicted of a crime or has pleaded guilty to a crime and before sentence is imposed, if said judge believes within his discretion that such an examination is necessary to a just and proper sentence and that the expenses of such an examination shall be paid out of the county

treasury of such county upon the certificate of the judge of the superior court and without further order. (Acts 1889, p. 156; 1950, pp. 427, 428.)

NOTE: Chatham County, Georgia, total population: 188,299. 1960 Census of Population, Vol. I, Part 12, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census.

Criminal Code of Georgia (1970 Revision) § 26-1901. Robbery.--A person commits robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another (a) by use of force; or (b) by intimidation, by the use of threat or coercion, or by placing such person in fear of immediate serious bodily injury to himself or to another; or (c) by sudden snatching. A person convicted of robbery shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. (Acts 1968, pp. 1249, 1298.)

§ 26-1902. Armed robbery.--A person commits armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon. The offense robbery by intimidation shall be a lesser included offense in the offense of armed robbery. A person convicted of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. (Acts 1968, pp. 1249, 1298; 1969, p. 810.)

Criminal Code of Georgia (1970 Revision) § 26-3301. Definition; punishment; continuing offense; jurisdiction. - A person commits hijacking of an aircraft when he (1) by use of force; or (2) by intimidation, by the use of threats or coercion, places the pilot of an aircraft in fear of immediate serious bodily injury to himself or to another, causes the diverting of an aircraft from its intended destination to a destination dictated by such person. A person convicted of hijacking an aircraft shall be punished by death or life imprisonment. The offense of hijacking is declared to be a continuing offense from the point of beginning and jurisdiction to try a person accused of the offense of hijacking shall be in any county of Georgia over which the aircraft is being operated. (Acts 1969, pp. 741, 742)

Ga. Code Ann. (1970 Cumulative Pocket Part), § 27-405 (935 P.C.) Evidence; statement or testimony of defendant. - The court shall hear all legal evidence submitted by either party, and shall always permit the defendant to make his own statement of the transaction (not under oath) if he desires to do so. The weight to be given to such statement shall be entirely in the discretion and sound judgment of the court. Whenever such statement is made, it shall be the duty of the court to reduce it to writing, and return it with the other papers to the proper court in the event of a commitment. In the alternative, however, if the prisoner wishes to testify and announces in open court before any court of inquiry his intention to do so, he may so testify in his own behalf. If he so elects, he shall be sworn as any other witness and may be examined and cross-examined as any as any other witness, except that no evidence of general bad character or prior convictions shall be admissible unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue. The failure of a defendant to testify shall create no presumption against him, and no comment shall be made because of such failure. (Acts 1962, pp. 453, 454.)

Ga. Code (1933) (1953 Revision, Ga. Code Ann.) §27-1502. (976 P. C.) Plea of insanity, how tried.-- Whenever the plea of insanity is filed, it shall be the duty of the court to cause the issue on that plea to be first tried by a special jury, and if found to be true, the court shall order the defendant to be delivered to the superintendent of the Milledgeville State Hospital, there to remain until discharged in the manner prescribed by law.

Georgia Code Annotated (1953 Revision) § 27-2514. Sentence of death; copy for penitentiary superintendent. Time and mode of conveying prisoner to penitentiary. Expenses.--Upon the conviction of any person of a crime the punishment of which is death, it shall be the duty of the presiding judge to sentence such convicted person to death according to the provisions of this law, and to make such sentence in writing, which shall be filed with the papers in the case against such convicted person, and a certified copy thereof shall be sent by the clerk of the court in which said sentence is pronounced to the superintendent of the State penitentiary, not less than 10 days prior to the time fixed in the sentence of the court for the execution of the same; and in all cases it shall be the duty of the sheriff of the county in which such convicted person is so sentenced, together with one deputy or more, if in his judgment it is necessary, and provided that in all cases the number of guards shall be approved by the trial judge, or if he is not available, by the ordinary of said county in which such prisoner is sentenced, to convey such convicted person to said penitentiary, not more than 20 days nor less than two days prior to the time fixed in the judgment for the execution of such condemned person, unless otherwise directed by the Governor, or unless a stay

of execution has been caused by appeal, granting of a new trial, or other order of a court of competent jurisdiction; and the expense for transporting of said person to the penitentiary for the purpose of electrocution shall be paid by the ordinary of the county wherein the conviction was had, or the board of commissioners of roads and revenues, the county commissioner, or other person or persons having charge of the county funds, out of any funds on hand in the treasury of such county. (Acts 1924, p. 195.)

Georgia Code Annotated (1970 Cumulative Pocket Part) § 27-2515. Execution by warden and assistants; witnesses.--There shall be present at such execution the warden of the penitentiary, or a deputy warden thereof, who shall serve as executioner, at least two assistants, two physicians to determine when death supervenes, an electrician, a suitable guard, and, if the condemned person so desires, his counsel, relatives and such clergymen and friends as he may desire. (Acts 1924, p. 196; 1956, pp. 161, 182.)

Ga. Code Ann. (1953 Revision) § 27-2603. (1075 P.C.) Insane convict committed to the Milledgeville State Hospital. - When any person shall, after conviction of a capital crime, become insane, and shall be so declared in accordance with the provisions of the preceding section, the convict shall be received into Milledgeville State Hospital, there to be safely kept and treated as other adjudged insane persons. All the provisions of the law relating to insane persons under sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary shall apply to the class of cases herein provided for, so far as applicable. (Acts 1874, p. 30).

Ga. Code Ann. (1970 Cumulative Pocket Part) § 77-113. Disposition of tubercular prisoners.--When any person confined in the common jail awaiting trial for any offense against the penal laws of this State, or there confined after conviction for any such offense, or serving any jail sentence imposed upon him by authority, or there committed for any civil or criminal contempt, or serving any misdemeanor sentence under county jurisdiction in a public works camp or other institution for maintenance of county prisoners, shall be afflicted with tuberculosis, the judge of the superior court may order his delivery by the sheriff to the superintendent of the Battey State Hospital or such other institution as may be approved and supported by the State Board of Health for the care of tubercular patients, and thereupon he shall be so delivered and received, and he shall be there securely confined, kept and cared for.

The period of time such person is thus kept and confined in such hospital or institution shall be credited upon any jail sentence being served by him in the same manner as though he had remained in such jail. Any such person committed for any civil or criminal contempt while in such hospital or other institution shall remain for all

purposes under the orders, jurisdiction and authority of the court committing him for contempt in the same manner as though he had remained in such common jail. (Acts 1960, p. 769; 1964, p. 365.)

Georgia Code Annotated (1970 Cumulative Pocket Part) § 77-309(c)(d)

* * * * (c) Immediately upon the imposition of such a sentence as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and after all appeals or other motions have been disposed of so that said conviction has become final, the clerk of the court shall immediately notify the Director of Corrections of the sentence, and shall forthwith dispatch therewith, by mail, a complete history of such person upon forms provided by the Director.

***

(d) Within a reasonable time thereafter, the Director of Corrections shall assign such prisoner to a correctional institution designated by him in accordance with subsection (b) of this section. It shall be the financial responsibility of such correctional institution to provide for the picking up and transportation, under guard, of such prisoner to his assigned place of detention. . . .

(Acts 1956, pp. 161, 171; 1964, pp. 489, 490; 1968, p. 1399; 1969, p. 602.)

Ga. Code Ann. (1964 Revision) § 77-310. Classification and segregation of prisoners' establishment of separate camps; removal of women prisoners; transfer of mentally diseased and tubercular prisoners.

* * *

(d) The State Board of Corrections is authorized to transfer mentally diseased inmates from the Georgia State Prison or other institutions operating under its authority to the criminal ward or facility of the State Hospital for insane at Milledgeville, Georgia. Such prisoner shall remain at said hospital until the superintendent of said hospital declares that his sanity has been restored at which time the said prisoner shall be returned to the custody of the State Board of Corrections. At any time after completion of his sentence a prisoner detained at Milledgeville State Hospital on the ground that he is mentally diseased may petition for a trial of the question of his lunacy in accordance with the procedure provided in sections 35-236 and 35-237. Prior to completion of his sentence this procedure shall not be available to him.

Provided, however, that upon being presented with a proper certification from the county physician of a county where a person is sentenced to prison, that such person so sentenced is a dope addict or alcoholic to the extent that his health will be impaired or his life endangered without immediate treatment, the Board of Corrections is hereby directed to transfer such prisoner to the criminal ward or facility of the State Hospital at Milledgeville. Said prisoner shall remain there until the hospital authorities determine he is able to serve his sentence elsewhere.

Official Compilation, Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Volume II, Rules of the State Board of Corrections § 125-1-2.05 News Media Policy. Amended. Members of the news media possessing press passes issued by the Board of Corrections may visit all institutions, without prior appointment, at any hour of the normal business day and they shall be allowed to visit any part of the institution that they desire. Such news media personnel shall be accompanied, for safety reasons, by a person so designated by the warden. Inmates shall not be interviewed without the permission of the Board of Corrections and no article or program of a derogatory nature shall be published without first giving the Director an opportunity to offer a rebuttal. Authority Ga. Constitution 1945, Art. V., Sec. V., Par. I (Ga. Code Ann., Sec. 2-3401); Ga. L. 1956, pp. 161, 170 (Ga. Code Ann., 77-307). Effective May 4, 1971. Administrative History. Original Rule filed and effective on December 31, 1969. Amended: Filed April 14, 1971; effective May 4, 1971.

APPENDIX B

CRIMES UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE OF GEORGIA PUNISHABLE BY DEATH

Criminal Code of Georgia,

Sec.:	
26-1101	Murder
26-1311	Kidnapping
26-1902	Armed Robbery
26-2001	Rape
26-2201	Treason
26-2401	Perjury
26-3301	Aircraft Hijacking

APPENDIX C

PERSONS CURRENTLY UNDER DEATH PENALTY IN GEORGIA
SEPT. 20, 1971

(Information appears in court records and Department of Corrections files.)

NAME	RACE and SEX	AGE	CONVIC. DATE	SENTENCE DATE	JUDGE or JURY	COUNTY	OFFENSE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION
Arkwright, Willie	NM	36	7/16/67	7/18/67	Jury	Screven	Rape	WF, unknown to D, robbed, beaten, choked, raped 3 times by D and accomplice	Central State Hospital (for exam)
Cummings, George	NM	19	4/7/69	4/7/69	Jury	Fulton	Murder	Innocent M by-stander shot while D under influence of Red Devil	Fulton County Jail
Furman, William Henry	NM	28	9/20/68	9/20/68	Jury	Chatham	Murder	WM shot when he surprised D burglarizing his home at 2 am	Central State Hospital

Abbreviations used:

N - Negro
W - White
M - Male
F - Female
D - Defendant

APPENDIX C

RENTLY UNDER DEATH PENALTY IN GEORGIA
SEPT. 20, 1971

mation appears in court records
epartment of Corrections files.)

NTY	OFFENSE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION	STATUS OF CASE	ASSERTED GROUNDS
even	Rape	WF, unknown to D, robbed, beaten, choked, raped 3 times by D and accomplice	Central State Hospital (for exam)	Petition for writ of cert pending in US Sup Ct	Misapplication of Witherspoon; standardless jury; cruel and unusual; challenge to array; more attorney's expenses needed; challenge to Ga. change of venue procedure
ton	Murder	Innocent M by-stander shot while D under influence of Red Devil	Fulton County Jail	Petition for writ of cert pending in US Sup Ct	Unitary trial; denial of D's discovery motion; denial of D's motion to cross-examine prospective jurors concerning death penalty
cham	Murder	WM shot when he surprised D burglarizing his home at 2 am	Central State Hospital	Set for argument before US Sup Ct	Cruel and unusual, insanity at time of sentencing

NAME	RACE and SEX	AGE	CONVIC. DATE	SENTENCE DATE	JUDGE or JURY	COUNTY	OFFENSE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION	ST
Grantling, Charles F.	NM	22	3/24/70	3/25/70	Jury	Upson	Rape	18 yr old WF raped and severely beaten by D and accomplice knife and gun	Upson County Jail	Mo tr Up
Hart, Robert	NM	19			Jury	Fulton	Armed Robbery	NM permanently paralyzed by D's gunshot during armed robbery	Fulton County Jail	Af Su 1/
Henderson, Tommy Lee	NM	34	12/10/70	12/12/70	Jury	DeKalb	Kidnapping and Murder	WF kidnapped by D and accomplice and NM (age 27) accomplice of D	Georgia State Prison	pe wr pe Su
Jackson, Lucious	NM	24	12/10/68	12/10/68	Jury	Chatham	Rape	WF raped while D threatened her life with pair of scissors at her throat. Attempted robbery also	Georgia State Prison	Se me Su
Jackson, D.W.	NM	35	6/71	6/71	Jury	Coweta	Murder	NM (12 yrs) also shot the boy's mother and raped 14 yr old sister	Coweta County Jail	Mc tr ir

* In Georgia, the general grounds of a motion for new trial are:
1) verdict contrary to evidence;
2) verdict contrary to the weight of the evidence;
3) verdict contrary to law.

JNTY	OFFENSE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION	STATUS OF CASE	ASSERTED GROUNDS
;on	Rape	18 yr old WF raped and severely beaten by D and accomplice knife and gun	Upson County Jail	Motion for new trial pending in Upson County	General grounds *
.ton	Armed Robbery	NM permanently paralyzed by D's gunshot during armed robbery	Fulton County Jail	Affirmed-Ga. Sup Ct 1/7/71	
:alb	Kidnapping and Murder	WF kidnapped by D and accomplice and NM (age 27) accomplice of D	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ of cert pending in US Sup Ct	Standardless jury; unitary trial; application of Sims v. Georgia; exclusion of scrupled juror; cruel and unusual
.tham	Rape	WF raped while D threatened her life with pair of scissors at her throat. Attempted robbery also	Georgia State Prison	Set for argument in US Sup Ct	Cruel and unusual; standardless jury; unitary trial; misapplication of Witherspoon
eta	Murder	NM (12 yrs) also shot the boy's mother and raped 14 yr old sister	Coweta County Jail	Motion for new trial pending in Coweta Co	General grounds

new trial are:

evidence;

NAME	RACE and SEX	AGE	CONVIC. DATE	SENTENCE DATE	JUDGE or JURY	COUNTY	OFFENSE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION
Johnson, Edward	NM	24	9/13/69	9/13/69	Jury	Fulton	Murder	WM (80 yrs old) shot during armed robbery, D on drugs	Fulton County Jail
Johnson, Johnny B.	NM	32	5/6/69	5/7/69	Jury	Worth	Murder	WM policeman shot with shotgun during official investigation	Georgia State Prison
King, Otis	NM	20	6/23/71	6/23/71	Jury	Fulton	Murder and armed robbery	WM security guard shot during armed robbery	Fulton County Jail
Lee, James C.	NM	26	12/4/68	1/3/69	Jury	Richmond	Murder	WM medical student surprised D in act of burglary	Georgia State Prison
Lingo, Joe	NM	24	2/1/68	5/28/68	Jury	Lowndes	Murder	WM shot during armed robbery of service station at which he worked	Georgia State Prison
Manor, Robert	NM	41	9/28/68	9/28/68	Jury	Chatham	Murder	WF (age 62) had employed D. Died during rape by D	Georgia State Prison
Massey, DeWayne	WM	28	9/21/65	7/22/65	Jury	Turner	Rape	WF (age 28) beaten and raped in front of her 4 yr old child	Georgia State Prison

ABOUT IM	PRESENT LOCATION	STATUS OF CASE	ASSERTED GROUNDS
s old) ng armed D on	Fulton County Jail	On appeal to 5th Cir from denial of habeas corpus	Cruel and unusual; disqualification of jurors - opinion on death penalty
man shot gun dur- ial in- on	Georgia State Prison	Hearing on petition for habeas corpus set 10/4/71-Tattnall Co	No proof of waiver; no commitment hearing; challenge to array; inadequate counsel; improper instructions; standardless jury; cruel and unusual; guilty plea-waiver of jury trial; exclusion of scrupled jurors
ty guard ng armed	Fulton County Jail	Motion for new trial pending in Fulton County	General grounds
l stu- rised D bur-	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ of cert pending in US Sup Ct	Standardless jury; unitary trial; cruel and unusual; denial of effective counsel
uring bery of tation he	Georgia State Prison	Execution stayed by Governor 10/14/70	
2) had D. Died pe by D	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ cert US Sup Ct	Cruel and unusual; standardless jury; involuntary confession
3) beat- ped in ner 4 yr	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ cert US Sup Ct	Change of venue; standardless jury

ERRATUM

Name	Race and Sex
Pass, Dean E.	Should be "NM", not "WM".

Furman v. Georgia
1971 Term, No. 69-5003
Brief for Respondent

Insert between pages
3C and 4C of Appendix C

NAME	RACE and SEX	AGE	CONVIC. DATE	SENTENCE DATE	JUDGE or JURY	COUNTY	OFFENSE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION
McCrary, Prentice	NM	18	4/2/70	4/2/70	Jury	Upson	Rape	WF (age 18) beaten and raped, threatened with knife and gun	Upson County Jail
Miller, William Jack	NM	41	2/22/67	2/22/67	Jury	Jones	Rape	WF raped at knife point in front of aged mother	Georgia State Prison
Mitchell, John Henry	NM	24	5/19/69	5/19/69	Jury	DeKalb	Rape	WF raped by four NMs at gunpoint; had delivered child only 3 wks earlier	Georgia State Prison
Mobley, Charlie	NM	28	5/12/65	6/4/65	Jury	Burke	Murder	M, local grocer shot during armed robbery	Georgia State Prison
Moore, Robert F.	NM	39	4/14/66	4/16/71	Jury	Camden	Murder	M shot during armed robbery	Georgia State Prison
Park, A.C.	WM	82	1/68	1/68	Jury	Jackson	Murder	WM, solicitor general of county killed by dynamite attached to car	Georgia State Prison
Pass, Dean E.	WM		4/3/70	4/3/70	Jury	DeKalb	Murder	WM & WF killed when they surprised D in act of burglary	DeKalb County Jail

FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION	STATUS OF CASE	ASSERTED GROUNDS
WF (age 18) beaten and raped, threatened with knife and gun	Upson County Jail	Motion for new trial pending in Upson County	General grounds
WF raped at knife point in front of aged mother WF raped by four NMs at gunpoint; had delivered child only 3 wks earlier	Georgia State Prison Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ cert in US Sup Ct Petition for habeas corpus pending in Tattnall Co	Jury selection; right to counsel at preliminary hearing; competence to stand trial; standardless jury; cruel and unusual Equal protection-death penalty given mostly to indigents, blacks; no counsel at line-up or setting new date. Cruel and unusual; standardless jury; challenge to array; unitary trial struck by judge
M, local grocer shot during armed robbery	Georgia State Prison	Awaiting new execution date; H-C denied by 5th Cir	
M shot during armed robbery	Georgia State Prison	Motion for new trial pending in Camden County	General grounds
WM, solicitor general of county killed by dynamite attached to car	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ of cert pending in US Sup Ct	Confession of co-conspirators; right of confrontation
WM & WF killed when they surprised D in act of burglary	DeKalb County Jail	Execution stayed pending filing of petition for writ of cert US Sup Ct	(Enum. of Errors in Ga.Sup.Ct.) Refusal of court to accept guilty plea; objection to evidence; disqualification of jurors who would never impose death penalty; sheriff mentioned case to panel; coerced confession; no charge on insanity; improper instruction

NAME	RACE and SEX	AGE	CONVIC. DATE	SENTENCE DATE	JUDGE or JURY	COUNTY	OFFENSE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION
Roach, Freddie	WM		7/18/65	7/20/65	Jury	Whitfield	Rape	WF (age 25) beaten, choked, raped, threatened with knife	Georgia State Prison
Sheats, Lafayette	NM		11/2/70	11/2/70	Jury	Clarke	Murder	M shot during armed robbery	Clarke County Jail
Smith, Ronald Lee	WM	25	7/10/70	7/10/70	Jury	Spalding	Murder	M, killed during armed robbery	Spalding County Jail
Suggs, Steve B.	WM	25	10/1/68	10/1/68	Jury	Screven	Murder	WF (about age 18) killed after meeting D at dance, body horribly mutilated	Georgia State Prison
Sullivan, Julious	NM	35	3/15/67	9/25/68	Jury	Lamar	Murder	M, shot with shotgun	Georgia State Prison
Thacker, James C.	NM	24	12/13/65	12/13/65	Jury	Chatham	Murder	WM policeman shot with own gun by D who attempted to escape	Georgia State Prison
Walker, James H.	NM	25	4/17/69	4/17/69	Jury	DeKalb	Rape	WF raped by four NMs at gunpoint, had delivered child 4 wks earlier	Georgia State Prison

ISE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION	STATUS OF CASE	ASSERTED GROUNDS
	WF (age 25) beaten, choked, raped, threatened with knife	Georgia State Prison	No action pending; awaiting new execution date	
	M shot during armed robbery	Clarke County Jail	Mot for new trial pending in Clarke Co	General grounds
	M, killed during armed robbery	Spalding County Jail	Mot for new trial pending in Spalding Co	General grounds
	WF (about age 18) killed after meeting D at dance, body horribly mutilated	Georgia State Prison	Petition for habeas corpus pending in Tattnall Co	Equal protection-dealth penalty mostly for indigents with appointed counsel; challenge to array; standardless jury; unitary trial; cruel and unusual
	M, shot with shotgun	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ cert in US Sup Ct	Challenge to array; need for psychiatric exam; denial of "speedy trial" because State "knowingly" used illegal jury lists
	WM policeman shot with own gun by D who attempted to escape	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ cert in US Sup Ct	Standardless jury; unitary trial, cruel and unusual; exclusion of those completely opposed to death penalty; challenge to array; search and seizure
	WF raped by four NMs at gunpoint, had delivered child 4 wks earlier	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ cert in US Sup Ct	Misapplication of Witherspoon; conviction contrary to evidence; no counsel at line-up; cruel and unusual

NAME	RACE and SEX	AGE	CONVIC. DATE	SENTENCE DATE	JUDGE or JURY	COUNTY	OFFENSE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION	S
Ward, Ray	NM	29	7/21/69	7/25/69	Jury	Pulaski	Murder	WM (70 yrs old), local grocer shot during apparent armed robbery	Georgia State Prison	I v c
Williams, Venson E.	WM	37	10/7/65	10/7/65	Jury	Gwinett	Murder	3 WM policemen investigating auto theft. Shot with own guns by D & accomplice	Georgia State Prison	I v I s
Williams, Johnny B.	NM	27	7/18/67	7/18/67	Jury	Screven	Rape	WF choked and raped by D three times. Also robbed	Screven County Jail	I v I s
Ramsey, Ed	NM		9/15/55	9/15/55	Jury	Elbert	Robbery by force	No information	South Carolina State Prison (life sentence)	

Four men, one woman under death sentence were declared insane by Governor's Insanity Commission.

NSE	FACTS ABOUT VICTIM	PRESENT LOCATION	STATUS OF CASE	ASSERTED GROUNDS
r	WM (70 yrs old), local grocer shot during apparent armed robbery	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ of habeas corpus pending in Tattnall Co	Equal protection-death penalty imposed mostly on indigents; cruel and unusual; standardless jury; unitary trial; removal of Negroes from jury
r	3 WM policemen investigating auto theft. Shot with own guns by D & accomplice	Georgia State Prison	Petition for writ of cert pending in US Sup Ct	Due process-does in camera hearing on D's request for discovery violate?
	WF choked and raped by D three times. Also robbed	Screven County Jail	Petition for writ of cert pending in US Sup Ct	Equal protection-death penalty imposed mostly on Negroes; standardless jury; cruel and unusual; burden of proving alibi on D
:y by	No information	South Carolina State Prison (life sentence)		

: by Governor's Insanity Commission.

RECAPITULATION OF INFORMATION ON PERSONS CURRENTLY UNDER DEATH PENALTY IN GEORGIA

I Description of crime for which death penalty imposed:

A Murder:

During armed robbery or burglary	10
Killing of police or security guard	4
Apparent sexual motives	2
Killing of public official (premeditated)	1
Domestic quarrel (12 yr old boy killed)	1
Killing of accomplice during kidnapping	1
Senseless slayings (no apparent motive	2
Total	21

B Armed Robbery:

D shot victim who was permanently paralyzed	1
Facts unknown	1
Total	2

C Rape

Beatings	5
In front of sensitive witness	2
During robbery (or attempted robbery)	3
Raped more than once or more than one man	4
Life threatened and endangered	all
Gun (includes 2 co-D's for same crime)	4
Knife	4
Scissors	1
Choking	3
More than one man	4
Total	10

(Adds up to more than total- some crimes involve several elements.)

TOTAL 33

II Race of defendants:

A Murder:

Negro defendants	16
Known N victims	1
Known W victims	9
White defendants	4
Known W victims	4

B Armed Robbery:

Negro defendants	2
Known Negro victims	1

C Rape:

Negro defendants	8
White defendants	2
All victims white	

III Sentended:

All by jury

IV Present location:

Georgia State Prison	19
County Jails	11
Central State Hospital (temporary)	2
Out-of-State	1

V Current Status

Motion for new trial	7
State habeas corpus	4
Federal habeas corpus	1
Petition for certiorari in United States Supreme Court	13
Set for argument in United States Supreme Court	2
Awaiting new execution date	3
Execution stayed	2
Out-of-State	1

VI Length of time since conviction:

16 years (in South Carolina State Prison)	1
6 years	5
5 years	1
4 years	4
3 years	7
2 years	6
1 year	7
this year	2

FILE COPY

IN THE

JAN 17 1972

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM – 1971

NO. 69-5003

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN

Petitioner,

VS.

STATE OF GEORGIA,
Respondent

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF GEORGIA

Supreme Court Of The United States

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

William Henry Furman was tried and convicted on the 20th day of September, 1968, for the murder of William Joseph Micke, Jr., and sentenced to death by electrocution as a result of the verdict of the Jury.

Mrs. Lanell Micke after being sworn testified that between the hours of 2:00 and 2:30 A.M., on August 11, 1967, she and her husband thought they heard one of their five children, Jimmy, walking in the kitchen. The son Jimmy, was a chronic sleep walker. (Tr. of E. page 17, lines 19 through 33). She and her husband lay in bed about five minutes and heard the noise again coming from the kitchen and her husband removed himself from the bed to investigate. (Tr. of E. page 18 lines 25 through 40). She heard her husband call out to Jimmy to get back in bed, heard his footsteps quicken and all of a sudden heard a loud sound and he screamed. (Tr. of E. page 17 lines 1 through 14). She became frightened got all her children in one room and started screaming for Mr. Dozier: the next door neighbor. (Tr. of E. page 17, lines 16 through 20). Mr. Dozier and a person named Johnnie came over shortly after the screaming of Mrs. Micke and called the Police. (Tr. of E. page 19 lines 25 through 29). She testified that there was a back porch to the house where she and her husband lived and that you could gain entry into the kitchen from this back porch. The porch was enclosed by a screen and the screen door has a lock which she did not remember whether the screen door was locked that night. (Tr. of E. page 19 lines 38 through 41, page 20 lines 1 through 15). Mrs. Micke did not go to the kitchen because she was scared and feared for the lives of her children. (Tr. of E. page 21 lines 39 through 41, page 22 lines 1 through 6).

Sgt. G.W. Spivey of the Savannah Police Department testified that he answered a call to 508 West 63rd Street, the home of the deceased, at approximately 2:30 A.M., on August 11, 1967. (Tr. of E. page 24 lines 15 through 20). When he arrived he went in the back door and acting on information he received and believing the subject was still in the house crouched in the doorway leading to the kitchen at which time he saw the

body which later was identified as Mr. Micke. (Tr. of E. page 25 lines 1 through 29). Upon his examination he did not find anyone else in the house other than Mrs. Micke and her children. (Tr. of E. page 25 lines 21 through 29).

Dr. Harold Smith, Coroner for Chatham County, Georgia, testified that on the 11th day of August, 1967, he examined the body of William Joseph Micke, Jr., and that death was caused by a bullet wound which entered the upper chest causing severe lung hemorrhage. (Tr. of E. page 32, lines 23 through 28). He removed the bullet from the body of Mr. Micke and turned this bullet over to Detective B.W. Smith. (Tr. of E. page 32, lines 29 through 34).

Sgt. J.E. Mincey of the Savannah Police Department Identification Officer, testified that on August 11, 1967, he went to the address of 508 West 63rd Street and lifted from the back porch on a washing machine some latent fingerprints that he compared these prints with the known prints of William Henry Furman and that they were identical. (Tr. of E. page 33 lines 20 through 35, page 34, lines 1 through 14). These prints, both latent and known prints were sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C.. (Tr. of E. page 34, lines 16 through 19).

John F. Walters, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, testified that he examined and compared the prints sent by Officer Mincey and that the known prints of Furman are identical with the latent prints. (Tr. of E. page 35 lines 21 through 29, page 36 lines 1 through 20).

Officer Alphonso Hall, Savannah Police Department, testified that he answered the call to 508 West 63rd Street at approximately 2:30 A.M., on August 11, 1967. (Tr. of E. page 37 lines 28 through 30). Officer Hall left the residence to search the general area for the suspect. (Tr. of E. page 37, lines 35 through 37). He stationed himself southwest of 508 West 63rd Street and observed a subject coming out of the wooded area from the direction where Mr. Micke was killed. (Tr. of E. page 38, lines 1 through 24). After radioing for help he followed this subject to 5020 Temple Street where he found the subject under the house. (Tr. of E. page 39,

lines 9 through 40, page 40 lines 1 through 18). After the subject, who Officer Hall identified as Petitioner was removed from under the house he was searched by Officer Goode and a 22 pistol removed from his person. (Tr. of E. page 40 lines 25 through 33).

Officer J.R. Goode, Savannah Police Department, testified that on August 11, 1967, that he made a search of the Defendant and removed a 22 pistol which he identified as the pistol in Court. (Tr. of E. page 40 lines 24 through 35, page 42 lines 1 through 10).

Detective B. W. Smith, Savannah Police Department, testified that the petitioner made a statement to him whereby he admitted being in the man's kitchen, the man saw him grabbed for him, he went out the door, slammed the door, turned around and fired one shot and ran. (Tr. of E. page 47 lines 36 through 41).

Dr. Charles Sullenger, Senior Toxicologist, State Crime Laboratory, Chatham County, Georgia, testified that he was given the bullet removed from the victim's body and the pistol taken from petitioner, made the ballistics test and found that the bullet taken from the victim's body was fired from the pistol taken from petitioner. (Tr. of E. page 50 lines 8 through 18).

Petitioner took the stand and in an unsworn statement admitted going in the house of the victim but stated that he fell back and the gun discharged accidentally. (Tr. of E. page 54, lines 33 through 40, page 55 lines 1 through 2).

ARGUMENT AND LAW

Respondent contends that the death penalty should be kept in force and effect and in support of this position directs this Honorable Court to an old case decided by the United States Supreme Court in the matter of William Kemmler, 34 Lawyers Edition, page 519, 136, U.S., 436, 447, wherein the Court held:

> "The provisions in reference to cruel and unusual punishment taken from the well-known Act of Parliament of 1688, entitled rehearsing the various grounds of grievances and among others, that 'excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude

the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects; and excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishment inflicted;' it is declared that 'excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."

The Court after declaring this Act of Parliament went on further to state that the language used in the Constitution of the State of New York, from which this case came, was intended particularly to operate upon the legislature of the State, and while the language of the Constitution of the State of New York was similar to the declaration of rights referred to, that the Courts of the State of New York had the right to declare punishment cruel and unusual. This to include burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel or the like.

The Court in, In Re: Kemmler, Supra, further stated:

"Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarious, something more than mere extinguishment of life."

The United States Supreme Court in the case of Wallace Wilkerson vs. People of the United States in the Territory of Utah, 25 Lawyers Edition, page 345, 99 U.S., page 130, in reference to the death penalty, stated:

"Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that Amendment to the Constitution."

In the Wilkerson case the Court was concerned with the mode of punishment declared by the trial Court. The Defendant was on the 14th day of December next between the hours of 10:00 in the forenoon and 3:00 in

the afternoon to be taken to a place certain and there publicly shot until dead. The Court in its opinion stated:

> "Cruel and unusual punishment is forbidden by the Constitution, but the authorities referred to are quite sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not included in that category, within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment."

It can be seen that the question of cruel and unusual punishment dates back as far as the eighteen hundreds and the Supreme Court of these United States even then recognized that there was difference in the mode of executing the death penalty and even then they drew a distinction between the humane death and inhumane death such as torture or lingering death.

In the case of Trop vs. Dulles, 356 U.S. page 86, 2 Lawyers Edition 2, page 630, 78 Supreme Court 590, the Court in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Warren joined in by Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Whitaker stated the following:

> "At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the Constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the argument may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and the terms of accomplishing the purpose of punishment; and they are forceful, the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it can not be said to violate the Constitutional concept of cruelty. But it is equally plain that the existence of all death penalties is not a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagination."
>
> "The exact scope of the constitution phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court. But the basic policy reflected in these words is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice. The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights

of 1688, and the principle it represents can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards."

The Trop case was decided March 31, 1958, almost one hundred years after the Wilkerson case was decided. The concept of the United States Supreme Court with regard to the death penalty, in the late eighteen hundreds and the middle nineteen hundreds has not varied or changed. The concept of the death penalty as being cruel and unusual punishment is only limited by the execution of that death penalty. The Courts through the years have consistently held that if the mode of executing the death penalty is not that of our ancestors from England, such as breaking on the wheel, torture, or a slow and lingering death then it does not come within the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. If the mode of execution is a dignified means then this type of execution has been accepted by our Courts as being within the frame work of our Constitution and should continue to be within that frame work.

Throughout the years the Supreme Court has not seen fit to remove from States the power or powers to deal with criminals in the way they saw best provided that it did follow civilized standards."

The consent of not interferring with the States' powers was exemplified in a decision handed down by Mr. Justice Black, June 3, 1949, in the case of Samuel Titto Williams vs. The People of the State of New York, 93 Lawyers Edition page 1337, 337 U.S., page 240 through 253. This is a case where the petitioner was charged with murder and in a two-week trial was found guilty and recommendation of life imprisonment was forth-coming from the Jury. Under New York state law the Judge had the power and the right to either accept the recommendation of the Jury or to impose a sentence he felt justified. In this particular case after the verdict of the Jury, the trial Judge heard additional evidence as to the past activities of the petitioner and sentenced him to

death. In giving his reasons for imposing the death sentence the Judge discussed in open Court the evidence upon which the Jury had convicted stating:

> "That this evidence had been considered in the light of information obtained through the Court's probation department and through other sources."
>
> The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court for violation of due process in that petitioner was not allowed to examine the extra-ordinary evidence or to cross-examine the witnesses who gave this evidence.
>
> Mr. Justice Black in delivering the opinion of this Court stated the following:
>
> "To deprive sentencing Judges of this kind of information would undermind modern penological procedural policies that has been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation. We must recognize that most of the information now relied upon by Judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination."

Mr. Justice Black went on to say:

> "The due process clause should not be treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure. So to treat the due process clause would hinder if not preclude all courts, state and federal, from making progressive efforts to improve the administration of criminal justice."

It can be seen by Mr. Justice Black's opinion in the Williams case that states must have a right and the power, within the confines of the Constitution of the United States of America, to deal with criminal justice as their Legislatures deem best.

In the case of Laurence Aikin Jackson vs. Fred R. Dixon, 325 Federal 2d page 573, the Appellant in his petition and on argument in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals contended that the carrying out of the death

penalty would deprive him of due process and also that it would amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In delivering the opinion, Circuit Judge Duniway stated:

> "Traditionally the death penalty has been deemed an appropriate punishment for murder."
>
> Circuit Judge Deniway went on to say:
>
> "Here there is no suggestion as there was in certain of the cases above cited, that the method of administering of penalty is cruel and unusual. The contention is only that the penalty itself is of that character. This contention, in light of the foregoing authorities we must reject."

"Jackson's arguments, which attack the penalty as incompatible with modern concepts of justice, would more properly be addressed to the California Legislature. It is not for us to write our personal views on the matter, whatever they may be, into the Constitution. We hold that if the State is free to find Jackson guilty of murder in the first degree, as Leland makes clear that it was in this case, it does not violate the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to it by the Fourteenth Amendment, by imposing the death penalty upon him."

I think Judge Duniway has made clear the position which we believe should be taken by this Honorable Court, that position being that regardless of our personal feelings toward the death penalty and regardless of whether we feel that a person deserves or does not deserve ultimate punishment that we must confine ourselves to the question of whether or not the death penalty is, or is not, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America. We think it goes without saying that any type of torture or lingering death that is calculated to put a person in misery before he dies, is the type of death penalty outlawed and prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. Any type of death penalty, such as death by electrocution, by being shot, or by being put to death by gas, is the type of execution that is known to civilized men and is a type of execution that is constitutionally protected by the Eighth

Amendment and has been constitutionally protected by the United States Supreme Court in former years.

We find it difficult in 1971 to say that death by electrocution is wrong now but was right in the year 1958 and was right in 1879. The offense of murder, as the offense of rape, was wrong in 1879, it was wrong in 1958, and is wrong in 1971. The punishment for those crimes has been the same for almost one hundred years and we can not see now where the punishment should be deemed cruel and unusual.

Petitioner contends that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment and therefore should be eliminated because it violates the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America.

Respondent respectfully directs the Court's attention to a case decided by this Honorable Court on the 13th day of January, 1947, which was a case of State of Louisiana ex rel. Willie Francis, Petitioner, vs. E. Al Resweber, Sheriff of the Parish of St. Martin, Louisiana, et al., 329 U.S. 459 through 481, 91 Lawyers Edition page 422, wherein petitioner Francis was convicted of the offense of murder and sentenced to die in the electric chair on the 3rd day of May, 1946, pursuant to a death warrant. On the 3rd day of May, 1946, Petitioner was prepared for execution and sat in the electric chair and the Executioner threw the switch but, presumably, because of some mechanical malfunction, the current did not come on and dealth did not result. Therefore petitioner was removed from the electric chair and a new death warrant issued by the Governor of Louisiana fixing the date of execution for May 9, 1946.

After a refusal of an application to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, petitioner brought his case before the United States Supreme Court alleging a denial of due process and also alleging cruel and unusual punishment. The denial of due process consisted of the violation of the Fifth Amendment which was double jeopardy and the cruel and unusual punishment consisted of the violation of the Eighth Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment, all as applied to the State of Louisiana through the Fourteenth Amendment.

In announcing the decision, which was joined in by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Jackson, Mr. Justice Reed stated the following:

> "Our minds rebel against permitting the same sovereignty to punish an accused twice for the same offense ... But where the accused successfully seeks review of a conviction, there is no double jeopardy upon a new trial. ... Even where a state obtains a new trial after conviction because of errors, while an accused may be placed on trial a second time, it is not the sort of hardship to the accused that is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment ...
>
> As this is a prosecution under State law, so far as double jeopardy is concerned, the Palco case is decisive. For we see no difference from a constitutional point of view between a new trial for error of law at the instance of the State that results in a death sentence instead of imprisonment for life and the execution that follows because of failure of equipment. When an accident, with no suggestion of malevolence, prevents the consummation of a sentence, the State's subsequent course in the administration of its criminal law is not affected on that account by any requirement of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. We find no double jeopardy here which can be said to amount to a denial of federal due process in the proposed execution."
>
> "We find nothing in what took place here which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in the Constitutional sense. The case before us does not call for an examination into any punishment except that of death..." The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence. Prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The identical words appear in our Eighth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment would prohibit by its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner.
>
> "Petitioner's suggestion is that because he once underwent the pyschological strain of preparation for electrocution, now to require him to undergo this

preparation again subjects him to a lingering or cruel and unusual punishment. Even the fact that petitioner has already been subjected to a current of electricity does not make his subsequent execution any more cruel in the constitutional sense than any other execution. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add an element of cruelty to a subseqtient execution. There is no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution. The situation of the unfortunate victim of this accident is just as though he had suffered the identical amount of mental anguish and physical pain in any other occurrence, such as, for example, a fire in the cell block. We cannot agree that the hardship imposed upon the petitioner rises to that level of hardship denounced as denial of due process because of cruelty."

We can see by the Francis case (Supra) that the Supreme Court of the United States still upheld the theory that unless the type of execution to effect the death penalty is that of torture or lingering death then, even though the malfunction of the device used occurred to effect that type of punishment failed, it still is not excluded by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. Surely this Honorable Court would agree that the Francis case (Supra) would come close, if not the closest, to meeting a definition of a lingering death. Can this Court say that to prepare a person for death, see him upon the instrument that would cause his death, and let him experience all the fears of death including meeting the Supreme Being that created him, whether he stands in his favor or not, and death not resulting and then have this person returned at a later date to this instrument for the purpose of accomplishing the end that theretofore had failed, would not come within a lingering death? This was answered by the highest Court of our land in the year 1946, in the negative. Can this Honorable Court, as presently constituted, sixteen years later, say that death

by electrocution in a penal institution, in the sovereign state of Georgia, now constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is a type of punishment prohibited by the same Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution that existed in 1946?

As the Court can well see we have a young couple with five children in the safety of their home at 2:30 A.M., on August 11, 1967. The victim, Mr. Micke believing his child is sleep walking, leaves his bed, and his wife and goes into the kitchen to find not his child but an intruder. In an effort to protect his wife and five children he attempted to stop this intruder whereupon Petitioner runs out, slamming the door and fires at Mr. Micke. Petitioner says the penalty of death for this murder is too cruel and too unusual and therefore should be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America. I wonder what Mrs. Micke, who is now left alone to rear five children, thinks of what he did to her husband at 2:30 A.M., on August 11, 1967? I wonder if Petitioner's battery of Attorneys would say that William Henry Furman committed an act of cruel and unusual punishment on William Joseph Micke, Jr.? I wonder if they would say that William Henry Furman committed an act of cruel and unusual punishment on Mrs. Micke and her five young children? I am sure they think this is a deliberate crime and they grieve for the widow and fatherless children but now say that it is not right to take the life of a burglar, murder, who left the widow and five fatherless children. We don't accept the view taken by Petitioner or his Attorneys. We think the crime that he has committed is senseless, hideous and one for which he should be given the ultimate punishment which is death by electrocution.

We have a person before this Court, who broke into the house where a mother and father and five children lived. After being discovered by the head of the household he ran, but when he was outside on that porch after having slammed the door between Mr. Micke and himself, he wasn't content with just running away, he turned around and in a wanton, wilful disregard for human life he fired that 22 pistol through the door and into Mr. Micke's chest causing the death of Mr. Micke.

Can this Court now say that the crime committed was not a crime that deserved the death penalty? Throughout our legal history and throughout Biblical history man has invoked the death penalty, the Church has invoked the death penalty. The death penalty in our United States has been upheld as cited to this Court on numerous occasions. It has been guaranteed the protection by the Eighth Amendment for numerous years. Provided that it is not a torturious death or a lingering death. Our Bible says: "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life."

Our Bible says: "Render unto God the things that are God's and to Ceasar the things that are Ceasar's." We take the position that the State of Georgia has seen fit to invoke the death penalty; that our Legislature has seen fit to allow this Statute to remain on the books of the State of Georgia and now we are only rendering to Ceasar the things that are Ceasar's.

Petitioner in this case, as the petitioner in the case of Lucious Jackson, has made the same over-tones of racial discrimination. Let it be well understood by this Court that this State stands not for discrimination because of race, color or creed, but it stands for justice. Should it be a person of color that killed Mr. Micke or should it have been a white man and had he received the death penalty as petitioner did, this writer and this State would be as strong in favor of that execution being carried out as they are in this execution being carried out. This writer has never experienced an intruder in this house in the middle of the night and hopes he never will. I think there is nothing more terrifying than to be awakened in the middle of the night and find an outsider in my house.

We contend that when Petitioner broke into the victim's house he was armed with a pistol; we believe that he carried that pistol for the express purpose that if he was detected he would use that pistol to accomplish his end, whether it meant the extinguishment of life or not. We think the crime that he has committed deserved the death penalty; deserved the State taking his life, as he took the life of William Joseph Micke, Jr.

We ask only that this Honorable Court decide this case on the same legal basis that past Supreme Courts have decided this question.

Death by electrocution is not that type of torture or lingering death that is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of our Constitution. It is not that type of death which shocks the senses of civilized men. It is that type of punishment that has been sanctioned by this Court for almost one hundred years. It is that type of punishment that has been sanctioned by the English Parliament for hundreds of years.

We respectfully request that this Court affirm the decision of Georgia Supreme Court and uphold the death penalty as a proper means for punishment.

Respectfully submitted,

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, EASTERN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF GEORGIA



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MAR 25 1972
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

1971 TERM

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
GEORGIA,
Respondent.
NO. 69-5003

LUCIOUS JACKSON, JR.,
Petitioner,
v.
GEORGIA,
Respondent.
NO. 69-5030

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

Pursuant to leave granted Respondent by the Court to file a Supplemental Brief, after argument, the State of Georgia submits the following points and arguments in furtherance of the intentions expressed in its motion:

1. STATE PENALTIES

Insofar as the Eighth Amendment is concerned, it must be remembered that the amendment was intended, when adopted, to apply only to the federal government, and that the amendment was not considered applicable to the states until the 1962 case of *Robinson v. California,*

if then, and in that instance only by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Since the Fourteenth Amendment was not adopted until 1868, it would appear that it could have no effect on the penalties adopted by states *prior* to 1868 and in existence at that time. The death penalty as a maximum punishment for murder and for rape was well-settled in Georgia prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court said in *Coffey v. Harlan County*, 204 U.S. 659 (1907):

> "It is within the power of the state to enact laws creating and defining crimes against its sovereignty, regulating the procedure in the trial of those who are charged with committing them, and prescribing the character of the sentence which shall be awarded against those who have been found guilty. In these respects, the state is supreme and its power absolute, and without any limits other than those prescribed by the Constitution of the United States. The exercise of the power of the state in this field cannot be drawn in question in this court or elsewhere than in its own courts except for the purpose of restraining it within the limits thus established. One of the limitations upon the power of the state, imposed by the 14th Amendment, is that the state shall not deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." *Id.* at 662-663.

To accept Petitioners' contentions would result in the State's traditional penalties being declared unconstitutional on the basis of an amendment which did not apply to the states and which may only recently have been "incorporated" into the century-old guarantee of due process by the states. To say that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from imposing the death penalty because the Eighth Amendment forbids the federal government from imposing it for crime, is

to say that the penalties in force in the states in 1789 and 1868 were wiped out by the Fourteenth Amendment which imposed certain restrictions on the states. But the Fourteenth Amendment *reserved* the right of the states to authorize that penalty under protected circumstances, because the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the states cannot take life without due process of law, the converse of which is that the states *may* take life *with* due process of law. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment itself worked the *reverse* of incorporation of any prohibition of death penalty which may be found in the Eighth Amendment.

2. UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

The Eighth Amendment forbids *not* punishment that is "rarely" imposed, but unusual punishment, that is, punishment which is unusual in its nature. That meaning comports with its historical context derived from the Bill of Rights of 1689 which sought to ban the punishments imposed during the reign of the Stuarts.

With respect to the death penalty, that meaning also comports with the Framers' inclusion of it in the Constitution by reference in the Fifth Amendment to capital crimes, and reference in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to prohibition against the state and federal governments taking life, liberty or property without due process of law.

Death is not an "unusual punishment." It is statutorily provided for with respect to a wide variety of crimes throughout the United States, including murder, rape, treason, kidnapping, aircraft hijacking, armed robbery, and so on.

Thus, in the context of Constitutional meaning, inci-

dence of imposition is irrelevant to an application of the Eighth Amendment to a particular punishment.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

The constitutional prohibition on punishment which is cruel and unusual demands, by the character of the prohibition, a consideration of factors which are subjective. The reason is that the description or designation of something by the use of the adjective "cruel," at least, involves the operation of the designator's opinion, judgment, attitude, beliefs. What may be "cruel" in one person's opinion may not be "cruel" in another's. Factual information fed into a computer will not tell us whether something is, or is not, cruel. The exercise of subjectivity is inescapable.

However, this is not to say that the determination of whether a particular punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual is therefore relegated to measurement by shifting opinions of different courts and different judges from year to year. The prohibition's character does not degenerate it into a law of man, an opportunity for judicial imposition of an individual's personal tastes. Rather, it calls for a broad perimeter of subjectivity and a narrowly circumscribed injection of one's own notions.

The "broad perimeter" is established by benchmarks such as "unconscionable," "shocking to the conscience of reasonable men." The question is not whether the punishment is simply "cruel" in the jurist's way of thinking, and thus outside the context of the Constitution, but whether the punishment is so cruel that it is unreasonable, unconscionable. The distinction is, indeed, one of degree and it may be the difference between the question addressing a legislature and the constitutional question addressing the Court. It is for the legis-

lature a philosophical question, as to whether the death penalty is justified and should be authorized for certain crimes; it is for this Court a legal question, confined to legal considerations in the making of a judgment on this point of constitutional law. Thus, we are not dealing with the expediency, wisdom, or efficacy of the punishment, but with the true interpretation of the Constitution.

The subjectiveness inherent in the viability of "cruel and unusual punishment" as a measurable constitutional concept thus becomes largely objective when construed broadly and not in the narrow confines of current polls and statistics, as Petitioners urge.

In the same way, the standard of "decency" can be defined so narrowly that it becomes a matter of how many people think it is decent and how many people think it is not decent, with the ultimate determination grounded on the jurist's personal opinion. In order to have any validity as a yardstick of the constitutionality of punishment, the guide must measure only whether the punishment is one which no reasonable man could rightfully support. From this angle, the Court should have little difficulty in determining whether as a matter of law a challenged punishment was inside or outside the prescribed limits, as the Court's knowledge of standards of decency more or less universally accepted would not require examination of statistics and polls or expert opinion or other types of factual evidence.

In construing the Constitution, the utilization of "standards of decency," if that is appropriate to test whether the specific action is constitutional or not, must be broad and generalized in order that constitutional principles not be ad hoc and episodic, but rather

mindful of reconciliation between the needs of continuity and of change in a progressive society. It is submitted that it would be outside the limits, that is, the outer boundaries, of civilized standards only if it is "clearly and manifestly" cruel and unusual punishment. See *Bailey v. U.S.*, 74 F.2d 451, 453, (10th Cir. 1934). It is the legislatures on the other hand, with their facilities for research and hearings and other fact-gathering methods, that can draw the fine line as to which punishment would be the most desirable in terms of the objectives sought.

In this context, then, can it be said that the imposition in 1968 and the carrying out in 1972 of the death penalty for the totally unprovoked pistol-slaying of 29-year-old William Joseph Micke, Jr., or the terroristic assault and rape of Mrs. Mary Rose, a young mother, are universally regarded as contrary to human decency? The timeless question, insofar as it faces this Court, is "whence justice?"

4. "MATURING SOCIETY"

The death penalty is *more* appropriate for a maturing society: as the society becomes more enlightened, so greater becomes the breach between murder and rape on the one hand and responsible conduct by its members on the other. Thus, the imposition of the death penalty in appropriate cases:

(1) Enhances the dignity of man (the criminal, the society, and the victim);

(2) Places a greater gap between violent crime and what is expected of the responsible citizen;

(3) Demands greater safeguards to assure it is arrived at by due process;

(4) Expresses society's utter condemnation of capital crimes.

Death as a viable penalty has a unique relevancy in the "maturing society": does it *enhance* the dignity of man or the sanctity of human life to allow a citizen's life to be brutally, arbitrarily, senselessly snuffed out by the wanton hand of a fellow citizen, or to allow a woman's unwilling body to be outraged and defiled and her mind perpetually scarred by the lustful attack of a man who utterly disregards her dignity, *not* to demand the perpetrator to forfeit his life? The giving of life is regarded as the highest sacrifice. Does it not then *enhance* the dignity of man to require this sacrifice when the highest ideals are violated, such as the sanctity of human life, in the case of murder, and the sanctity of virtue, respect, honor, regard for the inviability of the most intimate and personal aspect of womanhood?

To say that we will *not* require this ultimate sacrifice by the perpetrator is to diminish the enormity and reprehensibleness of the crime. To say that the ultimate sacrifice will no longer be required is to give a measure of acceptance to the crime, to say that it is not so bad that we must exact the life of the offender. Such a step is not progressive, is not illustrative of greater enlightenment, but rather marks a laxity in the kind of conduct society demands of its citizens. Is the freedom of the members of our society, or is civility *enhanced* by the constitutional abolition of capital punishment for crime?

As a principle of fundamental justice, the enormity of the crime requires taking a perpetrator's life in response, in appropriate instances; it is a manifestation of proportioned punishment.

5. SCALE OF PENALTIES

To accurately measure whether as a matter of constitutional law, death constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, the punishment must be examined in its place. That is, consideration should be given to its position in the scheme or scale of punishments which are widely and traditionally imposed and about which there is no contention of unconstitutionality.

Thus, consideration of the penalty of death as cruel and unusual should take into account that punishment by incarceration and loss of freedom and liberty is a standard mode of punishment, with variables such as hard labor, solitary confinement, work release, etc., modifying incarceration in some instances. The other widely-used punishment is, of course, the extraction of fines. On a whole, however, punishment as such has not been abandoned, but rather is vigorously in mode. Death is the ultimate penalty, regarded as the next step after life imprisonment, in the severity of punishment scale. It is in reality the ultimate degree of deprivation, because a man is deprived of his life whereas in the mode of punishment by fines he is deprived of his property and in the incarceration mode, he is deprived of liberty.

In the scheme of punishments, it carries no weight to say that this ultimate punishment is unconstitutionally "unusual" because by its very nature, it is regarded as appropriate only for very severe crimes; hence, by its very nature, it is applied rarely and such a fact does not debilitate its constitutionality.

So viewed, can it be said that death is so far out of the scheme of widely acceptable punishments, that it is not a part of the scheme and thus is cruel and unusual

punishment? It is urged that a comparison of the cruelty and unusualness of life imprisonment is not so far more "dignified" or "humane" that in comparison, death is constitutionally forbidden. It is at least subject to question whether it is more in keeping with the dignity of man to require a man to spend the remainder of his life imprisoned in one of our current penitentiaries, subject to increasing demoralization and deterioration, than to require the capital felon to forfeit his life in a dignified manner.

6. BENCHMARKS

To be stricken as unconstitutional, the death penalty must be so cruel and unusual that it deprives a State prisoner of due process of law; it must be so cruel and unusual that it exceeds the outer boundaries beyond which State legislatures may not travel; it must be so cruel and unusual that, regardless of the enormity of the crimes sought to be punished and curtailed, it cannot be considered by the State legislature.

It is not necessary to fix that boundary in testing the death penalty because it is not a penalty of such cruel and unusual magnitude that it will fall clearly on one side or the other of that fine line. It is much within that boundary, as measured by the guideposts previously utilized in determining whether a particular punishment is, or is not, "cruel and unusual punishment." The death penalty does not approach that fine line, because it is not inhuman to deprive one of life as a consequence of his own anti-social, voluntary behavior, because it is not barbarous ("uncivilized"; "mercilessly harsh or cruel"; "offending against contemporary standards of correctness"). Nor is it torturous ("inflicting intense pain"; "anguish of body or mind"; "agony"; "to pun-

ish or coerce by inflicting excruciating pain.") Nor is it so disproportionate to the gravity or enormity of the crime that it is cruel and unusual punishment. Nor was it arrived at in the manner so lacking in due process that it is rendered cruel and unusual punishment. Nor is it cruel and unusual punishment in view of what is sought to be accomplished. Nor is it "cruel" ("disposed to inflict pain; causing or conducive to injury, grief or pain").

7. BREADTH OF APPLICATION OF PENALTY

Petitioners assert that the penalty is cruel and unusual punishment because it is not generally, even-handedly, or non-arbitrarily applied, and that if uniformly applied to all persons liable to it, it would be unacceptable to "the people." Such an argument would undoubtedly render all maximum penalties unconstitutional, because while it is true that contemporary society would probably not accept the imposition of current maximum penalties for every offender for murder or rape, the same is true for any other crime (such as 20 years for every burglary and every burglar, 10 years for every aggravated assault, 10 years for every first degree forgery and every such forger).

The argument is no more than a demand that we revert to a system of mandatory penalties fixed for narrowly-categorized crimes so that regardless of mitigating circumstances or the personal history of the defendant, the death penalty (or any other penalty for that matter) would be automatic once guilt was determined. It is difficult to see how such a wooden approach would be constitutionally mandated, particularly when the discretion of the jury has been regarded as the intervention of the voice of the society against which the

crime was committed, the necessary ingredient of community expression through community representatives. The attack here is therefore no more than a manifestation of distrust in the jury as the determiner of punishment; the attack does not reach the penalty per se. The individualization of penalty which is allowed by the flexible minimum-maximum concept does not lead to the conclusion that the penalty is therefore arbitrarily applied.

Even if such a conclusion were valid, it would be dissolved by the further classification of murders and rape and a provision that only class one murders (whatever their characteristics or elements would be) and class one rapes (again, whatever their elements would be) are punishable by death, mandatorily. Likewise, the "arbitrary application" argument does not reach the constitutionality of the penalty per se.

It is interesting to note that the campaign against "standardless juries" was grounded in great part on the argument that specific direction should be given to juries having discretion to fix penalties within a minimum-maximum framework, to take into account mitigating circumstances and personal information concerning the defendant in order to treat him individually and less harshly than others convicted of the same type of crime. The argument is thus turned around when one receives the maximum: the sentence was arbitrary to him, whereas to the defendant who receives the minimum, the jury "justly" gave way to mitigation. Petitioners have not shown, however, that they were treated unfairly by the juries determining sentence.

8. CRIME VS. CRIMINAL

The picture is askance if it is viewed only from the

point of view of the condemned criminal. The Court must look at the penalty from the point of view also of society, of the victims in these cases and future victims of violent crimes, of the capabilities of current law enforcement as well as the capabilities of current penal systems. It is only when society can be protected from violent crime, when a free society can be assured, when violent crime can be prevented, when we can so rehabilitate the capital felon that he can be returned to society with a reasonable guarantee of non-repetition, in a word, when the penalty becomes unnecessary, and without use or a legitimate purpose, or without redeeming social value, that we can declare its imposition unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment.

That day, unfortunately, may never come and a belief in this prognosis may well have led the Framers to say: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of *life*, liberty or property without due process of law."

9. GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Petitioners make the mistake of looking only at the convicted criminal, with respect to punishment, and not to society as a whole and to the victim:

> "But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." Cardoza, J., *Snyder v. Mass.*, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).

The death penalty is a means of self-defense for the members of society. Capital crimes violate the imperative of social preservation. The contest is not between the State and the individual; it is wholly between competing rights of the individual – the right to be protected

from criminal attack and the several rights in the Amendments. *State of New Jersey v. Bisaccia*, 279 A.2d 675, 677 (S.Ct. N.J., 1971). As said in that case, "'The first right of the individual is to be protected from attack. That is why we have government, as the preamble to the Federal Constitution plainly says":

> "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

Invalidating the death penalty per se, for any or all of the reasons advanced by Petitioners, betrays the high ideals of justice, tranquillity, common defense, welfare, and liberty which have long been the goals of our social order. Retention of the death penalty ensures a greater fear in the potential criminal and thereby contributes to a more civilized society wherein citizens may live and move with a diminished apprehension of criminal attack such as that which has curtailed general activity in more than one city of late. Forbidding the imposition of the penalty can do no more than foster social permissiveness among law-breakers at the cost of social permissiveness among law-abiding citizens.

10. ROOT OF THE "EVILS" ALLEGED

Petitioners' arguments against the death penalty per se are due process or equal protection arguments which, if proved, could be corrected and would only apply to the particular cases and *not* to the penalty as such. Their arguments do not show that the death penalty is *inherently* cruel and unusual punishment. The assertion

is, in effect, that the death penalty was arrived at by a procedure which violated or lacked some concept of constitutional law. As is illustrated by the vast number of corrective decisions which this Court has rendered in the area of criminal procedure in the past decade, defective procedures can, and indeed should, be remedied. Such an appropriate course in no way impugns the validity of the death penalty per se.

Looked at from another angle, the strict standards which must be adhered to in obtaining convictions, and the jealous safeguard of accused's rights which by legislative action and judicial decree guarantees the most fair trial possible in the world today, justify the imposition of the ultimate penalty in appropriate cases, because it will be arrived at in a manner adhering to constitutional "fair trial" procedures. Thus, the cautious ascertainment of proper procedure has enhanced the fairness of the ultimate sentence to a degree not heretofore known, and this care-taking should render the death penalty even more viable because of how it is arrived at.

Petitioners argue that the death penalty is meted out arbitrarily and discriminatorily to Negroes. But it must be remembered that both Furman and Jackson were tried in the latter months of 1968, *after* the Georgia jury selection system was corrected to expunge the element of prima facie discrimination which arose from the use of segregated tax digests as a source of jurors, by substituting the voter lists.* The potentiality of ra-

*See Ga. Laws 1967, pp. 251-252 (Ga. Code Ann. §59-106). Furman, tried on September 20, 1968, had challenged the juries, relying on the record in *State v. Simmons* (R 11-DD, 11-EE *et seq*). This record shows no evidence of discrimination. As said by the Supreme Court of Georgia on the appeal in *Simmons v. State*, 226

cially discriminatory juries was erased in both of these trials. It is also compellingly pertinent that the scrupled juror objection, which invited a presumption of death-prone penalty selection in *Witherspoon v. Illinois*, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), has also been avoided in the trials of Jackson and Furman.

11. EFFECTS OF DECLARING DEATH PENALTY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Some of the most obvious results of taking so drastic a judicial step would be:

(1) The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments will in effect have been rewritten. The reference to "capital . . . crime" in the Fifth Amendment would become meaningless; so would the reference to "jeopardy of life," as well as the mandate against deprivation "of life" without due process of law, which also appears in the Fourteenth Amendment as a curtailment of the states. Thus, four specific circumscriptions which recognize the existence of death penalty in the context of constitutional permanence, would become superfluous appendages, at the very least.

(2) The ultimate penalty will not be available for unknown crimes which may arise out of the ongoing developments generated by our society.

(3) A penalty which has been a part of criminal jurisprudence since time immemorial, and part of ecclesiastical jurisprudence in numerous societies throughout the ages, will be excised from

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Ga. 110, 111 (1970): "On the other hand, the other evidence on this question showed a conscientious effort on behalf of the jury commissioners to select a *cross-section* of citizens, Ga. L. 1967, p. 251 (Code Ann. §59-106), and one of the commissioners was a Negro." Jackson was indicted and tried several months later, on December 10, 1968.

our current and future systems, *not* because it is contrary to our fundamental concepts of fairness and justice, and *not* because it is disreputed by the people through their governmental processes; through their representatives, the legislators and juries, but merely because it purportedly does not comport with some people's sence of decency. Such a basis for constitutional voidance is not legal but political.

(4) The will and expression of the people of the majority of the sovereign states, expressed through their legislators and the juries, and the almost uniform consensus of judges and appellate courts rendering judicial review, will have been conclusively defeated.

(5) The availability of the penalty and its application in appropriate cases will be lost as unmistakable notice of the total unacceptance of capital crimes and as clear warning to those who contemplate such acts. It will be lost as a viable guardian of a *free* society.

CONCLUSION

It has not been demonstrated that the death penalty for the crimes of murder and rape, illustrated by the specific instances of those crimes spread on the records of these cases now before the Court, is excessive or disproportionate to a constitutional degree, barbaric, contrary to commonly-held notions of human decency, unnecessarily or inherently cruel. Petitioners have not met the burden of proving that the legislatively-provided penalties are contrary to the constitutional principles invoked.

The Constitution does not demand the abolition of forfeiture of life as a penalty for crime and as a weapon against crime by way of its existence as a threat; the

Constitution does not demand that the balance of fear weigh more heavily on the citizen than on the potential capital criminal.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Dorothy T. Beasley, Attorney of Record for the Respondent herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, I served the foregoing Brief for Respondent on the Petitioner by depositing copies of the same in a United States mailbox, with first class postage prepaid, addressed to counsel of record at their post office addresses:

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This 24th day of March, 1972.

DOROTHY T. BEASLEY

FILE COPY

JUL 24 1972

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

1971 TERM

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN v. GEORGIA	No. 69-5003
LUCIOUS JACKSON, JR. v. GEORGIA	No. 69-5030
A. C. PARK v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 69-3 (Formerly No. 809, October Term, 1969).
JOHNNIE B. WILLIAMS v. STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 69-5049 (Formerly No. 2383, Misc., October Term, 1969).
WILLIE ARKWRIGHT, v. STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 69-5032 (Formerly No. 1953, Misc., October Term, 1969).
WILLIAM JACK MILLER v. STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 70-5065 (Formerly No. 6569, October Term, 1970).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. VENSON EUGENE WILLIAMS v. LAMONT SMITH (Formerly A. L. Dutton), Warden, Georgia State Prison	No. 70-5066 (Formerly No. 6570, October Term, 1970).
TOMMIE LEE HENDERSON v. STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 70-5079 (Formerly No. 6733, October Term, 1970).
JULIOUS SULLIVAN v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 69-5006 (Formerly No. 825, Misc., October Term, 1969).
JAMES C. THACKER v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 69-5045 (Formerly No. 5331, October Term, 1970).

GEORGE CUMMINGS v. STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 69-5027 (Formerly No. 683, Misc., October Term, 1969).
JAMES C. LEE, alias MOSES KING, JR. v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 69-5039 (Formerly No. 5256, October Term, 1970).
JAMES HENRY WALKER, v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA	No. 70-3 (Formerly No. 429, October Term, 1970).

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

MOTION TO STAY ISSUANCE OF JUDGMENTS AND MANDATES

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

1971 TERM

WILLIAM HENRY FURMAN, *Petitioner,* v. GEORGIA, *Respondent.*	No. 69-5003
LUCIOUS JACKSON, JR., *Petitioner,* v. GEORGIA, *Respondent.*	No. 69-5030
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JAMES HENRY WALKER, *Petitioner*, v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA, *Respondent*.	No. 70-3 (Formerly No. 429, October Term, 1970).

MOTION TO STAY ISSUANCE OF JUDGMENTS AND MANDATES

To: The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Justice of the United States and
Circuit Justice for the Fifth Judicial Circuit:

Respondent, by its Attorney General, respectfully moves, pursuant to Rule 59, to stay the issuance of the judgments and mandates in the above-entitled causes, in which causes judgments and orders were entered on June 29, 1972, vacating the judgment of the lower court in each case insofar as it left undisturbed the death

penalty imposed and remanding the case, in each instance, for further proceedings. The following good cause is shown to justify a stay of the issuance of the judgments and mandates in the above-entitled causes, that will remain in effect at least until the Court reconvenes in October, 1972, and has had an opportunity to act further:

1.

If the stays are not granted, the sentences imposed will be incapable of being carried out and the lower courts will be confronted with fashioning extra-statutory procedures for the setting of new sentences, which will of necessity require further action and proceeding in the trial courts wherein the original sentences were imposed, all of which is further complicated by the dicotomy which exists between the murder cases, *i.e.* Furman, Park, Venson Williams, and Henderson (where the only alternative punishment is life imprisonment: Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005; Criminal Code of Georgia § 26-1101), and the rape cases, *i.e.*, Jackson, Arkwright, Miller, and Johnnie Williams (where the alternative punishments are life imprisonment or labor in the penitentiary for a period of between one and twenty years: Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302).

2.

Such a procedure would result in sentences less than death for these persons whose petitions were pending in the Supreme Court. Respondent has filed a Petition for Rehearing[1] in these cases which, if granted after the

[1]Copy is attached to the original hereof; copies were served on all counsel listed in the Certificate of Service attached hereto, before the Petition was filed.

Court reconvenes in October, would present cases in which the controversy has then become moot.

3.

At the same time, and in the event the stays are denied, the remainder of the over 30 sentences of death which remain unexecuted and unreversed in Georgia, would be subject to the non-finality of the Court's decision in the above-entitled causes due to the pendency of the Petition for Rehearing heretofore filed.

4.

Even if the denial of stays does not moot the question for which certiorari was granted in *Furman* and *Jackson*, the granting of the petition and any subsequent change or modification in the Court's primary decision would probably affect the extant death sentences which have *not* been before the Court. The result would be that some persons will have been subject to the decision as it stands today while others, similarly situated except for the happenstance of not having their cases pending before the Court on the date the decision was rendered, are subject to a later revised decision. Inconsistency of treatment would be the obvious effect.

5.

Granting the stays will not substantially affect the custody of petitioners, whose present incarceration would in all likelihood be continued after resentencing.

6.

Granting the stays will permit orderly and fair final adjudication of a question common to over 30 Georgia prisoners and avoid the singling out of only a few to

whom the current decision would apply. It will also allow the continued adjudication of the penalty in cases deemed appropriate by judges or juries in the interim. Thus, all persons subject to the penalty in Georgia would ultimately receive like treatment.

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays that this Motion be granted, in each and every cause styled above.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Dorothy T. Beasley, Attorney of record for the Respondent herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, I served the foregoing "Motion to Stay Issuance of Judgments and Mandates" on the Petitioners by depositing copies of the same in a United States mailbox, with first class postage prepaid, addressed to counsel of record at their post office addresses:

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This ..... day of July, 1972.

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 69–5003, 69–5030, AND 69–5031

William Henry Furman, Petitioner, 69–5003 *v.* State of Georgia.	On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner in No. 69–5003 was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 26–1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). 225 Ga. 253, 167 S. E. 2d 628 (1969). Petitioner in No. 69–5030 was convicted of rape in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 26–1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). 225 Ga. 790, 171 S. E. 2d 501 (1969). Petitioner in No. 69–5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and was sentenced to death pursuant to Tex. Penal Code Ann., Art. 1189 (1961). 447 S. W. 2d 932 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Certiorari was granted limited to the following question: "Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?"

403 U. S. 952 (1971). The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.

So ordered.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL have filed separate opinions in support of the judgments. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST have filed separate dissenting opinions.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 69–5003, 69–5030, AND 69–5031

William Henry Furman, Petitioner, 69–5003 *v.* State of Georgia.	On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.

In these three cases the death penalty was imposed, one of them for murder, and two for rape. In each the determination of whether the penalty should be death or a lighter punishment was left by the State to the discretion of the judge or of the jury. In each of the three cases the trial was to a jury. They are here on petitions for certiorari which we granted limited to the question whether the imposition and execution of the death penalty constitutes "cruel and unusual punishments" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the States by the Fourteenth.[1] I vote to vacate each

[1] The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia affirming Furman's conviction of murder and sentence of death is reported in 225 Ga. 253, 167 S. E. 2d 628, and its opinion affirming. Jackson's conviction of rape and sentence of death is reported in 225 Ga. 790, 171 S. E. 2d 501. The conviction of Branch of rape and the sentence of death was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas and reported in 447 S. W. 2d 932.

judgment, believing that the exaction of the death penalty does violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

That the requirements of due process ban cruel and unusual punishment is now settled. *Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459, 463, 473–474; *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660, 667. It is also settled that the proscription of cruel and unusual punishments forbids the judicial imposition of them as well as their proscription by the legislature. *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349, 378–382.

Congressman Bingham, in proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, maintained that "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included protection against "cruel and unusual punishments:"

> ". . . many instances of State injustice and oppression have already occurred in the State legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guaranteed privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national Government furnished and could furnish by law no remedy whatever. Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution, 'cruel and unusual punishments' have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon citizens, not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for which and against which the Government of the United States had provided no remedy and could provide none." Cong. Globe, May 10, 1866, p. 2542.

Whether the Privileges and Immunities route is followed or the due process route, the result is the same.

It has been assumed in our decisions that punishment by death is not cruel, unless the manner of execution can be said to be inhuman and barbarous. *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 436, 447. It is also said in our opinions

that the proscription of cruel and unusual punishments "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." *Weems* v. *United States, supra,* at 378. A like statement was made in *Trop* v. *Dulles,* 356 U. S. 86, 101, that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

The generalities of a law inflicting capital punishment is one thing. What may be said of the validity of a law on the books and what may be done with the law in its application do or may lead to quite different conclusions.

It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is "unusual" if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.

There is evidence that the provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 from which the language of the Eighth Amendment was taken was concerned primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties and that its aim was to forbid arbitary and discriminatory penalties of a severe nature: [2]

> "Following the Norman conquest of England in 1066, the old system of penalties, which ensured equality between crime and punishment, suddenly disappeared. By *the time systematic judicial records* were kept, its demise was almost complete. With the exception of certain grave crimes for which the punishment was death or outlawry, the arbitrary fine was replaced by a discretionary amercement. Although amercement's discretionary

[2] Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted"; The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 845–846 (1969).

character allowed the circumstances of each case to be taken into account and the level of cash penalties to be decreased or increased accordingly, the amercement presented an opportunity for excessive or oppressive fines.

"The problem of excessive amercements became so prevalent that three chapters of the Magna Carta were devoted to their regulation. Maitland said of Chapter 14 that 'very likely there was no clause in the Magna Carta more grateful to the mass of the people. Chapter 14 clearly stipulated as fundamental law a prohibition of excessiveness in punishments:

"'A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offence, except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be amerced according to its gravity, saving his livelihood; and a merchant likewise, saving his merchandise; in the same way a villein shall be amerced saving his wainage; if they fall into our mercy. And none of the aforesaid amercements shall be imposed except by the testimony of reputable men of the neighborhood.'"

The English Bill of Rights, enacted December 16, 1689, stated that "excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."[3] These were the words chosen for our Eighth Amendment. A like provision had been in Virginia's Constitution of 1776[4] and in seven other States.[5] The Northwest Ordinance, enacted under the

[3] 1 Gul. & Mar., Sess. 2, Cap. 2; Eng. Hist. Doc., Vol. VIII, 1660-1714, p. 122 (1953).

[4] 7 Thorpe, Federal & State Constitutions 3813 (1909).

[5] Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. 3 Thorpe, *op. cit., supra*, n. 4, 1688, 1892, 4 Thorpe 2457, 5 Thorpe, 2788, 3101, 6 Thorpe, 3257, 3264.

Articles of Confederation, included a prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.[6] But the debates of the First Congress on the Bill of Rights throw little light on its intended meaning. All that appears is the following:[7]

> "Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, objected to the words 'nor cruel and unusual punishments,' the import of them being too indefinite.
>
> "Mr. Livermore: 'The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in the future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it would be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.'"

The words "cruel and unusual" certainly include penalties that are barbaric. But the words, at least when read in light of the English proscription against selective and irregular use of penalties, suggest that it is "cruel and unusual" to apply the death penalty—or any other penalty—selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are

[6] 1 U. S. C. (1964) xxxvii, xxxviii.

[7] 1 Annals Congress, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 754 (1789).

unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of the same penalty across the boards.[8] Judge Tuttle indeed made abundantly clear in *Noval* v. *Beto*, 453 F. 2d 661, 673–679, that solitary confinement may at times be "cruel and unusual" punishment. Cf. *In re Medley*, 134 U. S. 160; *Brooks* v. *Florida*, 389 U. S. 413.

The Court in *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 198, noted that in this country there was almost from the beginning a "rebellion against the common-law rule imposing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers." The first attempted remedy was to restrict the death penalty to defined offenses such as "premeditated" murder.[9] *Ibid.* But juries took "the

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[8] ". . . When in respect of any class of offenses the difficulty of obtaining convictions is at all general in England, we may hold it as an axiom, that the law requires amendment. Such conduct in juries is the silent protest of the people against its undue severity. This was strongly exemplified in the case of prosecutions for the forgery of bank-notes, when it was a capital felony. It was in vain that the charge was proved. Juries would not condemn men to the gallows for an offense of which the punishment was out of all proportion to the crime; and as they could not mitigate the sentence they brought in verdicts of Not Guilty. The consequence was, that the law was changed; and when secondary punishments were substituted for the penalty of death, a forger had no better chance of an acquittal than any other criminal. Thus it is that the power which juries possess of refusing to put the law in force has, in the words of Lord John Russell, 'been the cause of amending many bad laws which the judges would have administered with professional bigotry, and above all, it has this important and useful consequence, that laws totally repugnant to the feelings of the community for which they are made, can not long prevail in England.'". Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 367–368 (2d ed. 1878).

[9] This trend was not universally applauded. In the early 1800's, England had a law that made it possible to impose the death sentence for stealing five shillings or more. 3 & 4 W. & M., c. 9, § 1. When a bill for abolishing that penalty (finally enacted in

law into their own hands" and refused to convict on the capital offense. *Id.*, at 199.

> "In order to meet the problem of jury nullification, legislatures did not try, as before, to refine further the definition of capital homicides. Instead they adopted the method of forthrightly granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact."

1827, 7 & 8 Sec. 4th, c. 27) was before the House of Lords in 1813, Lord Ellenborough said:

"If your Lordships look to the particular measure now under consideration, can it, I ask, be seriously maintained, that the most exemplary punishment, and the best suited to prevent the commission of this crime, ought not to be a punishment which might in some cases be inflicted? How, but by the enactments of the law now sought to be repealed, are the cottages of industrious poverty protected? What other security has a poor peasant, when he and his wife leave their home for their daily labours, that on their return their few articles of furniture or of clothes which they possess besides those which they carry on their backs, will be safe? . . . [b]y the enacting of the punishment of death, and leaving it to the discretion of the Crown to inflict that punishment or not, as the circumstances of the case may require, I am satisfied, and I am much mistaken if your Lordships are not satisfied, that this object is attained with the least possible expenditure. That the law is, as it has been termed, a bloody law, I can by no means admit. Can there be a better test than by a consideration of the number of persons who have been executed for offences of the description contained in the present Bill? Your Lordships are told, what is extremely true, that this number is very small; and this very circumstance is urged as a reason for a repeal of the law; but, before your Lordships are induced to consent to such repeal, I beg to call to your consideration the number of innocent persons who might have been plundered of their property or destroyed by midnight murderers, if the law now sought to be repealed had not been in existence:—a law upon which all the retail trade of this commercial country depends; and which I for one will not consent to be put in jeopardy." Debate in House of Lords, April 2, 1813 (London 1816), pp. 22–23.

The Court concluded "In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to any thing in the Constitution." *Id.* 207.

The Court refused to find constitutional dimensions in the argument that those who exercise their discretion to send a person to death should be given standards by which that discretion should be exercised. *Id.* 207–208.

A recent witness before the Committee of the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, Ernest van den Haag, testifying on H. R. 8414 and H. R. 3243,[10] stated:

> "Any penalty, a fine, imprisonment or the death penalty could be unfairly or unjustly applied. The

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[10] H. R. 3243, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Cong. Celler would stay for two years all executions by the United States or by any State.

H. R. 8414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Cong. Celler would also provide an interim stay of all executions by the United States or by any State and contains the following proposed finding:

"Congress hereby finds that there exists serious question—

"(a) whether the infliction of the death penalty amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendents to the Constitution; and

"(b) whether the death penalty is inflicted discriminatorily upon members of racial minorities, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution,

"and, in either case, whether Congress should exercise its authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to prohibit the use of the death penalty."

There is the naive view that capital punishment as "meted out in our courts, is the antithesis of barbarism." See Henry Paolucci, New York Times, May 27, 1972. But the Leopolds and Loebs, the Harry Thaws, the Dr. Sheppards and the Dr. Finchs of our society are never executed, only those in the lower strata, only those who are members of an unpopular minority or poor and despised.

vice in this case is not in the penalty but in the process by which it is inflicted. It is unfair to inflict unequal penalties on equally guilty parties, or on any innocent parties, *regardless of what the penalty is.*

"I conclude that this vice must be corrected, if it exists, not by changing penalties but by changing the processes by which they are judicially inflicted."

But those who advance that argument overlook *McGautha.*

We are now imprisoned in the *McGautha* holding. Indeed the seeds of the present cases are in *McGautha.* Juries (or judges, as the case may be) have practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die.[11]

Mr. Justice Field, dissenting in *O'Neil* v. *Vermont,* 144 U. S. 323, 340, said, "The State may, indeed, make the drinking of one drop of liquor an offence to be punished by imprisonment, but it would be unheard-of

[11] The tension between our decision today and *McGautha* highlights, in my view, the correctness of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dissent in that case, which I joined. 402 U. S., at 248. I should think that if the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on petitioners, because they are "among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed," opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, *post,* at —, or, because "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not," opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE, *post,* at —, statements with which I am in complete agreement—then the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would render unconstitutional "capital sentencing procedures that are purposely constructed to allow the maximum possible variation from one case to the next, and [which] provide no mechanism to prevent that consciously maximized variation from reflecting merely random or arbitrary choice." *McGautha* v. *California,* 402 U. S. 183, 248 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

cruelty if it should count the drops in a single glass and make thereby a thousand offences, and thus extend the punishment for drinking the single glass of liquor to an imprisonment of almost indefinite duration." What the legislature may not do for all classes uniformly and systematically, a judge or jury may not do for a class that prejudice sets apart from the community.

There is increasing recognition of the fact that the basic theme of equal protection is implicit in "cruel and unusual" punishments. "A penalty . . . should be considered 'unusually' imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily." [12] The same authors add that "The extreme rarity with which applicable death penalty provisions are put to use raises a strong inference of arbitrariness." [13] The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recently concluded: [14]

> "Finally there is evidence that the imposition of the death sentence and the exercise of dispensing power by the courts and the executive follow discriminatory patterns. The death sentence is disproportionately imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups."

A study of capital cases in Texas from 1924 to 1968 reached the following conclusions: [15]

> "Application of the death penalty is unequal: most of those executed were poor, young, and ignorant.

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[12] Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1773, 1790.

[13] *Id.*, at 1792.

[14] The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, p. 143 (1967).

[15] Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1927–1968, 15 Cr. & Del. 132, 141 (1969).

[*Footnote 15 is continued on p. 11*]

"Seventy-five of the 460 cases involved codefendants, who, under Texas law, were given separate trials. In several instances, where a white and a Negro were codefendants, the white was sentenced to life imprisonment or a term of years, and the Negro was given the death penalty.

"Another ethnic disparity is found in the type of sentence imposed for rape. The Negro convicted of rape is far more likely to get the death penalty

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In Bedau's Anthology, The Death Penalty in America, p. 474 (1964), it is stated:

RACE OF THE OFFENDER BY FINAL DISPOSITION

Final	Negro		White		Total	
Disposition	N	%	N	%	N	%
Executed	130	88.4	210	79.8	340	82.9
Commuted	17	11.6	53	20.2	70	17.1
Total	147	100.0	263	100.0	410	100.0

$X^2=4.33$; P less than .05.

"Although there may be a host of factors other than races involved in this frequency distribution, something more than chance has operated over the years to produce this racial difference. On the basis of this study it is not possbile to indict the judicial and other public processes prior to the death row as responsible for the association between Negroes and higher frequency of executions; nor is it entirely correct to assume that from the time of their appearance on death row Negroes are discriminated against by the Pardon Board. Too many unknown or presently immeasurable factors prevent our making definitive statements about the relationship. Nevertheless, because the Negro/high-execution association is statistically present, some suspicion of racial discrimination can hardly be avoided. If such a relationship had not appeared, this kind of suspicion could have been allayed; the existence of the relationship, although not 'proving' differential bias by the Pardon Boards over the years since 1914, strongly suggests that such bias has existed."

The latter was a study in Pennsylvania of people on death row between 1914 and 1958, made by Wolfgang, Kelly, and Nolde and printed in 53 J. Cr. L. Cr. & Pol. Sci. 301 (1962). And see Hartung, Trends in the Use of Captial Punishment, Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. Nov. 1952, pp. 8, 14–17.

than a term sentence, whereas whites and Latins are far more likely to get a term sentence than the death penalty."

Warden Lewis E. Lawes of Sing Sing said: [16]

"Not only does capital punishment fail in its justification, but no punishment could be invented with so many inherent defects. It is an unequal punishment in the way it is applied to the rich and to the poor. The defendant of wealth and position never goes to the electric chair or to the gallows. Juries do not intentionally favour the rich, the law is theoretically impartial, but the defendant with ample means is able to have his case presented with every favourable aspect, while the poor defendant often has a lawyer assigned by the court. Sometimes such assignment is considered part of political patronage; usually the lawyer assigned has had no experience whatever in a capital case."

Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has said, "It is the poor, the sick, the ignorant, the powerless and the hated who are executed." [17] One searches our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of this society. The Leopolds and Loebs are given prison terms, not sentenced to death.

Jackson, a Black, convicted of the rape of a white woman, was 21 years old. A court-appointed psychiatrist said that Jackson was of average education and average intelligence, that he was not an imbecile or schizophrenic or psychotic, that his traits were the product of environmental influences, and that he was competent to stand trial. Jackson had entered the house after the husband left for work. He held scissors against the neck of the

[16] Life & Death in Sing Sing, 155–160 (1928).

[17] Crime in America 335 (1971).

wife, demanding money. She could find none and a struggle ensued for the scissors, a battle which she lost; and she was then raped, Jackson keeping the scissors pressed against her neck. While there did not appear to be any long-term traumatic impact on the victim, she was bruised and abrased in the struggle but was not hospitalized. Jackson was a convict who had escaped from a work gang in the area, a result of a three-year sentence for auto theft. He was at large for three days and during that time had committed several other offenses—burglary, auto theft, and assault and battery.

Furman, a Black, killed a householder while seeking to enter the home at night. Furman shot the deceased through a closed door. He was 26-years-old and had finished the sixth grade in school. Pending trial he was committed to the Georgia Central State Hospital for a psychiatric examination on his plea of insanity tendered by court-appointed counsel. The superintendent reported: that a unanimous staff diagnostic conference on the same date had concluded "that this patient should retain his present diagnosis of Mental Deficiency, Mild to Moderate, with Psychoatic Episodes associated with Convulsive Disorder." The physicians agreed that "at present the patient is not psychotic, but he is not capable of cooperating with his counsel in the preparation of his defense"; and the staff believed "that he is in need of further psychiatric hospitalization and treatment."

Later he reported that the staff diagnosis was Mental Deficiency, Mild to Moderate, with Psychotic Episodes associated with Convulsive Disorder. He concluded, however, that Furman was "not psychotic at present, knows right from wrong and is able to cooperate with his counsel in preparing his defense."

Branch, a Black, entered the rural home of a 65-year-old widow, a White, while she slept and raped her, holding his arm against her throat. Thereupon he demanded

money and for 30 minutes or more the widow searched for money, finding little. As he left, Jackson said if the widow told anyone what happened, he would return and kill her. The record is barren of any medical or psychiatric evidence showing injury to her as a result of Branch's attack.

He had previously been convicted of felony theft and found to be a borderline mentally deficient and well below the average IQ of Texan prison inmates. He had the equivalent of five and a half years of grade school education. He had a "dull intelligence" and was in the lower four percentile of his class.

We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death because they were Black. Yet our task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.

Irving Brant has given a detailed account of the Bloody Assizes, the regime of terror that occupied the closing years of the rule of Charles II and the opening years of the regime of James. The Lord Chief Justice was Jeffreys:

> "Nobody knows how many hundreds of men, innocent or of unproved guilt, Jeffreys sent to their deaths in the pseudo trials that followed Monmouth's feeble and stupid attempt to seize the throne. When the ordeal ended, scores had been executed and 1,260 were awaiting the hangman in three counties. To be absent from home during the uprising was evidence of guilt. Mere death was considered much too mild for the villagers and

farmers rounded up in these raids. The directions to a high sheriff were to provide an ax, a cleaver, 'a furnace or cauldron to boil their heads and quarters, and soil to boil therewith, half a bushel to each traitor, and tar to tar them with, and a sufficient number of spears and poles to fix their heads and quarters' along the highways. One could have crossed a good part of northern England by their guidance.

"The story of The Bloody Assizes, widely known to Americans, helped to place constitutional limitations on the crime of treason and to produce a bar against cruel and unusual punishments. But in the polemics that led to the various guarantees of freedom, it had no place compared with the tremendous thrust of the trial and execution of Sidney. The hundreds of judicial murders committed by Jeffreys and his fellow judges were totally inconceivable in a free American republic, but any American could imagine himself in Sidney's place—executed for putting on paper, in his closet, words that later on came to express the basic principles of republican government. Unless barred by fundamental law, the legal rulings that permitted this result could easily be employed against any person whose political opinions challenged the party in power." The Bill of Rights, pp. 154–155 (1965).

Those who wrote the Eighth Amendment knew what price their forebears had paid for a system based, not on equal justice, but on discrimination. In those days the target was not the Blacks or the poor, but the dissenters, those who opposed absolutism in government, who struggled for a parliamentary regime, and who opposed governments' recurring efforts to foist a particular religion on the people. *Id.*, pp. 155–163. But the tool of capital punishment was used with vengeance against the opposition and those unpopular with the

regime. One cannot read this history without realizing that the desire for equality was reflected in the ban against "cruel and unusual punishments" contained in the Eighth Amendment.

In a Nation committed to Equal Protection of the laws there is no permissible "caste" aspect [18] of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, poor and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position. In ancient Hindu law a Brahmin was exempt from capital punishment.[19] And in those days, "Generally, in the law books, punishment increased in severity as social status diminished." [20] We have, I fear, taken in practice the same position, partially as a result of making the death penalty discretionary and partially as a result of the ability of the rich to purchase the services of the most respected and most resourceful legal talent in the Nation.

The high service rendered by the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are even-handed, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups. A law that stated that anyone making more than $50,000 would be exempt from the death penalty would plainly fall, as would a law that in terms said that Blacks, those who never went beyond the fifth grade

[18] See Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 Annals, Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., 93 (1941).

[19] See Spellman, Political Theory in Ancient India 112 (1964).

[20] Diekmeier, Kingship and Community in Early India 233 (1962).

in school, or those who made less than $3,000 a year, or those who were unpopular or unstable should be the only people executed. A law which in the overall view reaches that result in practice [21] has no more sanctity than a law which in terms provides the same.

Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implict in the ban on "cruel and unusual" punishments.

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[21] Cf. Prettyman, Death and The Supreme Court, pp. 296–297 (1961).

"The disparity of representation in capital cases raises doubts about capital punishment itself, which has been abolished in only nine states. If a James Avery [345 U. S. 559] can be saved from electrocution because his attorney made timely objection to the selection of a jury by the use of yellow and white tickets, while an Aubry Williams [349 U. S. 375] can be sent to his death by a jury selected in precisely the same manner, we are imposing our most extreme penalty in an uneven fashion.

"The problem of proper representation is not a problem of money, as some have claimed, but of a lawyer's ability, and it is not true that only the rich have able lawyers. Both the rich and the poor usually are well represented—the poor because more often than not the best attorneys are appointed to defend them. It is the middle-class defendant, who can afford to hire an attorney but not a very good one, who is at a disadvantage. Certainly William Fikes [352 U. S. 191], despite the anomalous position in which he finds himself today, received as effective and intelligent a defense from his court-appointed attorneys as he would have received from an attorney his family had scraped together enough money to hire.

"And it is not only a matter of ability. An attorney must be found who is prepared to spend precious hours—the basic commodity he has to sell—on a case that seldom fully compensates him and often brings him no fee at all. The public has no conception of the time and effort devoted by attorneys to indigent cases. And in a first-degree case, the added responsibility of having a man's life depend upon the outcome exacts a heavy toll."

Any law which is nondiscriminatory on its face may be applied in such a way as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Yick Wo* v. *Hopkins*, 118 U. S. 356. Such conceivably might be the fate of a mandatory death penalty, where equal or lesser sentences were imposed on the elite, a harsher one on the minorities or members of the lower castes. Whether a mandatory death penalty would otherwise be constitutional is a question I do not reach.

I concur in the judgments of the Court.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 69–5003, 69–5030, AND 69–5031

William Henry Furman, Petitioner, 69–5003 *v.* State of Georgia.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.

The question presented in these cases is whether death is today a punishment for crime that is "cruel and unusual" and consequently, by virtue of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, beyond the power of the State to inflict.[1]

Almost a century ago, this Court observed that "[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which

[1] The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, *nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.*" (Emphasis added.) The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is fully applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660 (1962); *Gideon* v. *Wainwright*, 372 U. S. 335, 342 (1963); *Malloy* v. *Hogan*, 378 U. S. 1, 6 n. 6 (1964); *Powell* v. *Texas*, 392 U. S. 514 (1968).

provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted." *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S. 130, 135–136 (1878). Less than 15 years ago, it was again noted that "[t]he exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court." *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 99 (1958). Those statements remain true today. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, like the other great clauses of the Constitution, is not susceptible to precise definition. Yet we know that the values and ideals it embodies are basic to our scheme of government. And we know also that the Clause imposes upon this Court the duty, when the issue is properly presented, to determine the constitutional validity of a challenged punishment, whatever that punishment may be. In these cases, "[t]hat issue confronts us, and the task of resolving it is inescapably ours." *Id.*, at 103.

I

We have very little evidence of the Framers' intent in including the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause among those restraints upon the new Government enumerated in the Bill of Rights. The absence of such a restraint from the body of the Constitution was alluded to, so far as we now know, in the debates of only two of the state ratifying conventions. In the Massachusetts convention, Mr. Holmes protested:

> "What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is the consideration, that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and determine, what kinds of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst

the most mild instruments of their discipline." 2 Elliot's Debates 111 (2d ed. 1876).

Holmes's fear that Congress would have unlimited power to prescribe punishments for crimes was echoed by Patrick Henry at the Virginia convention:

". . . Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into the business of human legislation. They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest offence—petty larceny. They may define crimes and prescribe punishments. In the definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed by what wise representatives ought to be governed by. But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives. What says our [Virginia] bill of rights?—'that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' Are you not, therefore, now calling on those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to . . . define punishments without this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to this bill of rights? You let them loose; you do more—you depart from the genius of your country. . . .

"In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your [Virginia] declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors?—That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment." 3 Elliot's Debates 447 (2d ed. 1876).[2]

[2] Henry continued:

"But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice

These two statements shed some light on what the Framers meant by "cruel and unusual punishments." Holmes referred to "the most cruel and unheard-of punishments," Henry to "tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment." It does not follow, however, that the Framers were exclusively concerned with prohibiting torturous punishments. Holmes and Henry were objecting to the absence of a Bill of Rights, and they cited to support their objections the unrestrained legislative power to prescribe punishments for crimes. Certainly we may suppose that they invoked the spectre of the most drastic punishments a legislature might devise.

In addition, it is quite clear that Holmes and Henry focused wholly upon the necessity to restrain the legislative power. Because they recognized "that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and determine, what kinds of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes," they insisted that Congress must be limited in its power to punish. Accordingly, they called for a "constitutional check" that would ensure that "when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to

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of France, Spain, and Germany—of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone." 3 Elliot's Debates 447–448 (2d ed. 1876). Although these remarks have been cited as evidence that the Framers considered only torturous punishments to be "cruel and unusual," it is obvious that Henry was referring to the use of torture for the purpose of eliciting confessions from suspected criminals. Indeed, in the ensuing colloquy, see n. 3, *infra*, George Mason responded that that use of torture was prohibited by the right against self-incrimination contained in the Virginia bill of rights.

be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives." [3]

The only further evidence of the Framers' intent appears from the debates in the First Congress on the adoption of the Bill of Rights.[4] As the Court noted in *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349, 368 (1910),

[3] It is significant that the response to Henry's plea, by George Nicholas, was simply that a Bill of Rights would be ineffective as a means of restraining the legislative power to prescribe punishments: "But the gentleman says that, by this Constitution, they have power to make laws to define crimes and prescribe punishments; and that, consequently, we are not free from torture. . . . If we had no security against torture but our [Virginia] declaration of rights, we might be tortured to-morrow; for it has been repeatedly infringed and disregarded." 3 Elliot's Debates, *supra*, at 451.

George Mason misinterpreted Nicholas's response to Henry:

"Mr. GEORGE MASON replied that the worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion that the [Virginia] bill of rights did not prohibit torture; for that one clause expressly provided that no man can give evidence against himself; and that the worthy gentleman must know that, in those countries where torture is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the prohibition." *Id.*, at 452.

Nicholas concluded the colloquy by making his point again:

"Mr. NICHOLAS acknowledged the [Virginia] bill of rights to contain that prohibition, and that the gentleman was right with respect to the practice of extorting confession from the criminal in those countries where torture is used; but still he saw no security arising from the bill of rights as separate from the Constitution, for that it had been frequently violated with impunity." *Ibid.*

There was thus no denial that the legislative power should be restrained; the dispute was whether a Bill of Rights would provide a realistic restraint. The Framers, obviously, believed it would.

[4] We have not been referred to any mention of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the debates of the state legislatures on ratification of the Bill of Rights.

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "received very little debate." The extent of the discussion, by two opponents of the Clause in the House of Representatives, was this:

> "Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, objected to the words 'nor cruel and unusual punishments;' the import of them being too indefinite.
>
> "Mr. Livermore.—The [Eighth Amendment] seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. . . . No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.
>
> "The question was put on the [Eighth Amendment], and it was agreed to by a considerable majority." 1 Annals of Congress 754 (1789).[5]

Livermore thus agreed with Holmes and Henry that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause imposed a limitation upon the legislative power to prescribe pun-

[5] The elided portion of Livermore's remarks reads: "What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to determine." Since Livermore did not ask similar rhetorical questions about the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, it is unclear whether he included the Clause in his objection that the Eighth Amendment "seems to have no meaning in it."

ishments. However, in contrast to Holmes and Henry, who were supporting the Clause, Livermore, opposing it, did not refer to punishments that were considered barbarous and torturous. Instead, he objected that the Clause might someday prevent the legislature from inflicting what were then quite common and, in his view, "necessary" punishments—death, whipping, and earcropping.[6] The only inference to be drawn from Livermore's statement is that the "considerable majority" were prepared to run that risk. No member of the House rose to reply that the Clause was intended merely to prohibit torture.

Several conclusions thus emerge from the history of the adoption of the Clause. We know that the Framers' concern was directed specifically to the exercise of legislative power. They included in the Bill of Rights a prohibition upon "cruel and unusual punishments" precisely because the legislature would otherwise have had the unfettered power to prescribe punishments for crimes. Yet we cannot now know exactly what the Framers thought "cruel and unusual punishments" were. Certainly they intended to ban torturous punishments, but the available evidence does not support the further conclusion that *only* torturous punishments were to be outlawed. As Livermore's comments demonstrate, the Framers were well aware that the reach of the Clause was not limited to the proscription of unspeakable atrocities. Nor did they intend simply to forbid punishments considered "cruel and unusual" at the time. The "import" of the Clause is, indeed, "indefinite," and for good reason. A constitutional provision "is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general lan-

[6] Indeed, the first federal criminal statute, enacted by the First Congress, prescribed 39 lashes for larceny and for receiving stolen goods, and one hour in the pillory for perjury. Act of April 30, 1790, c. 9, §§ 16–18, 1 Stat. 116.

guage should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 373.

It was almost 80 years before this Court had occasion to refer to the Clause. See *Pervear* v. *The Commonwealth*, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 475, 479–480 (1867). These early cases, as the Court pointed out in *Weems* v. *United States, supra*, at 369, did not undertake to provide "an exhaustive definition" of "cruel and unusual punishments." Most of them proceeded primarily by "looking backwards for examples by which to fix the meaning of the clause," *id.*, at 377, concluding simply that a punishment would be "cruel and unusual" if it were similar to punishments considered "cruel and unusual" at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.[7] In *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S., at 136, for instance, the Court found it "safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden." The "punishments of torture," which the Court labeled "atrocities," were cases where the criminal "was embowelled alive, beheaded, and

[7] Many of the state courts, "feeling constrained thereto by the incidences of history," *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349, 376 (1910), were apparently taking the same position. One court "expressed the opinion that the provision did not apply to punishment by 'fine or imprisonment or both, but such as that inflicted at the whipping post, in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,' etc." *Ibid.* Another court "said that ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like. . . . Other cases . . . selected certain tyrannical acts of the English monarchs as illustrating the meaning of the clause and the extent of its prohibition." *Id.*, at 368.

quartered," and cases "of public dissection . . . and burning alive." *Id.*, at 135. Similarly, in *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 436, 446 (1890), the Court declared that "if the punishment prescribed for an offence against the laws of the State were manifestly cruel and unusual, as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition." The Court then observed, commenting upon the passage just quoted from *Wilkerson* v. *Utah, supra*, and applying the "manifestly cruel and unusual" test, that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." 136 U. S., at 447.

Had this "historical" interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prevailed, the Clause would have been effectively read out of the Bill of Rights. As the Court noted in *Weems* v. *United States, supra*, at 371, this interpretation led Story to conclude "that the provision 'would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious conduct.'" And Cooley, said the Court, "apparently in a struggle between the effect to be given to ancient examples and the inconsequence of a dread of them in these enlightened times, . . . hesitate[d] to advance definite views." *Id.*, at 375. The result of a judicial application of this interpretation was not surprising. A state court, for example, upheld the constitutionality of the whipping post: "In comparison with the 'barbarities of quarter-

ing, hanging in chains, castration, etc., it was easily reduced to insignificance." *Id.*, at 377.

But this Court in *Weems* decisively repudiated the "historical" interpretation of the Clause. The Court, returning to the intentions of the Framers, "rel[ied] on the conditions which existed when the Constitution was adopted." And the Framers knew "that government by the people instituted by the Constitution would not imitate the conduct of arbitrary monarchs. The abuse of power might, indeed, be apprehended, but not that it would be manifested in provisions or practices which would shock the sensibilities of men." *Id.*, at 375. The Clause, then, guards against "[t]he abuse of power"; contrary to the implications in *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, *supra*, and *In re Kemmler*, *supra*, the prohibition of the Clause is not "confine[d] . . . to such penalties and punishment as were inflicted by the Stuarts." 217 U. S., at 372. Although opponents of the Bill of Rights "felt sure that the spirit of liberty could be trusted, and that its ideals would be represented, not debased, by legislation," *ibid.*, the Framers disagreed:

> "[Patrick] Henry and those who believed as he did would take no chances. Their predominant political impulse was distrust of power, and they insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse. But surely they intended more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went out of practice with the Stuarts. Surely, their jealously of power had a saner justification than that. They were men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain imagining, and it must have come to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation. With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal character to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix terms

> of imprisonment with what accompaniments they might, what more potent instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power? And it was believed that power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the clause, and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we cannot think that it was intended to prohibit only practices like the Stuarts, or to prevent only an exact repetition of history. We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms of punishment was overlooked." *Id.*, at 372–373.

The Court in *Weems* thus recognized that this "restraint upon legislatures" possesses an "expansive and vital character" that is " 'essential . . . to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom.' " *Id.*, at 376–377. Accordingly, the responsibility lies with the courts to make certain that the prohibition of the Clause is enforced.[8] Referring to cases in which "prominence [was] given to the power of the legislature to define crimes and their punishment," the Court said:

> "We concede the power in most of its exercises. We disclaim the right to assert a judgment

[8] The Court had earlier emphasized this point in *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 436 (1890), even while stating the narrow, "historical" interpretation of the Clause:

> "This [English] Declaration of Rights had reference to the acts of the *executive* and *judicial* departments of the government of England; but the language in question as used in the constitution of the State of New York was intended particularly to operate upon the *legislature* of the State, to whose control the punishment of crime was almost wholly confided. So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offence against the laws of the State were manifestly cruel and unusual, . . . it would be the duty of the *courts* to adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition. And we think this equally true of the [Clause], in its application to *Congress*." *Id.*, at 446–447 (emphasis added).

against that of the legislature of the expediency of the laws or the right to oppose the judicial power to the legislative power to define crimes and fix their punishment, unless that power encounters in its exercise a constitutional prohibition. In such case not our discretion but our legal duty, strictly defined and imperative in its direction, is invoked." *Id.*, at 378.[9]

In short, this Court finally adopted the Framers' view of the Clause as a "constitutional check" to ensure that "when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives." That, indeed, is the only view consonant with our constitutional form of government. If the judicial conclusion that a punishment is "cruel and unusual" "depend[ed] upon virtually unanimous condemnation of the penalty at issue," then, "[l]ike no other constitutional provision, [the Clause's] only function would be to legitimize advances already made by the other departments and opinions already the conventional wisdom." We know that the Framers did not envision "so narrow a role for this basic guaranty of human rights." Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1773, 1782 (1970). The right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, like the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, "may not be submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elections." "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied

[9] Indeed, the Court in *Weems* refused even to comment upon some decisions from state courts because they were "based upon sentences of courts, not upon the constitutional validity of laws." 217 U. S., at 377.

by the courts." *Board of Education* v. *Barnette*, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943).

Judicial enforcement of the Clause, then, cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the reason the Clause appears in the Bill of Rights. The difficulty arises, rather, in formulating the "legal principles to be applied by the courts" when a legislatively prescribed punishment is challenged as "cruel and unusual." In formulating those constitutional principles, we must avoid the insertion of "judicial conception[s] of . . . wisdom or propriety," *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 379, yet we must not, in the guise of "judicial restraint," abdicate our fundamental responsibility to enforce the Bill of Rights. Were we to do so, the "constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality." *Id.*, at 373. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would become, in short, "little more than good advice." *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 104.

II

Ours would indeed be a simple task were we required merely to measure a challenged punishment against those that history has long condemned. That narrow and unwarranted view of the Clause, however, was left behind with the 19th century. Our task today is more complex. We know "that the words of the [Clause] are not precise, and that their scope is not static." We know, therefore, that the Clause "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the prog-

ress of a maturing society." *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, at 100–101.[10] That knowledge, of course, is but the beginning of the inquiry.

In *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, at 99, it was said that "[t]he question is whether [a] penalty subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the [Clause]." It was also said that a challenged punishment must be examined "in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment" embodied in the Clause. *Id.*, at 100 n. 32. It was said, finally, that:

> "The basic concept underlying the [Clause] is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has power to punish, the [Clause] stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." *Id.*, at 100.

At bottom, then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is "cruel and unusual," therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.

This formulation, of course, does not of itself yield principles for assessing the constitutional validity of particular punishments. Nevertheless, even though "[t]his Court has had little occasion to give precise content to the [Clause]," *ibid.*, there are principles recognized in our cases and inherent in the Clause sufficient to permit a judicial determination whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity.

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[10] The Clause "may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 378.

The primary principle is that a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings. Pain, certainly, may be a factor in the judgment. The infliction of an extremely severe punishment will often entail physical suffering. See *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 366.[11] Yet the Framers also knew "that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation." *Id.*, at 372. Even though "[t]here may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture," *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, at 101, severe mental pain may be inherent in the infliction of a particular punishment. See *Weems* v. *United States*, *supra*, at 366.[12] That, indeed, was one of the conclusions underlying the holding of the plurality in *Trop* v. *Dulles* that the punishment of expatriation violates the Clause.[13] And the

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[11] "It may be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted. He must bear a chain night or day. He is condemned to painful as well as hard labor. What painful labor may mean we have no exact measure. It must be something more than hard labor. It may be hard labor pressed to the point of pain."

[12] "His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil without giving notice to the 'authority immediately in charge of his surveillance,' and without permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes and among other people, to retrieve his fall from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him and he is subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty."

[13] "This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and for what cause his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to banish-

physical and mental suffering inherent in the punishment of *cadena temporal*, see nn. 11–12, *supra*, was an obvious basis for the Court's decision in *Weems* v. *United States* that the punishment was "cruel and unusual." [14]

More than the presence of pain, however, is comprehended in the judgment that the extreme severity of a punishment makes it degrading to the dignity of human beings. The barbaric punishments condemned by history, "punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like," are, of course, "attended with acute pain and suffering." *O'Neil* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). When we consider why they have been condemned, however, we realize that the pain involved is not the only reason. The true significance of these punishments is that they treat

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ment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international community of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The threat makes the punishment obnoxious." *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 102 (1958). Cf. *id.*, at 110–111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring):

"[I]t can be supposed that the consequences of greatest weight in terms of ultimate impact on the petitioner, are unknown and unknowable. Indeed, in truth, he may live out his life with but minor inconvenience. . . . Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the impact of expatriation—especially where statelessness is the upshot—may be severe. Expatriation, in this respect, constitutes an especially demoralizing sanction. The uncertainty, and the consequent psychological hurt, which must accompany one who becomes an outcast in his own land must be reckoned a substantial factor in the ultimate judgment."

[14] "It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind." *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 377.

members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.

The infliction of an extremely severe punishment, then, like the one before the Court in *Weems* v. *United States*, from which "[n]o circumstance of degradation [was] omitted," 217 U. S., at 366, may reflect the attitude that the person punished is not entitled to recognition as a fellow human being. That attitude may be apparent apart from the severity of the punishment itself. In *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459, 464 (1947), for example, the unsuccessful electrocution, although it caused "mental anguish and physical pain," was the result of "an unforeseeable accident." Had the failure been intentional, however, the punishment would have been, like torture, so degrading and indecent as to amount to a refusal to accord the criminal human status. Indeed, a punishment may be degrading to human dignity solely because it *is* a punishment. A State may not punish a person for being "mentally ill, or a leper, or . . . afflicted with a venereal disease," or for being addicted to narcotics. *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660, 666 (1962). To inflict punishment for having a disease is to treat the individual as a diseased thing rather than as a sick human being. That the punishment is not severe, "in the abstract," is irrelevant; "[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." *Id.*, at 667. Finally, of course, a punishment may be degrading simply by reason of its enormity. A prime example is expatriation, a "punishment more primitive than torture," *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 101, for it necessarily involves a

denial by society of the individual's existence as a member of the human community.[15]

In determining whether a punishment comports with human dignity, we are aided also by a second principle inherent in the Clause—that the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment. This principle derives from the notion that the State does not respect human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does not inflict upon others. Indeed, the very words "cruel and unusual punishments" imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punishments. And, as we now know, the English history of the Clause[16] reveals a particular concern with the establishment of a safeguard against arbitrary punishments. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 857–860 (1969).[17]

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[15] "There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights, and presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights." *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 101–102.

[16] "The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688 . . . ." *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, at 100.

[17] The specific incident giving rise to the provision was the perjury trial of Titus Oates in 1685. "None of the punishments inflicted upon Oates amounted to torture. . . . In the context of the Oates'

This principle has been recognized in our cases.[18] In *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S., at 133—134, the Court reviewed various treatises on military law in order to demonstrate that under "the customs of war" shooting was a common method of inflicting the punishment of death. On that basis, the Court concluded:

> "Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the authorities referred to [treatises on military law] are quite sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of

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case, 'cruel and unusual' seems to have meant a severe punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose." Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 859 (1969). Thus, "[t]he irregularity and anomaly of Oates' treatment was extreme," Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1773, 1789 n. 74 (1970). Although the English provision was intended to restrain the judicial and executive power, see n. 8, *supra*, the principle is, of course, fully applicable under our Clause, which is primarily a restraint upon the legislative power.

[18] In a case from the Philippines Territory, the Court struck down a punishment that "ha[d] no fellow in American legislation." *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 377. After examining the punishments imposed, under both United States and Philippine law, for similar as well as more serious crimes, *id.*, at 380–381, the Court declared that the "contrast" "exhibit[ed] a difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice," *id.*, at 381. And in *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, in which a law of Congress punishing wartime desertion by expatriation was held unconstitutional, it was emphasized that "[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime." *Id.*, at 102. When a severe punishment is not inflicted elsewhere, or when more serious crimes are punished less severely, there is a strong inference that the State is exercising arbitrary, "unrestrained power."

> murder in the first degree is not included in that category, within the meaning of the [Clause]. Soldiers convicted of desertion or other capital military offenses are in the great majority of cases sentenced to be shot, and the ceremony for such occasions is given in great fulness by the writers upon the subject of courts-martial." *Id.*, at 134–135.

The Court thus upheld death by shooting, so far as appears, solely on the ground that it was a common method of execution.[19]

As *Wilkerson* v. *Utah* suggests, when a severe punishment is inflicted "in the great majority of cases" in which it is legally available, there is little likelihood that the State is inflicting it arbitrarily. If, however, the infliction of a severe punishment is "something different from that which is generally done" in such cases, *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 100 n. 32,[20] there is a substantial likelihood that the State, contrary to the re-

[19] In *Weems* v. *United States*, *supra*, at 369–370, the Court summarized the holding of *Wilkerson* v. *Utah* as follows:

"The court pointed out that death was an usual punishment for murder, that it prevailed in the Territory for many years, and was inflicted by shooting, also that the mode of execution was usual under military law. It was hence concluded that it was not forbidden by the Constitution of the United States as cruel or unusual."

[20] It was said in *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, at 100 n. 32, that "[o]n the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the [Clause], precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn. . . . If the word 'unusual' is to have any meaning apart from the word 'cruel,' however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different from that which is generally done." There are other statements in prior cases indicating that the word "unusual" has a distinct meaning:

"We perceive nothing . . . unusual in this [punishment]." *Pervear* v. *The Commonwealth*, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 475, 480 (1867). " . . . the judgment of mankind would be that the punishment was not only an unusual but a cruel one . . . ." *O'Neil* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S. 323,

quirements of regularity and fairness embodied in the Clause, is inflicting the punishment arbitrarily. This principle is especially important today. There is scant danger, given the political processes "in an enlightened democracy such as ours," *id.*, at 100, that extremely severe punishments will be widely applied. The more significant function of the Clause, therefore, is to protect against the danger of their arbitrary infliction.

A third principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society. Rejection by society, of course, is a strong indication that a severe punishment does not comport with human dignity. In applying this principle, however, we must make certain that the judicial determination is as objective as possible.[21]

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340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). "It is unusual in its character." *Weems* v. *United States, supra,* at 377. "And the punishment inflicted . . . is certainly unusual." *United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co.* v. *Burleson,* 255 U. S. 407, 430 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "The punishment inflicted is not only unusual in character; it is, so far as known, unprecedented in American legal history." *Id.,* at 435. "There is no precedent for it. What then is it, if it be not cruel, unusual and unlawful?" *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber,* 329 U. S. 459, 479 (1947) (Burton, J., dissenting). "To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment that is either cruel or unusual." *Robinson* v. *California,* 370 U. S., at 667.

It is fair to conclude from these statements that "[w]hether the word 'unusual' has any qualitative meaning different from 'cruel' is not clear." *Trop* v. *Dulles, supra,* at 100 n. 32. The question, in any event, is of minor significance; this Court has never attempted to explicate the meaning of the Clause simply by parsing its words.

[21] The danger of subjective judgment is acute if the question posed is whether a punishment "shocks the most fundamental instincts of civilized man," *Louisiana ex. rel. Francis* v. *Resweber, supra,* at 473 (Burton, J., dissenting), or whether "any man of right feeling and heart can refrain from shuddering," *O'Neil* v. *Vermont, supra,* at 340 (Field, J., dissenting), or whether "a cry of horror would rise from every civilized and Christian community of the

Thus, for example, *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 380, and *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 102–103, suggest that one factor that may be considered is the existence of the punishment in jurisdictions other than those before the Court. *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S. 130 (1878), suggests that another factor to be considered is the historic usage of the punishment.[22] *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, at 99, combined present acceptance with past usage by observing that "the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty." In *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S., at 666, which involved the infliction of punishment for narcotics addiction, the Court went a step further, concluding simply that "in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment."

The question under this principle, then, is whether there are objective indicators from which a court can conclude that contemporary society considers a severe

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country," *ibid.* Mr. Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion in *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, *supra*, is instructive. He warned "against finding in personal disapproval a reflection of more or less prevailing condemnation" and against "enforcing . . . private view[s] rather than that consensus of society's opinion which, for purposes of due process, is the standard enjoined by the Constitution." *Id.*, at 471. His conclusions were as follows: "I cannot bring myself to believe that [the State's procedure] offends a principle of justice 'rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.'" *Id.*, at 470. ". . . I cannot say that it would be 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" *Id.*, at 471. Yet nowhere in the opinion is there any explanation of how he arrived at those conclusions.

[22] Cf. *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, *supra*, at 463: "The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence."

punishment unacceptable. Accordingly, the judicial task is to review the history of a challenged punishment and to examine society's present practices with respect to its use. Legislative authorization, of course, does not establish acceptance. The acceptability of a severe punishment is measured not by its availability, for it might become so offensive to society as never to be inflicted, but by its use.

The final principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary: The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, cf. *Robinson* v. *California, supra,* at 666; *id.,* at 677 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring); *Trop* v. *Dulles, supra,* at 114 (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive.

This principle first appeared in our cases in Mr. Justice Field's dissent in *O'Neil* v. *Vermont,* 144 U. S., at 337.[23] He there took the position that the Clause

"is directed, not only against punishments of the

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[23] It may, in fact, have appeared earlier. In *Pervear* v. *The Commonwealth,* 72 U. S., at 480, the Court stated:

"We perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in this [punishment]. The object of the law was to protect the community against the manifold evils of intemperance. The mode adopted, of prohibiting under penalties the sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors, without license, is the usual mode adopted in many, perhaps, all of the States. It is wholly within the discretion of State legislatures."

This discussion suggests that the Court viewed the punishment as reasonably related to the purposes for which it was inflicted.

> character mentioned [torturous punishments], but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the bail required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted." *Id.*, at 339–340.

Although the determination that a severe punishment is excessive may be grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the crime,[24] the more significant basis is that the punishment serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment. This view of the principle was explicitly recognized by the Court in *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349 (1910). There the Court, reviewing a severe punishment inflicted for the falsification of an official record, found that "the highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause the loss of many thousand of dollars, and to prevent which the duty of the State should be as eager as to prevent the perversion of truth in a public document, is not greater than that which may be imposed for falsifying a single item of a public account." *Id.*, at 381. Stating that "this contrast shows more than different exercises of legislative judgment," the Court concluded that the punishment was unnecessarily severe in view of the purposes for which it was imposed. *Ibid.*[25]

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[24] Mr. Justice Field apparently based his conclusion upon an intuitive sense that the punishment was disproportionate to the criminal's moral guilt, although he also observed that "the punishment was greatly beyond anything required by any humane law for the offences," *O'Neil* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S., at 340. Cf. *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 99: "Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument that the penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime."

[25] "The State thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal." *Weems* v. *United*

See also *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 111–112 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).[26]

There are, then, four principles by which we may determine whether a particular punishment is "cruel and unusual." The primary principle, which I believe supplies the essential predicate for the application of the others, is that a punishment must not by its severity be degrading to human dignity. The paradigm violation of this principle would be the infliction of a torturous punishment of the type that the Clause has always prohibited. Yet "[i]t is unlikely that any State at this moment in history," *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S., at 666, would pass a law providing for the infliction of such a punishment. Indeed, no such punishment has ever been before this Court. The same may be said of the other principles. It is unlikely that this Court will confront a severe punishment that is obviously inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion; no State would engage in a reign of blind terror. Nor is it likely that this Court will be called upon to revew a severe punishment that is clearly and totally rejected throughout society; no legislature would be able even to authorize the infliction of such a punishment. Nor, finally, is it likely that this Court will have to consider a severe punishment that is patently unnecessary; no State today would inflict a severe punishment knowing that there was no reason whatever for doing so. In short, we are unlikely to have occasion to determine that a punishment is fatally offensive under any one principle.

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[26] The principle that a severe punishment must not be excessive does not, of course, mean that a severe punishment is constitutional merely because it is necessary. A State could not now, for example, inflict a punishment condemned by history, for any such punishment, no matter how necessary, would be intolerably offensive to human dignity. The point is simply that the unnecessary infliction of suffering is also offensive to human dignity.

Since the Bill of Rights was adopted, this Court has adjudged only three punishments to be within the prohibition of the Clause. See *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349 (1910) (12 years in chains at hard and painful labor); *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86 (1958) (expatriation); *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660 (1962) (imprisonment for narcotics addiction). Each punishment, of course, was degrading to human dignity, but of none could it be said conclusively that it was fatally offensive under one or the other of the principles. Rather, these "cruel and unusual punishments" seriously implicated several of the principles, and it was the application of the principles in combination that supported the judgment. That, indeed, is not surprising. The function of these principles, after all, is simply to provide means by which a court can determine whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity. They are, therefore, interrelated, and in most cases it will be their convergence that will justify the conclusion that a punishment is "cruel and unusual." The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.

III

The punishment challenged in these cases is death. Death, of course, is a "traditional" punishment, *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, at 100, one that "has been employed throughout our history," *id.*, at 99, and its constitu-

tional background is accordingly an appropriate subject of inquiry.

There is, first, a textual consideration raised by the Bill of Rights itself. The Fifth Amendment declares that if a particular crime is punishable by death, a person charged with that crime is entitled to certain procedural protections.[27] We can thus infer that the Framers recognized the existence of what was then a common punishment. We cannot, however, make the further inference that they intended to exempt this particular punishment from the express prohibition of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.[28] Nor is there any indication in the debates on the Clause that a special exception was to be made for death. If anything, the indication is to the contrary, for Livermore specifically mentioned death as a candidate for future proscription under the Clause. See p. 6, *supra*. Finally, it does not advance analysis to insist that the Framers did not believe that adoption

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[27] The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a *capital*, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of *life* or limb; . . . nor be deprived of *life*, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

[28] No one, of course, now contends that the reference in the Fifth Amendment to "jeopardy of . . . limb" provides perpetual constitutional sanction for such corporal punishments as branding and earcropping, which were common punishments when the Bill of Rights was adopted. But cf. n. 29, *infra*. As the California Supreme Court pointed out with respect to the California Constitution:

"The Constitution expressly proscribes cruel or unusual punishments. It would be mere speculation and conjecture to ascribe to the framers an intent to exempt capital punishment from the compass of that provision solely because at a time when the death penalty was commonly accepted they provided elsewhere in the Constitution for special safeguards in its application." *People* v. *Anderson*, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 639, 493 P. 2d 880, 887, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 159 (1972).

of the Bill of Rights would immediately prevent the infliction of the punishment of death; neither did they believe that it would immediately prevent the infliction of other corporal punishments that, although common at the time, see n. 6, *supra*, are now acknowledged to be impermissible.[29]

There is also the consideration that this Court has decided three cases involving constitutional challenges to particular methods of inflicting this punishment. In *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S. 130 (1878), and *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 436 (1890), the Court, expressing in both cases the since-rejected "historical" view of the Clause, see pp. 8–9, *supra*, approved death by shooting and death by electrocution. In *Wilkerson*, the Court concluded that shooting was a common method of execution, see pp. 19–20, *supra*;[30] in *Kemmler*, the Court held that the Clause did not apply to the States, 136 U. S., at 447–449.[31] In

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[29] Cf. *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 226 (1971) (separate opinion of Black, J.):

"The [Clause] forbids 'cruel and unusual punishments.' In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors came at the time the [Clause] was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the framers intended to end capital punishment by the [Clause]."

Under this view, of course, any punishment that was in common use in 1791 is forever exempt from the Clause.

[30] The Court expressly noted that the constitutionality of the punishment itself was not challenged. *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S. 130, 136–137 (1878). Indeed, it may be that the only contention made was that, in the absence of statutory sanction, the sentencing "court possessed no authority to prescribe the mode of execution." *Id.*, at 137.

[31] Cf. *McElvaine* v. *Brush*, 142 U. S. 155, 158–159 (1891):

"We held in the case of *Kemmler* . . . that as the legislature of the State of New York had determined that [electrocution] did not inflict

Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459 (1947), the Court approved a second attempt at electrocution after the first had failed. It was said that "[t]he Fourteenth [Amendment] would prohibit by its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner," *id.*, at 463, but that the abortive attempt did not make the "subsequent execution any more cruel in the constitutional sense than any other execution," *id.*, at 464.[32] These three decisions thus reveal that the Court, while ruling upon various methods of inflicting death, has assumed in the past that death was a constitutionally permissible punishment.[33] Past assumptions, however, are not sufficient to limit the scope of our examination of this punishment today. The constitutionality of death itself under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is before this Court for the first time; we cannot avoid the question by recalling past cases that never directly considered it.

The question, then, is whether the deliberate infliction of death is today consistent with the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict punishments that

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cruel and unusual punishment, and its courts had sustained that determination, we were unable to perceive that the State had thereby abridged the privileges or immunities of petitioner or deprived him of due process of law."

[32] It was also asserted that the Constitution prohibits "cruelty inherent in the method of punishment," but does not prohibit "the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely." 329 U. S., at 464. No authority was cited for this assertion, and, in any event, the distinction drawn appears to be meaningless.

[33] In a nondeath case, *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86 (1958), it was said that *"in a day* when it is still *widely accepted*, [death] cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty." *Id.*, at 99 (emphasis added). This statement, of course, left open the future constitutionality of the punishment.

do not comport with human dignity. I will analyze the punishment of death in terms of the principles set out above and the cumulative test to which they lead: It is a denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an unusually severe punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as acceptable and that cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic punishment. Under these principles and this test, death is today a "cruel and unusual" punishment.

Death is a unique punishment in the United States. In a society that so strongly affirms the sanctity of life, not surprisingly the common view is that death is the ultimate sanction. This natural human feeling appears all about us. There has been no national debate about punishment, in general or by imprisonment, comparable to the debate about the punishment of death. No other punishment has been so continuously restricted, see pp. 40–42, *infra*, nor has any State yet abolished prisons, as some have abolished this punishment. And those States that still inflict death reserve it for the most heinous crimes. Juries, of course, have always treated death cases differently, as have governors exercising their commutation powers. Criminal defendants are of the same view. "As all practicing lawyers know, who have defended persons charged with capital offenses, often the only goal possible is to avoid the death penalty." *Griffin* v. *Illinois*, 351 U. S. 12, 28 (1956) (Burton and Minton, JJ., dissenting). Some legislatures have required particular procedures, such as two-stage trials and automatic appeals, applicable only in death cases. "It is the universal experience in the administration of criminal justice that those charged with capital offenses are granted special considerations." *Ibid.* See *Williams* v. *Florida*, 399 U. S. 78, 103 (1970) (all States require juries of 12 in death cases). This Court, too, almost

always treats death cases as a class apart.[34] And the unfortunate effect of this punishment upon the functioning of the judicial process is well known; no other punishment has a similar effect.

The only explanation for the uniqueness of death is its extreme severity. Death is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable to death in terms of physical and mental suffering. Although our information is not conclusive, it appears that there is no method available that guarantees an immediate and painless death.[35] Since the discon-

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[34] "That life is at stake is of course another important factor in creating the extraordinary situation. The difference between capital and noncapital offenses is the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways in which the distinction becomes relevant." *Williams* v. *Georgia*, 349 U. S. 375, 391 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.). "When the penalty is death, we, like state court judges, are tempted to strain the evidence and even, in close cases, the law in order to give a doubtfully condemned man another chance." *Stein* v. *New York*, 346 U. S. 156, 196 (1953) (Jackson, J.). "In death cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved in favor of the accused." *Andres* v. *United States*, 333 U. S. 740, 752 (1948) (Reed, J.). Mr. Justice Harlan expressed the point strongly: "I do not concede that whatever process is 'due' an offender faced with a fine or a prison sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of the Constitution in a capital case. The distinction is by no means novel, . . . nor is it negligible, being literally that between life and death." *Reid* v. *Covert*, 354 U. S. 1, 77 (1957) (concurring opinion). And, of course, for many years this Court distinguished death cases from all others for purposes of the constitutional right to counsel. See *Powell* v. *Alabama*, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); *Betts* v. *Brady*, 316 U. S. 455 (1942); *Bute* v. *Illinois*, 333 U. S. 640 (1948).

[35] See Report of Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949–1953, at 246–273 (1953); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1760, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 19–21 (1970) (testimony of Clinton Duffy); H. Barnes & N. Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology 306–309 (3d ed. 1959); C. Chessman, Trial by Ordeal 195–202 (1955); M. DiSalle, The Power of Life and Death 84–85 (1965); C. Duffy, 88 Men and 2 Women 13–14 (1962); B. Eshel-

tinuance of flogging as a constitutionally permissible punishment, *Jackson* v. *Bishop*, 404 F. 2d 571 (CA8 1968), death remains as the only punishment that may involve the conscious infliction of physical pain. In addition, we know that mental pain is an inseparable part of our practice of punishing criminals by death, for the prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long wait between the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death. Cf. *Ex parte Medley*, 134 U. S. 160, 172 (1890). As the California Supreme Court pointed out, "the process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture." *People* v. *Anderson*, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P. 2d 880, 894, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 166 (1972).[36] Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted, "the onset

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man, Death Row Chaplain 26–29, 101–104, 159–164 (1962); R. Hammer, Between Life and Death 208–212 (1969); K. Lamott, Chronicles of San Quentin 228–231 (1961); L. Lawes, Life and Death in Sing Sing 170–171 (1928); Rubin, The Supreme Court, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Death Penalty, 15 Crime & Delinquency 121, 128–129 (1969); Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 1268, 1338–1341 (1968); Brief *amici curiae* filed by James V. Bennett, Clinton T. Duffy, Robert G. Sarver, Harry C. Tinsley, and Lawrence E. Wilson, at 12–14.

[36] See H. Barnes & N. Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology 309–311 (3d ed. 1959); Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in A. Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death 131, 151–156 (1960); C. Duffy, 88 Men and 2 Women 68–70, 254 (1962); R. Hammer, Between Life and Death 222–235, 244–250, 269–272 (1969); S. Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correction 340 (1963); Bluestone & McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 Amer. J. Psychiatry 393 (1962); Gottlieb, Capital Punishment, 15 Crime and Delinquency 1, 8–10 (1969); West, Medicine and Capital Punishment, in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1760, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 (1970); Ziferstein, Crime and Punishment, The Center Magazine 84 (Jan. 1968); Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 1268, 1342 (1968); Note, Mental Suffering under Sentence of Death, 57 Iowa L. Rev. 814 (1972).

of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon." *Solesbee* v. *Balkcom*, 339 U. S. 9, 14 (1950) (dissenting opinion). The "fate of ever-increasing fear and distress" to which the expatriate is subjected, *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 102, can only exist to a greater degree for a person confined in prison awaiting death.[37]

The unusual severity of death is manifested most clearly in its finality and enormity. Death, in these respects, is in a class by itself. Expatriation, for example, is a punishment that "destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development," that "strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community," and that puts "[h]is very existence" in jeopardy. Expatriation thus inherently entails "the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society." *Id.*, at 101. "In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights." *Id.*, at 102. Yet, demonstrably, expatriation is not "a fate worse than death." *Id.*, at 125 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).[38] Although death, like expatriation, destroys the individual's "political existence" and his "status in organized society," it does more, for, unlike expatriation, death also destroys "[h]is very existence." There is,

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[37] The State, of course, does not purposely impose the lengthy waiting period in order to inflict further suffering. The impact upon the individual is not the less severe on that account. It is no answer to assert that long delays exist only because condemned criminals avail themselves of their full panoply of legal rights. The right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment cannot, of course, be played off against the right to pursue due process of law, but, apart from that, the plain truth is that it is society that demands, even against the wishes of the criminal, that all legal avenues be explored before the execution is finally carried out.

[38] It was recognized in *Trop* itself that expatriation is a "punishment short of death." 356 U. S., at 99. Death, however, was distinguished on the ground that it was "still widely accepted." *Ibid.*

too, at least the possibility that the expatriate will in the future regain "the right to have rights." Death forecloses even that possibility.

Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity. The contrast with the plight of a person punished by imprisonment is evident. An individual in prison does not lose "the right to have rights." A prisoner retains, for example, the constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion, to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, and to treatment as a "person" for purposes of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. A prisoner remains a member of the human family. Moreover, he retains the right of access to the courts. His punishment is not irrevocable. Apart from the common charge, grounded upon the recognition of human fallibility, that the punishment of death must inevitably be inflicted upon innocent men, we know that death has been the lot of men whose convictions were unconstitutionally secured in view of later, retroactively applied, holdings of this Court. The punishment itself may have been unconstitutionally inflicted, see *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), yet the finality of death precludes relief. An executed person has indeed "lost the right to have rights." As one 19th century proponent of punishing criminals by death declared, "When a man is hung, there is an end of our relations with him. His execution is a way of saying, 'You are not fit for this world. Take your chance elsewhere.' " [39]

In comparison to all other punishments today, then, the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity. I would not

[39] Stephen, Capital Punishments, 69 Fraser's Magazine 753, 763 (1864).

hesitate to hold, on that ground alone, that death is today a "cruel and unusual" punishment, were it not that death is a punishment of longstanding usage and acceptance in this country. I therefore turn to the second principle—that the State may not arbitrarily inflict an unusually severe punishment.

The outstanding characteristic of our present practice of punishing criminals by death is the infrequency with which we resort to it. The evidence is conclusive that death is not the ordinary punishment for any crime.

There has been a steady decline in the infliction of this punishment in every decade since the 1930's, the earliest period for which accurate statistics are available. In the 1930's, executions averaged 167 per year; in the 1940's, the average was 128; in the 1950's, it was 72; and in the years 1960–1962, it was 48. There have been a total of 46 executions since then, 36 of them in 1963–1964.[40] Yet our population and the numbers of capital crimes committed have increased greatly over the past four decades. The contemporary rarity of the infliction of this punishment is thus the end result of a long-continued decline. That rarity is plainly revealed by an examination of the years 1961–1970, the last 10-year period for which statistics are available. During that time, an average of 106 death sentences were imposed each year.[41] Not nearly that number,

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[40] From 1930 to 1939: 155, 153, 140, 160, 168, 199, 195, 147, 190, 160. From 1940 to 1949: 124, 123, 147, 131, 120, 117, 131, 153, 119, 119. From 1950 to 1959: 82, 105, 83, 62, 81, 76, 65, 65, 49, 49. From 1960 to 1967: 56, 42, 47, 21, 15, 7, 1, 2. National Prisoner Statistics No. 46, Capital Punishment 1930–1970, at 8 (August 1971). The last execution in the United States took place on June 2, 1967. *Id.*, at 4.

[41] 1961—140; 1962—103; 1963—93; 1964—106; 1965—86; 1966—118; 1967—85; 1968—102; 1969—97; 1970—127. National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 9.

however, could be carried out, for many were precluded by commutations to life or a term of years,[42] transfers to mental institutions because of insanity,[43] resentences to life or a term of years, grants of new trials and orders for resentencing, dismissals of indictments and reversals of convictions, and deaths by suicide and natural causes.[44] On January 1, 1961, the death row population was 219; on December 31, 1970, it was 608; during that span, there were 135 executions.[45] Consequently, had the 389 additions to death row also been executed, the annual average would have been 52.[46] In short, the country

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[42] Commutations averaged about 18 per year. 1961—17; 1962—27; 1963—16; 1964—9; 1965—19; 1966—17; 1967—13; 1968—16; 1969—20; 1970—29. National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 9.

[43] Transfers to mental institutions averaged about three per year. 1961—3; 1962—4; 1963—1; 1964—3; 1965—4; 1966—3; 1967—3; 1968—2; 1969—1; 1970—5. National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 9.

[44] These four methods of disposition averaged about 44 per year. 1961—31, 1962—30; 1963—32; 1964—58; 1965—39; 1966—33; 1967—53; 1968—59; 1969—64; 1970—42. National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 9. Specific figures are available starting with 1967. Resentences: 1967—7; 1968—18; 1969—12; 1970—14. Grants of new trials and orders for resentencing: 1967—31; 1968—21; 1969—13; 1970—9. Dismissals of indictments and reversals of convictions: 1967—12; 1968—19; 1969—33; 1970—17. Deaths by suicide and natural causes: 1967—2; 1968—1; 1969—5; 1970—2. National Prisoner Statistics No. 42, Executions 1930–1967, at 13 (June 1968); National Prisoner Statistics No. 45, Capital Punishment 1930–1968, at 12 (August 1969); National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 14–15.

[45] National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 9.

[46] During that 10-year period, 1,177 prisoners entered death row, including 120 who were returned following new trials or treatment at mental institutions. There were 653 dispositions other than by execution, leaving 524 prisoners who might have been executed, of whom 135 actually were. National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 9.

might, at most, have executed one criminal each week. In fact, of course, far fewer were executed. Even before the moratorium on executions began in 1967, executions totaled only 42 in 1961 and 47 in 1962, an average of less than one per week; the number dwindled to 21 in 1963, to 15 in 1964, and to seven in 1965; in 1966, there was one execution, and in 1967, there were two.[47]

When a country of over 200 million people inflicts an unusually severe punishment no more than 50 times a year, the inference is strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly applied. To dispel it would indeed require a clear showing of nonarbitrary infliction.

Although there are no exact figures available, we know that thousands of murders and rapes are committed annually in States where death is an authorized punishment for those crimes. However the rate of infliction is characterized—as "freakishly" or "spectacularly" rare, or simply as rare—it would take the purest sophistry to deny that death is inflicted in only a minute fraction of these cases. How much rarer, after all, could the infliction of death be?

When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system. The States claim, however, that this rarity is evidence not of arbitrariness, but of informed selectivity: Death is inflicted, they say, only in "extreme" cases.

Informed selectivity, of course, is a value not to be denigrated. Yet presumably the States could make precisely the same claim if there were 10 executions per year, or five, or even if there were but one. That there may be as many as 50 per year does not strengthen

[47] National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 8.

the claim. When the rate of infliction is at this low level, it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment. No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in those terms the few who die from the many who go to prison. Crimes and criminals simply do not admit of a distinction that can be drawn so finely as to explain, on that ground, the execution of such a tiny sample of those eligible. Certainly the laws that provide for this punishment do not attempt to draw that distinction; all cases to which the laws apply are necessarily "extreme." Nor is the distinction credible in fact. If, for example, petitioner Furman or his crime illustrate the "extreme," then nearly all murderers and their murders are also "extreme." [48] Furthermore, our procedures in death cases,

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[48] The victim surprised Furman in the act of burglarizing the victim's home in the middle of the night. While escaping, Furman killed the victim with one pistol shot fired through the closed kitchen door from the outside. At the trial, Furman gave his version of the killing:

"They got me charged with murder and I admit, I admit going to these folks' home and they did caught me in there and I was coming back out, backing up and there was a wire down there on the floor. I was coming out backwards and fell back and I didn't intend to kill nobody. I didn't know they was behind the door. The gun went off and I didn't know nothing about no murder until they arrested me, and when the gun went off I was down on the floor and I got up and ran. That's all to it." App. 54–55.

The Georgia Supreme Court accepted that version:

"The admission in open court by the accused . . . that during the period in which he was involved in the commission of a criminal act at the home of the deceased, he accidentally tripped over a wire in leaving the premises causing the gun to go off, together with other facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased by violent means, was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of

rather than resulting in the selection of "extreme" cases for this punishment, actually sanction an arbitrary selection. For this Court has held that juries may, as they do, make the decision whether to impose a death sentence wholly unguided by standards governing that decision. *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 196–208 (1971). In other words, our procedures are not constructed to guard against the totally capricious selection of criminals for the punishment of death.

Although it is difficult to imagine what further facts would be necessary in order to prove that death is, as my Brother STEWART puts it, "wantonly and freakishly" inflicted, I need not conclude that arbitrary infliction is patently obvious. I am not considering this punishment by the isolated light of one principle. The probability of arbitrariness is sufficiently substantial that it can be relied upon, in combination with the other principles, in reaching a judgment on the constitutionality of this punishment.

When there is a strong probability that an unusually severe and degrading punishment is being inflicted arbitrarily, we may well expect that society will disapprove of its infliction. I turn, therefore, to the third principle. An examination of the history and present operation of the American practice of punishing criminals by death reveals that this punishment has been almost totally rejected by contemporary society.

I cannot add to my Brother MARSHALL's comprehensive treatment of the English and American history of

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murder . . . ." *Furman* v. *State*, 225 Ga. 253, 254, 167 S. E. 2d 628, 629 (1969).

About Furman himself, the jury knew only that he was black and that, according to his statement at trial, he was 26 years old and worked at "Superior Upholstery." App. 54. It took the jury one hour and 35 minutes to return a verdict of guilt and a sentence of death. *Id.*, at 64–65.

this punishment. I emphasize, however, one significant conclusion that emerges from that history. From the beginning of our Nation, the punishment of death has stirred acute public controversy. Although pragmatic arguments for and against the punishment have been frequently advanced, this longstanding and heated controversy cannot be explained solely as the result of differences over the practical wisdom of a particular government policy. At bottom, the battle has been waged on moral grounds. The country has debated whether a society for which the dignity of the individual is the supreme value can without a fundamental inconsistency follow the practice of deliberately putting some of its members to death. In the United States as in other nations of the western world, "the struggle about this punishment has been one between ancient and deeply rooted beliefs in retribution, atonement or vengeance on the one hand, and, on the other, beliefs in the personal value and dignity of the common man that were born of the democratic movement of the eighteenth century, as well as beliefs in the scientific approach to an understanding of the motive forces of human conduct, which are the result of the growth of the sciences of behavior during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries." [49] It is this essentially moral conflict that forms the backdrop for the past changes in and the present operation of our system of imposing death as a punishment for crime.

Our practice of punishing criminals by death has changed greatly over the years. One significant change has been in our methods of inflicting death. Although this country never embraced the more violent and repulsive methods employed in England, we did for a long time rely almost exclusively upon the gallows and the firing squad. Since the development of the supposedly

[49] T. Sellin, The Death Penalty, A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute 15 (1959).

more humane methods of electrocution late in the 19th century and lethal gas in the 20th, however, hanging and shooting have virtually ceased.[50] Our concern for decency and human dignity, moreover, has compelled changes in the circumstances surrounding the execution itself. No longer does our society countenance the spectacle of public executions, once thought desirable as a deterrent to criminal behavior by others. Today we reject public executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all.

Also significant is the drastic decrease in the crimes for which the punishment of death is actually inflicted. While esoteric capital crimes remain on the books, since 1930 murder and rape have accounted for nearly 99% of the total executions, and murder alone for about 87%.[51] In addition, the crime of capital murder has itself been limited. As the Court noted in *McGautha v. California*, 402 U. S., at 198, there was in this country a "rebellion against the common-law rule imposing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers." Initially that rebellion resulted in legislative definitions that distinguished between degrees of murder, retaining the mandatory death sentence only for murder in the first degree. Yet "[t]his new legislative criterion for isolating crimes appropriately punishable by death soon proved as unsuccessful as the concept of 'malice aforethought,'" *ibid.*, the common-law means of separating murder from manslaughter. Not only was the distinction between degrees of murder confusing and uncertain in practice, but even in clear cases of first degree murder juries continued to take the law into

[50] Eight States still employ hanging as the method of execution, and one, Utah, also employs shooting. These nine States have accounted for less than 3% of the executions in the United States since 1930. National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 10–11.

[51] National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 8.

their own hands: if they felt that death was an inappropriate punishment, "they simply refused to convict of the capital offense." *Id.*, at 199. The phenomenon of jury nullification thus remained to counteract the rigors of mandatory death sentences. Bowing to reality, "legislatures did not try, as before, to refine further the definition of capital homicides. Instead they adopted the method of forthrightly granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact." *Ibid.* In consequence, virtually all death sentences today are discretionarily imposed. Finally, it is significant that nine States no longer inflict the punishment of death under any circumstances,[52] and five others have restricted it to extremely rare crimes.[53]

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[52] Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have abolished death as a punishment for crimes. National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 50. In addition, the California Supreme Court held the punishment unconstitutional under the state counterpart of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. *People* v. *Anderson*, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P. 2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).

[53] New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont have almost totally abolished death as a punishment for crimes. National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 40, at 50. Indeed, these five States might well be considered *de facto* abolition States. North Dakota and Rhode Island, which restricted the punishment in 1915 and 1852 respectively, have not carried out an execution since at least 1930, *id.*, at 10; nor have there been any executions in New York, Vermont, or New Mexico since they restricted the punishment in 1965, 1965, and 1969 respectively, *id.*, at 10–11. As of January 1, 1971, none of the five States had even a single prisoner under sentence of death. *Id.*, at 18–19.

In addition, six States, while retaining the punishment on the books in generally applicable form, have made virtually no use of it. Since 1930, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Wyoming have carried out a total of 22 executions. *Id.*, at 10–11. As of January 1, 1971, these six States had a total of three prisoners under sentences of death. *Id.*, at 18–19. Hence, assuming 25 executions in 42 years, each State averaged about one execution every 10 years.

Thus, although "the death penalty has been employed throughout our history," *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 99, in fact the history of this punishment is one of successive restriction. What was once a common punishment has become, in the context of a continuing moral debate, increasingly rare. The evolution of this punishment evidences not that it is an inevitable part of the American scene, but that it has proved progressively more troublesome to the national conscience. The result of this movement is our current system of administering the punishment, under which death sentences are rarely imposed and death is even more rarely inflicted. It is, of course, "We, the People" who are responsible for the rarity both of the imposition and the carrying out of this punishment. Juries, "express[ing] the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death," *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S., at 519, have been able to bring themselves to vote for death in a mere 100 or so cases among the thousands tried each year where the punishment is available. Governors, elected by and acting for us, have regularly commuted a substantial number of those sentences. And it is our society that insists upon due process of law to the end that no person will be unjustly put to death, thus ensuring that many more of those sentences will not be carried out. In sum, we have made death a rare punishment today.

The progressive decline in and the current rarity of the infliction of death demonstrate that our society seriously questions the appropriateness of this punishment today. The States point out that many legislatures authorize death as the punishment for certain crimes and that substantial segments of the public, as reflected in opinion polls and referendum votes, continue to support it. Yet the availability of this punishment through statutory authorization, as well as the polls and refer-

enda, which amount simply to approval of that authorization, simply underscores the extent to which our society has in fact rejected this punishment. When an unusually severe punishment is authorized for wide-scale application but not, because of society's refusal, inflicted save in a few instances, the inference is compelling that there is a deep-seated reluctance to inflict it. Indeed, the likelihood is great that the punishment is tolerated only because of its disuse. The objective indicator of society's view of an unusually severe punishment is what society does with it. And today society will inflict death upon only a small sample of the eligible criminals. Rejection could hardly be more complete without becoming absolute. At the very least, I must conclude that contemporary society views this punishment with substantial doubt.

The final principle to be considered is that an unusually severe and degrading punishment may not be excessive in view of the purposes for which it is inflicted. This principle, too, is related to the others. When there is a strong probability that the State is arbitrarily inflicting an unusually severe punishment that is subject to grave societal doubts, it is likely also that the punishment cannot be shown to be serving any penal purpose that could not be served equally well by some less severe punishment.

The States' primary claim is that death is a necessary punishment because it prevents the commission of capital crimes more effectively than any less severe punishment. The first part of this claim is that the infliction of death is necessary to stop the individuals executed from committing further crimes. The sufficient answer to this is that if a criminal convicted of a capital crime poses a danger to society, effective administration of the State's pardon and parole laws can delay or deny his

release from prison, and techniques of isolation can eliminate or minimize the danger while he remains confined.

The more significant argument is that the threat of death prevents the commission of capital crimes because it deters potential criminals who would not be deterred by the threat of imprisonment. The argument is not based upon evidence that the threat of death is a superior deterrent. Indeed, as my Brother MARSHALL establishes, the available evidence uniformly indicates, although it does not conclusively prove, that the threat of death has no greater deterrent effect than the threat of imprisonment. The States argue, however, that they are entitled to rely upon common human experience, and that experience, they say, supports the conclusion that death must be a more effective deterrent than any less severe punishment. Because people fear death the most, the argument runs, the threat of death must be the greatest deterrent.

It is important to focus upon the precise import of this argument. It is not denied that many, and probably most, capital crimes cannot be deterred by the threat of punishment. Thus the argument can apply only to those who think rationally about the commission of capital crimes. Particularly is that true when the potential criminal, under this argument, must not only consider the risk of punishment, but also distinguish between two possible punishments. The concern, then, is with a particular type of potential criminal, the rational person who will commit a capital crime knowing that the punishment is long-term imprisonment, which may well be for the rest of his life, but will not commit the crime knowing that the punishment is death. On the face of it, the assumption that such persons exist is implausible.

In any event, this argument cannot be appraised in the abstract. We are not presented with the theoretical

question whether under any imaginable circumstances the threat of death might be a greater deterrent to the commission of capital crimes than the threat of imprisonment. We are concerned with the practice of punishing criminals by death as it exists in the United States today. Proponents of this argument necessarily admit that its validity depends upon the existence of a system in which the punishment of death is invariably and swiftly imposed. Our system, of course, satisfies neither condition. A rational person contemplating a murder or rape is confronted not with the certainty of a speedy death, but with the slightest possibility that he will be executed in the distant future. The risk of death is remote and improbable; in contrast, the risk of long-term imprisonment is near and great. In short, whatever the speculative validity of the assumption that the threat of death is a superior deterrent, there is no reason to believe that as currently administered the punishment of death is necessary to deter the commission of capital crimes. Whatever might be the case were all or substantially all eligible criminals quickly put to death, unverifiable possibilities are an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that the threat of death today has any greater deterrent efficacy than the threat of imprisonment.[54]

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[54] There is also the more limited argument that death is a necessary punishment when criminals are already serving or subject to a sentence of life imprisonment. If the only punishment available is further imprisonment, it is said, those criminals will have nothing to lose by committing further crimes, and accordingly the threat of death is the sole deterrent. But "life" imprisonment is a misnomer today. Rarely, if ever, do crimes carry a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole. That possibility ensures that criminals do not reach the point where further crimes are free of consequences. Moreover, if this argument is simply an assertion that the

There is, however, another aspect to the argument that the punishment of death is necessary for the protection of society. The infliction of death, the States urge, serves to manifest the community's outrage at the commission of the crime. It is, they say, a concrete public expression of moral indignation that inculcates respect for the law and helps assure a more peaceful community. Moreover, we are told, not only does the punishment of death exert this widespread moralizing influence upon community values, it also satisfies the popular demand for grievous condemnation of abhorrent crimes and thus prevents disorder, lynching, and attempts by private citizens to take the law into their own hands.

The question, however, is not whether death serves these supposed purposes of punishment, but whether death serves them more effectively than imprisonment. There is no evidence whatever that utilization of imprisonment rather than death encourages private blood feuds and other disorders. Surely if there were such a danger, the execution of a handful of criminals each year would not prevent it. The assertion that death alone is a sufficiently emphatic denunciation for capital crimes suffers from the same defect. If capital crimes require the punishment of death in order to provide moral reinforcement for the basic values of the community, those values can only be undermined when death is so rarely inflicted upon the criminals who commit the crimes. Furthermore, it is certainly doubtful that the infliction of death by the State does in fact strengthen the community's moral code; if the deliberate extinguishment of human life has any effect at all, it more likely tends to lower our respect for life and brutalize our values. That, after all, is why we no longer carry

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threat of death is a more effective deterrent than the threat of increased imprisonment by denial of release on parole, then, as noted above, there is simply no evidence to support it.

out public executions. In any event, this claim simply means that one purpose of punishment is to indicate social disapproval of crime. To serve that purpose our laws distribute punishments according to the gravity of crimes and punish more severely the crimes society regards as more serious. That purpose cannot justify any particular punishment as the upper limit of severity.

There is, then, no substantial reason to believe that the punishment of death, as currently administered, is necessary for the protection of society. The only other purpose suggested, one that is independent of protection for society, is retribution. Shortly stated, retribution in this context means that criminals are put to death because they deserve it.

Although it is difficult to believe that any State today wishes to proclaim adherence to "naked vengeance," *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 112 (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the States claim, in reliance upon its statutory authorization, that death is the only fit punishment for capital crimes and that this retributive purpose justifies its infliction. In the past, judged by its statutory authorization, death was considered the only fit punishment for the crime of forgery, for the first federal criminal statute provided a mandatory death penalty for that crime. Act of April 30, 1790, c. 9, § 14, 1 Stat. 115. Obviously, concepts of justice change; no immutable moral order requires death for murderers and rapists. The claim that death is a just punishment necessarily refers to the existence of certain public beliefs. The claim must be that for capital crimes death alone comports with society's notion of proper punishment. As administered today, however, the punishment of death cannot be justified as a necessary means of exacting retribution from criminals. When the overwhelming number of criminals who commit capital crimes go to prison, it cannot be concluded that death serves the purpose of ret-

ribution more effectively than imprisonment. The asserted public belief that murderers and rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent with the execution of a random few. As the history of the punishment of death in this country shows, our society wishes to prevent crime; we have no desire to kill criminals simply to get even with them.

In sum, the punishment of death is inconsistent with all four principles: Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than the less severe punishment of imprisonment. The function of these principles is to enable a court to determine whether a punishment comports with human dignity. Death, quite simply, does not.

IV

When this country was founded, memories of the Stuart horrors were fresh and severe corporal punishments were common. Death was not then a unique punishment. The practice of punishing criminals by death, moreover, was widespread and by and large acceptable to society. Indeed, without developed prison systems, there was frequently no workable alternative. Since that time, successive restrictions, imposed against the background of a continuing moral controversy, have drastically curtailed the use of this punishment. Today death is a uniquely and unusually severe punishment. When examined by the principles applicable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity. The punishment of death is therefore "cruel and unusual," and the States may no longer inflict it as a punishment for crimes. Rather than kill an arbitrary handful of

criminals each year, the States will confine them in prison. "The State thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal." *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 381.

I concur in the judgments of the Court.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 69–5003, 69–5030, AND 69–5031

William Henry Furman, Petitioner, 69–5003 *v.* State of Georgia.	On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.

The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.

For these and other reasons, at least two of my Brothers have concluded that the infliction of the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Their case is a strong one. But I find it unnecessary to reach the ultimate question they would decide. See *Ashwander* v. *Tennessee Valley Authority*, 397 U. S. 288, 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

The opinions of other Justices today have set out in admirable and thorough detail the origins and judicial

history of the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments,[1] and the origin and judicial history of capital punishment.[2] There is thus no need for me to review the historical materials here, and what I have to say can, therefore, be briefly stated.

Legislatures—state and federal—have sometimes specified that the penalty of death shall be the mandatory punishment for every person convicted of engaging in certain designated criminal conduct. Congress, for example, has provided that anyone convicted of acting as a spy for the enemy in time of war shall be put to death.[3] The Rhode Island Legislature has ordained the death penalty for a life term prisoner who commits murder.[4] Massachusetts has passed a law imposing the death penalty upon anyone convicted of murder in the commission of a forcible rape.[5] An Ohio law imposes the mandatory penalty of death upon the assassin of the President of the United States or the Governor of a State.[6]

If we were reviewing death sentences imposed under these or similar laws, we would be faced with the need to decide whether capital punishment is unconstitutional for all crimes and under all circumstances. We would

[1] See dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 2–5; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, *ante*, at 3–5; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, *ante*, at 2–13; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, *post*, at 3–16; dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, *post*, at 2–5; dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, *post*, at 8–14.

[2] See dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, *post*, at 6–7; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, *ante*, at 26–29; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, *post*, at 20–29; dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, *post*, at 8–11.

[3] 10 U. S. C. § 906.

[4] 3 General Laws of Rhode Island § 11-23-2.

[5] Massachusetts General Laws, c. 265, § 2.

[6] Ohio Revised Code, Tit. 29, §§ 2901.09 and 2901.10.

need to decide whether a legislature—state or federal—could constitutionally determine that certain criminal conduct is so atrocious that society's interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform or rehabilitation of the perpetrator, and that, despite the inconclusive empirical evidence,[7] only the automatic penalty of death will provide maximum deterrence.

On that score I would say only that I cannot agree that retribution is a constitutionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment. The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.

The constitutionality of capital punishment in the abstract is not, however, before us in these cases. For the Georgia and Texas legislatures have not provided that the death penalty shall be imposed upon all those who are found guilty of forcible rape.[8] And the Georgia Legis-

[7] Many statistical studies—comparing crime rates in jurisdictions with and without capital punishment and in jurisdictions before and after abolition of capital punishment—have indicated that there is little, if any, measurable deterrent effect. See The Death Penalty in America 258–332 (H. Bedau ed. 1964). There remains uncertainty, however, because of the difficulty of identifying and holding constant all other relevant variables. See Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif. Law Review 1268, 1275–1292. See also dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, *post*, at 21–22; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, *post*, at 34–42.

[8] Georgia law, at the time of the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner in No. 69–5030, left the jury a choice between the death penalty, life imprisonment or "imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 20 years." Ga.

lature has not ordained that death shall be the automatic punishment for murder.[9] In a word, neither State has made a legislative determination that forcible rape and murder can be deterred only by imposing the penalty of death upon all who perpetrate those offenses. As MR. JUSTICE WHITE so tellingly puts it, the "legislative will is not frustrated if the penalty is never imposed." *Ante*, p. —.

Instead, the death sentences now before us are the product of a legal system that brings them, I believe, within the very core of the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments, a guarantee applicable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660. In the first place, it is clear that these sentences are "cruel" in the sense that they excessively go beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments that the state legislatures have determined to be necessary. *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349. In the second place, it is equally clear that these sentences are "unusual" in the sense that the penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder, and that its imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare.[10] But I do not rest my conclusion upon these two propositions alone.

Code Ann. § 26–1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). The current Georgia provision for the punishment of forcible rape continues to leave the same broad sentencing leeway: Ga. Crim. Code 26–2001 (Supp. 1971) (effective July 1, 1969). Texas law, under which the petitioner in 69–5031 was sentenced, provides that a "person guilty of rape shall be punished by death or by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for any term of years not less than five." Texas Penal Code Ann., Art. 1189.

[9] Georgia law, under which the petitioner in No. 69–5003, was sentenced, left the jury a choice between the death penalty and life imprisonment. Ga. Code Ann. § 26–1005 (effective prior to July 1, 1969). Current Georgia law provides for similar sentencing leeway. Ga. Crim. Code § 26–1101 (effective July 1, 1969).

[10] See dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, *post*, at 13 n. 11; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, *ante*, at 35–37.

These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968,[11] many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.[12] My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.[13] See *McLaughlin* v. *Florida*, 379 U. S. 184. But racial discrimination has not been proved,[14] and I put it to one side. I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.

For these reasons I concur in the judgments of the Court.

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[11] Petitioner Branch was sentenced to death in a Texas court on July 26, 1967. Petitioner Furman was sentenced to death in a Georgia court on September 20, 1968. Petitioner Jackson was sentenced to death in a Georgia court on December 10, 1968.

[12] A former United States Attorney General has testified before the Congress that only a "small and capricious selection of offenders have been put to death. Most persons convicted of the same crimes have been imprisoned." Statement by Attorney General Clark before the Subcommittee of Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Committee, July 2, 1968, Department of Justice Release 2.

In *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, the Court dealt with claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. We expressly declined in that case to consider claims under the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments. See 398 U. S. 936 (limited grant of certiorari).

[13] See concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, *ante*, at 10–11; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, *post*, at 53 n. 155.

[14] Cf. Note, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1297 (1969); dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, *post*, at 15–16 n. 12.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

The facial constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of the death penalty for first degree murder, for more narrowly defined categories of murder or for rape would present quite different issues under the Eighth Amendment than are posed by the cases before us. In joining the Court's judgment, therefore, I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is unconstitutional *per se* or that there is no system of capital punishment that would comport with the Eighth Amendment. That question, ably argued by several of my Brethren, is not presented by these cases and need not be decided.

The narrower question to which I address myself concerns the constitutionality of capital punishment statutes under which (1) the legislature authorizes the imposition of the death penalty for murder or rape; (2) the legislature does not itself mandate the penalty in any

particular class or kind of case (that is, legislative will is not frustrated if the penalty is never imposed) but delegates to judges or juries the decisions as to those cases, if any, in which the penalty will be utilized; and (3) judges and juries have ordered the death penalty with such infrequency that the odds are now very much against imposition and execution of the penalty with respect to any convicted murderer or rapist. It is in this context that we must consider whether the execution of these petitioners violates the Eighth Amendment.

I begin with what I consider a near truism: that the death penalty could so seldom be imposed that it would cease to be a credible deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other end of punishment in the criminal justice system. It is perhaps true that no matter how infrequently those convicted of rape or murder are executed, the penalty so imposed is not disproportionate to the crime and those executed may deserve exactly what they received. It would also be clear that executed defendants are finally and completely incapacitated from again committing rape or murder or any other crime. But when imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied. Nor could it be said with confidence that society's need for specific deterrence justifies death for so few when for so many in like circumstances life imprisonment or shorter prison terms are judged sufficient, or that community values are measurably reenforced by authorizing a penalty so rarely invoked.

Most important, a major goal of the criminal law—to deter others by punishing the convicted criminal—would not be substantially served where the penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible threat essential to influence the conduct of others. For pres-

ent purposes I accept the morality and utility of punishing one person to influence another. I accept also the effectiveness of punishment generally and need not reject the death penalty as a more effective deterrent than a lesser punishment. But common sense and experience tell us that seldom-enforced laws become ineffective measures for controlling human conduct and that the death penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency, will make little contribution to deterring those crimes for which it may be exacted.

The imposition and execution of the death penalty are obviously cruel in the dictionary sense. But the penalty has not been considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense because it was thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to serve. At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these purposes, however, the emerging question is whether its imposition in such circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it would, for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.

It is also my judgment that this point has been reached with respect to capital punishment as it is presently administered under the statutes involved in these cases. Concededly, it is difficult to prove as a general proposition that capital punishment, however administered, more effectively serves the ends of the criminal law than does imprisonment. But however that may be, I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes before us are now administered, the penalty is so infrequently

imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.

I need not restate the facts and figures that appear in the opinions of my Brethren. Nor can I "prove" my conclusion from these data. But like my Brethren, I must arrive at judgment; and I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty. That conclusion, as I have said, is that the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. The short of it is that the policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily in juries—a decision largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness of the law and to bring community judgment to bear on the sentence as well as guilt or innocence—has so effectively achieved its aims that capital punishment within the confines of the statutes now before us has for all practical purposes run its course.

Judicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict between judicial and legislative judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires. In this respect, Eighth Amendment cases come to us in no different posture. It seems conceded by all that the Amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments that the Amendment would bar whether legislatively approved or not. Inevitably, then, there will be occasions when we will differ with Congress or state legislatures with respect to the validity of punishment. There will also be cases in which we shall strongly disagree among ourselves. Unfortunately, this is one of them.

But as I see it, this case is no different in kind from many others, although it may have wider impact and provoke sharper disagreement.

In this respect, I add only that past and present legislative judgment with respect to the death penalty loses much of its force when viewed in light of the recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to the jury and the fact that a jury, in its own discretion and without violating its trust or any statutory policy, may refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime. Legislative "policy" is thus necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon them. In my judgment what was done in these cases violated the Eighth Amendment.

I concur in the judgments of the Court.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 69–5003, 69–5030, and 69–5031

William Henry Furman, Petitioner, 69–5003 *v.* State of Georgia.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.

These three cases present the question whether the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[1]

[1] Certiorari was also granted in a fourth case, *Aikens* v. *California*, No. 68–5027, but the writ was dismissed after the California Supreme Court held that capital punishment violates the State Constitution. — U. S. —. See *People* v. *Anderson*, 6 Cal. 3d 288, 493 P. 2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, — U. S. — (1972). The California decision reduced by slightly more than 100 the number of persons currently awaiting execution.

In No. 69–5003, Furman was convicted of murder for shooting the father of five children when he discovered that Furman had broken into his home early one morning. No. 69–5030 and 69–5031 involve state convictions for forcible rape. Jackson was found guilty of rape during the course of a robbery in the victim's home. The rape was accomplished as he held the pointed ends of scissors at the victim's throat. Branch also was convicted of a rape committed in the victim's home. No weapon was utilized, but physical force and threats of physical force were employed.

The criminal acts with which we are confronted are ugly, vicious, reprehensible acts. Their sheer brutality cannot and should not be minimized. But, we are not called upon to condone the penalized conduct; we are asked only to examine the penalty imposed on each of the petitioners and to determine whether or not it violates the Eighth Amendment. The question then is not whether we condone rape or murder, for surely we do not; it is whether capital punishment is "a punishment no longer consistent with our self-respect"[2] and, therefore, violative of the Eighth Amendment.

The elasticity of the constitutional provision under consideration presents dangers of too little or too much self-restraint.[3] Hence, we must proceed with caution

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[2] Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (5th Series) (Lords, 43d Parl., 1st Sess., 1964–1965) 703 (1965) (Lord Chancellor Gardiner).

[3] Compare, *e. g.*, *State ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), with F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 81 (1956). See *In re Anderson*, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 634–635, 447 P. 2d 117, 131–132 (1968) (Mosk, J., concurring); cf. *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510, 542 (1968) (WHITE, J., dissenting).

to answer the question presented.[4] By first examining the historical derivation of the Eighth Amendment and the construction given it in the past by this Court, and then exploring the history and attributes of capital punishment in this country, we can answer the question presented with objectivity and a proper measure of self-restraint.

Candor is critical to such an inquiry. All relevant material must be marshalled and sorted and forthrightly examined. We must not only be precise as to the standards of judgment which we are utilizing, but exacting in examining the relevant material in light of those standards.

Candor compels me to confess that I am not oblivious to the fact that this is truly a case of life and death. Hanging in the balance are not only the lives of these three petitioners, but those of the almost 600 other condemned men and women in this country currently awaiting execution. While this fact cannot affect our ultimate decision, it necessitates that the decision be free from any possibility of error.

I

The Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishments derives from English law. In 1583, John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, turned the High Commission into a permanent ecclesiastical court, and the Commission began to use torture to extract confessions from persons suspected of various offenses.[5] Sir Robert Beale protested that cruel and barbarous

[4] See generally M. Frankel, Book Review, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 354, 362 (1971).

[5] Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The

torture violated Magna Carta, but his protests were made in vain.[6]

Cruel punishments were not confined to those accused of crimes, but were notoriously applied with even greater relish to those who were convicted. Blackstone described in ghastly detail the myriad of inhumane forms of punishment imposed on persons found guilty of any of a large number of offenses.[7] Death, of course, was the usual result.[8]

The treason trials of 1685—the "Bloody Assize"—which followed an abortive rebellion by the Duke of Monmouth, marked the culmination of the parade of horrors, and most historians believe that it was this event which finally spurred the adoption of the English

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Original Meaning, 57 U. Cal. L. Rev. 839, 848 (1969) (hereinafter "Granucci").

[6] *Ibid.* Beale's views were conveyed from England to America and were first written into American law by the Reverend National Ward who wrote the "Body of Liberties" for the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Clause 46 of that work read: "For bodilie punishments we allow amongst us none that are inhumane, Barbarous, or cruel." B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, Vol. I, at 71, 77 (1971) (hereinafter "Schwartz").

[7] 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 1757 (Lewis ed. 1902). See also 1 J. Chitty, The Criminal Law 785–786 (5th ed. 1847); Sherman, . . . Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted, 14 Crime & Delinq. 73, 74 (1968).

[8] Not content with capital punishment as a means of retribution for crimes, the English also provided for attainder ("dead in law") as the immediate and inseparable concomitant of the death sentence. The consequences of attainder were forfeiture of real and personal estates and corruption of blood. An attainted person could not inherit land or other heriditaments, nor retain those he possessed, nor transmit them by descent to any heir. Descents were also obstructed whenever posterity derived a title through one who was attainted. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 1759 (Lewis ed. 1902).

Bill of Rights containing the progenitor of our prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.[9] The conduct of Chief Justice Jefferies at those trials has been described as an "insane lust for cruelty" which was "stimulated by orders from the King" (James II).[10] The assize received wide publicity from Puritan pamphleteers and doubtless had some influence on the adoption of a cruel and unusual punishments clause. But, the legislative history of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 indicates that the assize may not have been as critical to the adoption of the clause as is widely thought. After William and Mary of Orange crossed the channel to invade England, James II fled. Parliament was summoned into session and a committee was appointed to draft general statements containing "such things as are absolutely necessary to be considered for the better securing of our religion, laws, and liberties."[11] An initial draft of the Bill of Rights prohibited "illegal" punishments, but a later draft referred to the infliction by James II of "illegal and cruel" punishments, and declared "cruel and unusual" punishments to be prohibited.[12] The use of the word "unusual" in the final draft appears to be inadvertent.

This legislative history has led at least one legal historian to conclude "that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was first, an objection to the imposition of punishments which were unauthorized by statute and outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing courts, and second, a reiteration

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[9] *E. g.*, 2 J. Story, On the Constitution § 1903, at 650 (5th ed. 1891).

[10] 2 G. M. Trevelyan, History of England 467 (1956 ed.).

[11] Granucci, *supra*, n. 5, at 854.

[12] *Id.*, at 855.

of the English policy against disproportionate penalties," [13] and not primarily a reaction to the torture of the High Commission, harsh sentences or the assize.

Whether the English Bill of Rights prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments is properly read as a response to excessive or illegal punishments, as a reaction to barbaric and objectionable modes of punishment, or as both, there is no doubt whatever that in borrowing the language and in including it in the Eighth Amendment, our Founding Fathers intended to outlaw torture and other cruel punishments.[14]

The precise language used in the Eighth Amendment first appeared in America on June 12, 1776, in Virginia's "Declaration of Rights," § 9 of which read: "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive

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[13] *Id.*, at 860. In reaching this conclusion, Professor Granucci relies primarily on the trial of Titus Oates as being the impetus behind the adoption of the clause. Oates was a minister of the Church of England who proclaimed the existence of a plot to assassinate King Charles II. He was tried for perjury, convicted, and sentenced to a fine of 2,000 marks, life imprisonment, whippings, pilloring four times a year, and defrocking. Oates petitioned both the House of Commons and the House of Lords for release from judgment. The House of Lords rejected his petition, but a minority of its members concluded that the King's Bench had no jurisdiction to compel defrocking and that the other punishments were barbarous, inhumane, unchristian, and unauthorized by law. The House of Commons agreed with the dissenting Lords. *Id.*, at 857–859.

The author also relies on the dictionary definition of "cruel" which meant "severe" or "hard" in the 17th century to support his conclusion. *Ibid.*

[14] Most historians reach this conclusion by reading the history of the cruel and unusual punishments clause as indicating that it was a reaction to inhumane punishments. Professor Granucci reaches the same conclusion by finding that the draftsmen of the Constitution misread the British history and erroneously relied on Blackstone. Granucci, *supra*, n. 5, at 862–865. It is clear, however, that prior to the adoption of the Amendment there was some feeling that a safeguard against cruelty was needed and that this feeling had support in past practices. See n. 6, *supra*, and accompanying text.

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." [15] This language was drawn verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Other States adopted similar clauses,[16] and there is evidence in the debates of the various state conventions which were called upon to ratify the Constitution of great concern for the omission of any prohibition against torture or other cruel punishments.[17]

The Virginia Convention offers some clues as to what the Founding Fathers had in mind in prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments. At one point George Mason advocated the adoption of a Bill of Rights, and Patrick Henry concurred, stating:

> "By this Constitution, some of the best barriers of human rights are thrown away. Is there not an additional reason to have a bill of rights? . . . Congress, from their general powers, may fully go into business of human legislation. They may legislate, in criminal cases, from treason to the lowest offence—petty larceny. They may define crimes and prescribe punishments. In the definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed by what wise representatives ought to be governed by. But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives. What says our bill of rights?—'that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive

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[15] Granucci, *supra*, n. 5, at 840; Schwartz, *supra*, n. 6, Vol. I, at 276, 278.

[16] See, *e. g.*, Delaware Declaration of Rights (1776), Maryland Declaration of Rights (1776), Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (1780), and New Hampshire Bill of Rights (1783). Schwartz, *supra*, n. 6, Vol. I, at 276, 278; 279, 281; 337, 343; 374, 379.

[17] See 2 J. Elliot, The Debates In the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 111 (2d ed. 1881) (hereinafter "Elliot"); 3 Elliot, at 447–481. See also, Schwartz, *supra*, n. 6, at 629, 674, 762, 852, 968.

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' Are you not, therefore, now calling on those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to prescribe trials and define punishments without this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to this bill of rights? You let them loose; you do more — you depart from the genius of your country. . . .

"In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors?—That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany—of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone." [18]

Henry's statement indicates that he wished to insure that cruel modes of punishment would be prohibited by the Constitution. Other expressions with respect to the proposed Eighth Amendment by Members of the First Congress indicate that they shared Henry's view

[18] 3 Elliot, *supra*, n. 17, at 446–448. A comment by George Mason which misinterprets a criticism leveled at himself and Patrick Henry is further evidence of the intention to prohibit torture and the like by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments. *Id.*, at 452.

of the need for and purpose of the cruel and unusual punishments clause.[19]

Thus, the history of the clause clearly establishes that it was intended to prohibit cruel punishments. We must now turn to the case law to discover the manner in which courts have given meaning to the term "cruel."

II

This Court did not squarely face the task of interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments language for the first time until *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S. 130 (1878), although the language received a cursory examination in several prior cases. See, *e. g.*, *Pervear* v. *Commonwealth*, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866). In *Wilkerson*, the Court unanimously upheld a sentence of public execution by shooting imposed pursuant to a conviction for premeditated murder. In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Clifford wrote:

> "Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution." 99 U. S., at 134.

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[19] 1 Annals of Congress 782–783 (1789). There is some recognition of the fact that a prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments is a flexible prohibition which may change in meaning as the mores of a society change, and which may eventually bar certain punishments not barred when the Constitution was adopted. *Ibid.* (remarks of Mr. Livermore of New Hampshire). There is also evidence that the general opinion at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted was that it prohibited every punishment which was not "evidently necessary." W. Bradford, An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death is Necessary in Pennsylvania (1793), reprinted in 12 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 122, 127 (1968).

Thus, the Court found that unnecessary cruelty was no more permissible than torture. To determine whether the punishment under attack was unnecessarily cruel, the Court examined the history of the Utah territory and the then current writings on capital punishment, and compared this Nation's practices with those of other countries. It is apparent that the Court felt it could not dispose of the question simply by referring to traditional practices; instead, it felt bound to examine developing thought.

Twelve years passed before the Court again faced a challenge to a specific punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In the case of *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 436 (1890), Chief Justice Fuller wrote an opinion for a unanimous Court upholding electrocution as a permissible mode of punishment. While the Court ostensibly held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the States, it is very apparent that the nature of the punishment involved was examined under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the punishment was not objectionable. Today, *Kemmler* stands primarily for the proposition that a punishment is not necessarily unconstitutional simply because it is unusual, so long as the legislature has a humane purpose in selecting it.[20]

Two years later in *O'Neil* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the Court reaffirmed that the Eighth Amendment was not applicable to the States. O'Neill was found guilty on 307 counts of selling liquor in violation of Vermont law. A fine of $6,140 ($20 for each offense) and the costs of prosecution ($497.96) were imposed. O'Neill was committed to prison until the fine and the costs were paid; and the Court provided that if

[20] The New York Court of Appeals had recognized the unusual nature of the execution, but attributed it to a legislative desire to minimize the pain of person executed.

they were not paid before a specified date, O'Neill was to be confined in the house of corrections for 19,914 days (approximately 54 years) at hard labor. Three Justices—Field, Harlan, and Brewer—dissented. They maintained not only that the cruel and unusual punishments clause was applicable to the States, but that in O'Neill's case it had been violated. Mr. Justice Field wrote:

> "That designation [cruel and unusual], it is true, is usually applied to punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with acute pain and suffering. . . . The inhibition is directed not only against punishments of the character mentioned, but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive. . . ." 144 U. S., at 339–340.

In *Howard* v. *Fleming*, 191 U. S. 126 (1903), the Court, in essence, followed the approach advocated by the dissenters in *O'Neill*. In rejecting the claim that 10-year sentences for conspiracy to defraud were cruel and unusual, the Court (per Mr. Justice Brewer) considered the nature of the crime, the purpose of the law, and the length of the sentence imposed.

The Court used the same approach seven years later in the landmark case of *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349 (1910). Weems, an officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation of the United States Government of the Phillipine Islands, was convicted of falsifying a "public and official document." He was sentenced to 15 years incarceration at hard labor with chains on his ankles, to an unusual loss of his civil rights, and to perpetual surveillance. Called upon to determine whether this was a cruel and unusual punish-

ment, the Court found that it was.[21] The Court emphasized that the Constitution was not an "ephemeral" enactment nor one "designed to meet passing occasions."[22] Recognizing that "[t]ime works changes, [and] brings into existence new conditions and purposes,"[23] the Court commented that "[i]n the application of a constitution, . . . our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be."[24]

In striking down the penalty imposed on Weems, the Court examined the punishment in relation to the offense, compared the punishment to those inflicted for other crimes and to those imposed in other jurisdictions, and concluded that the punishment was excessive.[25] Justices White and Holmes dissented and argued that the cruel and unusual prohibition was meant to prohibit only those things which were objectionable at the time the Constitution was adopted.[26]

Weems is a landmark case because it represents the first time that the Court invalidated a penalty prescribed by a legislature for a particular offense. The Court made it plain beyond any reasonable doubt that excessive punishments were as objectionable as those which were inherently cruel. Thus, it is apparent that the dissenters' position in *O'Neill* had become the opinion of the Court in *Weems*.

Weems was followed by two cases which added little

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[21] The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments relevant to Weems was that found in the Phillipine Bill of Rights. It was, however, borrowed from the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and has the same meaning. 217 U. S., at 367.

[22] *Id.*, at 373.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *Id.*, at 381.

[26] *Id.*, at 389–413. Mr. Justice Black expressed a similar point of view in his concurring opinion in *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 226 (1971).

to our knowledge of the scope of the cruel and unusual language, *Badders* v. *United States*, 240 U. S. 391 (1916); and *United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co.* v. *Burleson*, 255 U. S. 407 (1921).[27] Then came another landmark case, *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459 (1947).

Francis had been convicted of murder and sentenced to be electrocuted. The first time the current passed through him, there was a mechanical failure and he did not die. Thereafter, Francis sought to prevent a second electrocution on the ground that it would be a cruel and unusual punishment. Eight members of the Court assumed the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the States.[28] The Court was virtually unanimous in agreeing that "[t]he traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain," [29] but split 5–4 on whether Francis would, under the circumstances, be forced to undergo any

[27] Badders was found guilty on seven counts of using the mails as part of a scheme to defraud. He was sentenced to concurrent five year sentences and to a $1,000 fine on each count. The Court summarily rejected his claim that the sentence was a cruel and unusual punishment. In *Burleson*, the Court upheld the denial of second class mailing privileges to a newspaper that had allegedly printed articles conveying false reports of United States conduct during the First World War with intent to cause disloyalty. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented and indicated his belief that the "punishment" was unusual and possibly excessive under *Weems*. There is nothing in either of these cases demonstrating a departure from the approach used in *Weems*, or adding anything to it.

[28] Mr. Justice Frankfurter was the only member of the Court unwilling to make this assumption. However, like Chief Justice Fuller in *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 436 (1890), he examined the propriety of the punishment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 329 U. S., at 471. As MR. JUSTICE POWELL makes clear, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's analysis was different only in form from that of his Brethren; in substance, his test was fundamentally identical to that used by the rest of the Court.

[29] *Id.*, at 463.

excessive pain. Five members of the Court treated the case like *In re Kemmler* and held that the legislature adopted electrocution for a humane purpose, and that its will should not be thwarted because, in its desire to reduce pain and suffering in most cases, it may have inadvertently increased suffering in one particular case.[30] The four dissenters felt that the case should be remanded for further facts.

As in *Weems*, the Court was concerned with excessive punishments. *Resweber* is perhaps most significant because the analysis of cruel and unusual punishment questions first advocated by the dissenters in *O'Neill* was at last firmly entrenched in the minds of an entire Court.

Trop v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86 (1958), marked the next major cruel and unusual punishment case in this Court. Trop, a native born American, was declared to have lost his citizenship by reason of a conviction by court-martial for wartime desertion. Writing for himself and Justices Black, DOUGLAS, and Whittaker, Chief Justice Warren concluded that loss of citizenship amounted to a cruel and unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment.[31]

Emphasizing the flexibility inherent in the words "cruel and unusual," the Chief Justice wrote that "[t]he amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."[32] His approach to the problem was that utilized by the Court in *Weems:* he scrutinized the severity of the penalty in relation to the offense, exam-

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[30] English law required a second attempt at execution if the first attempt failed. L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law 185–186 (1948).

[31] MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concurred and concluded that the statute authorizing deprivations of citizenship exceeded Congress' legislative powers. 356 U. S., at 114.

[32] *Id.*, at 101.

ied the practices of other civilized nations of the world, nd concluded that involuntary statelessness was an xcessive and, therefore, an unconstitutional punishent. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, urged that exatriation was not punishment, and that even if it were, was not excessive. While he criticized the conclusion rrived at by the Chief Justice, his approach to the ighth Amendment question was identical.

Whereas in *Trop* a majority of the Court failed to gree on whether loss of citizenship was a cruel and nusual punishment, four years later, a majority did gree in *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660 (1962), hat a sentence of 90 days' imprisonment for violation f a California statute making it a crime to "be addicted o the use of narcotics" was cruel and unusual. MR. USTICE STEWART, writing the opinion of the Court, reterated what the Court had said in *Weems* and what Chief Justice Warren wrote in *Trop*—*i. e.*, that the cruel nd unusual punishment clause was not a static concept, ut one that must be continually re-examined "in the ght of contemporary human knowledge." [33] The fact hat the penalty under attack was only 90 days evidences he Court's willingness to carefully examine the possible xcessiveness of punishment in a given case even where hat is involved is a penalty that is familiar and widely ccepted.[34]

We distinguished *Robinson* in *Powell* v. *Texas*, 392 J. S. 514 (1968), where we sustained a conviction for runkenness in a public place and a fine of $20. Four ustices dissented on the ground that *Robinson* was conrolling. The analysis in both cases was the same;

[33] 370 U. S., at 666.

[34] *Robinson* removes any lingering doubts as to whether the Eighth mendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments is inding on the States. See also *Powell* v. *Texas*, 392 U. S. 514 1968).

only the conclusion as to whether or not the punishment was excessive differed. *Powell* marked the last time prior to today's decisions that the Court has had occasion to construe the meaning of the term "cruel and unusual" punishment.

Several principles emerge from these prior cases and serve as a beacon to an enlightened decision in the instant cases.

III

Perhaps the most important principle in analyzing "cruel and unusual" punishment questions is one that is reiterated again and again in the prior opinions of the Court: *i. e.*, the cruel and unusual language "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." [35] Thus, a penalty which was permissible at one time in our Nation's history is not necessarily permissible today.

The fact, therefore, that the Court, or individual Justices, may have in the past expressed an opinion that the death penalty is constitutional is not now binding on us. A fair reading of *Wilkerson* v. *Utah, supra; In re Kemmler, supra;* and *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber, supra,* would certainly indicate an acceptance *sub silentio* of capital punishment as constitutionally permissible. Several Justices have also expressed their individual opinions that the death penalty is constitutional.[36] Yet, some of these same Justices and others have at times expressed concern over capital punishment.[37]

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[35] *Trop v. Dulles,* 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958). See also *Weems* v. *United States,* 217 U. S. 349, 373 (1910); *Robinson* v. *California,* 370 U. S. 660, 666 (1962). See also n. 19, *supra.*

[36] *E. g., McGautha* v. *California,* 402 U. S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J. concurring); *Trop* v. *Dulles,* 356 U. S. 86, 99 (Warren, C. J.), 125 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

[37] See, *e. g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber,* 329 U. S. 459, 474 (1947) (Burton, J., dissenting); *Trop* v. *Dulles,* 356 U. S. 86, 99

There is no holding directly on point, and the very nature of the Eighth Amendment would dictate that unless a very recent decision existed, *stare decisis* would bow to changing values, and the question of the constitutionality of capital punishment at a given moment in history would remain open.

Faced with an open question, we must establish our standards for decision. The decisions discussed in the previous section imply that a punishment may be deemed cruel and unusual for any one of four distinct reasons.

First, there are certain punishments which inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering that civilized

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(1958) (Warren, C. J.); *Rudolph* v. *Alabama*, 375 U. S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 81 (1956).

There is no violation of the principle of *stare decisis* in a decision that capital punishment now violates the Eighth Amendment. The last case that implied that capital punishment was still permissible was *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 99 (1958). Not only was the implication purely dicta, but it was also made in the context of a flexible analysis that recognized that as public opinion changed, the validity of the penalty would have to be re-examined. *Trop* v. *Dulles* is nearly 15 years old now, and 15 years changes many minds about many things. MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests, however, that our recent decisions in *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), and *McGautha* v. *California*, 403 U. S. 183 (1971), imply that capital punishment is constitutionally permissible, because if they are viewed any other way they amount to little more than an academic exercise. In my view, this distorts the "rule of four" by which this Court decides which cases and which issues it will consider, and in what order. See *United States* v. *Generes*, — U. S. —, — (1972) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). There are many reasons why four members of the Court might have wanted to consider the issues presented in those cases before considering the difficult question that is now before us. While I do not intend to catalogue these reasons here, it should suffice to note that I do not believe that those decisions can, in any way, fairly be used to support *any* inference whatever that the instant cases have already been disposed of *sub silentio*.

people cannot tolerate them—*e. g.*, use of the rack, the thumbscrew, or other modes of torture. See *O'Neill* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S., at 339. Regardless of public sentiment with respect to imposition of one of these punishments in a particular case or at any one moment in history, the Constitution prohibits it. These are punishments that have been barred since the adoption of the Bill of Rights.

Second, there are punishments which are unusual, signifying that they were previously unknown as penalties for a given offense. Cf. *United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co.* v. *Burleson*, 255 U. S., at 435 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). If these punishments are intended to serve a humane purpose, they may be constitutionally permissible. *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S., at 447; *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S., at 464. Prior decisions leave open the question of just how much the word "unusual" adds to the word "cruel." I have previously indicated that use of the word "unusual" in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 was inadvertent, and there is nothing in the history of the Eighth Amendment to give flesh to its intended meaning. In light of the meager history that does exist, one would suppose that an innovative punishment would probably be constitutional if no more cruel than that punishment which it superseded. We need not decide this question here, however, for capital punishment is certainly not a recent phenomenon.

Third, a penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose. *Weems* v. *United States*, *supra*. The decisions previously discussed are replete with assertions that one of the primary functions of the cruel and unusual punishments clause is to prevent excessive or unnecessary penalties, *e. g.*, *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S., at 134; *O'Neill* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S., at (339–340) (Field, J., dissent-

ing); *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 381; *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459 (1947); these punishments are unconstitutional even though popular sentiment may favor them. Both THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE POWELL seek to ignore or to minimize this aspect of the Court's prior decisions. But, since Mr. Justice Field first suggested that "[t]he whole inhibition [of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments] is against that which is excessive," *O'Neill* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S., at 339–340, this Court has steadfastly maintained that a penalty is unconstitutional whenever it is unnecessarily harsh or cruel. This is what the Founders of this country intended; this is what their fellow citizens believed the Eighth Amendment provided; and this was the basis for our decision in *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660, for the plurality opinion by Chief Justice Warren in *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, and for the Court's decision in *Weems* v. *United States*, *supra*. See also W. Bradford, An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death is Necessary in Pennsylvania (1793), reprinted in 12 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 122, 127 (1968). It should also be noted that the cruel and unusual language of the Eighth Amendment immediately follows language that prohibits *excessive* bail and *excessive* fines. The entire thrust of the Eighth Amendment is, in short, against "that which is excessive."

Fourth, where a punishment is not excessive and serves a valid legislative purpose, it still may be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it. For example, if the evidence clearly demonstrated that capital punishment served valid legislative purposes, such punishment would, nevertheless, be unconstitutional if citizens found it to be morally unacceptable. A general abhorrence on the part of the public would, in effect, equate a modern punishment with those barred since the adop-

tion of the Eighth Amendment. There are no prior cases in this Court striking down a penalty on this ground, but the very notion of changing values requires that we recognize its existence.

It is immediately obvious then that since capital punishment is not a recent phenomenon, if it violates the Constitution, it does so because it is excessive or unnecessary, or because it is abhorrent to currently existing moral values.

We must proceed to the history of capital punishment in the United States.

IV

Capital punishment has been used to penalize various forms of conduct by members of society since the beginnings of civilization. Its precise origins are difficult to perceive, but there is some evidence that its roots lie in violent retaliation by members of a tribe or group, or by the tribe or group itself, against persons committing hostile acts toward group members.[38] Thus, infliction of death as a penalty for objectionable conduct appears to have its beginnings in private vengeance. For example, in Israel's ancient laws, whenever homicide was committed, the murdered person's nearest relative made himself sole arbiter of the guilt and appropriate punishment of the accused. There was no trial.[39]

As individuals gradually ceded their personal prerogatives to a sovereign power, the sovereign accepted the authority to punish wrongdoing as part of its "divine right" to rule. Individual vengeance gave way to the vengeance of the state, and capital punishment became

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[38] Ancel, The Problem of the Death Penalty, *in* Capital Punishment, at 4–5 (ed. T. Sellin, 1967) (hereinafter "Ancel"); G. R. Scott, The History of Capital Punishment 1 (1950) (hereinafter "Scott").

[39] Scott, *supra*, n. 38, at 1.

a public function.[40] Capital punishment worked its way into the laws of various countries,[41] and was inflicted in a variety of macabre and horrific ways.[42]

It was during the reign of Henry II (1154–1189) that English law first recognized that crime was more than a personal affair between the victim and the perpetrator.[43] The early history of capital punishment in England is set forth in *McGautha* v. *California,* 402 U. S. 183, 197–200 (1971), and need not be repeated here.

By 1500, English law recognized eight major capital crimes: treason, petty treason (killing of husband by his wife), murder, larceny, robbery, burglary, rape, and arson.[44] Tudor and Stuart kings added many more crimes to the list of those punishable by death, and by 1688 there were nearly 50.[45] George II (1727–1760) added nearly 36 more, and George III (1760–1820) increased the number by 60.[46]

By shortly after 1800, capital offenses numbered more than 200 and not only included crimes against person and property, but even some against the public peace. While England may, in retrospect, look particularly

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[40] *Id.*, at 2; Ancel, *supra,* n. 38, at 4–5.

[41] The Code of Hammurabi is one of the first known laws to have recognized the concept of an "eye for an eye," and consequently to have accepted death as an appropriate punishment for homicide. E. Block, And May God Have Mercy . . . 13–14 (1962).

[42] Scott, *supra,* n. 38, at 19–33.

[43] *Id.*, at 5. Prior to this time, the laws of Alfred (871–901) provided that one who wilfully slayed another should die, at least under certain circumstances. 3 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 24 (1883). But, punishment was apparently left largely to private enforcement.

[44] T. Pucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 424–454 (5th ed. 1956).

[45] H. A. Bedau, Introduction *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 1 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967) (hereinafter "Bedau").

[46] *Ibid.*

brutal, Blackstone points out that England was fairly civilized when compared to the rest of Europe.[47]

Capital punishment was not as common a penalty in the American Colonies. "The Capitall Lawes of New-England," dating from 1636, were drawn by the Massachusetts Bay Colony and are the first written expression of capital offenses known to exist in this country. These laws make the following crimes capital offenses: idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, murder, assault in sudden anger, sodomy, buggery, adultery, statutory rape, rape, man-stealing, perjury in a capital trial, and rebellion. Each crime is accompanied by a reference to the Old Testament to indicate its source.[48] It is not known how vigorously these laws were enforced.[49] Other Colonies had a variety of laws which spanned the spectrum of severity.[50]

By the 18th century, the list of crimes became much less theocratic and much more secular. In the average colony, there were 12 capital crimes.[51] This was far fewer than existed in England, and part of the reason

[47] 4 W. Blackstone Commentaries—(Lewis ed. 1902). How many persons were actually executed for committing capital offenses is not known. See Bedau, *supra*, n. 45, at 3; Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law 151, 153 (1948); T. Sellin, Two Myths in the History of Capital Punishment, 50 J. Crim. L. Crim. & Pol. Sci. 114 (1959). "Benefit of clergy" mitigated the harshness of the law somewhat. This concept arose from the struggle between church and state and originally provided that members of the clergy should be tried in ecclesiastical courts. Eventually all first offenders were entitled to "benefit of clergy." Bedau, *supra*, n. 45, at 4.

[48] G. Haskins, The Capitall Lawes of New-England, Harv. L. Sch. Bull. 10–11 (Feb. 1956).

[49] Bedau, *supra*, n. 45, at 5.

[50] *Id.*, at 6.

[51] Fuller, Movements to Abolish the Death Penalty in the United States, 284 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 124 (1952) (hereinafter "Fuller").

was that there was a scarcity of labor in the colonies.[52] Still, there were many executions, because "[w]ith county jails inadequate and insecure, the criminal population seemed best controlled by death, mutilation, and fines."[53]

Even in the 17th century, there was some opposition to capital punishment in some of the colonies. In his "Great Act" of 1682, William Penn prescribed death only for premeditated murder and treason,[54] although his reform was not long-lived.[55]

In 1776 the Philadelphia Society for Relieving Distressed Prisoners organized, and it was followed 11 years later by the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons.[56] These groups pressured for reform of all penal laws, including capital offenses. Dr. Benjamin Rush soon drafted America's first reasoned argument against capital punishment, entitled "An Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments upon Criminals and upon Society."[57] In 1793, William Bradford, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania and later Attorney General of the United States, conducted "An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death

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[52] *Ibid.*

[53] *Ibid.* (footnotes omitted).

[54] *Id.*, at 124; Bedau, *supra*, n. 45, at 6.

[55] For an unknown reason, Pennsylvania adopted the harsher penal code of England upon William Penn's death in 1718. There was no evidence, however of an increase in crime between 1682 and 1718. Fuller, *supra*, n. 51, at 124. In 1794, Pennsylvania eliminated capital punishment except for "murder of the first degree," which included all "willfull, deliberate and premeditated" killings. The death penalty was mandatory for this crime. Pa. Laws 1794, c. 1766. Virginia followed Pennsylvania's lead and enacted similar legislation. Other States followed suit.

[56] Fuller, *supra*, n. 51, at 124.

[57] *Id.*, at 124–125.

is Necessary in Pennsylvania."[58] He concluded that it was doubtful whether capital punishment was at all necessary, and that until more information could be obtained, it should be immediately eliminated for all offenses except high treason and murder.[59]

The "Enquiries" of Rush and Bradford and the Pennsylvania movement toward abolition of the death penalty had little immediate impact on the practices of other States.[60] But in the early 1800's, Governors George and DeWitt Clinton and Daniel Tompkins unsuccessfully urged the New York Legislature to modify or end capital punishment. During this same period, Edward Livingston, an American lawyer who later became Secretary of State and Minister to France under President Andrew Jackson, was appointed by the Louisiana legislature to draft a new penal code. At the center of his proposal was "the total abolition of capital punishment."[61] His "Introductory Report to the System of Penal Law Prepared for the State of Louisiana"[62] contained a systematic rebuttal of all arguments favoring capital punishment. Drafted in 1824, it was not published until 1833. This work was a tremendous impetus to the abolition movement for the next half century.

During the 1830's, there was a rising tide of sentiment against capital punishment. In 1834, Pennsylvania abolished public executions,[63] and two years later,

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[58] Reprinted in 12 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 122 (1968).

[59] His advice was in large measure followed. See n. 55, *supra*.

[60] One scholar has noted that the early abolition movement in the United States lacked the leadership of major public figures. Bedau, *supra*, n. 45, at 8.

[61] *Ibid.*; Fuller, *supra*, n. 51, at 126–127.

[62] See Scott, *supra*, n. 38, at 114–116.

[63] Fuller, *supra*, n. 51, at 127.

"The Report on Capital Punishment Made to the Maine Legislature" was published. It led to a law which prohibited the executive from issuing a warrant for execution within one year after a criminal was sentenced by the courts. The totally discretionary character of the law was at odds with almost all prior practices. The "Maine Law" resulted in little enforcement of the death penalty, which was not surprising since the legislature's idea in passing the law was that the affirmative burden placed on the governor to issue a warrant one full year or more after a trial would be an effective deterrent to exercise of his power.[64] The law spread throughout New England and led to Michigan's being the first State to abolish capital punishment in 1846.[65]

Anti-capital punishment feeling grew in the 1840's as the literature of the period pointed out the agony of the condemned man and expressed the philosophy that repentance atoned for the worst crimes, and that true repentance derived not from fear, but from harmony with nature.[66]

By 1850, societies for abolition existed in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Ohio, Alabama, Louisiana, Indiana, and Iowa.[67] New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania constantly had abolition bills before their legislatures. In 1852, Rhode Island followed in the footsteps of Michigan and totally abolished capital punishment.[68] Wisconsin followed

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[64] D. Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America 1787–1861, 63 Am. Hist. Rev. 23, 33 (1958) (hereinafter "Davis").

[65] Fuller, *supra*, n. 51, at 128. Captial punishment was abolished for all crimes but treason: The law was enacted in 1846, but did not go into effect until 1847.

[66] Davis, *supra*, n. 64, at 29–30.

[67] Fuller, *supra*, n. 51, at 129.

[68] *Id.*, at 130.

suit the next year.[69] Those States which did not abolish the death penalty greatly reduced its scope, and "[f]ew states outside the South had more than one or two . . : capital offenses" in addition to treason and murder.[70]

But, the Civil War halted much of the abolition furor. One historian has said that "[a]fter the Civil War, men's finer sensibilities, which had been revolted by the execution of a fellow being, seemed hardened and blunted."[71] Some of the attention previously given to abolition was diverted to prison reform. An abolition movement still existed, however. Maine abolished the death penalty in 1876, restored it in 1883, and abolished it again in 1887; Iowa abolished capital punishment from 1872–1878; Colorado began an erratic period of *de facto* abolition and revival in 1872; and Kansas also abolished it *de facto* in 1872, and by law in 1907.[72]

One great success of the abolitionist movement in the period from 1830–1900 was almost complete elimination of mandatory capital punishment. Before the legislatures formally gave juries discretion to refrain from imposing the death penalty, the phenomenon of "jury nullification" in which juries refused to convict in cases in which they believed that death was an inappropriate penalty, was experienced.[73] Tennessee was the first State to give juries discretion, Tenn. L. 1837–1838, c. 29, but other States quickly followed suit. Then, Rep. Curtis of New York introduced a federal bill that ultimately became law in 1897 which reduced the number of federal capital offenses from 60 to 3 (treason,

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[69] *Ibid.*

[70] Bedau, *supra*, n. 45, at 10.

[71] Davis, *supra*, n. 64, at 46.

[72] See App. I to this opinion.

[73] See *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 199 (1971).

murder, and rape) and gave the jury sentencing discretion in murder and rape cases.[74]

By 1917 12 States had become abolitionist jurisdictions.[75] But, under the nervous tension of World War I, four of these States reinstituted capital punishment and promising movements in other States came grinding to a halt.[76] During the period following the First World War, the abolition movement never regained its momentum.

It is not easy to ascertain why the movement lost its vigor. Certainly, much attention was diverted from penal reform during the economic crisis of the depression and the exhausting years of struggle during World War II. Also, executions, which had once been frequent, public spectacles, became infrequent private affairs. The manner of inflicting death changed, and the horrors of the punishment were, therefore, somewhat diminished in the minds of the general public.[77]

In recent years there has been renewed interest in modifying capital punishment. New York has moved toward abolition,[78] as have several other States.[79] In

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[74] Fuller, *supra*, n. 51, at 133. See also *Winston* v. *United States*, 172 U. S. 303 (1899). More than 90% of the executions since 1930 in this country have been for offenses with a discretionary death penalty. H. A. Bedau, The Courts, the Constitution and Capital Punishment, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 201, 204.

[75] See n. 72, *supra*.

[76] Fuller, *supra*, n. 51, at 134.

[77] T. Sellin in Captial Punishment, at 35 (ed. T. Sellin, 1967); United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Capital Punishment, Pt. II, ¶¶ 82–85, at 101–102 (1968) (hereinafter "United Nations").

[78] New York authorizes the death penalty only for murder of a police officer or for murder by a life term prisoner. N. Y. Penal Code § 125.30 (McKinney's 1967).

[79] See generally H. A. Bedau, The Courts, The Constitution and Capital Punishment, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 201. Nine States do not

1967, a bill was introduced in the Senate to abolish capital punishment for all federal crimes, but it died in committee.[80]

At the present time, 41 States, the District of Columbia, and other federal jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for at least one crime. It would be fruitless to attempt here to categorize the approach to capital punishment taken by the various States.[81] It is sufficient to note that murder is the crime most often punished by death, followed by kidnapping and treason.[82] Rape is a capital offense in 16 States and the federal system.[83]

The foregoing history demonstrates that capital punishment was carried from Europe to America but, once here, was tempered considerably. At times in our his-

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authorize capital punishment under any circumstances: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands also have no provision for captial punishment. Bedau, *supra*, n. 45, at 39. Those States were severely restrict the imposition of the death penalty are: New Mexico, N. M. Stat. Ann. § 40 A-29-2.1 (1969 Cum. Pocket Part); New York, N. Y. Penal Code § 125.30 (McKinney's 1967); North Dakota, N. D. Cent. Code ¶¶ 12-07-01, 12-27-13 (1960); Rhode Island, R. I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 (1970); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 2303 (1970 Cum. Supp.). California is the only State in which the judiciary has declared capital punishment to be invalid. See n. 1, *supra*.

[80] See generally Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 1760 (March 20, 21, and July 2, 1968) (hereinafter "Hearings").

[81] Extensive compilations of the capital crimes in particular States can be found in Bedau, *supra*, n. 45, at 39-52 and in the Brief for the Petitioner in No. 68-5027, App. G. An attempt is made to break down capital offenses into categories in Finkel, A Survey of Capital Offenses in Capital Punishment, at 22 (ed. T. Sellin, 1967).

[82] Bedau, *supra*, n. 45, at 43.

[83] *Ibid.* See also *Ralph* v. *Warden*, 438 F. 2d 786, 791-792 (CA4 1970).

tory, strong abolitionist movements have existed. But, they have never been completely successful, as no more than one-quarter of the States of the Union have, at any one time, abolished the death penalty. They have had partial success, however, especially in reducing the number of capital crimes, replacing mandatory death sentences with jury discretion, and developing more humane methods of conducting executions.

This is where our historical foray leads. The question now to be faced is whether American society has reached a point where abolition is not dependent on a successful grass roots movement in particular jurisdictions, but is demanded by the Eighth Amendment. To answer this question, we must first examine whether or not the death penalty is today tantamount to excessive punishment.

IV

In order to assess whether or not death is an excessive or unnecessary penalty, it is necessary to consider the reasons why a legislature might select it as punishment for one or more offenses, and examine whether less severe penalties would satisfy the legitimate legislative wants as well as capital punishment. If they would, then the death penalty is unnecessary cruelty, and, therefore, unconstitutional.

There are six purposes conceivably served by capital punishment: retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and economy. These are considered seriatim below.

A. The concept of retribution is one of the most misunderstood in all of our criminal jurisprudence. The principal source of confusion derives from the fact that, in dealing with the concept, most people confuse the question "why do men in fact punish?" with the ques-

tion "what justifies men in punishing?" [84] Men may punish for any number of reasons, but the one reason that punishment is morally good or morally justifiable is that someone has broken the law. Thus, it can correctly be said that breaking the law is the *sine qua non* of punishment, or, in other words, that we only tolerate punishment as it is imposed on one who deviates from the norm established by the criminal law.

The fact that the State may seek retribution against those who have broken its laws does not mean that retribution may then become the State's sole end in punishing. Our jurisprudence has always accepted deterrence in general, deterrence of individual recidivism, isolation of dangerous persons, and rehabilitation as proper goals of punishment. See *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Retaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable aspirations for a government in a free society.

Punishment as retribution has been condemned by scholars for centuries,[85] and the Eighth Amendment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from becoming synonomous with vengeance.

In *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 381, the Court, in the course of holding that Weems' punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, contrasted it with penalties provided for other offenses and concluded:

> "[t]his contrast shows more than different exercises of legislative judgement. It is greater than

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[84] See H. L. Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. L. Rev. 433, 448 (1957); Royal Commission on Captial Punishment, 1949–1953, Cmd. 8932, ¶¶ 52–53, at 17–18 (hereinafter "Royal Commission"). See generally, Reichert, Capital Punishment Reconsidered, 47 U. Ky. L. Rev. 397, 399 (1959).

[85] See, *e. g.*, C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment (tr. H. Paolucci, 1963); Archibold, On the Practice, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases (7th ed. by Waterman 1860), §§ 11–17, at XV–XIX.

> that. It condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual. It exhibits a difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice. The state thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. *The purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal.*" (Emphasis added.)

It is plain that the view of the *Weems* Court was that punishment for the sake of retribution was not permissible under the Eighth Amendment. This is the only view that the Court could have taken if the "cruel and unusual" language were to be given any meaning. Retribution surely underlies the imposition of some punishment on one who commits a criminal act. But, the fact that *some* punishment may be imposed does not mean that *any* punishment is permissible. If retribution alone could serve as a justification for any particular penalty, then all penalties selected by the legislature would by definition be acceptable means for designating society's moral approbation of a particular act. The "cruel and unusual" language would thus be read out of the Constitution and the fears of Patrick Henry and the other Founding Fathers would become realities.

To preserve the integrity of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has consistently denigrated retribution as a permissible goal of punishment.[86] It is undoubtedly

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[86] See, *e. g.*, *Rudolph* v. *Alabama*, 375 U. S. 889 (1963) (dissenting opinion); *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 97, 113 (1958); *Morissette* v. *United States*, 342 U. S. 246 (1952); *Williams* v. *New York*, 337 U. S. 241 (1949). In *Powell* v. *Texas*, 392 U. S. 514, 530 (1968), we said: "This Court has never held that anything in the Constitution requires that penal sanctions be designed solely to achieve therapeutic or rehabilitative effects . . . ." This is, of course, correct, since deterrence

correct that there is a demand for vengeance on the part of many persons in a community against one who is convicted of a particularly offensive act. At times a cry is heard that morality requires vengeance to evidence society's abhorence of the act.[87] But the Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves. The cruel and unusual language limits the avenues through which vengeance can be channeled. Were this not so, the language would be empty and a return to the rack and other tortures would be possible in a given case.

Mr. Justice Story wrote that the Eighth Amendment's limitation on punishment "would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious conduct." [88]

I would reach an opposite conclusion—*to wit*, that only in a free society would men recognize their inherent weaknesses and seek to compensate for them by means of a Constitution.

The history of the Eighth Amendment supports only the conclusion that retribution for its own sake is improper.

B. The most hotly contested issue regarding capital

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and isolation are clearly recognized as proper. *E. g., Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 111 (1958) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). There is absolutely nothing in the language, the rationale, or the holding of *Powell* v. *Texas* that implies that retribution for its own sake is a proper legislative aim in punishing.

[87] See, *e. g.*, Vellenga, Christianity and The Death Penalty *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 123–130 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967); Hook, The Death Sentence, *in* the Death Penalty in America, *supra*, at 146–154 (hereinafter "Hook"). See also, Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea—Clues to the Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell, 73 Yale L. J. 425, 433–439 (1964).

[88] 2 J. Story, On the Constitution § 1903, at 650 (5th ed. 1891).

punishment is whether it is better than life imprisonment as a deterrent to crime.[89]

While the contrary position has been argued,[90] it is my firm opinion that the death penalty is a more severe sanction than life imprisonment. Admittedly, there are some persons who would rather die than languish in prison for a lifetime. But, whether or not they should be able to choose death as an alternative is a far different question from that presented here—*i. e.*, whether the State can impose death as a punishment. Death is irrevocable; life imprisonment is not. Death, of course, makes rehabilitation impossible; life imprisonment does not. In short, death has always been viewed as the ultimate sanction, and it seems perfectly reasonable to continue to view it as such.[91]

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[89] Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 U. Cal. L. Rev. 1268, 1275 (1968); Note, Justice or Revenge, 60 Dick. L. Rev. 342, 343 (1956); Royal Commission, *supra*, n. 84, ¶ 55, at 18.

[90] J. Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 154, 163 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967); Hook, *supra*, n. 87, at 152.

[91] See *Commonwealth* v. *Elliott*, 371 Pa. 70, 78, 89 A. 2d 782, 786 (1952) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 101 (1956). This assertion that life imprisonment may somehow be more cruel than death is usually rejected as frivolous. Hence, I confess to surprise at finding the assertion being made in various ways in today's opinions. If there were any merit to the contention, it would do much to undercut even the retributive motive for imposing capital punishment. In any event, there is no better response to such an assertion than that of former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Musmanno in his dissent in *Commonwealth* v. *Elliott*, *supra*, at 79–80; 89 A. 2d, at 787:

"One of the judges of the lower Court indicated from the bench that a sentence of life imprisonment is not to be regarded as a lesser penalty than that of death. I challenge that statement categorically. It can be stated as a universal truth stretching from nadir to zenith that regardless of circumstances no one wants to die. Some person may, in an instant of spiritual or physical agony express a desire

It must be kept in mind then that the question to be considered is not simply whether capital punishment is a deterrent, but whether it is a better deterrent than life imprisonment.[92]

There is no more complex problem than determining the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. "Capital punishment has obviously failed as a deterrent when a murder is committed. We can number its failures. But we cannot even know how many people have refrained from murder because of the fear of being hanged."[93] This is the nub of the problem and it is exacerbated by the paucity of useful data. The United States is more fortunate than most countries, however, in that it has what are generally considered to be the world's most viable statistics.[94]

The two strongest arguments in favor of capital punishment as a deterrent are both logical hypotheses devoid of evidentiary support, but persuasive nonetheless. The first proposition was best stated by Sir James Stephen in 1864:

> "No other punishment deters men so effectually from committing crimes as the punishment of death.

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for death as an anodyne from intolerable pain, but that desire is never full-hearted because there is always the reserve of realization that the silken cord of life is not broken by a mere wishing. There is no person in the actual extremity of dropping from the precipice of life who does not desperately reach for a crag of time to which to cling even for a moment against the awful eternity of silence below. With all its 'slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,' life is yet sweet and death is always cruel."

Attention should also be given to the hypothesis of Sir James Stephen, quoted in the text *infra*, p. —.

[92] See H. A. Bedau, Deterrence and the Dealth Penalty: A Reconsideration, 61 J. Crim. L. Crim. & Pol. Sci. 539, 542 (1970).

[93] Royal Commission, *supra*, n. 84, ¶ 59, at 20.

[94] United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 134, at 117. The great advantage which this country has is that it can compare abolitionist

> This is one of those propositions which it is difficult to prove, simply because they are in themselves more obvious than any proof can make them. It is possible to display ingenuity in arguing against it, but that is all. The whole experience of mankind is in the other direction. The threat of instant death is the one to which resort has always been made when there was an absolute necessity for producing some result. . . . No one goes to certain inevitable death except by compulsion. Put the matter the other way. Was there ever yet a criminal who, when sentenced to death and brought out to die, would refuse the offer of a commutation of his sentence for the severest secondary punishment? Surely not. Why is this? It can only be because 'All that a man has will he give for his life.' In any secondary punishment, however terrible, there is hope; but death is death; its terrors cannot be described more forcibly." [95]

This hypothesis relates to the use of capital punishment as a deterrent for any crime. The second proposition is that "if life imprisonment is the maximum penalty for a crime such as murder, an offender who is serving a life sentence cannot then be deterred from murdering a fellow inmate or a prison officer." [96] This hypothesis advocates a limited deterrent effect under particular circumstances.

Abolitionists attempt to disprove these hypotheses by amassing statistical evidence to demonstrate that there is no correlation between criminal activity and the existence or nonexistence of a capital sanction. Almost all

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and retentionist States with geographic, economic, and cultural similarities.

[95] Reprinted in Royal Commission, *supra*, n. 84, ¶ 57, at 19.

[96] United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 139, at 118.

of the evidence involves the crime of murder, since murder is punishable by death in more jurisdictions than are other offenses,[97] and almost 90% of all executions since 1930 have been pursuant to murder convictions.[98]

Thorston Sellin, one of the leading authorities on capital punishment, has urged that if the death penalty deters prospective murderers, the following hypotheses should be true:

> "(a) Murders should be less frequent in states that have the death penalty than in those that have abolished it, other factors being equal. Comparisons of this nature must be made among states that are as alike as possible in all other respects—character of population, social and economic condition, etc.—in order not to introduce factors known to influence murder rates in a serious manner but present in only one of these states.
>
> "(b) Murders should increase when the death penalty is abolished and should decline when it is restored.
>
> "(c) The deterrent effect should be greatest and should therefore affect murder rates most powerfully in those communities where the crime occurred and its consequences are most strongly brought home to the population.
>
> "(d) Law enforcement officers would be safer from murderous attacks in states that have the death penalty than in those without it." (Footnote omitted.)[99]

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[97] See n. 82, *supra*.

[98] T. Sellin, The Death Penalty, A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute 5 (1959) (hereinafter "ALI"); Morris, Thoughts on Capital Punishment, 35 Wash. L. Rev. & St. J. 335, 340 (1960).

[99] ALI, *supra*, n. 98, at 21.

Sellin's evidence indicates that not one of these propositions is true. This evidence has its problems, however. One is that there are no accurate figures for capital murders; there are only figures on homicides and they, of course, include noncapital killings.[100] A second problem is that certain murders undoubtedly are misinterpreted as accidental deaths or suicides, and there is no way of estimating the number of such undetected crimes. A third problem is that all homicides are not reported. Despite these difficulties, most authorities have assumed that the proportion of capital murders in a State's or nation's homicide statistics remains reasonably constant,[101] and that the homicide statistics are therefore useful.

Sellin's statistics demonstrate that there is no correlation between the murder rate and the presence or absence of the capital sanction. He compares States that have similar characteristics and finds that irrespective of their position on capital punishment, they have similar murder rates. In the New England States, for example, there is no correlation between executions[102] and homicide rates.[103] The same is true for Mid-Western States,[104] and for all others studied. Both the United

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[100] Such crimes might include lessor forms of homicide or homicide by a child or a lunatic. *Id.*, at 22; H. A. Bedau, The Laws, The Crimes and The Executions, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 61 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967) (hereinafter "Bedau").

[101] Sutherland, Murder and the Death Penalty, 15 J. Crim. L. Crim. & Pol. Sci. 522 (1925); ALI, *supra*, n. 98, at 22; Bedau, *supra*, n. 100, at 73.

[102] Executions were chosen for purposes of comparison because whatever impact capital punishment had would surely be most forcefully felt where punishment was actually imposed.

[103] See App. II to this opinion.

[104] See App. III to this opinion.

Nations [105] and Great Britain [106] have acknowledged the validity of Sellin's statistics.

Sellin's statistics also indicate that abolition and/or reintroduction of the death penalty had no effect on the homicide rates of the various States involved.[107] This conclusion is borne out by others who have made similar inquiries [108] and by the experience of other countries.[109] Despite problems with the statistics,[110] Sellin's evidence has been relied upon in international studies of capital punishment.[111]

Statistics also show that the deterrent effect of capital punishment is no greater in those communities where executions take place than in other communities.[112] In

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[105] United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 134, at 117.

[106] Royal Commission, *supra*, n. 84, at 349–351. Accord, Vold, Extent and Trend of Capital Crimes in United States, 284 Annals of Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 4 (1952).

[107] ALI, *supra*, n. 98, at 35–38.

[108] See, *e. g.*, Guillot, Abolition and Restoration of the Death Penalty in Missouri, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 351, 358–359 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967); Cobin, Abolition and Restoration of the Death Penalty in Delaware, *in* The Death Penalty in America, *supra*, at 359, 371–372.

[109] ALI, *supra*, n. 98, at 38–39; Royal Commission, *supra*, n. 84, at 353; United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶¶ 130–136, at 116–118.

[110] One problem is that the statistics for the 19th century are especially suspect; another is that *de jure* abolution may have been preceded by *de facto* abolition which would have distorted the figures.

[111] Royal Commission, *supra*, n. 84, at 23, 346–349; United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 132, at 117.

[112] Hayner and Granor, The Death Penalty in Washington State, 284 Annals of Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 101 (1952); Graves, A Doctor Looks at Capital Punishment, 10 Med. Arts & Sci. 137 (1956); Dann, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, Bull. 29, Friends Social Service Series, Committee on Philanthropic Labor and Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Freinds (1935); Savitz, A Study in Capital Punishment, 49 J. Crim. L. Crim. & Pol. Sci. 338 (1958); United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 135, at 118.

fact, there is some evidence that imposition of capital punishment may actually encourage crime, rather than deter it.[113] And, while police and law enforcement officers are the strongest advocates of capital punishment,[114] the evidence is overwhelming that police are no safer in communities which retain the sanction than in those which have abolished it.[115]

There is also a substantial body of data showing that the existence of the death penalty has virtually no effect on the homicide rate in prisons.[116] Most of the

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[113] Graves, A Doctor Looks at Capital Punishment, 10 Med. Arts & Sci. 137 (1956); Hearings, *supra*, n. 80, at 23 (testimony of C. Duffy), 126 (statement of Dr. West); T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess 474 (1959); McCafferty, Major Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 25 Fed. Prob., No. 3, at 15 (Sept. 1961). Capital punishment may provide an outlet for suicidal impulses or a means of achieving notoriety, for example.

[114] See, *e. g.*, Gerstein, A Prosecutor Looks at Capital Punishment, 51 J. Crim. L. Crim. & Pol. Sci. 252 (1960); J. E. Hoover, Statements in Favor of Death Penalty, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 130 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967); Younger, Captial Punishment: A Sharp Medicine Reconsidered, 42 A. B. A. J. 113 (1956). But see, Symposium on Capital Punishment, D. A.'s Assn. of State of New York, Jan. 27, 1961, 7 N. Y. L. F. 249, 267 (1961) (Statement of A. Herman, head of the homicide bureau of the New York City Dist. Att'y's office).

[115] ALI, *supra*, n. 98, at 56–58; Koeniger, Capital Punishment in Texas 1924–1968, 284 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 132; T. Sellin, Does the Death Penalty Protect Municipal Police, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 284 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967); United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 136, at 118.

[116] L. Lawes, Life and Death in Sing Sing 150 (1937); McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by a Correctional Administrator, 28 Fed. Prob. 11 (1964); 1950 Survey of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, cited in ALI, *supra*, n. 98, at 70–72; T. Sellin, Prisons Homicides, *in* Capital Punishment, at 154 (ed T. Sellin, 1967); *cf.* Akman, Homicides and Assaults in Canadian Prisons, *in* Capital Punishment, *supra*, at 161, 168. The argument can be made that the reason for the good record of murderers is that those who are

persons sentenced to death are murderers, and murderers tend to be model prisoners.[117]

In sum, the only support for the theory that capital punishment is an effective deterrent is found in the hypotheses with which we began and the occasional stories about a specific individual being deterred from doing a contemplated criminal act.[118] These claims of specific deterrence are often spurious,[119] however, and may be more than counterbalanced by the tendency of capital punishment to incite certain crimes.[120]

The United Nation's Committee that studied capital punishment found that "[i]t is generally agreed between the retentionists and abolitionists, whatever their opinions about the validity of comparative studies of deterrence, that the data which now exist show no correlation between the existence of capital punishment and lower rates of capital crime." [121]

Despite the fact that abolitionists have not proved non-deterrence beyond a reasonable doubt, they have succeeded in showing by clear and convincing evidence that capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent

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likely to be recidivists are executed. There is, however, no evidence to show that in choosing between life and death sentences juries select the lesser penalties for those persons they believe are unlikely to commit future crimes.

[117] *E. g.*, United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 144, at 119; B. Eshelman and F. Riley, Death Row Chaplain 224 (1962). This is supported also by overwhelming statistics showing an extremely low rate of recidivism for convicted murderers who are released from prison. Royal Commission, *supra*, n. 84, App. 15, at 486–491; ALI, *supra*, n. 98, at 72–79; United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 144, at 119.

[118] See, *e. g.*, H. A. Bedau, The Question of Deterrence, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 267 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967).

[119] *Ibid.* and n. 11; Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 U. Cal. L. Rev. 1268, 1282–1283 (1968).

[120] See n. 113, *supra*.

[121] United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 159, at 123.

to crime in our society. This is all that they must do. We would shirk our judicial responsibilities if we failed to accept the presently existing statistics and demanded more proof. It may be that we now possess all the proof that anyone could ever hope to assemble on the subject. But, even if further proof were to be forthcoming, I believe there is more than enough evidence presently available for a decision in this case.

In 1793 William Bradford studied the utility of the death penalty in Pennsylvania and found that it probably had no deterrent effect but that more evidence was needed.[122] Edward Livingston reached a similiar conclusion with respect to deterrence in 1833 upon completion of his study for Louisiana.[123] Virtually every study that has since been undertaken has reached the result.[124]

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[122] See nn. 58 and 59, *supra*, and accompanying text.

[123] See n. 62, *supra*, and accompanying text.

[124] Graves, A Doctor Looks at Capital Punishment, 10 Med. Arts. & Sci. 137 (1956); Royal Commission, *supra*, n. 84, at 20–21; Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty, 284 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 55 (1952); United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 142, at 119; Wolfgang, Patterns of Criminal Homicide (1958).

One would assume that if deterrence were enhanced by capital punishment, the increased deterrence would be most effective with respect to the premeditated murderer or the hired killer who plots his crime before committing it. But, such people rarely expect to be caught and usually assume that if they are caught they will etiher be acquitted or sentenced to prison. This is a fairly dependable assusmption since a reliable estimate is that one person is executed for every 100 capital murders known to the police. H. L. Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. L. Rev. 433, 444–445 (1957). For capital punishment to deter anybody it must be a certain result of a criminal act, cf. *Ex parte Medley*, 134 U. S. 160 (1889), and it is not. It must also follow swiftly upon completion of the offense and it cannot in our complicated due process system of justice. See, *e. g.*, H. A. Bedau, The Question of Deterrence, *in* The Death Penalty in

In light of the massive amount of evidence before us, I see no alternative but to conclude that capital punishment cannot be justified on the basis of its deterrent effect.[125]

C. Much of what must be said about the death penalty as a device to prevent recidivism is obvious—if a murderer is executed, he cannot possibly commit another offense. The fact is, however, that murderers are extremely unlikely to commit other crimes either in prison or upon their release.[126] For the most part, they are first offenders, and when released from prison they are known to become model citizens.[127] Furthermore, most persons who commit capital crimes are not executed. With respect to those who are sentenced to die, it is critical to note that the jury is never asked to determine whether they are likely to be recidivists. In light

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America, at 258, 271–272 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967); DiSalle, Trends in the Abolition of Capital Punishment, 1 Toledo L. Rev. 1, 4 (1969). It is ironic that those persons whom we would like to deter the most have the least to fear from the death penalty and recognize that fact. T. Sellin, Address for Canadian Society for Abolition of the Death Penalty, Feb. 7, 1965, *in* 8 Crim. L. Q. 36, 48 (1966); Proceedings of the Section of Criminal Law of the ABA, August 24, 1959, at 7 (M. DiSalle).

[125] In reaching this conclusion, I maintain agreement with that portion of Stephen's hypothesis which suggests that convicted criminals fear death more than they fear life imprisonment. As I stated earlier, the death penalty is a more severe sanction. The error in the hypothesis lies in its assumption that because men fear death more than imprisonment after they are convicted, that they necessarily must weigh potential penalties prior to committing criminal acts and that they will conform their behavior so as to insure that, if caught, they will receive the lesser penalty. It is extremely unlikely that much thought is given to penalties before the act is committed, and even if it were, the preceding footnote explains why such thought would not lead to deterrence.

[126] See n. 117, *supra*.

[127] See, *e. g.*, Royal Commission, *supra*, n. 84, App. 15, at 486–491.

f these facts, if capital punishment were justified purely n the basis of preventing recidivism, it would have to e considered to be excessive; no general need to oblit- rate all capital offenders could have been demonstrated, or any specific need in individual cases.

D. The three final purposes which may underlie uti- ization of a capital sanction—encouraging guilty pleas nd confessions, eugenics, and reducing state expendi- ures—may be dealt with quickly. If the death penalty s used to encourage guilty pleas and thus to deter sus- ects from exercising their rights under the Sixth Amend- ent to jury trials, it is unconstitutional. *United States . Jackson*, 390 U. S. 570 (1968).[128] Its elimination ould do little to impair the State's bargaining posi- ion in criminal cases, since life imprisonment remains severe sanction which can be used as leverage for argaining for pleas or confessions in exchange either or charges of lesser offenses or recommendations of eniency.

Moreover, to the extent that capital punishment is sed to encourage confessions and guilty pleas, it is not eing used for punishment purposes. A State which ustifies capital punishment on its utility as part of he conviction process could not profess to rely on cap- al punishment as a deterrent. Such a State's system ould be structured with twin goals only: obtaining uilty pleas and confessions and imposing *imprisonment* s the maximum sanction. Since life imprisonment is ufficient for bargaining purposes, the death penalty is xcessive if used for the same purposes.

In light of the previous discussion on deterrence, any uggestions concerning the eugenic benefits of capital

[128] *Jackson* applies to the States under the criteria articulated in *uncan* v. *Louisiana*, 391 U. S. 145, 149 (1968).

punishment are obviously meritless.[129] As I pointed out above, there is not even any attempt made to discover which capital offenders are likely to be recidivists let alone which are positively incurable. No test or procedure presently exists by which incurables can be screened from those who would benefit from treatment. On the one hand, due process would seem to require that we have some procedure to demonstrate incurability before execution; and, on the other hand, equal protection would then seemingly require that all incurables be executed, cf. *Skinner* v. *Oklahoma*, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). In addition, the "cruel and unusual" language would require that life imprisonment, treatment, and sterilization be inadequate for eugenic purposes. More importantly, this Nation has never formally professed eugenic goals, and the history of the world does not look kindly on them. If eugenics is one of our purposes, then the legislatures should say so forthrightly and design procedures to serve this goal. Until such time, I can only conclude, as has virtually everyone else who has looked at the problem,[130] that capital punishment cannot be defended on the basis of any eugenic purposes.

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[129] See, *e. g.*, Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 154 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967).

[130] See, *e. g.*, H. A. Bedau, Death as a Punishment, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 226–228 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967); Caldwell, Why is the Death Penalty Retained?, 284 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 45, 50 (1952) (hereinafter "Caldwell"); Johnson, Selective Factors in Capital Punishment, 36 Soc. Forces 165, 169 (1957); Sellin, Capital Punishment, 25 Fed. Prob. 3 (Sept. 1961). We should not be surprised at the lack of merit in the eugenic arguments. There simply is no evidence that mentally ill persons who commit capital offenses constitute a psychiatric entity distinct from other mentally disordered patients or that they do not respond as readily to treatment. Cruvant and Waldrop, The Murderer in the Mental Institution, 284 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 35, 43 (1952).

As for the argument that it is cheaper to execute a capital offender than to imprison him for life, even assuming that such an argument, if true, would support a capital sanction, it is simply incorrect. A disproportionate amount of money spent on prisons is attributable to death row.[131] Condemned men are not productive members of the prison community, although they could be,[132] and executions are expensive.[133] Appeals are often automatic, and courts admittedly spend more time with death cases.[134]

At trial, the selection of jurors is likely to become a costly, time-consuming problem in a capital case,[135] and defense counsel will reasonably exhaust every possible means to save his client from execution, no matter how long the trial takes.

During the period between conviction and execution, there are an inordinate number of collateral attacks on the conviction and attempts to obtain executive clemency, all of which exhaust the time, money, and effort of the State. There are also continual assertions that the condemned prisoner has gone insane.[136] Because there is a formally established policy of not executing insane persons,[137] great sums of money may be spent on detecting and curing mental illness in order to per-

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[131] Caldwell, *supra*, n. 130, at 48; McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by a Correctional Administrator, 28 Fed. Prob. 11 (June 1964) (hereinafter "McGee").

[132] McGee, *supra*, n. 131, at 13–14; Bailey, Rehabilitation on Death Row, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 556 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967).

[133] T. Thomas, This Life We Take 20 (3d ed. 1965).

[134] *Stein* v. *New York*, 346 U. S. 156, 196 (1953) (Jackson, J.); cf. *Reid* v. *Covert*, 354 U. S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).

[135] See, *e. g.*, *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510 (1968).

[136] Slovenko, And the Penalty is (Sometimes) Death, 24 Antioch Review 351 (1964).

[137] See, *e. g.*, *Caritativo* v. *California*, 357 U. S. 549 (1958).

form the execution.[138] Since no one wants the responsibility for the execution, the condemned man is likely to be passed back and forth from doctors to custodial officials to courts like a ping-pong ball.[139] The entire process is very costly.

When all is said and done, there can be no doubt that it costs more to execute a man than to keep him in prison for life.[140]

E. There is but one conclusion that can be drawn from all of this—*i. e.*, the death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment which violates the Eighth Amendment. The statistical evidence is not convincing beyond all doubt, but, it is persuasive. It is not improper at this point to take judicial notice of the fact that for more than 200 years men have labored to demonstrate that capital punishment serves no purpose that life imprisonment could not serve equally as well. And they have done so with great success. Little if any evidence has been adduced to prove the contrary. The point has now been reached at which deference to the legislatures is tantamount to abdication of our judicial roles as factfinders, judges, and ultimate arbiters of the Constitution. We know that at some point the presumption of constitutionality accorded legislative acts gives way to a realistic assessment of those acts. This point comes when there is sufficient evidence available so that judges can determine not whether the legislature acted wisely, but whether it had any rational basis

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[138] This practice has seemed a strange way to spend money to others as well as to the author of this opinion. See, *e. g.*, T. W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government 10–13 (1935).

[139] Slovenko, And the Penalty is (Sometimes) Death, 24 Antioch Review 351, 363 (1964).

[140] B. Eshelman and F. Riley, Death Row Chaplain 226 (1962); Caldwell, *supra*, n. 130, at 48; McGee, *supra*, n. 131, at 13; Sellin, Capital Punishment, 25 Fed. Prob. 3 (Sept. 1961).

whatsoever for acting. We have this evidence before us now. There is no rational basis for concluding that capital punishment is not excessive. It therefore violates the Eighth Amendment.[141]

V

In addition, even if capital punishment is not excessive, it nonetheless violates the Eighth Amendment

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[141] This analysis parallels in some ways the analysis used in striking down legislation on the ground that it violates Fourteenth Amendment concepts of substantive due process. See Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1074 (1964). There is one difference, however. Capital punishment is unconstitutional because it is excessive and unnecessary punishment, not because it is irrational.

The concepts of cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due process become so close as to merge when the substantive due process argument is stated in the following manner: because capital punishment deprives an individual of a fundamental right (*i. e.*, the right to life), *Johnson* v. *Zerbst*, 304 U. S. 458, 462 (1938), the State needs a compelling interest to justify it. See Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 U. Cal. L. Rev. 1268, 1324–1354 (1968). Thus stated, the substantive due process argument reiterates what is essentially the primary purpose of the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment—*i. e.*, punishment may not be more severe than is necessary to serve the legitimate interests of the State.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE asserts that if we hold that capital punishment is unconstitutional because it is excessive, we will next have to determine whether a 10-year prison sentence rather than a five-year sentence is also excessive, or whether a $5 fine would not do equally well as a $10 fine. He may be correct that such determinations will have to be made, but, as in these cases, those persons challenging the penalty will bear a heavy burden of demonstrating that it is excessive. These cases arise after 200 years of inquiry, 200 years of public debate and 200 years of marshalling evidence. The burden placed on those challenging capital punishment could not have been greater. I am convinced that they have met their burden. Whether a similar burden will prove too great in future cases is a question that we can resolve in time.

because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history.

In judging whether or not a given penalty is morally acceptable, most courts have said that the punishment is valid unless "it shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people." [142]

Judge Frank once noted the problems inherent in the use of such a measuring stick:

> "[The Court,] before it reduces a sentence as 'cruel and unusual,' must have reasonably good assurances that the sentence offends the 'common conscience.' And, in any context, such a standard—the community's attitude—is usually an unknowable. It resembles a slithery shadow, since one can seldom learn, at all accurately, what the community, or a majority, actually feels. Even a carefully-taken 'public opinion poll' would be inconclusive in a case like this." [143]

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[142] *United States* v. *Rosenberg*, 195 F. 2d 583, 608 (CA2) (Frank, J.), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 838 (1952). See also *Kasper* v. *Brittain*, 245 F. 2d 92, 96 (CA6), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 834 (1957) ("shocking to the sense of justice"); *People* v. *Morris*, 80 Mich. 634, 639, 45 N. W. 591, 592 (1890) ("shock the moral sense of the people"). In *Repouille* v. *United States*, 165 F. 2d 152 (CA2 1947), and *Schmidt* v. *United States*, 177 F. 2d 450, 451 (CA2 1949), Judge Learned Hand wrote that the standard of "good moral character" in the Nationality Act was to be judged by "the generally accepted moral conventions current at the time." 165 F. 2d, at 153. Judge Frank, who was later to author the *Rosenberg* opinion in which a similar standard was adopted, dissented in *Repouille* and urged that the correct standard was the "attitude of our ethical leaders." 165 F. 2d, at 154. In light of *Rosenberg*, it is apparent that Judge Frank would require a much broader-based moral approbation before striking down a punishment as cruel and unusual than he would for merely holding that conduct was evidence of bad moral character under a legislative act.

[143] *United States* v. *Rosenberg*, 195 F. 2d 583, 608 (CA2), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 838 (1952).

While a public opinion poll obviously is of some assistance in indicating public acceptance or rejection of a specific penalty,[144] its utility cannot be very great. This is because whether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its mere mention "shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people," but on whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.[145]

In other words, the question with which we must deal is not whether a substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find

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[144] See *Repouille* v. *United States*, 165 F. 2d 152, 153 (CA2 1947). In *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510, 520 (1968), the Court cited a public opinion poll which showed that 42% of the American people favored capital punishment, while 47% opposed it. But the polls have shown great fluctuation. See H. A. Bedau, What Do Americans Think of the Death Penalty, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 231–241 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967).

[145] The fact that the constitutionality of capital punishment turns on the opinion of an informed citizenry undercuts the argument that since the legislature is the voice of the people, its retention of capital punishment must represent the will of the people. So few people have been executed in the past decade that capital punishment is a subject only rarely brought to the attention of the average American. Lack of exposure to the problem is likely to lead to indifference, and indifference and ignorance result in preservation of the status quo, whether or not that is desirable, or desired.

It might be argued that in choosing to remain indifferent and uninformed, citizens reflect their judgment that capital punishment is really a question of utility, not morality, and not one, therefore, of great concern. As attractive as this is on its face, it cannot be correct, because such an argument requires that the choice to remain ignorant or indifferent be a viable one. That, in turn, requires that it be a knowledgable choice. It is therefore imperative for constitutional purposes to attempt to discern the probable opinion of an informed electorate.

it to be so in the light of all information presently available.

This is not to suggest that with respect to this test of unconstitutionality people are required to act rationally; they are not. With respect to this judgment, a violation of the Eighth Amendment is totally dependent on the predictable subjective, emotional reactions of informed citizens.[146]

It has often been noted that American citizens know almost nothing about capital punishment.[147] Some of the conclusions arrived at in the preceding section and the supporting evidence would be critical to an informed judgment on the morality of the death penalty: *e. g.*, that the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than life imprisonment, that convicted murderers are rarely executed, but are usually sentenced to a term in prison; that convicted murderers usually are model prisoners, and that they almost always become law-abiding citizens upon their release from prison; that the costs of executing a capital offender exceed the costs of imprisoning him for life; that while in prison, a convict under sentence of death performs none of the useful functions that life prisoners perform; that no attempt is made in the sentencing process to ferret out likely recidivists for execution; and that the death penalty may actually stimulate criminal activity.

This information would almost surely convince the average citizen that the death penalty was unwise, but a problem arises as to whether it would convince him that the penalty was morally reprehensible. This problem arises from the fact that the public's desire for

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[146] Cf. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1076 (1964).

[147] *E. g.*, Gold, A Psychiatric Review of Capital Punishment, 6 J. Forensic Sci. 465, 466 (1961); A. Koestler, Reflections on Hanging 164 (1957); cf. C. Duffy & A. Hirshberg, 88 Men and 2 Men 257–258 (1962).

retribution, even though this is a goal which the legislature cannot constitutionally pursue as its sole justification for capital punishment, might influence the citizenry's view of the morality of capital punishment. The solution to the problem lies in the fact that no one has ever seriously advanced retribution as a legitimate goal of our society. Defenses of capital punishment are always mounted on deterrent or other similar theories. This should not be surprising. It is the people of this country who have urged in the past that prisons rehabilitate as well as isolate offenders, and it is the people who have injected a sense of purpose into our penology. I cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American people would ever knowingly support purposeless vengeance. Thus, I believe that the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of the material already considered that the death penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional.

But, if this information needs supplementing, I believe that the following facts would serve to convince even the most hesitant of citizens to condemn death as a sanction: capital punishment is imposed discriminatorily against certain identifiable classes of people; there is evidence that innocent people have been executed before their innocence can be proved; and the death penalty wreaks havoc with our entire criminal justice system. Each of these facts is considered briefly below.

Regarding discrimination, it has been said that "[i]t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member of the minority group—the man who, because he is without means, and is defended by a court appointed attorney—who becomes society's sacrificial lamb . . . ." [148] Indeed, a look at the bare statistics regarding executions is enough to betray much of the

[148] Hearings, *supra*, n. 80, at 11 (Statement of M. DiSalle).

discrimination. A total of 3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of which 1,751 were White and 2,066 were Negro.[149] 3,334 of the executions were for murder; 1,664 of the executed murderers were White and 1,630 were Negro.[150] 455 persons, including 48 Whites and 405 Negroes, were executed for rape.[151] It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than Whites in proportion to their percentage of the population. Studies indicate that while the higher rate of execution among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial discrimination.[152] Racial or other discriminations should not be surprising. In *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, this Court held "that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is [not] offensive to anything in the

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[149] National Prisoner Statistics, No. 45, Capital Punishment (1930–1968), at 7 (August 1969).

[150] *Ibid.*

[151] *Ibid.*

[152] Alexander, The Abolition of Capital Punishment, Proceedings of the 96th Congress of Correction Proceedings of the American Correctional Association, Baltimore, Md., at 59 (1967); H. A. Bedau, Criminal Justice: The General Aspects, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 405, 411–414 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967); H. A. Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey, 1907–1960, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 18–21, 52–53 (1964); R. Clark, Crime in America 335 (1970); Hochhammer, The Capital Punishment Controversy, 60 J. Crim. L. Crim. & Pol. Sci. 360, 361–362 (1969); Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 93, 95, 99 (1941); Johnson, Selective Factors in Capital Punishment, 36 Social Forces 165 (1967); United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 69, at 98; Williams, The Death Penalty and the Negro, 67 Crisis 501, 511 (1960); Wolfgang and Cohen, Crime and Race: Conceptions and Misconceptions 77, 80–81, 85–86 (1970); Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted Along Admissions to Death Role, 53 J. Crim. L. Crim. & Pol. Sci. 301 (1962). MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS explores the discriminatory application of the death penalty at great length.

Constitution." This was an open invitation to discrimination.

There is also overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is employed against men and not women. Only 32 women have been executed since 1930, while 3,827 men have met a similar fate.[153] It is difficult to understand why women have received such favored treatment since the purposes allegedly served by capital punishment seemingly are equally applicable to both sexes.[154]

It also is evident that the burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged members of society.[155] It is the poor, and the members of minority groups who are least able to voice their complaints against capital punishment. Their impotence leaves them victims of a sanction which the wealthier, better-represented, just-as-guilty person can escape. So long as the capital sanction is used only against the forlorn, easily forgotten members of society, legislators are content to maintain the status

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[153] National Prisoner Statistics, No. 45, Capital Punishment (1930–1968), at 28 (August 1969).

[154] Men kill between four and five times more frequently than women. See Wolfgang, A Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 74, 75 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967). Hence, it would not be irregular to see four or five times as many men executed as women. The statistics show a startling greater disparity, however. United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶ 67, at 97–98.

[155] H. A. Bedau, Criminal Justice, The General Aspects, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 405, 411; H. A. Bedau, Capital Punishment in Oregon, 1903–1964, 45 Ore. L. Rev. 1 (1965); H. A. Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey, 1907–1960, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1964); R. Clark, Crime in America 335 (1970); C. Duffy & A. Hirschberg, 88 Men and 2 Women 256–257 (1962); Carter & Smith, The Death Penalty in California: A Statistical and Composite Portrait, 15 Crime & Delinq. 62 (1969); Hearings, *supra*, n. 80, at 124–125 (Statement of Dr. West); Koeniger, Captial Punishment in Texas, 1924–1968, 15, 302 (1928); McGee, *supra*, n. 131, at 11–12.

quo, because change would draw attention to the problem and concern might develop. Ignorance is perpetuated and apathy soon becomes its mate, and we have today's situation.

Just as Americans know little about who is executed and why, they are unaware of the potential dangers of executing an innocent man. Our "beyond-a-reasonable doubt" burden of proof in criminal cases is intended to protect the innocent, but we know it is not foolproof. Various studies have shown that people whose innocence is later convincingly established are convicted and sentenced to death.[156]

Proving one's innocence after a jury finding of guilt is almost impossible. While reviewing courts are willing to entertain all kinds of collateral attacks where a sentence of death is involved, they very rarely dispute the jury's interpretation of the evidence. This is, perhaps, as it should be. But, if an innocent man has been found guilty, he must then depend on the good faith of the prosecutor's office to help him establish his innocence. There is evidence, however, that prosecutors do not welcome the idea of having convictions

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[156] See, *e. g.*, E. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932); J. Frank & B. Frank, Not Guilty (1957); E. S. Gardner, Court of Last Resort (1952). These three books examine cases in which innocent persons were sentenced to die. None of the innocents was actually executed, however. Hugo Adam Bedau has abstracted 74 cases occurring in the United States since 1893 in which a wrongful conviction for murder was alleged and usually proved "beyond doubt." In almost every case, the convictions were sustained on appeal. Bedau seriously contends that innocent persons were actually executed. H. A. Bedau, Murder, Errors of Justice, and Capital Punishment, *in* The Death Penalty in America, at 434, 438 (ed. H. A. Bedau, 1967). See also Black, The Crisis in Capital Punishment, 31 Md. L. Rev. 289 (1971); Hirschberg, Wrongful Convictions, 13 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 20 (1940); Pollak, The Errors of Justice, 284 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 115 (1952).

which they labored hard to secure, overturned, and that their cooperation is highly unlikely.[157]

No matter how careful courts are, the possibility of perjured testimony, mistaken honest testimony, and human error remain all too real.[158] We have no way of judging how many innocent persons have been executed but we can be certain that there were some. Whether there were many is an open question made difficult by the loss of those who were most knowledgable about the crime for which they were convicted. Surely there will be more as long as capital punishment remains part of our penal law.

While it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the degree to which the death penalty is discriminatorily imposed or the number of innocent persons sentenced

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[157] E. S. Gardner, Court of Last Resort 178 (1952).

[158] MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS recognized this fact when he wrote:

"One who reviews the records of criminal trials need not look long to find an instance where the issue of guilt or innocence hangs in delicate balance. A judge who denies a stay of execution in a capital case often wonders if an innocent man is going to his death. . . .

"Those doubts exist because our system of criminal justice does not work with the efficiency of a machine—errors are made and innocent as well as guilty people are sometimes punished. . . .

". . . We believe that it is better for ten guilty people to be set free than for one innocent man to be unjustly imprisoned.

"Yet the sad truth is that a cog in the machine often slips: memories fail; mistaken identifications are made; those who wield the power of life and death itself—the police officer, the witness, the prosecutor, the juror, and even the judge—become overzealous in their concern that criminals be brought to justice. And at times there is a venal combination between the police and a witness."

Foreword, J. Frank & B. Frank, Not Guilty 11–12 (1957).

There has been an "incredible lag" between the development of modern scientific methods of investigation and their application to criminal cases. When modern methodology is available, prosecutors have the resources to utilize it, whereas defense counsel often may not. Lassers, Proof of Guilt in Capital Cases—An Unscience, 58 J. Crim. L. Crim. & Pol. Sci. 310 (1967). This increases the chances of error.

to die, there is one conclusion about the penalty that is universally accepted—*i. e.*, it "tends to distort the course of the criminal law." [159] As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:

> "I am strongly against capital punishment . . . . When life is at hazard in a trial, it sensationalizes the whole thing almost unwittingly; the effect on juries, the Bar, the public, the Judiciary, I regard as very bad. I think scientifically the claim of deterrence is not worth much. Whatever proof there may be in my judgment does not outweigh the social loss due to the inherent sensationalism of a trial for life." [160]

The deleterious effects of the death penalty are also felt otherwise than at trial. For example, its very existence "inevitably sabotages a social or institutional program of reformation." [161] In short "[t]he presence of the death penalty, as the keystone of our penal system bedevils the administration of criminal justice all the way down the line and is the stumbling block in the path of general reform and of the treatment of crime and criminal." [162]

Assuming knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.[163] For this reason alone capital punishment cannot stand.

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[159] Ehrmann, The Death Penalty and the Administration of Justice, 284 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 73, 83 (1952).

[160] F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 81 (1956).

[161] B. Eshelman & F. Riley, Death Row Chaplain 222 (1962).

[162] McCafferty, Major Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 25 Fed. Prob. 15, 21 (Sept. 1961) (quoting Dr. S. Glueck of Harvard University).

[163] MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests that this conclusion is speculative, and he is certainly correct. But the mere recognition of this truth does not undercut the validity of the conclusion. MR. JUSTICE

VI

To arrive at the conclusion that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment, we have had to engage in a long and tedious journey. The amount of infor-

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POWELL himself concedes that judges somehow know that certain punishments are no longer acceptable in our society; for example, he refers to branding and pillorying. Whence comes this knowledge? The answer is that it comes from our intuition as human beings that our fellow human beings no longer will tolerate such punishments.

I agree wholeheartedly with the implication in my Brother POWELL's opinion that judges are not free to strike down penalties that they find personally offensive. But, I disagree with his suggestion that it is improper for judges to ask themselves whether a specific punishment is morally acceptable to the American public. Contrary to some current thought, judges have not lived lives isolated from a broad range of human experience. They have come into contact with many people, many ways of life, and many philosophies. They have learned to share with their fellow human beings common views of morality. If, after drawing on this experience and considering the vast range of people and views that they have encountered, judges conclude that these people would not knowingly tolerate a specific penalty in light of its costs, then this conclusion is entitled to weight. See M. Frankel, Book Review, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 354 (1971). Judges can find assistance in determining whether they are being objective, rather than subjective, by referring to the attitudes of the persons whom most citizens consider our "ethical leaders." See *Repouille* v. *United States*, 165 F. 2d 152, 154 (CA2 1947) (Frank, J., dissenting).

I must also admit that I am confused as to the point that my Brother POWELL seeks to make regarding the underprivileged members of our society. If he is stating that this Court cannot solve all of their problems in the context of this case, or even many of them, I would agree with him. But if he is opining that it is only the poor, the ignorant, the racial minorities, and the hapless in our society who are executed; that they are executed for no real reason other than to satisfy some vague notion of society's cry for vengeance; and that knowing these things, the people of this country would not care, then I most urgently disagree.

There is too much crime, too much killing, too much hatred in this country. If the legislatures could eradicate these elements from

mation which we have assembled and sorted is enormous. Yet, I firmly believe that we have not deviated in the slightest from the principles with which we began.

At a time in our history when the streets of the Nation's cities inspire fear and despair, rather than pride and hope, it is difficult to maintain objectivity and concern for our fellow citizens. But, the measure of a country's greatness is its ability to retain compassion in time of crisis. No nation in the recorded history of man has a greater tradition of revering justice and fair treatment for all its citizens in times of turmoil, confusion, and tension than ours. This is a country which stands tallest in troubled times, a country that clings to fundamental principles, cherishes its constitutional heritage, and rejects simple solutions that compromise the values which lie at the roots of our democratic system.

In striking down capital punishment, this Court does not malign our system of government. On the contrary, it pays homage to it. Only in a free society could right triumph in difficult times, and could civilization record its magnificent advancement. In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest tribute. We achieve "a major milestone in

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our lives by utilizing capital punishment, then there would be a valid purpose for the sanction and the public would surely accept it. It would be constitutional. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE POWELL point out, however, capital punishment has been with us a long time. What purpose has it served? The evidence is that it has served none. I cannot agree that the American people have been so hardened, so embittered that they want to take the life of one who performs even the basest criminal act knowing that the execution is nothing more than bloodlust. This has not been my experience with my fellow citizens. Rather, I have found that they earnestly desire their system of punishments to make sense in order that it can be a morally justifiable system. See generally T. Arnold, The Criminal Trial As a Symbol of Public Morality, *in* Criminal Justice In Our Time (ed. A. E. D. Howard 1965).

the long road up from barbarism." [164] and join the approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their regard for civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment.[165]

I concur in the judgments of the Court.

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[164] R. Clark, Crime in America 336 (1970).

[165] Some jurisdictions have *de facto* abolition; others have *de jure*. *Id.*, at 330; Hearings, *supra*, n. 80, at 9–10 (Statement of M. DiSalle). See generally Patrick, The Status of Capital Punishment: A World Perspective, 56 J. Crim. L. Crim. & Pol. Sci. 397 (1965); United Nations, *supra*, n. 77, ¶¶ 10–17, 63–65, at 83–85, 96–97; Brief for Petitioner, No. 68–5027, App. E.

APPENDIX I

ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1846–1968

(States are listed according to year most recent action was taken)

State	Year of partial abolition	Year of complete abolition	Year of restoration	Year of reabolition
New York	1965 [1]	—	—	—
Vermont	1965 [2]	—	—	—
West Virginia	—	1965	—	—
Iowa	—	1872	1878	1965
Oregon	—	1914	1920	1964
Michigan	1847 [3]	1963	—	—
Delaware	—	1958	1961	—
Alaska	—	1957	—	—
Hawaii	—	1957	—	—
South Dakota	—	1915	1939	—
Kansas	—	1907	1935	—
Missouri	—	1917	1919	—
Tennessee	1915 [4]	—	1919	—
Washington	—	1913	1919	—
Arizona	1916 [5]	—	1918	—
North Dakota	1915 [6]	—	—	—
Minnesota	—	1911	—	—
Colorado	—	1897	1901	—
Maine	—	1876	1883	1887
Wisconsin	—	1853	—	—
Rhode Island	1852 [7]	—	—	—

[1] Death penalty retained for persons found guilty of killing a peace officer who is acting in line of duty, and for prisoners under a Life sentence who murder a guard or inmate while in confinement or while escaping from confinement.

[2] Death penalty retained for persons convicted of first-degree murder who commit a second "unrelated" murder, and for the first-degree murder of any law enforcement officer or prison employee who is in the performance of the duties of his office.

[3] Death penalty retained for treason. Partial abolition was voted in 1846, but was not put into effect until 1847.

[4] Death penalty retained for rape.

[5] Death penalty retained for treason.

[6] Death penalty retained for treason, and for first-degree murder committed by a prisoner who is serving a Life sentence for first-degree murder.

[7] Death penalty retained for persons convicted of committing murder while serving a Life sentence for any offense.

National Prisoner Statistics, No. 45, Capital Punishment (1930-1968), August 1969, at 30.

APPENDIX II

CRUDE HOMICIDE DEATH RATES AND NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS IN CERTAIN AMERICAN STATES: 1920-1955

Year	Maine*	N. H.		Vt.		Mass.		R. I.*	Conn.	
	Rates	Rates	Exec.	Rates	Exec.	Rates	Exec.	Rates	Rates	Exec.
1920	1.4	1.8		2.3		2.1	1	1.8	3.9	1
1921	2.2	2.2		1.7		2.8		3.1	2.9	2
1922	1.7	1.6		1.1		2.6		2.2	2.9	1
1923	1.7	2.7		1.4		2.8	1	3.5	3.1	
1924	1.5	1.5		.6		2.7	1	2.0	3.5	
1925	2.2	1.3		.6		2.7		1.8	3.7	
1926	1.1	.9		2.2		2.0	1	3.2	2.9	1
1927	1.9	.7		.8		2.1	6	2.7	2.3	2
1928	1.6	1.3		1.4		1.9	3	2.7	2.7	
1929	1.0	1.5		1.4		1.7	6	2.3	2.6	1
1930	1.8	.9		1.4		1.8		2.0	3.2	2
1931	1.4	2.1		1.1	1	2.0	2	2.2	2.7	
1932	2.0	.2		1.1		2.1	1	1.6	2.9	
1933	3.3	2.7		1.6		2.5		1.9	1.8	
1934	1.1	1.4		1.9		2.2	4	1.8	2.4	
1935	1.4	1.0		.3		1.8	4	1.6	1.9	
1936	2.2	1.0		2.1		1.6	2	1.2	2.7	1
1937	1.4	1.8		1.8		1.9		2.3	2.0	1
1938	1.5	1.8		1.8		1.3	3	1.2	2.1	1
1939	1.2	2.3	1	.8		1.4	2	1.6	1.3	
1940	1.5	1.4		.8		1.5		1.4	1.8	2
1941	1.1	.4		2.2		1.3	1	.8	2.2	
1942	1.7	.2		.9		1.3	2	1.2	2.5	
1943	1.7	.9		.6		.9	3	1.5	1.6	2
1944	1.5	1.1		.3		1.4		.6	1.9	1
1945	.9	.7		2.9		1.5		1.1	1.5	1
1946	1.4	.8		1.7		1.4	1	1.5	1.6	3
1947	1.2	.6		1.1	1	1.6	2	1.5	1.9	
1948	1.7	1.0		.8		1.4		2.7	1.7	1
1949	1.7	1.5		.5		1.1		.5	1.8	
1950	1.5	1.3		.5		1.3		1.5	1.4	
1951	2.3	.6		.5		1.0		.9	2.0	
1952	1.0	1.5		.5		1.0		1.5	1.7	
1953	1.4	.9		.3		1.0		.6	1.5	
1954	1.7	.5		1.6	2	1.0		1.3	1.3	
1955	1.2	1.1		.5		1.2		1.7	1.3	3

*Maine and Rhode Island have no death penalty for ordinary murder.

ALI, *supra*, n. 98, at 25. More recent statistics indicate that the rates changed little between 1955 and 1965, and that changes were approximately equal in abolitionist and retentionist jurisdiction. Bedau, *supra*, n. 100, at 68.

APPENDIX III

CRUDE HOMICIDE DEATH RATES AND NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS IN CERTAIN AMERICAN STATES: 1920–1955

Year	Mich.*	Ohio		Ind.		Minn.*	Iowa		Wis.*	N.D.**	S.D.		Neb.	
	Rate	Rate	Ex.	Rate	Ex.	Rate	Rate	Ex.	Rate	Rate	Rate	Ex.	Rate	Ex.
1920	5.5	6.9	3	4.7	2	3.1	**		1.7	**	**	***	4.2	
1921	4.7	7.9	10	6.4		4.4			2.2				4.9	
1922	4.3	7.3	12	5.7	2	3.6		3	1.8				4.5	
1923	6.1	7.8	10	6.1		2.9	2.1	2	2.2				4.1	
1924	7.1	6.9	10	7.3		3.2	2.7	1	1.8	2.1			4.4	
1925	7.4	8.1	13	6.6	1	3.8	2.7	2	2.3	2.0			4.0	
1926	10.4	8.6	7	5.8	3	2.2	2.3		2.6	1.8			2.7	
1927	8.2	8.6	8	6.3	1	2.6	2.4		2.6	1.6			3.5	
1928	7.0	8.2	7	7.0	1	2.8	2.3		2.1	1.0			3.7	
1929	8.2	8.3	5	7.0	1	2.2	2.6		2.3	1.2			3.0	
1930	6.7	9.3	8	6.4	1	3.8	3.2		3.1	3.5	1.9		3.5	
1931	6.2	9.0	10	6.5	1	2.9	2.5	1	3.6	2.0	2.3		3.6	
1932	5.7	8.1	7	6.7	2	2.9	2.9		2.8	1.2	1.6		3.7	
1933	5.1	8.2	11	5.6	3	3.5	2.9		1.9	1.2	1.7		3.2	
1934	4.2	7.7	7	7.1	4	3.4	2.3		2.4	1.6	3.0		4.4	
1935	4.2	7.1	10	4.4	2	2.6	2.0	3	1.4	2.3	2.0		3.4	
1936	4.0	6.6	6	5.2	2	2.3	1.8		1.7	2.0	1.2		2.5	
1937	4.6	5.7	1	4.7	5	1.6	2.2		2.2	1.6	.1		2.0	
1938	3.4	5.1	12	4.4	8	1.6	1.4	4	2.0	2.4	.9		1.6	
1939	3.1	4.8	10	3.8	3	1.6	1.8		1.4	1.2	2.8		2.1	
1940	3.0	4.6	2	3.3		1.2	1.3	1	1.3	1.4	2.2		1.0	
1941	3.2	4.2	4	3.1	1	1.7	1.3	1	1.4	2.3	1.0		2.1	
1942	3.2	4.6	2	3.2	1	1.7	1.2		1.6	1.4	.9		1.8	
1943	3.3	4.4	5	2.8		1.2	1.0		1.1	.6	1.4		2.4	
1944	3.3	3.9	2	2.8		1.4	1.7	1	.9	.9	1.6		1.3	
1945	3.7	4.9	7	4.0	1	1.9	1.6	1	1.6	1.0	2.0		1.2	1
1946	3.2	5.2	2	3.9	1	1.6	1.8	2	.9	1.5	1.1		2.1	
1947	3.0	4.9	5	3.8		1.2	1.9		1.4	.4	1.0	1	2.2	
1948	3.4	4.5	7	4.2		1.9	1.4		.9	.9	2.0		2.5	1
1949	3.5	4.4	15	3.2	3	1.1	.9	1	1.3	.7	2.3		1.8	
1950	3.9	4.1	4	3.6	1	1.2	1.3		1.1	.5	1.1		2.9	
1951	3.7	3.8	4	3.9	1	1.3	1.5		1.1	.5	.9		1.0	
1952	3.3	4.0	4	3.8		1.3	1.5	1	1.6	.8	2.3		1.6	1
1953	4.6	3.6	4	4.0		1.5	1.1		1.2	1.1	1.1		2.0	
1954	3.3	3.4	4	3.2		1.0	1.0		1.1	.5	1.5		2.3	
1955	3.3	3.1		3.1		1.1	1.2		1.1	.8	1.8		1.3	

*Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and North Dakota have no death penalty for ordinary murder.

**Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota were not admitted to the national death registration area until 1923, 1924, and 1930 respectively.

***South Dakota introduced the death penalty in 1939.

ALI, *supra*, n. 98, at 28. See also *id.*, at 32–34.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 69–5003, 69–5030, AND 69–5031

William Henry Furman, Petitioner, 69–5003 *v.* State of Georgia.	On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

At the outset it is important to note that only two members of the Court, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, have concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for all crimes and under all circumstances. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS has also determined that the death penalty contravenes the Eighth Amendment, although I do not read his opinion as necessarily requiring final abolition of the penalty.[1] For the reasons set forth in Parts I–IV of this opinion, I conclude that the constitutional prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" cannot be construed to bar the imposition of the punishment of death.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE have concluded that petitioners' death sentences must be set

[1] See n. 25, *infra*.

aside because prevailing sentencing practices do not comply with the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons set forth in Part V of this opinion, I believe this approach fundamentally misconceives the nature of the Eighth Amendment guarantee and flies directly in the face of controlling authority of extremely recent vintage.

I

If we were possessed of legislative power, I would either join with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL or, at the very least, restrict the use of capital punishment to a small category of the most heinous crimes. Our constitutional inquiry, however, must be divorced from personal feelings as to the morality and efficacy of the death penalty and be confined to the meaning and applicability of the uncertain language of the Eighth Amendment. There is no novelty in being called upon to interpret a constitutional provision that is less than self-defining, but of all our fundamental guarantees, the ban on "cruel and unusual punishments" is one of the most difficult to translate into judicially manageable terms. The widely divergent views of the Amendment expressed in today's opinions reveal the haze that surrounds this constitutional command. Yet it is essential to our role as a court that we not seize upon the enigmatic character of the guarantee as an invitation to enact our personal predilections into law.

Although the Eighth Amendment literally reads as prohibiting only those punishments that are both "cruel" and "unusual," history compels the conclusion that the Constitution prohibits all punishments of extreme and barbarous cruelty, regardless of how frequently or infrequently imposed.

The most persuasive analysis of Parliament's adoption of the English Bill of Rights of 1689—the unquestioned source of the Eighth Amendment wording—

suggests that the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" was included therein out of aversion to severe punishments not legally authorized and not within the jurisdiction of the courts to impose. To the extent that the term "unusual" had any importance in the English version, it was apparently intended as a reference to illegal punishments.[2]

From every indication, the framers of the Eighth Amendment intended to give the phrase a meaning far different from that of its English precursor. The records of the debates in several of the State conventions called to ratify the 1789 draft Constitution submitted prior to the addition of the Bill of Rights show that the framers'

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[2] See Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 852–860 (1969). Earlier drafts of the Bill of Rights used the phrase "cruel and illegal." It is thought that the change to the "cruel and unusual" wording was inadvertent and not intended to work any change in meaning. *Ibid.* The historical background of the English Bill of Rights is set forth in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, *ante*, at 3–6.

It is intimated in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, *ante*, at 3–6, that the term "unusual" was included in the English Bill of Rights as a protest against the discriminatory application of punishments to minorities. However, the history of capital punishment in England dramatically reveals that no premium was placed on equal justice for all, either before or after the Bill of Rights of 1689. From the time of Richard I until 1826 the death penalty was authorized in England for treason and all felonies except larceny and mayhem, with the further exception that persons entitled to benefit of clergy were subject to no penalty or at most a very lenient penalty upon the commission of a felony. Benefit of clergy grew out of the exemption of the clergy from the jurisdiction of the lay courts. The exemption expanded to include assistants to clergymen, and by 1689, any male who could read. Although by 1689 numerous felonies had been deemed nonclergyable, the disparity in punishments imposed on the educated and noneducated remained for most felonies until the early 18th century. See 1 J. Stephen, History of Criminal Law of England 458 *et seq.* (1883).

exclusive concern was the absence of any ban on tortures.[3] The later inclusion of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause was in response to these objections. There was no discussion of the inter-relationship of the terms "cruel" and "unusual," and there is nothing in the debates supporting the inference that the Founding Fathers would have been receptive to torturous or excessively cruel punishments even if usual in character or authorized by law.

The cases decided under the Eighth Amendment are consistent with the tone of the ratifying debates. In *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S. 130 (1878), this Court held that execution by shooting was not a prohibited mode of carrying out a sentence of death. Speaking to the meaning of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause, the Court stated,

> ". . . it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution." 99 U. S., at 134.

The Court made no reference to the role of the term "unusual" in the constitutional guarantee.

In the case of *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 438 (1890), the Court held the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to the States and added the following dictum:

> "So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offense against the laws of the State were manifestly cruel and unusual, as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within the . . . [prohibition of the New York constitution]. And we think this equally true of the Eighth Amendment, in its application to Congress.
>
> ". . . Punishments are cruel when they involve

[3] See 2 J. Elliot's Debates 111 (2d ed. 1863); 3 J. Elliot's Debates 447–448, 451–452 (2d ed. 1863).

> torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." 136 U. S., at 446–447.

This language again reveals an exclusive concern with extreme cruelty. The Court made passing reference to the finding of the New York courts that electrocution was an "unusual" punishment, but it saw no need to discuss the significance of that term as used in the Eighth Amendment.

Opinions in subsequent cases also speak of extreme cruelty as though that were the sum and substance of the constitutional prohibition. See *O'Neil* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S. 323, 339–340 (1892); *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349, 372–373 (1910); *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459, 464 (1947). As summarized by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in the plurality opinion in *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 100 n. 32 (1958):

> "Whether the word 'unusual' has any qualitative meaning different from 'cruel' is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn. See *Weems* v. *United States, supra; O'Neil* v. *Vermont, supra; Wilkerson* v. *Utah, supra.* These cases indicate that the Court simply examines the particular punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual.'"

I do not suggest that the presence of the word "unusual" in the Eighth Amendment is merely vestigial, having no relevance to the constitutionality of any punishment that might be devised. But where, as here,

we consider a punishment well known to history, and clearly authorized by legislative enactment, it disregards the history of the Eighth Amendment and all the judicial comment that has followed to rely on the term "unusual" as affecting the outcome of these cases. Instead, I view these cases as turning on the single question whether capital punishment is "cruel" in the constitutional sense. The term "unusual" cannot be read as limiting the ban on "cruel" punishments or as somehow expanding the meaning of the term "cruel." For this reason I am unpersuaded by the facile argument that since capital punishment has always been cruel in the everyday sense of the word, and has become unusual due to decreased use, it is, therefore, now "cruel and unusual."

II

Counsel for petitioners properly concede that capital punishment was not impermissibly cruel at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. Not only do the records of the debates indicate that the Founding Fathers were limited in their concern to the prevention of torture, but it is also clear from the language of the Constitution itself that there was no thought whatever of the elimination of capital punishment. The opening sentence of the Fifth Amendment is a guarantee that the death penalty not be imposed "unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a prohibition against being "twice put in jeopardy of life" for the same offense. Similarly, the Due Process Clause commands "due process of law" before an accused can be "deprived of life, liberty or property." Thus the explicit language of the Constitution affirmatively acknowledges the legal power to impose capital punishment; it does not expressly or by implication acknowledge the legal power to impose any of the

various punishments that have been banned as cruel since 1791. Since the Eighth Amendment was adopted on the same day in 1791 as the Fifth Amendment, it hardly needs more to establish that the death penalty was not "cruel" in the constitutional sense at that time.

In the 181 years since the enactment of the Eighth Amendment, not a single decision of this Court has cast the slightest shadow of a doubt on the constitutionality of capital punishment. In rejecting Eighth Amendment attacks on particular modes of execution, the Court has more than once implicitly denied that capital punishment is impermissibly "cruel" in the constitutional sense. *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S. 130 (1878); *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459, 464 (1947). *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 438 (1890) (dictum). It is only 14 years since Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for four members of the Court, stated without equivocation,

> "... Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty." *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 99.

It is only one year since Mr. Justice Black made his feelings clear on the constitutional issue:

> "The Eighth Amendment forbids 'cruel and unusual punishments.' In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the framers intended to end capital punishment by the Amendment." *Mc-*

Gautha v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 226 (1971) (concurring opinion).

By limiting its grants of certiorari, the Court has refused even to hear argument on the Eighth Amendment claim on two occasions in the last four years. *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, cert. granted, 389 U. S. 1035, rev'd, 391 U. S. 510 (1968); *McGautha* v. *California*, cert. granted, 398 U. S. 936 (1970), aff'd, 402 U. S. 183 (1971). In these cases the Court confined its attention to the procedural aspects of capital trials, it being implicit that the punishment itself could be constitutionally imposed. Nonetheless, the Court has now been asked to hold that a punishment clearly permissible under the Constitution at the time of its adoption and accepted as such by every member of the Court until today, is suddenly so cruel as to be incompatible with the Eighth Amendment.

Before recognizing such an instant evolution in the law, it seems fair to ask what factors have changed that capital punishment should now be "cruel" in the constitutional sense as it has not been in the past. It is apparent that there has been no change of constitutional significance in the nature of the punishment itself. Twentieth century modes of execution surely involve no greater physical suffering than the means employed at the time of the Eighth Amendment's adoption. And although a man awaiting execution must inevitably experience extraordinary mental anguish,[4] no one suggests that this anguish is materially different from that experienced by condemned men in 1791, even though protracted appellate review processes have greatly increased the waiting time on "death row." To be sure, the ordeal of the condemned man may be thought cruel in the sense that all suffering is thought cruel. But if the Constitution proscribed every punishment pro-

[4] But see Bluestone & McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Mental Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 Am. J. Psych. 393 (1962).

ducing severe emotional stress, then capital punishment would clearly have been impermissible in 1791.

However, the inquiry cannot end here. For reasons unrelated to any change in intrinsic cruelty, the Eighth Amendment prohibition cannot fairly be limited to those punishments thought excessively cruel and barbarous at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. A punishment is inordinately cruel, in the sense we must deal with it in these cases, chiefly as perceived by the society so characterizing it. The standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change. This notion is not new to Eighth Amendment adjudication. In *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), the Court referred with apparent approval to the opinion of the commentators that "[t]he clause of the Constitution . . . may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." 217 U. S., at 378. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing the plurality opinion in *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, stated, "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 356 U. S., at 101. Nevertheless, the Court up to now has never actually held that a punishment has become impermissibly cruel due to a shift in the weight of accepted social values; nor has the Court suggested judicially manageable criteria for measuring such a shift in moral consensus.

The Court's quiescence in this area can be attributed to the fact that in a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people. For this reason, early commentators suggested that the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause was an unnecessary

constitutional provision.[5] As acknowledged in the principal brief for petitioners, "both in constitutional contemplation and in fact, it is the legislature, not the Court, which responds to public opinion and immediately reflects the society's standards of decency."[6] Accordingly, punishments such as branding and the cutting off of ears, which were commonplace at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, passed from the penal scene without judicial intervention because they became basically offensive to the people and the legislatures responded to this sentiment.

Beyond any doubt if we were today called upon to review such punishments, we would find them excessively cruel because we could say with complete assurance that contemporary society universally rejects such bizarre penalties. However, this speculation on the Court's probable reaction to such punishments is not of itself significant. The critical fact is that this Court has never had to hold that a mode of punishment authorized by a domestic legislature was so cruel as to be fundamentally at odds with our basic notions of decency. Cf. *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349 (1910). Judicial findings of impermissible cruelty have been limited, for the most part, to offensive punishments devised without specific authority by prison officials, not by legislatures. See, *e. g.*, *Jackson* v. *Bishop*, 404 F. 2d 571 (CA8 1968); *Wright* v. *McMann*, 387 F. 2d 519 (CA2 1967). The paucity of judicial decisions invalidating legislatively prescribed punishments is powerful evidence that in this country

[5] See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1903 (5th ed. 1891); 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 604 (8th ed. 1927). See also Joseph Story on Capital Punishment, 43 Cal. L. Rev. 76 (Hogan ed.) (1955).

[6] Brief for Petitioner in *Aikens* v. *California*, No. 68–5027, at 19 (cert. dismissed, June 7, 1972). This, plainly, was the foundation of Mr. Justice Black's strong views on this subject expressed most recently in *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 226 (1971) (concurring opinion).

legislatures have in fact been responsive—albeit belatedly at times—to changes in social attitudes and moral values.

I do not suggest that the validity of legislatively authorized punishments presents no justiciable issue under the Eighth Amendment, but rather that the primacy of the legislative role narrowly confines the scope of judicial inquiry. Whether or not provable, and whether or not true at all times, in a democracy the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic standards of decency prevailing in the society. This presumption can only be negated by unambiguous and compelling evidence of legislative default.

III

There are no obvious indications that capital punishment offends the conscience of society to such a degree that our traditional deference to the legislative judgment must be abandoned. It is not a punishment such as burning at the stake that everyone would ineffably find to be repugnant to all civilized standards. Nor is it a punishment so roundly condemned that only a few aberrant legislatures have retained it on the statute books. Capital punishment is authorized by statute in 40 States, the District of Columbia and in the federal courts for the commission of certain crimes.[7] On four occasions in the last 11 years Congress has added to the list of federal crimes punishable by death.[8] In looking for reliable indicia of con-

[7] See Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics, No. 46, Capital Punishment 1930–1970, at 50. Since the publication of the Department of Justice report, capital punishment has been judicially abolished in California, *People* v. *Anderson*, — Cal. 2d —, — P. 2d —, — Cal. Rptr. —, cert. denied, — U. S. — (1972). The States where capital punishment is no longer authorized are Alaska, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

[8] See Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L. 91–644, Tit. IV, § 15, 84 Stat. 1891, 18 U. S. C. § 351 (Supp. I, 1971); see Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, Tit. XI, § 1102 (a), 84 Stat. 956, 18 U. S. C. § 844

temporary attitude, none more trustworthy has been advanced.

One conceivable source of evidence that legislatures have abdicated their essentially barometric role with respect to community values would be public opinion polls, of which there have been many in the past decade addressed to the question of capital punishment. Without assessing the reliability of such polls, or intimating that any judicial reliance could ever be placed on them, it need only be noted that the reported results have shown nothing approximating the universal condemnation of capital punishment that might lead us to suspect that the legislatures in general have lost touch with current social values.[9]

Counsel for petitioners rely on a different body of empirical evidence. They argue, in effect, that the number of cases in which the death penalty is imposed, as compared with the number of cases in which it is statutorily available, reflects a general revulsion toward the penalty that would lead to its repeal if only it were more generally and widely enforced. It cannot be gainsaid that by the choice of juries—and sometimes judges[10]—the death penalty is imposed in far fewer than half the

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(f)(i) (1970); Act of Aug. 28, 1965, Pub. L. 89-141, § 3, 79 Stat. 580, 18 U. S. C. § 1751 (1970); Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. 87-197, § 1, 75 Stat. 466, 49 U. S. C. § 1472 (i) (1970). See also opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, *post*, at 8–9.

[9] A 1966 poll indicated that 42% of those polled favored capital punishment while 47% opposed it, and 11% had no opinion. A 1969 poll found 51% in favor, 40% opposed and 9% with no opinion. See Erskine, The Polls: Capital Punishment, 34 Public Opinion Quarterly Rev. 290 (1970).

[10] The jury plays the predominant role in sentencing in capital cases in this country. Available evidence indicates that where the judge determines the sentence, the death penalty is imposed with a slightly greater frequency than where the jury makes the determination. Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury 436 (1966).

cases in which it is available.[11] To go further and characterize the rate of imposition as "freakishly rare," as petitioners insist, is unwarranted hyperbole. And regardless of its characterization, the rate of imposition does not impel the conclusion that capital punishment is now regarded as intolerably cruel or uncivilized.

It is argued that in those capital cases where juries have recommended mercy, they have given expression to civilized values and effectively renounced the legislative authorization for capital punishment. At the same time it is argued that where juries have made the awesome decision to send men to their deaths, they have acted arbitrarily and without sensitivity to prevailing standards of decency. This explanation for the infrequency of imposition of capital punishment is unsupported by known facts, and is inconsistent in principle with everything this Court has ever said about the functioning of juries in capital cases.

In *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183 (1971),

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[11] In the decade from 1961–1970, an average of 106 men per year were received under sentence of death in the prisons of the United States, ranging from a low of 85 in 1967 to a high of 140 in 1961; 127 men were received under sentence of death in 1970. Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics, No. 46, Capital Punishment 1930–1970, at 9. See also H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, 35 Fed. Prob. (No. 2) 32 (1971). Although accurate figures are difficult to obtain, it is thought that from 15% to 20% of those convicted of murder are sentenced to death in States where it is authorized. See, *e. g.*, McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by a Correctional Administrator, 28 Fed. Prob. (No. 2) 11, 12 (1964); Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907–1960, 19 Rutg. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1964); Florida Division of Corrections, Seventh Biennial Report (July 1, 1968, to June 30, 1970) 82 (1970); H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 435–436 (1966). The rate of imposition for rape and the few other crimes made punishable by death in certain States is considerably lower. See, *e. g.*, Florida Division of Corrections, Seventh Biennial Report, *supra*, at 83; Partington, The Incidence of the Death Penalty for Rape in Virginia, 22 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 43, 43–44, 71–73 (1965).

decided only one year ago, the Court held that there was no mandate in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that juries be given instructions as to when the death penalty should be imposed. After reviewing the autonomy which juries have traditionally exercised in capital cases and noting the practical difficulties of framing manageable instructions, this Court concluded that judicially articulated standards were not needed to insure a responsible decision as to penalty. Nothing in *McGautha* licenses capital juries to act arbitrarily or assumes that they have so acted in the past. On the contrary, the assumption underlying the *McGautha* ruling is that juries "will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision." 402 U. S., at 208.

The responsibility of juries deciding capital cases in our system of justice was nowhere better described than in *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510 (1968):

> "[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more—and must do nothing less—than express *the conscience of the community* on the ultimate question of life or death.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> "And one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary human values and the penal system—a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society'" 391 U. S., at 519 and n. 15 (emphasis added).

The selectivity of juries in imposing the punishment of death is properly viewed as a refinement on rather than a repudiation of the statutory authorization for that penalty. Legislatures prescribe the categories

of crimes for which the death penalty should be available, and, acting as "the conscience of the community," juries are entrusted to determine in individual cases that the ultimate punishment is warranted. Juries are undoubtedly influenced in this judgment by myriad factors. The motive or lack of motive of the perpetrator, the degree of injury or suffering of the victim or victims and the degree of brutality in the commission of the crime would seem to be prominent among these factors. Given the general awareness that death is no longer a routine punishment for the crimes for which it is made available, it is hardly surprising that juries have been increasingly meticulous in their imposition of the penalty. But to assume from the mere fact of relative infrequency that only a random assortment of pariahs are sentenced to death, is to cast grave doubt on the basic integrity of our jury system.

It would, of course, be unrealistic to assume that juries have been perfectly consistent in choosing the cases where the death penalty is to be imposed, for no human institution performs with perfect consistency. There are doubtless prisoners on death row who would not be there had they been tried before a different jury or in a different State. In this sense their fate has been controlled by a fortuitous circumstance. However, this element of fortuity does not stand as an indictment either of the general functioning of juries in capital cases or of the integrity of jury decisions in individual cases. There is no empirical basis for concluding that juries have generally failed to discharge in good faith the responsibility described in *Witherspoon*—that of choosing between life and death in individual cases according to the dictates of community values.[12]

[12] Counsel for petitioners make the conclusory statement that "[t]hose who are selected to die are the poor and powerless, personally ugly and socially unacceptable." Brief for petitioner in No. 68–5027, at 51. However, the sources cited contain no empiri-

The rate of imposition of death sentences falls far short of providing the requisite unambiguous evidence that the legislatures of 40 States and the Congress have turned

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cal findings to undermine the general premise that juries impose the death penalty in the most extreme cases. One study has discerned a statistically noticeable difference between the rate of imposition on blue collar and white collar defendants; the study otherwise concludes that juries do follow rational patterns in imposing the sentence of death. Note, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree-Murder Cases, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1297 (1969). See also H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 434–449 (1966).

Statistics are also cited to show that the death penalty has been imposed in a racially discriminatory manner. Such statistics suggest, at least as a historical matter, that Negroes have been sentenced to death with greater frequency than whites in several States, particularly for the crime of interracial rape. See, *e. g.*, Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924–1968, 15 Crime & Delinq. 132 (1969); Note, Capital Punishment in Virginia, 58 Va. L. Rev. 97 (1972). If a statute that authorizes the discretionary imposition of a particular penalty for a particular crime is used primarily against defendants of a certain race, and if the pattern of use can be fairly explained only by reference to the race of the defendants, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids continued enforcement of that statute in its existing form. Cf. *Yick Wo* v. *Hopkins*, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); *Gomillion* v. *Lightfoot*, 364 U. S. 339 (1960).

To establish that the statutory authorization for a particular penalty is inconsistent with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause, it is not enough to show how it was applied in the distant past. The statistics that have been referred to us cover periods when Negros were systematically excluded from jury service and when racial segregation was official policy in many States. Data of more recent vintage is essential. See *Maxwell* v. *Bishop*, 398 F. 2d 138, 148 (CA8 1968), vacated, 398 U. S. 262 (1970). While no statistical survey could be expected to bring forth absolute and irrefutable proof of a discriminatory pattern of imposition, a strong showing would have to be made taking all relevant factors into account.

It must be noted, that any equal protection claim is totally distinct from the Eighth Amendment question, to which our grant of cer-

their backs on current or evolving standards of decency in continuing to make the death penalty available. For if selective imposition evidences a rejection of capital punishment in those cases where it is not imposed, it surely evidences a correlative affirmation of the penalty in those cases where it is imposed. Absent some clear indication that the continued imposition of the death penalty on a selective basis is violative of prevailing standards of civilized conduct, the Eighth Amendment cannot be said to interdict its use.

In two of these cases we have been asked to rule on the narrower question whether capital punishment offends the Eighth Amendment when imposed as the punishment for the crime of forcible rape.[13] It is true that the death penalty is authorized for rape in fewer States than it is for murder,[14] and that even in those States it is applied more sparingly for rape than for murder.[15] But for the reasons aptly brought out in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, *post*, at 44–49, I do not believe these differences can be elevated to the level of an Eighth Amendment distinction. This blunt constitutional command cannot be sharpened to carve neat distinctions corresponding to the categories of crimes defined by the legislatures.

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tiorari was limited in these cases. Evidence of a discriminatory pattern of enforcement does not imply that any use of a particular punishment is so morally repugnant as to violate the Eighth Amendment.

[13] *Jackson* v. *Georgia*, No. 69–5030; *Branch* v. *Texas*, No. 69–5031.

[14] Rape is punishable by death in 16 States and in the federal courts when committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 18 U. S. C. § 2031. The States authorizing capital punishment for rape are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

[15] See n. 11, *supra*.

IV

Capital punishment has also been attacked as violative of the Eighth Amendment on the ground that it is not needed to achieve legitimate penal aims and is thus "unnecessarily cruel." As a pure policy matter, this approach has much to recommend it, but it seeks to give a dimension to the Eighth Amendment that it was never intended to have and promotes a line of inquiry that this Court has never before pursued.

The Eighth Amendment, as I have noted, was included in the Bill of Rights to guard against the use of torturous and inhuman punishments, not those of limited efficacy. One of the few to speak out against the adoption of the Eighth Amendment asserted that it is often necessary to use cruel punishments to deter crimes.[16] But among those favoring the Amendment, no sentiment was expressed that a punishment of extreme cruelty could ever be justified by expediency. The dominant theme of the Eighth Amendment debates was that the ends of the criminal laws cannot justify the use of measures of extreme cruelty to achieve them. Cf. *Rochin* v. *California*, 342 U. S. 165, 172–173 (1952).

The apparent seed of the "unnecessary cruelty" argument is the following language, quoted earlier, found in *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, *supra*:

> "Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, . . . *and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty*, are forbidden by

[16] 1 Annals of Congress 754 (1789) (1st Congress, 1st Session) (Remarks of Rep. Livermore).

the Constitution." 99 U. S., at 134 (emphasis added).

To lift the italicized phrase from the context of the *Wilkerson* opinion and now view it as a mandate for assessing the value of punishments in achieving the aims of penology is a gross distortion; nowhere are such aims even mentioned in the *Wilkerson* opinion. The only fair reading of this phrase is that punishments similar to torture in their extreme cruelty are prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. In *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S., at 463, 464, the Court made reference to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the infliction of "unnecessary pain" in carrying out an execution. The context makes abundantly clear that the Court was disapproving the wanton infliction of physical pain, and once again not advising pragmatic analysis of punishments approved by legislatures.[17]

Apart from these isolated uses of the word "unnecessary," nothing in the cases suggests that it is for the courts to make a determination of the efficacy of punishments. The decision in *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), is not to the contrary. In *Weems* the Court held that for the crime of falsifying public documents, the punishment imposed under the Philippine Code of 15 years' imprisonment at hard labor under shackles, followed by perpetual surveillance, loss of voting rights, loss of the right to hold public office and loss of right to change domicile freely, was violative of the Eighth Amendment. The case is generally regarded as

[17] Petitioner Francis had been sentenced to be electrocuted for the crime of murder. He was placed in the electric chair, and the executioner threw the switch. Due to a mechanical difficulty, death did not result. A new death warrant was issued fixing a second date for execution. The Court held that the proposed execution would not constitute cruel and unusual punishment or double jeopardy.

holding that a punishment may be excessively cruel within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment because it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime;[18] some view the decision of the Court primarily as a reaction to the mode of the punishment itself.[19] Under any characterization of the holding, it is readily apparent that the decision grew out of the Court's overwhelming abhorrence of the imposition of the particular penalty for the particular crime; it was making an essentially moral judgment, not a dispassionate assessment of the need for the penalty. The Court specifically disclaimed "the right to assert a judgment against that of the legislature of the expediency of the laws . . . ." 217 U. S., at 378. Thus apart from the fact that the Court in *Weems* concerned itself with the crime committed as well as the punishment imposed, the case marks no departure from the largely unarticulable standard of extreme cruelty. However intractable that standard may be, that it what the Eighth Amendment is all about. The constitutional provision is not addressed to social utility and does not command that enlightened principles of penology always be followed.

By pursuing the necessity approach, it becomes even

[18] There is no serious claim of disproportionality presented in these cases. Murder and forcible rape have always been regarded as among the most serious crimes. It cannot be said that the punishment of death is out of all proportion to the severity of these crimes.

The Court's decision in *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660 (1962), can be viewed as an extension of the disproportionality doctrine of the Eighth Amendment. The Court held that a statute making it a crime punishable by imprisonment to be a narcotics addict violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court in effect ruled that the status of being an addict is not a criminal act, and that any criminal punishment imposed for addiction exceeds the penal power of the States. The Court made no analysis of the necessity of imprisonment as a means of curbing addiction.

[19] See Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1075 (1964).

more apparent that it involves matters outside the purview of the Eighth Amendment. Two of the several aims of punishment are generally associated with capital punishment—retribution and deterrence. It is argued that retribution can be discounted because that, after all, is what the Eighth Amendment seeks to eliminate. There is no authority suggesting that the Eighth Amendment was intended to purge the law of its retributive elements, and the Court has consistently assumed that retribution is a legitimate dimension of the punishment of crimes. See *Williams* v. *New York*, 337 U. S. 241, 248 (1949); *United States* v. *Lovett*, 328 U. S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Furthermore, responsible legal thinkers of widely varying persuasions have debated the sociological and philosophical aspects of the retribution question for generations, neither side being able to convince the other.[20] It would be reading a great deal into the Eighth Amendment to hold that the punishments authorized by legislatures cannot constitutionally reflect a retributive purpose.

The less esoteric but no less controversial question is whether the death penalty acts as a superior deterrent. Those favoring abolition find no evidence that it does.[21] Those favoring retention start from the intuitive notion that capital punishment should act as the most effective deterrent and note that there is no convincing evidence

[20] See H. M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401 (1958); H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 37–39 (1968); M. Cohen, Reason and Law 41–44 (1950); Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report 1949–1953, CMD No. 8932, at 17–18 (1953); H. L. A. Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433, 446–455 (1957); H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 60–69 (1963).

[21] See, *e. g.*, T. Sellin, Capital Punishment 135 *et seq.* (1967); Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty, 284 Annals 54 (1952).

that it does not.[22] Escape from this empirical stalemate is sought by placing the burden of proof on the States and concluding that they have failed to demonstrate that capital punishment is a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment. Numerous justifications have been advanced for shifting the burden, and they are not without their rhetorical appeal. However, these arguments are not descended from established constitutional principles, but are born of the urge to bypass an unresolved factual question.[23] Comparative deterrence is not a matter that lends itself to precise measurement; to shift the burden to the States is to provide an illusory solution to an enormously complex problem. If it were proper to put the States to the test of demonstrating the deterrent value of capital punishment, we could just as well ask them to prove the need for life imprisonment or any other punishment. Yet I know of no convincing evidence that life imprisonment is a more effective deterrent than 20 years' imprisonment, or even that a $10 parking ticket is a more effective deterrent than a $5 parking ticket. In fact, there are some who go so far as to challenge the notion that any punishments deter crime.[24] If the States are unable to adduce convincing proof rebutting such asser-

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[22] See, *e. g.*, Hoover, Statements in Favor of the Death Penalty, in The Death Penalty in America, 130 (Bedau ed. 1967); Allen, Capital Punishment: Your Protection and Mine, in The Death Penalty in America, *supra*, at 135. See also H. L. A. Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433, 457 (1957); H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, *supra*, at 265–266.

[23] See *Powell* v. *Texas*, 392 U. S. 514, 531 (1968) (MARSHALL, J.) (plurality opinion).

[24] See, *e. g.*, K. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment 206–208 (1968).

tions, does it then follow that all punishments are suspect of being "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Constitution? On the contrary, I submit that the questions raised by the necessity approach are beyond the pale of judicial inquiry under the Eighth Amendment.

V

Today the Court has not ruled that capital punishment is *per se* violative of the Eighth Amendment; nor has it ruled that the punishment is barred for any particular class or classes of crimes. The substantially similar concurring opinions of MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE, which are necessary to support the judgment setting aside petitioners' sentences, stop short of reaching the ultimate question. The actual scope of the Court's ruling, which I take to be embodied in these concurring opinions, is not entirely clear. This much, however, seems apparent: if the legislatures are to continue to authorize capital punishment for some crimes, juries and judges can no longer be permitted to make the sentencing determination in the same manner they have in the past.[25] This approach—not urged in oral arguments or briefs—misconceives the nature of the constitutional command against "cruel and unusual punishments," disregards controlling case law, and demands a rigidity in capital cases which, if possible of achievement, cannot be regarded as a welcome change. Indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

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[25] Much in the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS similarly suggests that it is the sentencing system rather than the punishment itself that is constitutionally infirm. However, the opinion also indicates that in the wake of the Court's decision in *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183 (1971), the validity of the sentencing process is no longer open to question.

As I have earlier stated, the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of punishments that are so cruel and inhumane as to violate society's standards of civilized conduct. The Amendment does not prohibit all punishments the States are unable to prove necessary to deter or control crime. The Amendment is not concerned with the process by which a State determines that a particular punishment is to be imposed in a particular case. And the Amendment most assuredly does not speak to the power of legislatures to confer sentencing discretion on juries, rather than to fix all sentences by statute.

The critical factor in the concurring opinions of both MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE is the infrequency with which the penalty is imposed. This factor is taken not as evidence of society's abhorrence of capital punishment—the inference that petitioners would have the Court draw—but as the earmark of a deteriorated system of sentencing. It is concluded that petitioners' sentences must be set aside, not because the punishment is impermissibly cruel, but because juries and judges have failed to exercise their sentencing discretion in acceptable fashion.

To be sure, there is a recitation cast in Eighth Amendment terms: petitioners' sentences are "cruel" because they exceed that which the legislatures have deemed necessary for all cases;[26] petitioners' sentences are "unusual" because they exceed that which is imposed in most cases.[27] This application of the words of the Eighth Amendment suggests that capital punishment can be made to satisfy Eighth Amendment values if its rate of imposition is somehow multiplied; it seemingly follows

[26] See concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, *ante*, at 4–5; concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE, *ante*, at 3.

[27] See concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, *ante*, at 5; cf. concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE, *ante*, at 3.

that the flexible sentencing system created by the legislatures, and carried out by juries and judges, has yielded more mercy than the Eighth Amendment can stand. The implications of this approach are mildly ironical. For example, by this measure of the Eighth Amendment, the elimination of death-qualified juries in *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), can only be seen in retrospect as a setback to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958).

This novel formulation of Eighth Amendment principles—*albeit* necessary to satisfy the terms of our limited grant of certiorari—does not lie at the heart of these concurring opinions. The decisive grievance of the opinions—not translated into Eighth Amendment terms—is that the present system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce evenhanded justice; the problem is not that too few have been sentenced to die, but that the selection process has followed no rational pattern.[28] This claim of arbitrariness is not only lacking in empirical support,[29] but it manifestly fails to establish that the death penalty is a "cruel and unusual" punishment. The Eighth Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights to assure that certain types of punishments would never be imposed, not to channelize the sentencing process. The approach of these concurring opinions has no antecedent in the Eighth Amendment cases. It is essentially and exclusively a procedural due process argument.

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[28] This point is more heavily emphasized in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART than in that of MR. JUSTICE WHITE. However, since MR. JUSTICE WHITE allows for statutes providing a mandatory death penalty for "more narrowly defined categories" of crimes, it appears that he too is more concerned with a regularized sentencing process, than with the aggregate number of death sentences imposed for all crimes.

[29] See n. 12, *supra*.

This ground of decision is plainly foreclosed as well as misplaced. Only one year ago, in *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183 (1971), the Court upheld the prevailing system of sentencing in capital cases. The Court concluded:

> "In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution." 402 U. S., at 207.

In reaching this decision, the Court had the benefit of extensive briefing, full oral argument, and six months of careful deliberations. The Court's labors are documented by 130 pages of opinions in the United States Reports. All of the arguments and factual contentions accepted in the concurring opinions today were considered and rejected by the Court one year ago. *McGautha* was an exceedingly difficult case, and reasonable men could fairly disagree as to the result. But the Court entered its judgment, and if *stare decisis* means anything, that decision should be regarded as a controlling pronouncement of law.

Although the Court's decision in *McGautha* was technically confined to the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment as made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would be disingenuous to suggest that today's ruling has done anything less than overrule *McGautha* in the guise of an Eighth Amendment adjudication. It may be thought appropriate to subordinate principles of *stare decisis* where the subject is as sensitive as capital punishment and the stakes are so high, but these external considerations were no less weighty last year. This pat-

tern of decisionmaking will do little to inspire confidence in the stability of the law.

While I would not undertake to make a definitive statement as to the parameters of the Court's ruling, it is clear that if state legislatures and the Congress wish to maintain the availability of capital punishment, significant statutory changes will have to be made. Since the two pivotal concurring opinions turn on the assumption that the punishment of death is now meted out in a random and unpredictable manner, legislative bodies may seek to bring their laws into compliance with the Court's ruling by providing standards for juries and judges to follow in determining the sentence in capital cases or by more narrowly defining the crimes for which the penalty is to be imposed.[30] If such standards can be devised or the crimes more meticulously defined, the result cannot be detrimental. However, Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in *McGautha* convincingly demonstrates that all past efforts "to identify before the fact" the cases in which the penalty is to be imposed have been "uniformly unsuccessful." 402 U. S., at 197. One problem is that "the factors which determine whether the sentence of death is the appropriate penalty in particular cases are too complex to be compressed within the limits of a simple formula . . . ." Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949–1953, Cmd. 8932, ¶ 498 (1953). As the Court stated in *McGautha*, "The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either meaningless 'boilerplate' or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need." 402 U. S., at 208. But even assuming that suitable guidelines can be established, there is no assurance that sentencing patterns will change so long as juries are possessed of the

[30] It was pointed out in the Court's opinion in *McGautha* that these two alternatives are substantially equivalent. 402 U. S., at 206 n. 16.

power to determine the sentence or to bring in a verdict of guilt on a charge carrying a lesser sentence; juries have not been inhibited in the exercise of these powers in the past. Thus, unless the Court in *McGautha* misjudged the experience of history, there is little reason to believe that sentencing standards in any form will substantially alter the discretionary character of the prevailing system of sentencing in capital cases. That system may fall short of perfection, but it is yet to be shown that a different system would produce more satisfactory results.

Real change could clearly be brought about if legislatures provided mandatory death sentences in such a way as to deny juries the opportunity to bring in a verdict on a lesser charge; under such a system, the death sentence could only be avoided by a verdict of acquittal. If this is the only alternative that the legislatures can safely pursue under today's ruling, I would have preferred that the Court opt for total abolition.

It seems remarkable to me that with our basic trust in lay jurors as the keystone in our system of criminal justice, it should now be suggested that we take the most sensitive and important of all decisions away from them. I could more easily be persuaded that mandatory sentences of death, without the intervening and ameliorating impact of lay jurors, are so arbitrary and doctrinaire that they violate the Constitution. The very infrequency of death penalties imposed by jurors attests their cautious and discriminating reservation of that penalty for the most extreme cases. I had thought that nothing was clearer in history, as we noted in *McGautha* one year ago, than the American abhorrence of "the common law rule imposing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers." 402 U. S., at 198. As the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL shows, *ante*, at 26, the 19th century movement away from mandatory death sentences marked an enlightened introduction of

flexibility into the sentencing process. It recognized that individual culpability is not always measured by the category of the crime committed. This change in sentencing practice was greeted by the Court as a humanizing development. See *Winston* v. *United States*, 172 U. S. 303 (1899); cf. *Calton* v. *Utah*, 130 U. S. 83 (1889). See also *Andres* v. *United States*, 333 U. S. 740, 753 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). I do not see how this history can be ignored and how it can be suggested that the Eighth Amendment demands the elimination of the most sensitive feature of the sentencing system.

As a general matter, the evolution of penal concepts in this country has not been marked by great progress, nor have the results up to now been crowned with significant success. If anywhere in the whole spectrum of criminal justice fresh ideas deserve sober analysis, the sentencing and correctional area ranks high on the list. But it has been widely accepted that mandatory sentences for crimes do not best serve the ends of the criminal justice system. Now, after the long process of drawing away from the blind imposition of uniform sentences for every person convicted of a particular offense, we are confronted with an argument perhaps implying that only the legislatures may determine that a sentence of death is appropriate, without the intervening evaluation of jurors or judges. This approach threatens to turn back the progress of penal reform, which has moved until recently at too slow a rate to absorb significant setbacks.

VI

Since there is no majority of the Court on the ultimate issue presented in these cases, the future of capital punishment in this country has been left in an uncertain limbo. Rather than providing a final and unambiguous answer on the basic constitutional question, the collective impact of the majority's ruling is to demand

an undetermined measure of change from the various state legislatures and the Congress. While I cannot endorse the process of decisionmaking that has yielded today's result and the restraints which that result imposes on legislative action, I am not altogether displeased that legislative bodies have been given the opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility, to make a thorough re-evaluation of the entire subject of capital punishment. If today's opinions demonstrate nothing else, they starkly show that this is an area where legislatures can act far more effectively than courts.

The legislatures are free to eliminate capital punishment for specific crimes or to carve-out limited exceptions to a general abolition of the penalty, without adherence to the conceptual strictures of the Eighth Amendment. The legislatures can and should make an assessment of the deterrent influence of capital punishment, both generally and as affecting the commission of specific types of crimes. If legislatures come to doubt the efficacy of capital punishment, they can abolish it, either completely or on a selective basis. If new evidence persuades them that they have acted unwisely, they can reverse their field and reinstate the penalty to the extent it is thought warranted. An Eighth Amendment ruling by judges cannot be made with such flexibility or discriminating precision.

The world-wide trend toward limiting the use of capital punishment, a phenomenon we have been urged to give great weight, hardly points the way to a judicial solution in this country under a written Constitution. Rather, the change has generally come about through legislative action, often on a trial basis and with the retention of the penalty for certain limited classes of

crimes.[31] Virtually nowhere has change been wrought by so crude a tool as the Eighth Amendment. The complete and unconditional abolition of capital punishment in this country by judical fiat would have undermined the careful progress of the legislative trend and foreclosed further inquiry on many as yet unanswered questions in this area.

Quite apart from the limitations of the Eighth Amendment itself, the preference for legislative action is justified by the inability of the courts to participate in the debate at the level where the controversy is focused. The case against capital punishment is not the product of legal dialectic, but rests primarily on factual claims, the truth of which cannot be tested by conventional judicial processes. The five opinions in support of the judgment differ in many respects, but they share a willingness to make sweeping factual assertions, unsupported by empirical data, concerning the manner of imposition and effectiveness of capital punishment in this country. Legislatures will have the opportunity to make a more penetrating study of these claims with the familiar and effective tools available to them as they are not to us.

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[31] See Patrick, The Status of Capital Punishment: A World Perspective, 56 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Crim. Sci. 397 (1965). In England, for example, 1957 legislation limited capital punishment to murder, treason, piracy with violence, dockyards arson and some military offenses. The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty Act) 1965 eliminated the penalty for murder on a five-year trial basis. 2 Public General Acts, c. 71, p. 1577 (Nov. 8, 1965). This abolition was made permanent in 1969. See 793 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (5th series) (Commons, 44th Parl., 4th Sess., 1969–1970), 1294–1298 (Dec. 16, 1969); 306 *id.* (Lords, 44th Parl., 4th Sess., 1969–1970), 1317–1322 (Dec. 18, 1969). Canada has also undertaken limited abolition on a five-year experimental basis. I Acts of Canada (16 & 17 Eliz. II) 145 (1967).

The highest judicial duty is to recognize the limits on judicial power and to permit the democratic processes to deal with matters falling outside of those limits. The "hydraulic pressures" [33] that Holmes spoke of as being generated by cases of great import have propelled the Court to go beyond the limits of judicial power, while fortunately leaving some room for legislative judgment.

[33] *Northern Securities Co.* v. *United States*, 193 U. S. 197, 401 (1904) (dissenting opinion).

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 69–5003, 69–5030, AND 69–5031

William Henry Furman, Petitioner, 69–5003 *v.* State of Georgia.	On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.

I join the respective opinions of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and add only the following, somewhat personal, comments.

1. Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates childhood's training and life's experiences, and is not compatible with the philosophical convictions I have been able to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of "reverence for life." Were I a legislator, I would vote against

the death penalty for the policy reasons argued by counsel for the respective petitioners and expressed and adopted in the several opinions filed by the Justices who vote to reverse these convictions.

2. Having lived for many years in a State that does not have the death penalty,[1] that effectively abolished it in 1911,[2] and that carried out its last execution on February 13, 1906,[3] capital punishment had never been a part of life for me. In my State it just did not exist. So far as I can determine, the State, purely from a statistical deterrence point of view, was neither the worse nor the better for its abolition, for, as the majority opinions observe, the statistics prove little, if anything. But the State and its citizens accepted the fact that the death penalty was not to be in the arsenal of possible punishments for any crime.

3. I, perhaps alone among the present members of the Court, am on judicial record as to this. As a member of the United States Court of Appeals I first struggled silently with the issue of capital punishment in *Feguer* v. *United States*, 302 F. 2d 214 (CA8 1962), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 872 (1962). That defendant may have been one of the last to be executed under federal auspices. I struggled again with the issue, and once more refrained from comment, in my writing for an *en banc* court in *Pope* v. *United States*, 372 F. 2d 710 (CA8 1967), vacated (upon acknowledgment by the Solicitor General of error revealed by the subsequently decided *United States* v. *Jackson*, 390 U. S. 570 (1968)) and remanded, 392 U. S. 651 (1968). Finally, in *Maxwell* v. *Bishop*, 398 F. 2d 138 (CA8 1968), vacated and remanded *sua sponte* by the Court on grounds not raised

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[1] Minn. Stat. § 609.10.

[2] Minn. Sess. Laws 1911, c. 387.

[3] See W. Trenerry, Murder in Minnesota, 163–167 (1962).

below, 398 U. S. 262 (1970), I revealed, solitarily and not for the panel, my distress and concern. 398 F. 2d, at 153–154.[4] And in *Jackson* v. *Bishop*, 404 F. 2d 571 (CA8 1968), I had no hesitancy in writing a panel opinion that held the use of the strap by trusties upon fellow Arkansas prisoners to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment. That, however, was in-prison punishment imposed by inmate-foremen.

4. The several majority opinions acknowledge, as they must, that until today capital punishment was accepted and assumed as not unconstitutional *per se* under the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. This is either the flat or the implicit holding of a unanimous Court in *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S. 130, 134–135, in 1878; of a unanimous Court in *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 436, 447, in 1890; of the Court in *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349, in 1910; of all those members of the Court, a majority, who addressed the issue in *Louisiana ex rel. Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459, 463–464, 471–472, in 1947; of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for himself and three others (Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker) in *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86,

[4] "It is obvious, we think, that the efforts on behalf of Maxwell would not thus be continuing, and his case reappearing in this court were it not for the fact that it is the death penalty, rather than life imprisonment, which he received on his rape conviction. This fact makes the decisional process in a case of this kind particularly excruciating for the author of this opinion [1] who is not personally convinced of the rightness of capital punishment and who questions it as an effective deterrent. But the advisability of capital punishment is a policy matter ordinarily to be resolved by the legislature or through executive clemency and not by the judiciary. [2]We note, for what that notice may be worth, that the death penalty for rape remains available under federal statutes. 18 U. S. C. § 2031; 10 U. S. C. § 920 (a)."

The designated footnote observed that my fellow judges did not join in my comment.

99, in 1958;[5] in the denial of certiorari in *Rudolph* v. *Alabama*, 375 U. S. 889, in 1963 (where, however, Justices DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and Goldberg would have heard argument with respect to the imposition of the ultimate penalty on a convicted rapist who had "neither taken nor endangered human life"); and of Mr. Justice Black in *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 226, decided only last Term on May 3, 1971.[6]

Suddenly, however, the course of decision is now the opposite way, with the Court evidently persuaded that somehow the passage of time has taken us to a place of greater maturity and outlook. The argument, plausible and high-sounding as it may be, is not persuasive, for it is only one year since *McGautha*, only eight and one-half years since *Rudolph*, 14 years since *Trop*, and 25 years since *Francis*, and we have been presented with nothing that demonstrates a significant movement of any kind in these brief periods. The Court has just decided that it is time to strike down the death penalty. There would have been as much reason to do this when any of the cited cases were decided. But the

[5] "At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty. . . ."

[6] "The Eighth Amendment forbids 'cruel and unusual punishments.' In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the framers intended to end capital punishment by the Amendment. Although some people have urged that this Court should amend the Constitution by interpretation to keep it abreast of modern ideas, I have never believed that lifetime judges in our system have any such legislative power."

Court refrained from that action on each of those occasions.

The Court has recognized, and I certainly subscribe to the proposition, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause "may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349, 378 (1910). And Mr. Chief Justice Warren, for a plurality of the Court, referred to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958). Mr. Jefferson expressed the same thought well.[7]

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[7] "Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. . . . I know . . . that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors. . . . Let us follow no such examples, nor weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs. Let us, as our sister States have done, avail ourselves of our reason and experience, to correct the crude essays of our first and unexperienced, although wise, virtuous, and well-meaning councils. And lastly, let us provide in our Constitution for its revision at stated periods." Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, 15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 40–42 (Memorial Edition 1904).

My problem, however, as I have indicated, is the suddenness of the Court's perception of progress in the human attitude since decisions of only a short while ago.

5. To reverse the judgments in these cases is, of course, the easy choice. It is easier to strike the balance in favor of life and against death. It is comforting to relax in the thoughts—perhaps the rationalizations—that this is the compassionate decision for a maturing society; that this is the moral and the "right" thing to do; that thereby we convince ourselves that we are moving down the road toward human decency; that we value life even though that life has taken another or others or has grievously scarred another or others and their families; and that we are less barbaric than we were in 1878 or in 1890 or in 1910 or in 1947 or in 1958 or in 1963 or a year ago in 1971 when *Wilkerson*, *Kemmler*, *Weems*, *Francis*, *Trop*, *Rudolph*, and *McGautha* were respectively decided.

This, for me, is good argument, and it makes some sense. But it is good argument and it makes sense only in a legislative and executive way and not as a judicial expedient. As I have said above, were I a legislator, I would do all I could to sponsor and to vote for legislation abolishing the death penalty. And were I the chief executive of a sovereign State, I would be sorely tempted to exercise executive clemency as Governor Rockefeller of Arkansas did recently just before he departed from office. There—on the Legislative Branch of the State or Federal Government, and secondarily, on the Executive Branch—is where the authority and responsibility for this kind of action lies. The authority should not be taken over by the judiciary in the modern guise of an Eighth Amendment issue.

I do not sit on these cases, however, as a legislator,

responsive, at least in part, to the will of constituents. Our task here, as must so frequently be emphasized and re-emphasized, is to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation that has been enacted and that is challenged. This is the sole task for judges. We should not allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our distaste for such action, to guide our judicial decision in cases such as these. The temptations to cross that policy line are very great. In fact, as today's decision reveals, they are almost irresistible.

6. The Court, in my view, is somewhat propelled toward its result by the interim decision of the California Supreme Court, with one justice dissenting, that the death penalty is violative of that State's constitution. *People* v. *Anderson*, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P. 2d 880 (February 18, 1972). So far as I am aware, that was the first time the death penalty in its entirety has been nullified by judicial decision. Cf. *Ralph* v. *Warden*, 438 F. 2d 786, 793 (CA4 1970), cert. pending. California's moral problem was a profound one, for more prisoners were on death row there than in any other state. California, of course, has the right to construe its constitution as it will. Its construction, however, is hardly a precedent for federal adjudication.

7. I trust the Court fully appreciates what it is doing when it decides these cases the way it does today. Not only are the capital punishment laws of 39 States and the District of Columbia stricken down, but also all those provisions of the federal statutory structure that permit the death penalty apparently are voided. No longer is capital punishment possible, I suspect, for, among other crimes, treason, 18 U. S. C. § 2381; or assassination of the President, the Vice President, or those who stand elected to those positions, 18 U. S. C. § 1751; or assassination of a Member or member-elect of Con-

gress, 18 U. S. C. § 351; or espionage, 18 U. S. C. § 794; or rape within the special maritime jurisdiction, 18 U. S. C. § 2031; or aircraft or motor vehicle destruction where death occurs, 18 U. S. C. § 34; or explosives offenses where death results, 18 U. S. C. § 844 (d) and (f); or train wrecking, 18 U. S. C. § 1992; or aircraft piracy, 49 U. S. C. § 1472 (i). Also in jeopardy, perhaps, are the death penalty provisions in various Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U. S. C. §§ 885, 890, 894, 899, 901, 904, 906, 913, 918, and 920. All these seem now to be discarded without a passing reference to the reasons, or the circumstances, that prompted their enactment, some very recent, and their retention in the face of efforts to repeal them.

8. It is of passing interest to note a few voting facts with respect to recent federal death penalty legislation:

A. The aircraft piracy statute, 49 U. S. C. § 1472 (i), was enacted September 5, 1961. The Senate vote on August 10 was 92–0. It was announced that Senators Chavez, Fulbright, Neuberger, and Symington were absent but that, if present, all four would vote yea. It was also announced, on the other side of the aisle, that Senator Butler was ill and that Senators Beall, Carlson, and Morton were absent or detained, but that those four, if present, would vote in the affirmative. These announcements, therefore, indicate that the true vote was 100–0. 107 Cong. Rec. 15440. The House passed the bill without recorded vote. 107 Cong. Rec. 16849.

B. The presidential assassination statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1751, was approved August 28, 1965, without recorded votes. 111 Cong. Rec. 14103, 18026, and 20239.

C. The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 was approved January 2, 1971. Title IV thereof added the congressional assassination statute that is now 18 U. S. C. § 351. The recorded House vote on October 7, 1970, was 341–26, with 63 not voting and 62 of those paired. 116

Cong. Rec. 35363–35364. The Senate vote on October 8 was 59–0, with 41 not voting, but with 21 of these announced as favoring the bill. 116 Cong. Rec. 35743. Final votes after conference were not recorded. 116 Cong. Rec. 42150, 42199.

It is impossible for me to believe that the many lawyer-members of the House and Senate—including, I might add, outstanding leaders and prominent candidates for higher office—were callously unaware and insensitive of constitutional overtones in legislation of this type. The answer, if course, is that in 1961, in 1965, and in 1970 these elected representatives of the people—far more conscious of the temper of the times, of the maturing of society, and of the contemporary demands for man's dignity, than are we who sit cloistered on this Court—took it as settled that the death penalty then, as it always had been, was not in itself unconstitutional. Some of those Members of Congress, I suspect, will be surprised at this Court's giant stride today.

9. If the reservations expressed by my Brother STEWART (which, as I read his opinion, my Brother WHITE shares) were to command support, namely, that capital punishment may not be unconstitutional so long as it be mandatorily imposed, the result, I fear, will be that statutes stricken down today will be reenacted by state legislatures to prescribe the death penalty for specified crimes without any alternative for the imposition of a lesser punishment in the discretion of the judge or jury, as the case may be. This approach, it seems to me, encourages legislation that is regressive and of an antique mold, for it eliminates the element of mercy in the imposition of punishment. I thought we had passed beyond that point in our criminology long ago.

10. It is not without interest, also, to note, that, although the several opinions for the majority acknowledge the heinous and atrocious character of the offenses com-

mitted by the petitioners, none of those opinions makes reference to the misery the petitioners' crimes occasioned to the victims, to the families of the victims, and to the communities where the offenses took place. The arguments for the respective petitioners, particularly the oral arguments, were similarly and curiously devoid of reference to the victims. There is risk, of course, in a comment such as this, for it opens one to the charge of emphasizing the retributive. But see *Williams* v. *New York*, 337 U. S. 241, 248 (1949). Nevertheless, these cases are here because offenses to innocent victims were perpetrated. This fact and the terror that occasioned it, and the fear that stalks the streets of many of our cities today, perhaps deserve not to be entirely overlooked. Let us hope that, with the Court's decision, the terror imposed will be forgotten by those upon whom it was visited, and that our society will reap the hoped-for benefits of magnanimity.

Although personally I may rejoice at the Court's result, I find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of constitutional pronouncement. I fear the Court has overstepped. It has sought and has achieved an end.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 69–5003, 69–5030, AND 69–5031

William Henry Furman, Petitioner, 69–5003 *v.* State of Georgia.	On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

The Court granted certiorari in these cases to consider whether the death penalty is any longer a permissible form of punishment. 403 U. S. 952 (1971). It is the judgment of five Justices that the death penalty, as customarily prescribed and implemented in this country today, offends the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The reasons for that judgment are stated in five separate opinions, expressing as many separate rationales. In my view, none of these opinions provides a constitutionally adequate foundation for the Court's decision.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concludes that capital punishment is incompatible with notions of "equal protection" that he finds to be "implicit" in the Eighth Amendment. *Ante*, p. —. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN bases his judgment primarily on the thesis that the penalty "does not comport with human dignity." *Ante*, p. —. MR. JUSTICE STEWART concludes that the penalty is applied in a "wanton" and "freakish" manner. *Ante*, p. —. For MR. JUSTICE WHITE it is the "infrequency" with which the penalty is imposed that renders its use unconstitutional. *Ante*, p. —. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL finds that capital punishment is an impermissible form of punishment because it is "morally unacceptable" and "excessive." *Ante*, pp. —.

Although the central theme of petitioners' presentations in these cases is that the imposition of the death penalty is *per se* unconstitutional, only two of today's opinions explicitly conclude that so sweeping a determination is mandated by the Constitution. Both MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL call for the abolition of all existing state and federal capital punishment statutes. They intimate as well that no capital statute could be devised in the future that might comport with the Eighth Amendment. While the practical consequences of the other three opinions are less certain, they at least do not purport to render impermissible every possible statutory scheme for the use of capital punishment that legislatures might hereafter devise.[1] Insofar as these latter opinions fail, at least ex-

[1] MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS holds only that "the Eighth Amendment [requires] legislatures to write penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective and nonarbitrary, and [requires] judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively and spottily to unpopular groups." *Ante*, p. —. The import of this rationale is

plicitly, to go as far as petitioners' contentions would carry them, their reservations are attributable to a willingness to accept only a portion of petitioners' thesis. For the reasons cogently set out in the CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion (*ante*, p. ——), and for reasons stated elsewhere in this opinion, I find my Brothers' less-than-absolute-abolition judgments unpersuasive. Because those judgments are, for me, not dispositive, I shall focus primarily on the broader ground upon which the petftions in these cases are premised. The foundations of my disagreement with that broader thesis are equally applicable to each of the majority's opinions. I will, therefore, not endeavor to treat each one separately. Nor will I attempt to predict what forms of capital statutes, if any, may avoid condemnation in the future under the variety of views expressed by the collective majority today. That difficult task, not performed in any of the controlling opinions, must go unanswered

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that while all existing laws must fall, it remains theoretically possible for a State or Congress to devise a statute capable of withstanding a claim of discriminatory application. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, in addition to reserving judgment on at least four presently existing statutes (*ante*, p. ——), indicates that statutes making capital punishment mandatory for any category of crime, or providing some other means of assuring against "wanton" and "freakish" application (*ante*, p. ——), would present a difficult question that he does not reach today. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, for somewhat different reasons, appears to come to the conclusion that a mandatory system of punishment might prove acceptable. *Ante*, p. ——.

The brief and selective references, in my opinion above and in this note, to the opinions of other Justices obviously do not adequately summarize the thoughtful and scholarly views set forth in their full opinions. I have tried merely to select what seems to me to be the respective points of primary emphasis in each of the majority's opinions.

until other cases presenting these more limited inquiries arise.

Whatever uncertainties may hereafter surface, several of the consequences of today's decision are unmistakably clear. The decision is plainly one of the greatest importance. The Court's judgment removes the death sentences previously imposed on some 600 persons awaiting punishment in state and federal prisons throughout the country. At least for the present, it also bars the States and the Federal Government from seeking sentences of death for defendants awaiting trial on charges for which capital punishment was heretofore a potential alternative. The happy event for these countable few constitutes, however, only the most visible consequence of this decision. Less measurable, but certainly of no less significance, is the shattering effect this collection of views has on the root principles of *stare decisis*, federalism, judicial restraint and—most importantly—separation of powers.

The Court rejects as not decisive the clearest evidence that the Framers of the Constitution and the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that those documents posed no barrier to the death penalty. The Court also brushes aside an unbroken line of precedent reaffirming the heretofore virtually unquestioned constitutionality of capital punishment. Because of the pervasiveness of the constitutional ruling sought by petitioners, and accepted in varying degrees by five members of the Court, today's departure from established precedent invalidates a staggering number of state and federal laws. The capital punishment laws of no less than 39 States[2] and the District of Columbia are nullified.

[2] While statutes in 40 States permit capital punishment for a variety of crimes, the constitutionality of a very few mandatory statutes remains undecided. See concurring opinions by MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE. Since Rhode Island's only

In addition, numerous provisions of the Criminal Code of the United States and of the Uniform Code of Military Justice also are voided. The Court's judgment not only wipes out laws presently in existence, but denies to Congress and to the legislatures of the 50 States the power to adopt new policies contrary to the policy selected by the Court. Indeed, it is the view of two of my Brothers that the people of each State must be denied the prerogative to amend their constitutions to provide for capital punishment even selectively for the most heinous crime.

In terms of the constitutional role of this Court, the impact of the majority's ruling is all the greater because the decision encroaches upon an area squarely within the historic prerogative of the legislative branch—both state and federal—to protect the citizenry through the designation of penalties for prohibitable conduct. It is the very sort of judgment that the legislative branch is competent to make and for which the judiciary is ill-equipped. Throughout our history, Justices of this Court have emphasized the gravity of decisions invalidating legislative judgments, admonishing the nine men who sit on this bench of the duty of self-restraint, especially when called upon to apply the expansive due process and cruel and unusual punishment rubrics. I can recall no case in which, in the name of deciding constitutional questions, this Court has subordinated national and local democratic processes to such an extent. Before turning to address the thesis of petitioners' case against capital punishment—a thesis that has proved, at least in large measure, persuasive to a majority of this Court—I first will set out the principles that counsel against the Court's sweeping decision.

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capital statute—murder by a life term prisoner—is mandatory, no law in that State is struck down by virtue of the Court's decision today.

I

The Constitution itself poses the first obstacle to petitioners' argument that capital punishment is *per se* unconstitutional. The relevant provisions are the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The first of these provides in part:

> "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."

Thus, the Federal Government's power was restricted in order to guarantee those charged with crimes that the prosecution would have only a single opportunity to seek imposition of the death penalty and that the death penalty could not be exacted without due process and a grand jury indictment. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted some 77 years after the Bill of Rights, imposed the due process limitation of the Fifth Amendment upon the States' power to authorize capital punishment.

The Eighth Amendment, adopted at the same time as the Fifth, proscribes "cruel and unusual" punishments. In an effort to discern its meaning, much has been written about its history in the opinions of this Court and elsewhere.[1] That history need not be restated here

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[1] For a thorough presentation of the history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause see MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S opinion today, *ante*, pp.———. See also *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349, 389–409 (1910) (White, J., dissenting); *O'Neil* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839 (1969).

since, whatever punishments the Framers of the Constitution may have intended to prohibit under the "cruel and unusual" language, there cannot be the slightest doubt that they intended no absolute bar on the Government's authority to impose the death penalty. *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). As much is made clear by the three references to capital punishment in the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the same body that proposed the Eighth Amendment also provided, in the First Crime Act of 1790, for the death penalty for a number of offenses. 1 Stat. 112.

Of course, the specific prohibitions within the Bill of Rights are limitations on the exercise of power; they are not an affirmative grant of power to the Government. I, therefore, do not read the several references to capital punishment as foreclosing this Court from considering whether the death penalty in a particular case offends the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nor are "cruel and unusual punishment" and "due process of law" static concepts whose meaning and scope were sealed at the time of their writing. They were designed to be dynamic and to gain meaning through application to specific circumstances, many of which were not contemplated by their authors. While flexibility in the application of these broad concepts is one of the hallmarks of our system of government, the Court is not free to read into the Constitution a meaning that is plainly at variance with its language. Both the language of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the history of the Eighth Amendment confirm beyond doubt that the death penalty was considered to be a constitutionally permissible punishment. It is, however, within the historic process of constitutional adjudication to challenge the imposition of the death penalty in some barbaric manner or as a penalty wholly dispropor-

tionate to a particular criminal act. And in making such a judgment in a case before it, a court may consider contemporary standards to the extent they are relevant. While this weighing of a punishment against the Eighth Amendment standard on a case-by-case basis is consonant with history and precedent, it is not what petitioners demand in these cases. They seek nothing less than the total abolition of capital punishment by judicial fiat.

II

Petitioners assert that the constitutional issue is an open one uncontrolled by prior decisions of this Court. They view the several cases decided under the Eighth Amendment as assuming the constitutionality of the death penalty without focusing squarely upon the issue. I do not believe that the case law can be so easily cast aside. The Court on numerous occasions has both assumed and asserted the constitutionality of capital punishment. In several cases that assumption provided a necessary foundation for the decision, as the issue was whether a particular means of carrying out a capital sentence would be allowed to stand. Each of those decisions necessarily was premised on the assumption that some method of exacting the penalty was permissible.

The issue in the first capital case in which the Eighth Amendment was invoked, *Wilkerson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S. 130 (1878), was whether carrying out a death sentence by public shooting was cruel and unusual punishment. A unanimous Court upheld that form of execution, noting first that the punishment itself, as distinguished from the mode of its infliction, was "not pretended by the counsel for the prisoner" (*id.*, at 136–137) to be cruel and unusual. The Court went on to hold that,

> "Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the authorities . . . are quite

sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not included in that category. . . ." *Id.*, at 134–135.

Twelve years later, in *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S. 436 (1890), the Court again faced a question involving the method of carrying out a capital sentence. On review of a denial of habeas corpus relief by the Supreme Court of New York, this Court was called on to decide whether electrocution, which only very recently had been adopted by the New York Legislature as a means of execution, was impermissibly cruel and unusual in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.[4] Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the entire Court, ruled in favor of the State. Electrocution had been selected by the legislature, after careful investigation, as "the most humane and practical method known to modern science of carrying into effect the sentence of death." *Id.*, at 444. The

[4] The Court pointed out that the Eighth Amendment applied only to the Federal Government and not to the States. The Court's power in relation to state action was limited to protecting privileges and immunities and to assuring due process of law, both within the Fourteenth Amendment. The standard—for purposes of due process—was held to be whether the State had exerted its authority, "within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." 136 U. S., at 448. The State of Georgia, in No. 69–5003 and No. 69–5030, has placed great emphasis on this discussion in *Kemmler* and has urged that the instant cases should all be decided under the more expansive tests of due process rather than under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause *per se*. Irrespective whether the decisions of this Court are viewed as "incorporating" the Eighth Amendment (see *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660 (1962); *Powell* v. *Texas*, 392 U. S. 514 (1968)), it seems clear that the tests for applying these two provisions are fundamentally identical. Compare Mr. Justice Frankfurter's test in *Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459, 470 (1947), with Chief Justice Warren's test in *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 100–101 (1958).

Court drew a clear line between the penalty itself and the mode of its execution:

> "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." *Id.*, at 447.

More than 50 years later, in *Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459 (1947), the Court considered a case in which, due to a mechanical malfunction, Louisiana's initial attempt to electrocute a convicted murderer had failed. Petitioner sought to block a second attempt to execute the sentence on the ground that to do so would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In the plurality opinion written by Mr. Justice Reed, concurred in by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Black and Jackson, relief was denied. Again the Court focused on the manner of execution, never questioning the propriety of the death sentence itself.

> "The case before us does not call for an examination into any punishments except that of death. . . . The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence . . . .
>
> "The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely." *Id.*, at 463–464.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, unwilling to dispose of the case under the Eighth Amendment's specific prohibition, approved the second execution attempt under the Due Process Clause. He concluded that "a State may be

found to deny a person due process by treating even one guilty of crime in a manner that violates standards of decency more or less universally accepted though not when it treats him by a mode about which opinion is fairly divided." *Id.*, at 469–470.

The four dissenting Justices, although finding a second attempt at execution to be impermissibly cruel, expressly recognized the validity of capital punishment:

> "In determining whether the proposed procedure is unconstitutional, we must measure it against a lawful electrocution. . . . Electrocution, when instantaneous, *can* be inflicted by a state in conformity with due process of law. . . .
>
> "The all-important consideration is that the execution shall be so instantaneous and substantially painless that the punishment shall be reduced, as nearly as possible, to no more than that of death itself." *Id.*, at 474 (emphasis from original).

Each of these cases involved the affirmance of a death sentence where its validity was attacked as violating the Eighth Amendment. Five opinions were written in these three cases, expressing the views of 23 Justices. While in the narrowest sense it is correct to say that in none was there a frontal attack upon the constitutionality of the death penalty, each opinion went well beyond an unarticulated assumption of validity. The power of the States to impose capital punishment was repeatedly and expressly recognized.

In addition to these cases in which the constitutionality of the death penalty was a necessary foundation for the decision, those who today would have this Court undertake the absolute abolition of the death penalty also must reject the opinions of other cases stipulating or assuming the constitutionality of capital punishment. *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86, 99, 100 (1958);

Weems v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349, 382, 409 (1910) (White, J., joined by Holmes, J., dissenting).[5] See also *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660, 676 (1962) (DOUGLAS, J., concurring).

The plurality opinion in *Trop* v. *Dulles*, *supra*, is of special interest since it is this opinion, in large measure, that provides the foundation for the present attack on the death penalty.[6] It is anomalous that the standard urged by petitioners—"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" (356 U. S., at 101)—should be derived from an opinion that so unqualifiedly rejects their arguments. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black, DOUGLAS, and Whittaker, stated flatly:

> "At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty." *Id.*, at 99.

The issue in *Trop* was whether forfeiture of citizenship was a cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on a wartime deserter who had gone "over the hill" for

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[5] Mr. Justice White stated:

"Death was a well-known method of punishment prescribed by law, and it was, of course painful, and in that sense was cruel. But the infliction of this punishment was clearly not prohibited by the word cruel, although that word manifestly was intended to forbid the resort to barbarous and unnecessary methods of bodily torture, in executing even the penalty of death." 217 U. S., at 409.

[6] See Part III, *infra*.

less than a day and had willingly surrendered. In examining the consequences of the relatively novel punishment of denationalization,[7] Chief Justice Warren drew a line between "traditional" and "unusual" penalties:

> "While the State has the power to punish, the [Eighth] Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect." *Id.*, at 100.

The plurality's repeated disclaimers of any attack on capital punishment itself must be viewed as more than off-hand dicta since those views were written in direct response to the strong language in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent arguing that denationalization could not be a disproportionate penalty for a concededly capital offense.[8]

The most recent precedents of this Court—*Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), and *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183 (1971)—are also premised to a significant degree on the constitutionality of the death penalty. While the scope of review in both cases was limited to questions involving the procedures for

[7] In footnote 32, at 100–101 the plurality opinion indicates that denationalization "was never explicitly sanctioned by this Government until 1940 and never tested against the Constitution until this day."

[8] "It seems scarcely arguable that loss of citizenship is within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition because disproportionate to an offense that is capital and has been so from the first year of Independence . . . . Is constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can be seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?" *Id.*, at 125.

selecting juries and regulating their deliberations in capital cases,[9] those opinions were "singularly academic exercises" [10] if the members of this Court were prepared at those times to find in the Constitution the complete prohibition of the death penalty. This is especially true of Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in *McGautha*, in which, after a full review of the history of capital punishment, he concluded that "we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution." *Id.*, at 207.[11]

Perhaps enough has been said to demonstrate the unswerving position that this Court has taken in opin-

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[9] 398 U. S. 936 (1970); 402 U. S., at 306 (MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting). While the constitutionality *per se* of capital punishment has been assumed almost without question, recently members of this Court have expressed the desire to consider the constitutionality of the death penalty with respect to its imposition for specific crimes. *Rudolph* v. *Alabama*, 375 U. S. 889 (1963) (dissent from the denial of certiorari).

[10] Brief for Respondent in *Branch* v. *Texas*, No. 69–5031, at 6.

[11] While the implicit assumption in *McGautha* of the acceptability of death as a form of punishment must prove troublesome for those who urge total abolition, it presents an even more severe problem of *stare decisis* for those Justices who treat the Eighth Amendment essentially as a *process* prohibition. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, while stating that the Court is "now imprisoned in *McGautha* (*ante*, p. —), concludes that capital punishment is unacceptable precisely because the procedure governing its imposition is arbitrary and discriminatory. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, taking a not dissimilar tack on the merits, disposes of *McGautha* in a footnote reference indicating that it is not applicable because the question there arose under the Due Process Clause. *Ante*, p. — n. 11. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, who also finds the death penalty intolerable because of the process for its implementation, makes no attempt to distinguish *McGautha*'s clear holding. For the reasons expressed in the CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion, *McGautha* simply cannot be distinguished. *Ante*, p. —. These various opinions would, in fact, overrule that recent precedent.

ions spanning the last hundred years. On virtually every occasion that any opinion has touched on the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty, it has been asserted affirmatively, or tacitly assumed, that the Constitution does not prohibit the penalty. No Justice of the Court, until today, has dissented from this consistent reading of the Constitution. The petitioners in these cases now before the Court cannot fairly avoid the weight of this substantial body of precedent merely by asserting that there is no prior decision precisely in point. *Stare decisis*, if it is a doctrine founded on principle, surely applies where there exists a long line of cases endorsing or necessarily assuming the validity of a particular matter of constitutional interpretation. *Green v. United States*, 356 U. S. 165, 189–193 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). While these oft-repeated expressions of unchallenged belief in the constitutionality of capital punishment may not justify a summary disposition of the constitutional question before us, they are views expressed and joined in over the years by no less than 29 Justices of this Court and therefore merit the greatest respect.[12] Those who now resolve to set those views aside indeed have a heavy burden.

III

Petitioners seek to avoid the authority of the foregoing cases, and the weight of express recognition in the Constitution itself, by reasoning which will not withstand analysis. The thesis of petitioners' case derives from several opinions in which members of this Court have recognized the dynamic nature of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. The

[12] This number includes all the Justices who participated in *Wilkerson*, *Kemmler*, and *Francis* as well as those who joined in the plurality and dissenting opinions in *Trop* and the dissenting opinion in *Weems*.

final meaning of those words was not set in 1791. Rather, to use the words of Chief Justice Warren speaking for a plurality of the Court in *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 100–101:

> "[T]he words of the Amendment are not precise, and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

But this was not new doctrine. It was the approach to the Eighth Amendment taken by Mr. Justice McKenna in his opinion for the Court in *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349 (1910). Writing for four Justices sitting as the majority of the six-man Court hearing the case, he concluded that the clause must be "progressive"; it is not "fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." *Id.*, at 378. The same test was offered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his separate concurrence in *Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S., at 469. While he rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Eighth Amendment fully applicable to the States, he nonetheless found as a matter of due process that the States were prohibited from "treating even one guilty of crime in a manner that violates standards of decency more or less universally accepted."

Whether one views the question as one of due process or of cruel and unusual punishment, as I do for convenience in this case, the issue is essentially the same.[13] The fundamental premise upon which either standard is based is that notions of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or due process do evolve.

[13] See n. 4, *supra*.

Neither the Congress nor any state legislature would today tolerate pillorying, branding, or cropping or nailing of the ears—punishments that were in existence during our colonial era.[14] Should, however, any such punishment be prescribed, the courts would certainly enjoin its execution. See *Jackson* v. *Bishop*, 404 F. 2d 571 (CA8 1968). Likewise no court would approve any method of implementation of the death sentence found to involve unnecessary cruelty in light of presently available alternatives. Similarly, there may well be a process of evolving attitude with respect to the application of the death sentence for particular crimes.[15] See *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S., at 242 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).

But we are not asked to consider the permissibility of any of the several methods employed in carrying out the death sentence. Nor are we asked, at least as part of the core submission in these cases, to determine whether the penalty might be a grossly excessive punishment for some specific criminal conduct. Either inquiry would call for a discriminating evaluation of particular means, or of the relationship between particular conduct and its punishment. Petitioners' principal argument goes far beyond the traditional process of case-by-case inclusion and exclusion. Instead the argument insists on an unprecedented constitutional rule of absolute prohibition of capital punishment for any crime, regardless of its depravity and impact on society. In calling for a precipitous and final judicial end to this form of penalty as offensive to evolving standards of decency, petitioners would have this Court abandon the traditional and more refined approach consistently

[14] See, *e. g.*, *Ex parte Wilson*, 114 U. S. 417, 427–428 (1885).

[15] See Part VII, *infra*.

followed in its prior Eighth Amendment precedents. What they are saying, in effect, is that the evolutionary process has come suddenly to an end; that the ultimate wisdom as to the appropriateness of capital punishment under all circumstances, and for all future generations, has somehow been revealed.

The prior opinions of this Court point with great clarity to reasons why those of us who sit on this Court at a particular time should act with restraint before assuming, contrary to a century of precedent, that we now know the answer for all time to come. First, where as here, the language of the applicable provision provides great leeway and where the underlying social policies are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to read personal preference into the Constitution is understandably great. It is too easy to propound our subjective standards of wise policy under the rubric of more or less universally held standards of decency. See *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 103 (Mr. Chief Justice Warren); 119–120 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter); *Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S., at 470–471 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter); *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 378–379 (Mr. Justice McKenna).

The second consideration dictating judicial self-restraint arises from a proper recognition of the respective roles of the legislative and judicial branches. The designation of punishments for crimes is a matter peculiarly within the sphere of the state and federal legislative bodies. See, *e. g.*, *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S., at 447; *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 103. When asked to encroach on the legislative prerogative we are well counseled to proceed with the utmost reticence. The review of legislative choices, in the performance of our duty to enforce the Constitution, has been characterized most

appropriately by Mr. Justice Holmes as "the gravest and most delicate duty that the Court is called on to perform." *Blodgett* v. *Holden*, 275 U. S. 142, 147–148 (1927) (concurring opinion).

How much graver is that duty when we are not asked to pass on the constitutionality of a single penalty under the facts of a single case but instead are urged to overturn the legislative judgments of 40 State legislatures as well as those of Congress. In so doing is the majority able to claim, as did the Court in *Weems*, that it appreciates "to the fullest the wide range of power that the legislature possesses to adapt its penal laws to conditions as they may exist and punish crimes of men according to their forms and frequency"? 217 U. S., at 379. I think not. No more eloquent statement of the essential separation of powers limitation on our prerogative can be found than the admonition of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in *Trop*. His articulation of the traditional view takes on added significance where the Court undertakes to nullify the legislative judgments of the Congress and four-fifths of the States.

> "What is always basic when the power of Congress to enact legislation is challenged is the appropriate approach to judicial review of congressional legislation . . . . When the power of Congress to pass a statute is challenged, the function of this Court is to determine whether legislative action lies clearly outside the constitutional grant of power to which it has been, or may fairly be, referred. In making this determination, the Court sits in judgment on the action of a co-ordinate branch of the Government while keeping unto itself—as it must under our constitutional system—the final determination of its own power to act. . . .

> "Rigorous observation of the difference between limits of power and wise exercise of power—between questions of authority and questions of prudence—requires the most alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle relationship of two concepts that too easily coalesce. No less does it require a disciplined will to adhere to the difference. It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail, to disregard one's own strongly held view of what is wise in the conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do." 356 U. S., at 119–120.

See also Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion in *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 382.

IV

Although determining the range of available punishments for a particular crime is a legislative function, the very presence of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause within the Bill of Rights requires, in the context of a specific case, that courts decide whether particular acts of the Congress offend that Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the judiciary a similar obligation to scrutinize state legislation. But the proper exercise of that constitutional obligation in the cases before us today must be founded on a full recognition of the several considerations set forth above—the affirmative references to capital punishment in the Constitution, the prevailing

precedents of this Court, the limitations on the exercise of our power imposed by tested principles of judicial self-restraint, and the duty to avoid encroachment on the powers conferred upon state and federal legislatures. In the face of these considerations, only the most conclusive of objective demonstrations could warrant this Court in holding capital punishment *per se* unconstitutional. The burden of seeking so sweeping a decision against such formidable obstacles is almost insuperable. Viewed from this perspective, as I believe it must be, the case against the death penalty falls far short.

Petitioners' contentions are premised, as indicated above, on the long-accepted view that concepts embodied in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments evolve. They present, with skill and persistence, a list of "objective indicators" which are said to demonstrate that prevailing standards of human decency have progressed to the final point of requiring the Court to hold, for all cases and for all time, that capital punishment is unconstitutional.

Briefly summarized, these proffered indicia of contemporary standards of decency include the following: (i) a worldwide trend toward the disuse of the death penalty; [16] (ii) the reflection in the scholarly literature of a progressive rejection of capital punishment founded essentially on moral opposition to such treatment; [17] (iii) the decreasing numbers of executions over the last

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[16] See, *e. g.*, Sellin, The Death Penalty, in ALI, Model Penal Code (Tent. Draft No. 9) (1959); United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Capital Punishment (1968); 2 National Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers, 1351 n. 13 (1970).

[17] The literature on the moral question is legion. Representative collections of the strongly held views on both sides may be found in H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America (1967), and in Royal Comm'n on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence (1949–1953).

40 years and especially over the last decade;[18] (iv) the small number of death sentences rendered in relation to the number of cases in which it might have been imposed;[19] and (v) the indication of public abhorrence of

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[18] United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics No. 46, Capital Punishment 1930–1970 (Aug. 1971) (191 executions during the 1960's; no executions since June 2, 1967); President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Admin. of Justice, Report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 143 (1967) ("The most salient characteristic of capital punishment is that it is infrequently applied.").

Petitioners concede, as they must, that little weight can be given to the lack of executions in recent years. A *de facto* moratorium has existed for five years now while cases challenging the procedures for implementing the capital sentence have been re-examined by this Court. *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183 (1971); *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510 (1968). The infrequency of executions during the years before the moratorium became fully effective may be attributable in part to decisions of this Court giving expanded scope to the criminal procedural protections of the Bill of Rights, especially under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. *E. g., Miranda* v. *Arizona*, 384 U. S. 436 (1966); *Mapp* v. *Ohio*, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). Additionally, decisions of the early 1960's amplifying the scope of the federal habeas corpus remedy also may help account for a reduction in the number of executions. *E. g., Fay* v. *Noia*, 372 U. S. 391 (1963); *Townsend* v. *Sain*, 372 U. S. 293 (1963). The major effect of either expanded procedural protections or extended collateral remedies may well have been simply to postpone the date of execution for some capital offenders, thereby leaving them ultimately in the moratorium limbo.

[19] An exact figure for the number of death sentences imposed by the sentencing authorities—judge or jury—in the various jurisdictions is difficult to determine. But the National Prisoner Statistics show the numbers of persons received at the state and federal prisons under sentence of death. This number, however, does not account for those who may have been sentenced and retained in local facilities during the pendency of their appeals. Accepting with this reservation the NPS figures as a minimum, the most recent statistics

the penalty reflected in the circumstance that executions are no longer public affairs.[20] The foregoing is an incomplete summary but it touches the major bases of petitioners' presentation. Although they are not appropriate for consideration as objective evidence, petitioners strongly urge two additional propositions. They contend, first, that the penalty survives public condemnation only through the infrequency, arbitrariness and discriminatory nature of its application, and, second, that there no longer exists any legitimate justifications for the utilization of the ultimate penalty. These contentions, which have proved persuasive to several of

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show that at least 1,057 persons were sentenced to death during the decade of the 1960's. NPS, *supra*, n. 18, at 9.

No fully reliable statistics are available on the nationwide ratio of death sentences to cases in which death was a statutorily permissible punishment. At oral argument, counsel for petitioner in No. 69-5003 estimated that the ratio is 12 or 13 to one. Transcript of oral argument in *Furman* v. *Georgia*, No. 69-5003, at 11. Others have found a higher correlation. See McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by a Correctional Administrator, 28 Fed. Prob. (No. 2) 11, 12 (1964) (one out of every five, or 20% of persons convicted of murder received the death penalty in California); Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907–1960, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1964) (between 1916 and 1955, 157 out of 652 persons charged with murder received the death sentence in New Jersey—about 20%; between 1956 and 1960, 13 out of 61 received the death sentence—also about 20%); H. Kalven & H. Ziesel, The American Jury 435–436 (1966) (21 of 111 murder cases resulted in death sentences during three representative years during the mid-1950's); see also Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924–1968, 15 Crime & Delinq. 132 (1969).

[20] See, *e. g.*, *California* v. *Anderson*, No. 13,617 (Calif. S. C., Feb. 18, 1972), cert. denied, — U. S. — (1972) (slip op., at 17–19); Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1773, 1783 (1970). But see F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 97–98 (1956) (reprint of testimony before the Royal Comm'n on Capital Punishment).

the Justices comprising the majority, deserve separate consideration and will be considered in the ensuing sections. Before turning to those arguments, I first address the argument based on "objective" factors.

Any attempt to discern contemporary standards of decency through the review of objective factors must take into account several overriding considerations which petitioners choose to discount or ignore. In a democracy the first indicator of the public's attitude must always be found in the legislative judgments of the people's chosen representatives. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion today catalogues the salient statistics. Forty States,[21] the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government still authorize the death penalty for a wide variety of crimes. That number has remained relatively static since the end of World War I. *Ante*, p. —. That does not mean, however, that capital punishment has become a forgotten issue in the legislative arena. As recently as January, 1971, Congress approved the death penalty for congressional assassination. 18 U. S. C. § 351. In 1965 Congress added the death penalty for presidential and vice presidential assassinations. 18 U. S. C. § 1751. Additionally, the aircraft piracy statute passed in 1961 also carried the death penalty. 49 U. S. C. § 1472 (i). MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion catalogues the impressive ease with which each of these statutes was approved. *Ante*, p. —. On the converse side, a bill proposing the abolition of capital punishment for all federal crimes was introduced in 1967 but failed to reach the Senate floor.[22]

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[21] Nine States have abolished capital punishment without resort to the courts. See H. Bedau, *supra*, n. 17, at 39. California has been the only State to abolish capital punishment judicially. *California* v. *Anderson*, No. 13,617 (Calif. S. C., Feb. 18, 1972), cert. denied, — U. S. — (1972).

[22] Hearings on S. 1760 before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1968).

At the state level, New York, among other States, has recently undertaken reconsideration of its capital crimes. A law passed in 1967 restricted the use of capital punishment to the crimes of murder of a police officer and murder by a person serving a sentence of life imprisonment. N. Y. Penal Code § 125.30 (McKinney's 1967).

I pause here to state that I am at a loss to understand how those urging this Court to pursue a course of *absolute* abolition as a matter of constitutional judgment can draw any support from the New York experience. As is also the case with respect to recent legislative activity in Canada [23] and Great Britain.[24] New York's decision to restrict the availability of the death penalty is a product of refined and discriminating legislative judgment, reflecting not the total rejection of capital punishment as inherently cruel, but indicating a desire to limit it to those circumstances in which legislative judgment deems retention to be in the public interest. No such legislative flexibility is permitted by the contrary course petitioners urge this Court to follow.[25]

In addition to the New York experience, a number of other States have undertaken reconsideration of capital punishment in recent years. In four States the penalty has been put to a vote of the people through public referenda—a means likely to supply objective evidence of

[23] Canada has recently undertaken a five-year experiment—similar to that conducted in England—abolishing the death penalty for most crimes. -I Acts of Canada (16 & 17 Eliz. II) 145 (1967). However, capital punishment is still prescribed for some crimes, including murder of a police officer or corrections official, treason, and piracy.

[24] Great Britain, after many years of controversy over the death penalty, undertook a five-year experiment in abolition in 1965. Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, 2 Pub. Gen. Acts, c. 71, p. 1577. Although abolition became final in 1969, the penalty was retained for several crimes, including treason, piracy, and dockyards arson.

[25] See n. 62, *infra*.

community standards. In Oregon a referendum seeking abolition of capital punishment failed in 1958 but was subsequently approved in 1964.[26] Two years later the penalty was approved in Colorado by a wide margin.[27] In Massachusetts, in 1968, in an advisory referendum, the voters there likewise recommended retention of the penalty. In 1970, approximately 64% of the voters in Illinois approved the penalty.[28] In addition, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws reports that legislative committees in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland recommended abolition, while committees in New Jersey and Florida recommended retention.[29] The legislative views of other States have been summarized by Professor Hugo Bedau in his compilation of sources on capital punishment entitled The Death Penalty in America:

> "What our legislative representatives think in the two score states which still have the death penalty may be inferred from the fate of the bills to repeal or modify the death penalty filed during recent years in the legislatures of more than half of these states. In about a dozen instances, the bills emerged from committee for a vote. But in none except Delaware did they become law. In those states where these bills were brought to the floor of the legislatures, the vote in most instances wasn't even close." [30]

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[26] See H. Bedau, *supra*, n. 17, at 233.

[27] *Ibid.* (approximately 65% of the voters approved the death penalty).

[28] See Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, 35 Fed. Prob. (No. 2) 32, 35 (1971).

[29] Natl. Comm'n, *supra*, n. 16, at 1365.

[30] H. Bedau, *supra*, n. 17, at 232. See, *e. g.*, *Connecticut* v. *Davis*, 158 Conn. 341, 356–359, 260 A. 2d 587, 595–596 (1969), in which

This recent history of activity with respect to legislation concerning the dealth penalty abundantly refutes the abolitionist position.

The second and even more direct source of information reflecting the public's attitude toward capital punishment is the jury. In *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), MR. JUSTICE STEWART, joined by Justices BRENNAN and MARSHALL, characterized the jury's historic function in the sentencing process in the following terms:

> "[T]he jury is given broad discretion to decide whether or not death *is* 'the proper penalty' in a given case, and a juror's general views about capital punishment play an inevitable role in any such decision.
>
> "A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror. . . . Guided by neither rule nor standard, . . . a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more—and must do nothing less—than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.
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> . . . . . .
>
> "[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system—a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the

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the Connecticut Supreme Court points out that the state legislature had considered the question of abolition during the 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, and 1969 sessions and had "specifically declined to abolish the death penalty" every time.

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' *Trop* v. *Dulles*, . . ." [31]

Any attempt to discern, therefore, where the prevailing standards of decency lie must take careful account of the jury's response to the question of capital punishment. During the 1960's juries returned in excess of a thousand death sentences, a rate of approximately two per week. Whether it is true that death sentences were returned in less than 10% of the cases as petitioners estimate or whether some higher percentage is more accurate,[32] these totals simply do not support petitioners' assertion at oral argument that "the death penalty is virtually unanimously repudiated and condemned by the conscience of contemporary society." [33] It is also worthy of note that the annual rate of death sentences has remained relatively constant over the last 10 years and that the figure for 1970—127 sentences—is the highest annual total since 1961.[34] It is true that the sentencing rate might be expected to rise, rather than remain constant, when the number of violent crimes increases as it has in this country.[35] And it may be conceded that the constancy in these statistics indicates the unwillingness of juries to demand the ultimate pen-

[31] *Id.*, at 519 and n. 15. See also *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S., at 201–202; *Williams* v. *New York*, 337 U. S. 241, 253 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("In our criminal courts the jury sits as the representative of the community."); W. Douglas, We the Judges 389 (1956); Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443, 460 (1899).

[32] See n. 19, *supra*.

[33] Transcript of Oral Argument in *Aikens* v. *California*, No. 68-5027, at 21. Although the petition for certiorari in this case was dismissed after oral argument, *Aikens* v. *California*, — U. S. — (1972), the same counsel argued both this case and *Furman*. He stated at the outset that his argument was equally applicable to each case.

[34] National Prisoner Statistics, *supra*, n. 18.

[35] FBI, Uniform Crime Reports—1970, 7–14 (1971).

alty in many cases where it might be imposed. But these considerations fall short of indicating that juries are imposing the death penalty with such rarity as to justify this Court in reading into this circumstance a public rejection of capital punishment.[36]

One must conclude, contrary to petitioners' submission, that the indicators most likely to reflect the public's view—legislative bodies, state referenda and the juries which have the actual responsibility—do not support the contention that evolving standards of decency require total abolition of capital punishment.[37] Indeed,

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[36] Public opinion polls, while of little probative relevance, corroborate substantially the conclusion derived from examining legislative activity and jury sentencing—opinion on capital punishment is "fairly divided." *Francis* v. *Resweber*, 327 U. S., at 470 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring). See, *e. g.*, *Witherspoon* v. *Illinois*, 391 U. S., at 520, n. 16 (1966 poll finding 42% in favor of the death penalty and 47% opposed); Goldberg & Dershowitz, *supra*, n. 20, at 1781 n. 39 (1969 poll shows 51% in favor of retention—the same percentage as in 1961); H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 231–241 (1967); Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, 35 Fed. Prob. (No. 2) 32, 34–35 (1971).

[37] If, as petitioners suggest, the judicial branch itself reflects the prevailing standards of human decency in our society, it may be relevant to note the conclusion reached by state courts in recent years on the question of the acceptability of capital punishment. In the last five years alone, since the *de facto* "moratorium" on executions began (see n. 18, *supra*), the appellate courts of 26 States have passed on the constitutionality of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment and under similar provisions of most state constitutions. Every court, except the California Supreme Court (*California* v. *Anderson*, No. 13,617 (Calif. S. C., Feb. 18, 1972), cert. denied, —, U. S. — (1972), has found the penalty to be constitutional. Those States, and the year of the most recent decision on the issue, are: Alabama (1971); Arizona (1969); Colorado (1967); Connecticut (1969); Delaware (1971); Florida (1969); Georgia (1971); Illinois (1970); Kansas (1968); Kentucky (1971); Louisiana (1971); Maryland (1971); Missouri (1971); Nebraska (1967); Nevada (1970); New Jersey (1971); New Mexico (1969); North Carolina (1972); Ohio (1971); Oklahoma (1971); South Carolina

the weight of the evidence indicates that the public generally has not accepted either the morality or the social merit of the views so passionately advocated by the articulate spokesmen for abolition. But however one may assess the amorphous ebb and flow of public opinion generally on this volatile issue, this type of inquiry lies at the periphery—not the core—of the judicial process in constitutional cases. The assessment of popular opinion is essentially a legislative, not a judicial, function.

V

Petitioners seek to salvage their thesis by arguing that the infrequency and discriminatory nature of the actual resort to the ultimate penalty tends to diffuse public opposition. We are told that the penalty is imposed exclusively on uninfluential minorities—"the poor, the powerless, the personally ugly and socially unacceptable." [38] It is urged that this pattern of application assures that large segments of the public will be

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(1970); Texas (1971); Utah (1969); Virginia (1971); Washington (1971). While the majority of these state court opinions do not give the issue more than summary exposition, many have considered the question at some length, and, indeed, some have considered the issue under the "evolving standards" rubric. See, *e. g.*, *Connecticut* v. *Davis*, 158 Conn. 341, 356–359, 260 A. 2d 587, 595–596 (1969); *Louisiana* v. *Crook*, 253 La. 961, 967–970, 221 So. 2d 473, 475–476 (1969); *Bartholomey* v. *Maryland*, 260 Md. 504, 273 A. 2d 164 (1971); *Nebraska* v. *Alvarez*, 182 Neb. 358, 366–367, 154 N. W. 2d 746, 751–752 (1961); *New Mexico* v. *Pace*, 80 N. M. 364, 371–372, 456 P. 2d 197, 204–205 (1969). Every federal court that has passed on the issue has ruled that the death penalty is not *per se* unconstitutional. See, *e. g.*, *Ralph* v. *Warden*, 438 F. 2d 786, 793 (CA4 1971); *Jackson* v. *Dickson*, 325 F. 2d 573, 575 (CA9 1963), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 957 (1964).

[38] Petitioner's Brief in No. 68–5027, at 51. Although the *Aikens* case is no longer before us (see n. 33, *supra*), the petitioners in *Furman* and *Jackson* have incorporated petitioner's brief in *Aikens* by reference. See Petitioner's Brief in No. 69–5003, at 11–12; Petitioner's Brief in No. 69–5030, at 11–12.

either uninformed or unconcerned and will have no reason to measure the punishment against prevailing moral standards.

Implicitly, this argument concedes the unsoundness of petitioners' contention, examined above under Part IV, that objective evidence shows a present and widespread community rejection of the death penalty. It is now said, in effect, not that capital punishment presently offends our citizenry, but that the public *would* be offended *if* the penalty were enforced in a nondiscriminatory manner against a significant percentage of those charged with capital crimes and *if* the public were thereby made aware of the moral issues surrounding capital punishment. Rather than merely registering the objective indicators on a judicial balance, we are asked ultimately to rest a far-reaching constitutional determination on a prediction regarding the subjective judgments of the mass of our people under hypothetical assumptions that may or may not be realistic.

Apart from the impermissibility of basing a constitutional judgment of this magnitude on such speculative assumptions, the argument suffers from other defects. If, as petitioners urge, we are to engage in speculation, it is not at all certain that the public would experience deep-felt revulsion if the States were to execute as many sentenced capital offenders this year as they executed in the mid-1930's.[39] It seems more likely that

[39] In 1935 available statistics indicate that 184 convicted murderers were executed. That is the highest annual total for any year since statistics have become available. NPS, *supra*, n. 18. 1935 is the year chosen by petitioners in stating their thesis:

"If, in fact, 184 murderers were executed in this year 1971, we submit it is palpable that the public conscience of the Nation would be profoundly and fundamentally revolted, and that the death penalty for murder would be abolished forthwith as the atavistic horror that it is." Petitioner's Brief in No. 68–5027, at 26 (see n. 38, *supra*).

public reaction, rather than being characterized by undifferentiated rejection, would depend upon the facts and circumstances surrounding each particular case.

Members of this Court know, from the petitions and appeals that come before us regularly, that brutish and revolting murders continue to occur with disquieting frequency. Indeed, murders are so commonplace in our society that only the most sensational receive significant and sustained publicity. It could hardly be suggested that in any of these highly publicized murder cases—the several senseless assassinations or the too numerous shocking multiple murders that have stained this country's recent history—the public has exhibited any signs of "revulsion" at the thought of executing the convicted murderers. The public outcry, as we all know, has been quite to the contrary. Furthermore, there is little reason to suspect that the public's reaction would differ significantly in response to other less publicized murders. It is certainly arguable that many such murders, because of their senselessness or barbarousness, would evoke a public demand for the death penalty rather than a public rejection of that alternative. Nor is there any rational basis for arguing that the public reaction to any of these crimes would be muted if the murderer were "rich and powerful." The demand for the ultimate sanction might well be greater, as a wealthy killer is hardly a sympathetic figure. While there might be specific cases in which capital punishment would be regarded as excessive and shocking to the conscience of the community, it can hardly be argued that the public's dissatisfaction with the penalty in particular cases would translate into a demand for absolute abolition.

In pursuing the foregoing speculation, I do not suggest that it is relevant to the appropriate disposition of these cases. The purpose of the digression is to indicate that judicial decisions cannot be founded on such

speculations and assumptions however appealing they may seem.

But the discrimination argument does not rest alone on a projection of the assumed effect on public opinion of more frequent executions. Much also is made of the undeniable fact that the death penalty has a greater impact on the lower economic strata of society, which include a relatively higher percentage of persons of minority racial and ethnic group backgrounds. The argument drawn from this fact is two-pronged. In part it is merely an extension of the speculation approach pursued by petitioners, *i. e.*, that public revulsion is suppressed in callous apathy because the penalty does not affect persons from the white middle class who comprise the majority in this country. This aspect, however, adds little to the infrequency rationalization for public apathy which I have found unpersuasive.

As MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S opinion today demonstrates, the argument does have a more troubling aspect. It is his contention that if the average citizen were aware of the disproportionate burden of capital punishment borne by the "poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged," he would find the penalty "shocking to his conscience and sense of justice" and would not stand for its further use. *Ante*, pp. ———. This argument, like the apathy rationale, calls for further speculation on the part of the Court. It also illuminates the quicksands upon which we are asked to base this decision. Indeed, the two contentions seem to require contradictory assumptions regarding the public's moral attitude toward capital punishment. The apathy argument is predicated on the assumption that the penalty is used against the less influential elements of society, that the public is fully aware of this, and that it tolerates use of capital punishment only because of a callous indifference to the offenders who are sentenced. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S

argument, on the other hand, rests on the contrary assumption that the public does not know against whom the penalty is enforced and that if the public were educated to this fact it would find the punishment intolerable. *Ante*, p. —. Neither assumption can claim to be an entirely accurate portrayal of public attitude; for some acceptance of capital punishment might be a consequence of hardened apathy based on the knowledge of infrequent and uneven application, while for others acceptance may grow only out of ignorance. More significantly, however, neither supposition acknowledges what, for me, is a more basic flaw.

Certainly the claim is justified that this criminal sanction falls more heavily on the relatively impoverished and underprivileged elements of society. The "have-nots" in every society always have been subject to greater pressure to commit crimes and to fewer constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens. This is, indeed, a tragic byproduct of social and economic deprivation, but it is not an argument of constitutional proportions under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. The same discriminatory impact argument could be made with equal force and logic with respect to those sentenced to prison terms. The Due Process Clause admits of no distinction between the deprivation of "life" and the deprivation of "liberty." If discriminatory impact renders capital punishment cruel and unusual, it likewise renders invalid most of the prescribed penalties for crimes of violence. The root causes of the higher incidence of criminal penalties on "minorities and the poor" will not be cured by abolishing the system of penalties. Nor, indeed, could any society have a viable system of criminal justice if sanctions were abolished or ameliorated because most of those who commit crimes happen to be underprivileged. The basic problem results not from the penalties imposed

for criminal conduct but from social and economic factors that have plagued humanity since the beginning of recorded history, frustrating all efforts to create in any country at any time the perfect society in which there are no "poor," no "minorities" and no "underprivileged." [40] The causes underlying this problem are unrelated to the constitutional issue before the Court.

Finally, yet another theory for abolishing the death penalty—reflected in varying degrees in each of the majority's opinions today—is predicated on the discriminatory impact argument. Quite part from measuring the public's acceptance or rejection of the death penalty under the "standards of decency" rationale, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS finds the punishment cruel and unusual because it is "arbitrarily" invoked. He finds that "the basic theme of equal protection is implicit" in the Eighth Amendment, and that the Amendment is violated when jury sentencing may be characterized as arbitrary or discriminatory. *Ante*, p. —. While MR. JUSTICE STEWART does not purport to rely on notions of equal protection, he also rests primarily on what he views to be a history of arbitrariness. *Ante*, p. —.[41] What-

[40] Not all murders, and certainly not all crimes, are committed by persons classifiable as "underprivileged." Many crimes of violence are committed by professional criminals who willingly choose to prey upon society as an easy and remunerative way of life. Moreover, the terms "underprivileged," the "poor" and the "powerless" are relative and inexact, often conveying subjective connotations which vary widely depending upon the viewpoint and purpose of the user.

[41] Similarly, MR. JUSTICE WHITE exhibits concern for a lack of any "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many in which it is not." *Ante*, p. —. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL treat the arbitrariness question in the same manner that it is handled by petitioners—as an element of the approach calling for total abolition.

ever may be the facts with respect to jury sentencing, this argument calls for a reconsideration of the "standards" aspects of the Court's decision in *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183 (1971). Although that is the unmistakable thrust of these opinions today, I see no reason to reassess the standards question considered so carefully in Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court last Term. Having so recently reaffirmed our historic dedication to entrusting the sentencing function to the jury's "untrammelled discretion" (*id.*, at 207), it is difficult to see how the Court can now hold the entire process constitutionally defective under the Eighth Amendment. For all of these reasons I find little merit in the various discrimination arguments, at least in the several lights in which they have been cast in these cases.

Although not presented by any of the petitioners today, a different argument, premised on the Equal Protection Clause, might well be made. If a Negro defendant, for instance, could demonstrate that members of his race were being singled out for more severe punishment than others charged with the same offense, a constitutional violation might be established. This was the contention made in *Maxwell* v. *Bishop*, 398 F. 2d 138 (CA8 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 398 U. S. 262 (1970), in which the Eighth Circuit was asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus setting aside a death sentence imposed on a Negro defendant convicted of rape. In that case substantial statistical evidence was introduced tending to show a pronounced disproportion in the number of Negroes receiving death sentences for rape in parts of Arkansas and elsewhere in the South. That evidence was not excluded but was found to be insufficient to show discrimination in sentencing in Maxwell's trial. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

then sitting on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, concluded:

> "The petitioner's argument is an interesting one and we are not disposed to say that it could not have some validity and weight in certain circumstances. Like the trial court, however . . . we feel that the argument does not have validity and pertinent application to Maxwell's case. . . .
>
> "We are not yet ready to condemn and upset the result reached in every case of a Negro rape defendant in the State of Arkansas on the basis of broad theories of social and statistical injustice. . . .
>
> "We do not say there is no ground for suspicion that the death penalty for rape may have been discriminatorily applied over the decades in that large area of states whose statutes provide for it. There are recognizable indicators of this. But . . . improper state practice of the past does not automatically invalidate a procedure of the present. . . ." *Id.*, at 146–148.

I agree that discriminatory application of the death penalty in the past, admittedly indefensible, is no justification for holding today that capital punishment is invalid in all cases in which sentences were handed out to members of the class discriminated against. But *Maxwell* does point the way to a means of raising the equal protection challenge that is more consonant with precedent and the Constitution's mandates than the several courses pursued by today's majority opinions.

A final comment on the racial discrimination problem seems appropriate. The possibility of racial bias in the trial and sentencing process has diminished in recent years. The segregation of our society in decades past, which contributed substantially to the severity of punishment for interracial crimes, is now no longer prev-

alent in this country. Likewise the day is past when juries did not represent the minority group elements of the community. The assurance of fair trials for all citizens is greater today than at any previous time in our history. Because standards of criminal justice have "evolved" in a manner favorable to the accused, discriminatory imposition of capital punishment in far less likely today than in the past.

VI

Petitioner in *Branch* v. *Texas*, No. 69–5031, and to a lesser extent the petitioners in the other cases before us today, urge that capital punishment is cruel and unusual because it no longer serves any rational legislative interests. Before turning to consider whether any of the traditional aims of punishment justify the death penalty, I should make clear the context in which I approach this aspect of the cases.

First, I find no support—in the language of the Constitution, in its history, or in the cases arising under it—for the view that this Court may invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe penalties adequate to serve the ends of penology. While the cases affirm our authority to prohibit punishments that are cruelly inhumane (*e. g.*, *Wilkinson* v. *Utah*, 99 U. S., at 135–136; *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S., at 447), and punishments that are cruelly excessive in that they are disproportionate to particular crimes (see Part VII, *infra*), the precedents of this Court afford no basis for striking down a particular form of punishment because we may be persuaded that means less stringent would be equally efficacious.

Secondly, if we were free to question the justifications for the use of capital punishment, a heavy burden would rest on those who attack the legislatures' judgments to prove the lack of rational justifications. This Court has long held that legislative decisions in this area, which

lie within the special competency of that branch, are entitled to a presumption of validity. See, *e. g., Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 103; *Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S., at 470 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S., at 378–379; *In re Kemmler*, 136 U. S., at 449.

I come now to consider, subject to the reservations above expressed, the two justifications most often cited for the retention of capital punishment. The concept of retribution—though popular for centuries—is now criticized as unworthy of a civilized people. Yet this Court has acknowledged the existence of a retributive element in criminal sanctions and has never heretofore found it impermissible. In *Williams* v. *New York*, 337 U. S. 241 (1944), Mr. Justice Black stated that,

> "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." *Id.*, at 247–248.

It is clear, however, that the Court did not reject retribution altogether. The record in that case indicated that one of the reasons why the trial judge imposed the death penalty was his sense of revulsion at the "shocking details of the crime." *Id.*, at 244. Although his motivation was clearly retributive, the Court upheld the trial judge's sentence.[42] Similarly, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL noted in his plurality opinion in *Powell* v. *Texas*, 392 U. S. 514, 530 (1968), that this Court "has never held that anything in the Constitution requires

[42] In *Morissette* v. *United States*, 342 U. S. 246 (1952), Mr. Justice Jackson spoke of "the tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution." *Id.*, at 250–251. He also noted that the penalties for invasions of the rights of property are high as a consequence of the "public demand for retribution." *Id.*, at 260.

that penal sanctions be designed solely to achieve therapeutic or rehabilitative effects." [43]

While retribution alone may seem an unworthy justification in a moral sense, its utility in a system of criminal justice requiring public support has long been recognized. Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls of the Court of Appeal in England, testified on this subject before the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment:

> "Many are inclined to test the efficacy of punishment solely by its value as a deterrent: but this is too narrow a view. Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing: in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else. If this were so, we should not send to prison a man who was guilty of motor manslaughter, but only disqualify him from driving; but would public opinion be content with this? The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-doer

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[43] See also *Massiah* v. *United States*, 377 U. S. 201, 207 (1964) (WHITE, J., dissenting) (noting the existence of a "profound dispute about whether we should punish, deter, rehabilitate or cure"); *Robinson* v. *California*, 370 U. S. 660, 674 (1962) (DOUGLAS, J., concurring); *Francis* v. *Resweber*, 329 U. S. 459, 470-471 (1947) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's admonition that the Court is not empowered to act simply because of "feelings of revulsion against the State's insistence on its pound of flesh"); *United States* v. *Lovett*, 328 U. S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). ("Punishment presupposes an offense, not necessarily an act previously declared criminal, but an act for which retribution is exacted.").

deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not." [44]

The view expressed by Lord Denning was cited approvingly in the Royal Commission's Report, recognizing "a strong and widespread demand for retribution." [45] MR. JUSTICE STEWART makes much the same point in his opinion today when he concludes that expression of man's retributive instincts in the sentencing process "serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law." *Ante*, p. —. The view, moreover, is not without respectable support in the jurisprudential literature in this country,[46] despite a substantial body of opinion to the contrary.[47] And it is conceded on all sides that, not infrequently, cases arise that are so shocking or offensive that the public demands the ultimate penalty for the transgressor.

Deterrence is a more appealing justification, although opinions again differ widely. Indeed, the deterrence issue lies at the heart of much of the debate between the abolitionists and retentionists.[48] Statistical studies, based primarily on trends in States that have abolished

[44] Royal Comm'n on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, 207 (1949–1953) (Statement of Lord Denning).

[45] Royal Comm'n on Capital Punishment, Report, at 18, ¶ 53 (1949–1953) (Cmd. No. 8932).

[46] M. Cohen, Reason and Law 50 (1950); H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 11–12 (1968); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401 (1958).

[47] The authorities are collected in Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 1268, 1297–1301 (1968). The competing contentions are summarized in the Working Papers of the Natl. Comm'n on Reform of Federal Crim. Laws, *supra*, n. 16, at 1358–1359. See also the persuasive treatment of this issue by Dr. Karl Menninger in The Crime of Punishment 190–218 (1966).

[48] See *e. g.*, H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 260 (1967); Natl. Comm'n, *supra*, n. 16, at 1352.

the penalty, tend to support the view that the death penalty has not been proved to be a superior deterrent.[49] Some dispute the validity of this conclusion,[50] pointing out that the studies do not show that the death penalty has no deterrent effect on any categories of crimes. On the basis of the literature and studies currently available, I find myself in agreement with the conclusions drawn by the Royal Commission following its exhaustive study of this issue:

> "The general conclusion which we reach, after careful review of all the evidence we have been able to obtain as to the deterrent effect of capital punishment, may be stated as follows. *Prima facie* the penalty of death is likely to have a stronger effect as a deterrent to normal human beings than any other form of punishment, and there is some evidence (though no convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so. But this effect does not operate universally or uniformly, and there are many offenders on whom it is limited and may often be negligible. It is accordingly important to view this question in a just perspective and not base a penal policy in relation to murder on exaggerated estimates of the uniquely deterrent force of the death penalty." [51]

Only recently this Court was called on to consider the deterrence argument in relation to punishment by fines for public drunkenness. *Powell* v. *Texas*, 392 U. S. 514 (1968). The Court was unwilling to strike down the

[49] See Sellin, The Death Penalty, *supra*, n. 16, at 19–52.

[50] The countervailing considerations, tending to undercut the force of Professor Sellin's statistical studies, are collected in Natl. Comm'n, *supra*, n. 16, at 1354; H. Bedau, *supra*, n. 48, at 265–266; Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433, 455–460 (1957).

[51] Report of the Royal Comm'n, *supra*, n. 45, at 24, ¶ 68.

Texas statute on grounds that it lacked a rational foundation. What MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL said there would seem to have equal applicability in this case:

> "The long-standing and still raging debate over the validity of the deterrence justification for penal sanctions has not reached any sufficiently clear conclusions to permit it to be said that such sanctions are ineffective in any particular context for any particular group of people who are able to appreciate the consequences of their acts. . . ." *Id.*, at 531.

As I noted at the outset of this section, legislative judgments as to the efficacy of particular punishments are presumptively rational and may not be struck down under the Eighth Amendment because this Court may think that some alternate sanction would be more appropriate. Even if such judgments were within the judicial prerogative, petitioners have failed to show that there exist no justifications for the legislative enactments challenged in these cases.[52] While the evidence and arguments advanced by petitioners might have proved profoundly persuasive if addressed to a legislative body, they do not approach the showing traditionally required before a court declares that the legislature has acted irrationally.

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[52] It is worthy of note that the heart of the argument here—that there are no legitimate justifications—was impliedly repudiated last Term by both the majority and dissenting opinions in *McGautha* v. *California*, 402 U. S. 183 (1971). The argument in that case centered on the proposition that due process requires that the standards governing the jury's exercise of its sentencing function be elucidated. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent made clear, whatever standards might be thought to exist arise out of the list of justifications for the death penalty—retribution, deterrence, etc. *Id.*, at 284. If no such standards exist, the controversy last Term was a hollow one indeed.

VII

In two of the cases before us today juries imposed sentences of death after convictions for rape.[53] In these cases we are urged to hold that even if capital punishment is permissible for some crimes, it is a cruel and unusual punishment for this crime. These petitioners rely on the Court's opinions holding that the Eighth Amendment, in addition to prohibiting punishments deemed barbarous and inhumane, also condemns punishments that are greatly disproportionate to the crime charged. This reading of the Amendment was first expressed by Mr. Justice Field in his dissenting opinion in *O'Neil* v. *Vermont*, 144 U. S. 323, 337 (1892), a case in which a defendant charged with a large number of violations of Vermont's liquor laws received a fine in excess of $6,600, or a 54-year jail sentence if the fine was not paid. The majority refused to consider the question on the ground that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the States. The dissent, after carefully examining the history of that Amendment and the Fourteenth, concluded that its prohibition was binding on Vermont and that it was directed against "all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportionate to the offenses charged." *Id.*, at 339–340.[54]

The Court, in *Weems* v. *United States*, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), adopted Mr. Justice Field's view. The defendant, in *Weems*, charged with falsifying Government documents, had been sentenced to serve 15 years in *cadena temporal*, a punishment which included carrying chains at the wrists and ankles and the perpetual loss of the right to vote and hold office. Finding the sen-

[53] *Jackson* v. *Georgia*, No. 69–5030; *Branch* v. *Texas*, No. 69–5031.

[54] Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Brewer, dissented separately but agreed that the State had inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment. *Id.*, at 371.

tence grossly excessive in length and condition of imprisonment, the Court struck it down. This notion of disproportionality—that particular sentences may be cruelly excessive for particular crimes—has been cited with approval in more recent decisions of this Court. See *Robinson* v. *California,* 370 U. S. 660, 667 (1962); *Trop* v. *Dulles,* 356 U. S. 86, 100 (1958); see also *Howard* v. *Fleming,* 141 U. S. 126, 135–136 (1903).

These cases, while providing a rationale for gauging the constitutionality of capital sentences imposed for rape, also indicate the existence of necessary limitations on the judicial function. The use of limiting adjectives in the various expressions of this test found in the opinions—*grossly* excessive, *greatly* disproportionate—emphasizes that the Court's power to strike down punishments as excessive must be exercised with the greatest circumspection. As I have noted earlier, nothing in the history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause indicates that it may properly be utilized by the judiciary to strike down punishments—authorized by legislatures and imposed by juries—in any but the extraordinary case. This Court is not empowered to sit as a court of sentencing review, implementing the personal views of its members on the proper role of penology. To do so is to usurp a function committed to the Legislative Branch and beyond the power and competency of this Court.

Operating within these narrow limits, I find it quite impossible to declare the death sentence grossly excessive for all rapes. Rape is widely recognized as among the most serious of violent crimes, as witnessed by the very fact that it is punishable by death in 16 States and by life imprisonment in most other States.[55] The

[55] In addition to the States in which rape is a capital offense, statutes in 28 States prescribe life imprisonment as a permissible punishment for at least some category of rape. Also indicative of

several reasons why rape stands so high on the list of serious crimes are well known: It is widely viewed as the most atrocious of intrusions upon the privacy and dignity of the victim; never is the crime committed accidentally; rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated; often the victim suffers serious physical injury; the psychological impact can often be as great as the physical consequences; in a real sense, the threat of both types of injury is always present.[56] For these reasons, and for the reasons arguing against abolition of the death penalty altogether, the excessiveness rationale provides no basis for rejection of the penalty for rape in all cases.

The argument that the death penalty for rape lacks rational justification because less severe punishments might be viewed as accomplishing the proper goals of penology is as inapposite here as it was in considering *per se* abolition. See Part VI *supra*. The state of knowledge with respect to the deterrent value of the sentence for this crime is inconclusive.[57] Moreover, what has been said about the concept of retribution applies with equal force where the crime is rape. There are many cases in which the sordid, heinous nature of a particular crime, demeaning, humiliating and often physically or psychologically traumatic, will call for

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the seriousness with which the crime of rape is viewed, is the fact that in nine of the 10 States that have abolished death as a punishment for any crime, the maximum term of years for rape is the same as for first-degree murder. Statistical studies have shown that the average prison term served by rapists is longer than for any category of offense other than murder. J. MacDonald, Rape—Offenders and Their Victims 298 (1971).

[56] J. MacDonald, *supra*, n. 55, at 63–64; Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1077 (1964).

[57] See J. MacDonald, *supra*, n. 55, at 314; Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 703.

public condemnation. In a period in our country's history when the frequency of this crime is increasing alarmingly,[58] it is indeed a grave event for the Court to take from the States whatever deterrent and retributive weight the death penalty retains.

Other less sweeping applications of the disproportionality concept have been suggested. Recently the Fourth Circuit struck down a death sentence in *Ralph* v. *Warden*, 438 F. 2d 786 (CA4 1970), holding that the death penalty was an appropriate punishment for rape only where life is "endangered." Chief Judge Haynsworth, who joined in the panel's opinion, wrote separately in denying the State of Maryland's petition for rehearing in order to make clear the basis for his joinder. He stated that, for him, the appropriate test was not whether life was endangered, but whether the victim in fact suffered "grievous physical or psychological harm." *Id.*, at 744. See *Rudolph* v. *Alabama*, 375 U. S. 889 (1963) (dissent from the denial of certiorari).

It seems to me that both of these tests depart from established principles and also raise serious practical problems. How are those cases in which the victim's life is endangered to be distinguished from those in which no danger is found? The threat of serious injury is implicit in the definition of rape; the victim is either forced into submission by physical violence or by the threat of violence. Certainly that test would provide little comfort for either of the rape defendants in the cases presently before us. Both criminal acts were accomplished only after a violent struggle. Petitioner Jackson held a scissors blade against his victim's neck. Petitioner Branch had less difficulty subduing his 65-year-old victim. Both assailants threatened to kill their vic-

[58] FBI, Uniform Crime Reports—1970, 14 (1971) (during the 1960's the incidence of rape rose 121%).

tims. See MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS' opinion, ante, pp. ——. The alternate test, limiting the penalty to cases in which the victim suffers physical or emotional harm, might present even greater problems of application. While most physical effects may be seen and objectively measured, the emotional impact may be impossible to gauge at any particular point in time. The extent and duration of psychological trauma may not be known or ascertainable prior to the date of trial.

While I reject each of these attempts to establish specific categories of cases in which the death penalty may be deemed excessive, I view them as groping toward what is for me the appropriate application of the Eighth Amendment. While in my view the disproportionality test may not be used either to strike down the death penalty for rape altogether or to install the Court as a tribunal for sentencing review, that test may find its application in the peculiar circumstances of specific cases. Its utilization should be limited to the rare case in which the death penalty is rendered for a crime technically falling within the legislatively defined class but factually falling outside the likely legislative intent in creating the category. Specific rape cases (and specific homicides as well) can be imagined in which the conduct of the accused would render the ultimate penalty a grossly excessive punishment. Although this case-by-case approach may seem painfully slow and inadequate to those who wish the Court to assume an activist legislative role in reforming criminal punishments, it is the approach dictated both by our prior opinions and by a due recognition of the limitations of judicial power. This approach, rather than the majority's more pervasive and less refined judgment, marks for me the appropriate course under the Eighth Amendment.

VIII

I now return to the overriding question in these cases: whether this Court, acting in conformity with the Constitution, can justify its judgment to abolish capital punishment as heretofore known in this country. It is important to keep in focus the enormity of the step undertaken by the Court today. Not only does it invalidate hundreds of state and federal laws, it deprives those jurisdictions of the power to legislate with respect to capital punishment in the future, except in a manner consistent with the cloudily outlined views of those Justices who do not purport to undertake total abolition. Nothing short of an amendment to the United States Constitution can reverse the Court's judgment. Meanwhile, all flexibility is foreclosed. The normal democratic process, as well as the opportunities for the several States to respond to the will of their people expressed through ballot referenda (as in Massachusetts, Illinois, and Colorado),[59] is now shut off.

The sobering disadvantage of constitutional adjudication of this magnitude is the universality and permanence of the judgment. The enduring merit of legislative action is its responsiveness to the democratic process, and to revision and change: mistaken judgments may be corrected and refinements perfected. In England[60] and Canada[61] critical choices were made after studies canvassing all competing views, and in those countries revisions may be made in light of experience.[62]

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[59] See text accompanying nn. 27 & 28, *supra*.

[60] See n. 24, *supra*.

[61] See n. 23, *supra*.

[62] Recent legislative activity in New York State serves to underline the preferability of legislative action over constitutional adjudication. New York abolished the death penalty for murder in 1965,

As recently as 1967 a presidential commission did consider, as part of an overall study of crime in this country, whether the death penalty should be abolished. The commission's unanimous recommendation was as follows:

> "The question whether capital punishment is an appropriate sanction is a policy decision to be made by each State. Where it is retained, the types of offenses for which it is available should be strictly limited, and the law should be enforced in an even-handed and nondiscriminatory manner, with procedures for review of death sentences that are fair and expeditious. When a State finds that it cannot administer the penalty in such a manner, or that the death penalty is being imposed but not carried into effect, the penalty should be abandoned." [63]

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leaving only a few crimes for which the penalty is still available. See text accompanying n. 25, *supra*. On April 27, 1972, a bill that would have restored the death penalty was considered by the State Assembly. After several hours of heated debate, the bill was narrowly defeated by a vote of 65 to 59. N. Y. Times, April 28, 1972, at 1, col. 1. After seven years of disuse of the death penalty the representatives of the people in that State had not come finally to rest on the question of capital punishment. Because the 1965 decision had been the product of the popular will it could have been undone by an exercise of the same democratic process. No such flexibility is permitted when abolition, even though not absolute, flows from constitutional adjudication.

[63] President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 143 (1967) (chaired by Nicholas Katzenbach, then Attorney General of the United States). The text of the Report stated, among other things, that the abolition of the death penalty "is being widely debated in the states"; that it is "impossible to say with certainty whether capital punishment significantly reduces the incidence of heinous crimes"; that "whatever views one may have on the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent, it clearly has an undesirable impact on the administration of criminal justice"; and that "all members of the

The thrust of the Commission's recommendation, as presently relevant, is that this question "is a policy decision to be made by each State." There is no hint that this decision could or should be made by the judicial branch.

The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws also considered the capital punishment issue. The introductory commentary of its final report states that "a sharp division [existed] within the Commission on the subject of capital punishment, although a majority favored its abolition."[64] Again, consideration of the question was directed to the propriety of retention or abolition as a legislative matter. There was no suggestion that the difference of opinion existing among commission members, and generally across the country, could or should be resolved in one stroke by a decision of this Court.[65] Similar activity was, before today, evident at the state level with re-evaluation having been undertaken by special legislative committees in some States and by public ballot in others.[66]

With deference and respect for the views of the Justices who differ, it seems to me that all these studies—both in this country and elsewhere—suggest that as a matter of

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Commission agree that the present situation in the administration of the death penalty in many states is intolerable." *Id.*, at 143. As a member of this Presidential Commission I subscribed then, and do now, to the recommendations and views above quoted.

[64] Final Report of the Natl. Comm'n on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws 310 (1971).

[65] The American Law Institute, after years of study, decided not to take an official position on the question of capital punishment, although the Advisory Committee favored abolition by a vote of 18–2. The Council was more evenly divided but all were in agreement that many States would undoubtedly retain the punishment and that, therefore, the Institute's efforts should be directed toward providing standards for its implementation. ALI, Model Penal Code, 65 (Tent. draft No. 9, 1959).

[66] See text accompanying nn. 26 through 30, *supra*.

policy and precedent this is a classic case for the exercise of our oft-announced allegiance to judicial restraint. I know of no case in which greater gravity and delicacy have attached to the duty that this Court is called on to perform whenever legislation—state or federal—is challenged on constitutional grounds.[67] It seems to me that the sweeping judicial action undertaken today reflects a basic lack of faith and confidence in the democratic process. Many may regret, as I do, the failure of some legislative bodies to address the capital punishment issue with greater frankness or effectiveness. Many might decry their failure either to abolish the penalty entirely or selectively, or to establish standards for its enforcement. But impatience with the slowness, and even the unresponsiveness, of legislatures is no justification for judicial intrusion upon their historic powers. Rarely has there been a more appropriate opportunity for this Court to heed the philosophy of Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. As Mr. Justice Frankfurther reminded the Court in *Trop:*

> "the whole of [Mr. Justice Holmes'] work during his thirty years of service on this Court should be a constant reminder that the power to invalidate legislation must not be exercised as if, either in constitutional theory or in the act of government, it stood as the sole bulwark against unwisdom or excesses of the moment." 356 U. S., at 128.

[67] *Blodgett* v. *Holden*, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (Mr. Justice Holmes, concurring). See also *Trop* v. *Dulles*, 356 U. S., at 128 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting):

"The awesome power of this Court to invalidate . . . legislation, because in practice it is bound only by our own prudence in discerning the limits of the Court's Constitutional function, must be exercised with the utmost restraint."

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 69–5003, 69–5030, AND 69–5031

William Henry Furman, Petitioner, 69–5003 *v.* State of Georgia.	On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Lucious Jackson, Jr., Petitioner, 69–5030 *v.* State of Georgia.	
Elmer Branch, Petitioner, 69–5031 *v.* State of Texas.	On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

[June 29, 1972]

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.

The Court's judgment today strikes down a penalty that our Nation's legislators have thought necessary since our country was founded. My Brothers DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL would at one fell swoop invalidate laws enacted by Congress and 40 of the 50 state legislatures and would consign to the limbo of unconstitutionality under a single rubric penalties for offenses as varied and unique as murder, piracy, mutiny, highjacking, and desertion in the face of the enemy. My Brothers STEWART and WHITE, asserting reliance on a more limited rationale—the reluctance of judges and juries actually to impose the death penalty in the majority of capital cases—join in the judgment in these cases. Whatever its precise rationale, today's holding necessarily brings

into sharp relief the fundamental question of the role of judicial review in a democratic society. How can government by the elected representatives of the people co-exist with the power of the federal judiciary, whose members are constitutionally insulated from responsiveness to the popular will, to declare invalid laws duly enacted by the popular branches of government?

The answer, of course, is found in Hamilton's Federalist Paper No. 78 and in Chief Justice Marshall's classic opinion in *Marbury* v. *Madison*, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). An oft told story since then, it bears summarization once more. Sovereignty resides ultimately in the people as a whole, and by adopting through their States a written Constitution for the Nation, and subsequently adding amendments to that instrument, they have both granted certain powers to the national Government, and denied other powers to the national and the state governments. Courts are exercising no more than the judicial function conferred upon them by Art. III of the Constitution when they assess, in a case before them, whether or not a particular legislative enactment is within the authority granted by the Constitution to the enacting body, and whether it runs afoul of some limitation placed by the Constitution on the authority of that body. For the theory is that the people themselves have spoken in the Constitution, and therefore its commands are superior to the commands of the legislature, which is merely an agent of the people.

The Founding Fathers thus wisely sought to have the best of both worlds, the undeniable benefits of both democratic self-government and individual rights protected against possible excesses of that form of government.

The courts in cases properly before them have been entrusted under the Constitution with the last word, short of constitutional amendment, as to whether a law passed

by the legislature conforms to the Constitution. But just because courts in general, and this Court in particular, do have the last word, the admonition of Mr. Justice Stone in *United States* v. *Butler* must be constantly borne in mind:

> "[W]hile unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." 297 U. S. 1, 78–79.

Rigorous attention to the limits of this Court's authority is likewise enjoined because of the natural desire that beguiles judges along with other human beings into imposing their own views of goodness, truth, and justice upon others. Judges differ only in that they have the power, if not the authority, to enforce their desires. This is doubtless why nearly two centuries of judicial precedent from this Court counsel the sparing use of that power. The most expansive reading of the leading constitutional cases does not remotely suggest that this Court has been granted a roving commission, either by the Founding Fathers or by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, to strike down laws that are based upon notions of policy or morality suddenly found unacceptable by a majority of this Court. The Framers of the Constitution would doubtless have agreed with the great English political philosopher John Stuart Mill when he observed:

> "The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by any-

thing but want of power." J. S. Mill, On Liberty 28 (1885).

A separate reason for deference to the legislative judgment is the consequence of human error on the part of the judiciary with respect to the constitutional issue before it. Human error there is bound to be, judges being men and women, and men and women being what they are. But an error in mistakenly sustaining the constitutionality of a particular enactment, while wrongfully depriving the individual of a right secured to him by the Constitution, nonetheless does so by simply letting stand a duly enacted law of a democratically chosen legislative body. The error resulting from a mistaken upholding of an individual constitutional claim against the validity of a legislative enactment is a good deal more serious. For the result in such a case is not to leave standing a law duly enacted by a representative assembly, but to impose upon the Nation the judicial fiat of a majority of a court of judges whose connection with the popular will is remote at best.

The task of judging constitutional cases imposed by Art. III cannot for this reason be avoided, but it must surely be approached with the deepest humility and genuine deference to legislative judgment. Today's decision to invalidate capital punishment is, I respectfully submit, significantly lacking in those attributes. For the reasons well stated in the opinions of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I conclude that this decision holding unconstitutional capital punishment is not an act of judgment, but rather an act of will. It completely ignores the strictures of Mr. Justice Holmes, writing more than 40 years ago in *Baldwin* v. *Missouri:*

"I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing scope given

to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us *carte blanche* to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions. Yet I can think of no narrower reason that seems to me to justify the present and the earlier decisions to which I have referred. Of course the words 'due process of law,' if taken in their literal meaning, have no application to this case; and while it is too late to deny that they have been given a much more extended and artificial signification, still we ought to remember the great caution shown by the Constitution in limiting the power of the States, and should be slow to construe the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment as committing to the Court, with no guide but the Court's own discretion, the validity of whatever laws the States may pass." *Baldwin* v. *Missouri*, 281 U. S. 586, 595.

More than 20 years ago, Justice Jackson made a similar observation with respect to this Court's restriction of the States in the enforcement of their own criminal laws:

> "The use of the due process clause to disable the States in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate a use of federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from social or economic experimentation." Jackson, J., in *Ashcraft* v. *Tennessee*, 322 U. S. 143, 174.

If there can be said to be one dominant theme in the Constitution, perhaps more fully articulated in The Federalist Papers than in the instrument itself, it is the

notion of checks and balances. The Framers were well aware of the natural desire of office holders as well as others to seek to expand the scope and authority of their particular office at the expense of others. They sought to provide against success in such efforts by erecting adequate checks and balances in the form of grants of authority to each branch of the government in order to counteract and prevent usurpation on the part of the others.

This philosophy of the Framers is best described by one of the ablest and greatest of their number, James Madison, in Federalist No. 51:

> "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."

Madison's observation applies to the Judicial Branch with at least as much force as to the Legislative and Executive Branches. While overreaching by the Legislative and Executive Branches may result in the sacrifice of individual protections that the Constitution was designed to secure against action of the State, judicial overreaching may result in sacrifice of the equally important right of the people to govern themselves. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were "never intended to destroy the States' power to govern themselves." Black, J., in *Oregon* v. *Mitchell*, 400 U. S. 112, 126 (1970).

The very nature of judicial review, as pointed out by Justice Stone in his dissent in the *Butler* case, makes the courts the least subject to Madisonian check in the event that they shall, for the best of motives, expand judicial authority beyond the limits contemplated by the

Framers. It is for this reason that judicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an expressed, condition of the grant of authority of judicial review. The Court's holding these cases has been reached, I believe, in complete disregard of that implied condition.